

63. Q. Do you disagree with any part of that plot?

A. No, sir, I don't.

64. Q. Were you observing the rudder angle on the WASP throughout the maneuver that brought you to a heading of 260 or did you just glance at it from time to time?

A. I don't believe I would ever stand on the bridge and look at a rudder angle indicator, but I checked it initially.

65. Q. And saw that it had come to an angle of 10°?

A. Yes, sir.

66. Q. And you didn't observe it any further?

A. No, sir.

67. Q. Had the Captain, at any time prior to your observing the HOBSON in a left turn, assumed the conn?

A. No, sir, he did not. His order to the engineroom ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY was his assumption of the conn.

68. Q. When you observed the HOBSON in that left turn did it occur to you to turn on your navigation lights?

A. I think in a situation like that the first move was to back the engines. I don't know whether that turning on of our navigation lights at that point would have been of any assistance or not. It is very hard to say.

69. Q. Your first move was to say, "Captain, we are in trouble," wasn't it?

A. Yes, sir.

70. Q. And how soon after that did the Captain give the order ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY, simultaneously or --

A. It wasn't exactly simultaneously but I didn't have time to say anything else. There was a slight overlap.

71. Q. With a rudder angle of 10° what would be the tactical diameter of the WASP?

A. I would say 1500 yards.

72. Q. Have you ever participated in any exercises on the WASP that would definitely reveal that diameter?

A. No, sir, I believe those figures come to us from technical data furnished by the Navy.

73. Q. Could you compute the lapsed time between the order ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY and collision?

A. Could I compute the time, sir? I believe the time could be computed on an assumption.

74. Q. On what assumption?

A. On the assumption of the approximate speed and rudder angle as used by the HOBSON. I am quite sure it could be computed.

75. Q. What is your best estimate aside from that of the time that lapsed between the order ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY and collision?

A. I would estimate that it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 45 seconds.

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76. Q. Do you know whether during this maneuver Mr. B-6, the JOD, had been taking bearings on the HOBSON?

A. I don't believe he had. If he did he didn't report them to me.

77. Q. Was anybody reporting to you any ranges, during this time, between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

78. Q. What in your best judgment was the lapsed time between the order to turn to 260 and collision?

A. From my experience in turning the ship through a heading of that much I would estimate that it was between three and four minutes. It generally takes us about that long to swing around.

79. Q. And during that three or four minutes, so far as you know, no one had taken any ranges or no one had given you, as officer of the deck, any information on the ranges between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. I believe that is correct, sir.

80. Q. And at what point in that turn would you estimate that your radar went out?

A. I don't know, sir. I could estimate when it went out.

81. Q. Were you aware of its going out?

A. No, I wasn't, sir.

82. Q. Until after collision.

A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

83. Q. As officer of the deck were you at all concerned with getting ranges on other ships in the formation during such a turn as this?

A. Under the circumstances, had I been maneuvering on the guide I would have been more concerned about getting ranges and bearings.

84. Q. Do I understand your testimony to mean that since you were the guide you were not particularly concerned with the ranges?

A. No indeed, sir. I was very definitely concerned about the movements of the ship's bow, especially the one on my starboard hand because we were turning that way.

85. Q. Did you get any ranges from the RODMAN?

A. No, sir. The worst thing she could have done was turn left, which under those circumstances we were turning right and there would have been, as far as I could see, no possibility of danger there.

86. Q. As I understand it, your primary concern as officer of the deck in that time was with the RODMAN and you had told the junior officer of the deck to observe the movements of the HOBSON.

A. I don't quite understand what you mean my primary concern.

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87. Q. You were turning in the direction of the HOBSON and, as I understand your testimony, you considered the greatest danger if there was danger, from that quarter rather than from the RODMAN, the vessel you were turning away from, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

88. Q. You say that you were concerned with the ship on your starboard side which was the HOBSON. I may have confused you. You were turning from the RODMAN, weren't you?

A. The RODMAN was on our port bow and the HOBSON was on our starboard quarter.

89. Q. Then you were concerned more about the HOBSON than you were with the RODMAN.

A. I was indeed, sir.

90. Q. And yet you got no ranges on the HOBSON.

A. That is correct.

91. Q. Was there any way you could tell from the position of the HOBSON's truck lights the heading of the HOBSON?

A. I don't believe -- no, sir.

92. Q. Do you think there was any way the HOBSON could tell the heading of the WASP from looking at your truck lights or any lights you had visible?

A. It would require fairly intimate knowledge of the lighting measure on a carrier, I believe.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: Repeat that answer please.

WITNESS: It would require a fairly good knowledge of the lighting measure on a carrier.

93. Q. I don't know that I understand you. Did you have any lights other than your truck lights burning that should have been visible to the HOBSON? Do you feel your answer to that should be in closed court?

A. I can --

CAPTAIN *B-6*, A PARTY: Would you have the question repeated.

At this point the reporter read the last question.

WITNESS: There is a question in my mind as to whether the HOBSON could have seen such lights had they existed.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I think I should possibly get a more definite answer.

COURT: The court sees no objection to the witness' answer. Do you have any further questions? What was the answer?

WITNESS: I answered I believe that there is some doubt in my mind as to whether the HOBSON could have seen such lights had they existed.

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COURT: What other question did you wish to ask? That was your answer, was it not?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

Examination by the counsel for the court continued:

94. Q. When you observed the HOBSON in a left turn at a range which you estimate to be a thousand yards and the Captain gave the order to ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY, did it occur to you to sound any whistle signal?

A. It occurred to me at the time, (1) that I agreed with what the Captain had done, (2) he had the conn, (3) we were in what I might describe as a tight situation. I felt that at that particular time that silence on the bridge was golden.

95. Q. And such orders and commands as were given, were given by the commanding officer?

A. Yes, sir, I was there to see that any order he should give was carried out immediately.

96. Q. I hand you a document marked Exhibit 68 purporting to be the rough deck log of the WASP in use on the 26th of April 1952 and purporting to be signed by you for the 2000 to 2400 watch. Is that your signature?

A. Yes, it is.

97. Q. Would you read to the court entries in that log commencing at time 2220.

A. "2220: Changed course to 260°T. Changed speed to 27 knots to recover aircraft. 2225: Captain ordered ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY. 2226: Collision with USS HOBSON (DMS-26) on course 260, all engines backing emergency. HOBSON on course approximately 350, speed 25 knots." Under that same time, "Sounded COLLISION QUARTERS. 2227: All engines stop. 2229: lowered away all life boats and life rafts. Called away the fire and rescue party. 2230: Hobson sank. 2237: No. 2 life boat in water. 2238: No. 1 life boat in water. 2240: four motor launches and two motor boats lowered away. 2245: manned deck edge fire stations. 2249: forward magazine sprinkling system manned. 2251: secured boilers three and seven. 2251: compartment A-707 reported flooded to level of 24 feet. 2315: compartment A-302-A reported flooded. 2330: no damage aft of frame 26 reported."

98. Q. I hand you a document marked Exhibit 69 purporting to be the smooth deck log in use aboard the WASP on the 26th of April purporting to bear the signature of B-6 Lieutenant JG, U.S. Naval Reserve, and ask you if that is your signature on the 2000 to 2400 watch.

A. Yes, sir, that is my signature.

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99. Q. Starting with the 2220 entry, will you read that up to the end of the pertinent portion.

A. "2220 changed course to 260°T 282°psc. Increased speed to 27 knots. 2225 Captain ordered all engines back emergency. 2226 collision with USS HOBSON (DMS-26) on course 260°T 282°psc, all engines backing emergency. HOBSON on course approximately 350°T, speed 25 knots. Sounded collision quarters. 2227 all engines stop. 2229 lowered away all lifeboats and liferafts, called away the fire and rescue party. 2230 HOBSON sank. 2237 #2 lifeboat in water. 2238 #1 lifeboat in water. 2240 four motor launches, two motor boats lowered away. 2245 manned deck edge fire stations. 2249 forward magazine sprinkler system manned. 2251 secured boilers #3 and 7. Compartment A-707-AE reported flooded to level of 24 feet. 2315 compartment A-302-A reported flooded. 2330 no damage aft of frame 26 reported."

100. Q. Now did you make any memorandum of those times or did you obtain them from some source such as the quartermaster's notebook?

A. I did not obtain them from the quartermaster's notebook. The times are based primarily on my own estimate.

101. Q. They are your own recollection of those times, is that correct?

A. And also the --

102. Q. A reconstruction of the times from the physical facts as you know them, is that it?

A. They are approximately correct. They are an estimate, just an estimate.

103. Q. And that estimate made at some period of time after the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

104. Q. You were, during the time that we have been discussing, standing on the open bridge?

A. Yes, sir.

105. Q. What other officers and personnel were on the open bridge?

A. The Captain was there, the executive officer was there, I was there, Lieutenant *B. B.*, and we had a talker who was in direct communication by sound powered phones with the 24 inch search lights. That was part of the night flight quarters.

106. Q. Was the executive officer participating in this maneuver at all?

A. Would you care to enlarge on that?

107. Q. Did he transmit any orders? Was he passing any information to you or were you passing any to him? Had he taken any proceedings there on the open bridge or was he just standing there as an observer?

A. Primarily he was there as an observer. I don't recall if he gave any information to me. If he gave me any information it was very helpful. I don't recall anything other than along those lines.

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108. Q. But you didn't observe him taking any bearings or participating in the watch?

A. No, sir, I was not observing the other officers on the bridge.

Cross-examined by *RL*, a party:

109. Q. Mr. *RL*, I believe you testified that as the WASP completed its turn and approached the proposed course of 260 you observed the lights of the HOBSON as she passed from the WASP's starboard to port side.

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

110. Q. At what appeared to be a safe range?

A. That is correct.

111. Q. Was that the type of movement you expected the HOBSON to make at that point in your turn as far as the change in bearing is concerned?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

112. Q. You expected the HOBSON at that point to be over on the WASP's port side?

A. The normal turn I expected the ship to pass in front of me and be on my port hand.

113. Q. Now from that time up to, but not including this last few seconds when the HOBSON made that fatal left turn, just considering up to that point, was there anything alarming in the appearance of the HOBSON's lights over on the port side of the WASP?

A. No, sir.

114. Q. So that the first intimation of danger you had was in that last few seconds when the HOBSON made the unexpected left turn across the bow of the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

115. Q. Let me ask you one more thing just to emphasize that point. Supposing that instead of making the last left turn, which she did, the HOBSON had continued on its average course of 090, would there have been any danger at all of collision in that type of maneuver by the HOBSON?

A. No, sir, as a matter of fact, that would be quite a normal type of maneuver by the HOBSON, a port to port passing.

116. Q. Supposing at this point that the HOBSON actually made that turn in the last few seconds she had, instead of turning left, turned right, would there have been anything alarming to you in that course?

A. It is quite a normal thing to do.

117. Q. If she had turned right at that point would it have been likely that she would have wound up approximately on her proper station with the WASP, or assigned station?

A. I would say fairly likely.

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118. Q. You say it would be fairly likely?

A. It would be. I can look at that (indicating Exhibit 66) and assume the turning point she turns around. It is quite clear she would be on station.

119. Q. It is clear she would be fairly close to station by making this maneuver. Would she ever be able to get to her appropriate station by turning left at that point?

A. No, sir.

120. Q. One more point I would like to call your attention to. If she had been able to time her turn to the right at the proper split second she could have wound up approximately on station by considering - -

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney objected to the question on the grounds that it was argumentative.

The party withdrew the question.

121. Q. The point I am really trying to get at is this. Considering that the WASP went to, and during this period of her course, was actually or approximately on 260 and that the HOBSON during this period was on an average course of 090, the relative speed of the two ships was such as to require split second timing if there was any hope to turn right and wind up on the proper station, would it not - -

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney objected to the question on the ground that it assumed facts not in evidence.

The party withdrew the question.

122. Q. Considering that the WASP and the HOBSON were on almost opposite courses, would the relative speed, considering each was making from around 25 knots, require split second timing by the HOBSON in order to turn right and get on station at that point?

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney objected to the question on the ground that it assumed facts not in evidence.

The party replied.

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney replied.

The court was cleared. The court was opened. All parties to the inquiry entered, and the court announced that the objection was sustained.

Examination by Captain *B* a party, continued:

123. Q. Mr. *B*, there has been mention of, without stating the exact nature of the signal, which is classified, that a signal indicating an intention to adjust closer to the wind to a course 250 immediately prior to the accident - -

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COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I object to that question. If it please the court, I would like the court to be closed to discuss the objection if it is agreeable to the court.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

At this point the court directed the reporter to read the last question.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: If I may suggest, it is a very crucial signal and on it hangs, to me, the fault or lack of fault of Commander Tierney, and if it would be possible, sir, I would like the court to interpret the signal so that counsel for all parties and the court would have an understanding as to what this signal meant.

COURT: The court feels that the question, that the need for his reference to this signal vaguely has been removed, and believes in the interest of clarity it would be best if you phrased your question using perfect freedom of expression.

CAPTAIN ^{B-6} , A PARTY: I could do that by merely saying MIKE CORPEN 250.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: That would be all right. If that is done all of my testimony is going to have to be in closed court, and I have no objection to having it in closed court, but if that is done I must refer to that signal in the courtroom which means from here on - -

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: If counsel for Captain ^{B-6} withdraws his original question he could rephrase it using the words MIKE CORPEN. He hasn't done so yet.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I contend the MIKE CORPEN signal means that the course of the sender is as stated. It is a statement of fact and not an intention.

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All redactions
are B-6.

as reporter. , yeoman, first class, U. S. Navy, entered

The party withdrew the question.

124. Q. Was any signal relating to the course 250 degrees at the time now under discussion receipted for by either the HOBSON or the RODMAN?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

125. Q. At any time prior to the actual collision, did the WASP steady on course 260?

A. Yes, sir.

126. Q. At the moment of the collision what was the WASP's heading?

A. 258.

127. Q. Considering the moment when you first noticed a dangerous movement on the part of the HOBSON a few moments before the actual collision and made the statement: "We are in trouble," and the Captain's order "ALL BACK EMERGENCY," do you feel, looking back on that situation, that the Captain had observed the danger and acted on his own initiative at approximately the same time that you did?

A. I would say that is right. I got the feeling that both of us must have seen the same thing and at approximately the same time.

128. Q. In other words, your remark and his order were so close to being given simultaneously that it would result in that impression on your part?

A. That is correct, sir.

129. Q. Mr. , would you kindly step up to the chart (indicating Exhibit 66) for a moment. Will you note the time 2224:30 here and the approximately position in this area of the WASP at that time?

A. Approximately here (indicating on Exhibit 66).

130. Q. Will you also note the approximate position of the HOBSON at that time as shown on this chart?

A. Approximately here (indicating on Exhibit 66).

131. Q. Now, you have - your attention is directed to those two relative positions - - -

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I object to the question because those are not the two relative positions as shown on that diagram.

CAPTAIN , A PARTY: As shown on the diagram, this is the approximate position of the WASP at 2224 and 30 seconds, as indicated on the diagram by the, I believe - strike that - I'm not sure who made this.

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132. Q. Will you point out where the approximate position of the HOBSON is on this diagram at 2224 and 30 seconds?

A. I would say it was approximately here (indicating on Exhibit 66).

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I object.

CAPTAIN *nb* A PARTY: I want to emphasize there is no evidence that the WASP ever/did proceed on course 250.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I don't think the counsel had finished his question.

COUNSEL FOR LCDR TIERNEY: I withdraw my objection temporarily.

134. Q. If the WASP at this point (indicating Exhibit 66) was on course 250°, would the HOBSON at this point (indicating) have been to the right or to the left of the projected course of 250°?

A. This mark would indicate 270 degrees, assuming that the heading was ten degrees - 260°, ten to the left of that would be 250°. The center line is marked here and line these two up and we will have the center of the scale. Here is the approximate place - point of time called 2224.30; here is the projected - approximate projected course line of the WASP.

135. Q. You may mark this line 250°?

A. (The witness so marked the document).

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Let the record show that the witness is indicating on Exhibit 66, and counsel for the court will object to any further marks or illustrations or tampering or altering of that exhibit. If the counsel can ask this witness question from another chart which the witness has drawn on which he has positions similar, he can have the question asked along those lines. I object to further alteration - defacing of the exhibit.

COURT: I think the point of counsel for the court is well-taken.

A. (continuing) my observation here, knowing the projected course line 250° and the point at which the WASP was approximately on course 250, it appears to me we would have the HOBSON on our port hand.

136. Q. And to further emphasize the picture, if you were on the HOBSON, would you have gone to the right or left of that projected course line?

A. I would have gone to the right had I been on the HOBSON.

137. Q. If you were in the HOBSON on the right of that projected course line and had ordered a left turn, would that have caused you to cross the projected course line of the WASP if the WASP were on 250°?

A. Quite sure it would have, sir.

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138. Q. If at that point you were on the HOBSON and felt there was any danger would you have turned right or left even if you assumed the WASP's course was 250°?

A. I believe that my actual action would have been to hold my course and speed until the picture was clearly in my mind.

139. Q. Assuming you were going to make a turn, which would you make?

A. I feel quite certain I would have turned to the right.

140. Q. Now, we have been basing these questions on the assumption, namely, that the WASP's course was 250; as an actual matter of fact - - -

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I object. The facts have not been interpreted in this case.

CAPTAIN *B-6*, A PARTY: I haven't finished my question yet.

141. Q. As an actual matter of fact, did the WASP continue its turn and steady on 260°?

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I object to the question. The witness can testify as to what the WASP did, but I think it is up to the court to decide what the actual facts are.

The party withdrew the question.

142. Q. To your knowledge, did the WASP continue its turn and steady on course 260°?

A. I have so testified.

143. Q. And to the best of your knowledge, did she ever swing back to course 250 prior to the collision?

A. No, sir, she did not.

Cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

144. Q. Lieutenant *B-6*, you have been officer of the deck for approximately how many months on board the WASP?

A. Well, since - - well, I was qualified for in-port as of date of commissioning of the ship and we were underway for a couple of weeks down in Cuba and the second time we went down I was given top watch.

145. Q. During this time you observed the WASP perform a number of maneuvering evolutions?

A. Yes, sir. I have. While we were down in Cuba we conducted flight operations down there three days a week all day and I had considerable experience in just this type of maneuver.

146. Q. Have you taken the conn during man overboard drill?

A. Yes, sir, I have.

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147. Q. In man overboard drill do you sometimes back down?
A. To the best of my knowledge I would not back down.

148. Q. I didn't ask you what you would do, I asked, in conning the ship during man overboard drill, do you sometimes back down?
A. No, sir.

149. Q. Have you ever had occasion to - as officer of the deck to back the ship down?
A. Well, not that I recall. I got the ship underway at one time down - - -

150. Q. But in the position of officer of the deck have you ever had occasion to back the ship with considerable headway on her?
A. Now, would you care to enlarge on that? I have been officer of the deck when we backed down with considerable headway. As a matter of fact, the answer to your question is absolutely yes, because I brought the ship to anchor and it was necessary to back down full and I was at the time in conn of the ship.

151. Q. From your observation of the WASP and backing down from the time the order was rung up "ALL BACK FULL" to the screws beginning to turn in reverse directions takes about how many seconds?
A. I would estimate 25 seconds - 35 seconds.

152. Q. 25 - 35 seconds. Is there any officer on board the WASP who is qualified to give the precise answer to that question?
A. Yes, sir, I feel sure there are numerous officers.

153. Q. Will you name one, please?
A. I would name the main propulsion assistant, Lieutenant

154. Q. Were the propellers going astern at the time of collision?
A. Yes, sir.

155. Q. Is there any vibration on board when the propellers are going astern at high speed?
A. There is indeed, sir.

156. Q. Did you experience that vibration prior to collision?
A. Yes, sir.

157. Q. For how long did you experience it, roughly?
A. I would say just prior to collision.

158. Q. Just prior to collision. Now, in making a turn on board the WASP does the Officer of the Deck issue or the assistant - Junior Officer of the Deck give all orders to the helm?
A. Normally the Officer of the Deck would.

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159. Q. Does the helmsman have any latitude in the movement of the rudder?

A. He has some. The course is announced to him immediately after the course is given and he would then have some latitude in using his rudder.

160. Q. Are any orders given after the initial course change to the helm?

A. That would depend on the helmsman. It is my practice on watch to watch the swing of the ship coming to our new course. If I don't think it is being checked right I will say something about it.

161. Q. And on the evening in question when the WASP was turning from 102 to 260, will you recite the orders that you gave to the helm as you recall them?

A. As I recall my first order to the helm was right standard rudder, which was right ten degrees rudder. And I believe shortly before - - I think perhaps, 20 degrees before we came to the course why we eased five degrees.

162. Q. Eased to?

A. Ten degrees to shift the rudder, then that would be left rudder, then I think perhaps a little bit to check our swing to 260.

163. Q. Did you give these commands yourself to ease her amidships, meet her?

A. I don't believe I gave the words "meet her" and "amidships" I have stated what I did, sir.

164. Q. What is the effect of easing the rudder on turns?

A. It is very normal. The rule as I understand it, "Easing the ship to the new course."

165. Q. What is the effect on the swing of the ship when the rudder is eased?

A. It should ease the swinging of the ship somewhat.

166. Q. Is that all the answer?

A. I say it would ease the swing of the ship - - is that enough, sir?

167. Q. What was the first time that you observed the bearing of the HOBSON drifting to the left?

A. Drifting to the left, sir? I have stated very nearly on course 260, that as the actual swinging passed 250 thereabouts, the HOBSON crossed our bow and went over our port hand.

168. Q. Was the true bearing changing to the left - relative bearing changing to the left?

A. Well, I would say the relative bearing was changing to the left.

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169. Q. Which direction was the true bearing changing - the relative bearing was changing to the left?

A. I don't believe I took the true bearing, it would be very difficult to say. I might remark we were steady on - - and relative bearing - - bearing would have some meaning there.

170. Q. Could you describe fully the radio communications available to bridge personnel on board the WASP on the night of the collision?

A. On the bridge of the WASP we had the secondary tactical circuit.

171. Q. Is that all, secondary tactical circuit?

A. No, we also had a primary tactical circuit.

172. Q. Did you have any other radio communications available to bridge personnel?

A. Well, those - - there is a question in my mind in answering that question. Is it all right for me to disclose the communication set-up on the bridge? Essentially that is what I'm being asked for.

COURT: Go ahead.

A. (continuing) We have three means of transmitting from the open bridge and those are duplicated in the pilot house. We have a standby set on the primary, a primary set on the primary maneuvering circuit and we had one set for the secondary tactical circuit. As I said, all three are duplicated in the pilot house.

173. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge if the HOBSON was guarding the primary tactical circuit at the time of collision?

A. I don't know that she was. We had held a radio check over the primary circuit previously during the intervening time and the circuit was not complete and so I issued no orders over the primary circuit.

174. Q. Do you know approximately when you had the last radio check with the HOBSON on the primary circuit?

A. I would say at about 2100.

175. Q. Were you still in communication with the HOBSON at that time?

A. Well, I believe we were, sir. The circuit was not any too good.

176. Q. I show you Exhibit 73 and without revealing the contents because it is classified, from your examination of this would you please tell the court at what time the HOBSON and WASP were last in direct communication on the primary circuit?

CAPTAIN ⁷⁻⁶, A PARTY: I believe perhaps I had better object to the way that is phrased in that he is asked at a glance to tell what time a certain thing happened. Actually all he could be able to tell the court is what the exhibit handed to him says. That is, he may or may not. I don't know.

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Counsel representing LCDR Tierney withdrew the question.

177. Q. Will you kindly examine the exhibit and inform the court when the exhibit states the WASP and HOBSON had last checked communications on the primary circuit?

A. Here is a 2126 time.

178. Q. That was approximately how long before collision?

A. About an hour.

179. Q. Now, after the 2127 check which appears - - -

A. Excuse me, 2126.

180. Q. After the 2126 check which appears in the exhibit when is the next recording in the exhibit as you have it before you?

A. There appears to be no recording in here from 2126 to 2450.

181. Q. Will you restate that?

A. I say there appears no record of any communication in the log on this paper from 2126 to 2450. Now that 2450, I presume would be on the morning of the 27th.

182. Q. Yes - we don't know. What had been the length of time between the communication of 2126 and the length of time of the next previous communication as noted on Exhibit 73?

A. Well, the next entry is 2125, that is just before 2126.

183. Q. What is the one prior to the next prior communication?

A. That appears to be 1613. I was not on watch - - I am now just reading something to you.

184. Q. Will you look again, please, on the second page of the exhibit and I ask you the general question: Is the message at the top of the page complete?

A. In what sense?

185. Q. Complete in form and substance.

A. I don't - - -

186. Q. May I amplify that, please? I'm not endeavoring to elicit whether or not the message is technically imperfect, just does the message make sense of itself?

A. Should I read this message would I know what to do?

187. Q. Yes?

A. The answer is yes.

188. Q. Will you please just read to yourself the first few messages on that second sheet, and please note mentally the times of the messages? From your reading will you say the primary tactical circuit was very active at that time?

A. It appears that is so, yes, sir.

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189. Q. Does the preceding sheet show that the primary circuit was active?

A. No, sir.

190. Q. From your examination of the activity as stated in that exhibit and your general perusal, would you believe it would be justified in drawing the conclusion that one or more papers are missing?

A. I would say that no papers are missing.

191. Q. Do you know who kept that log on the night of 26 April on the night watch?

A. No, sir.

192. Q. Whose responsibility is it for supervising the preparation of those logs?

A. That would come under the CIC officer.

193. Q. CIC officer?

A. Yes, sir.

194. Q. What is his name?

A. Lieutenant Commander ⁷⁻⁶. I think one of his initials is "R."

195. Q. Did you hear the communication check on the primary circuit at 2126?

A. I conducted those checks, sir.

196. Q. Do you know who logged the fact that a check was made?

A. I have answered I don't know who keeps that - - I believe that would again apply. I don't know who kept this record for the radio check at 2126.

197. Q. Was it somebody on the bridge?

A. I have stated this record is kept in CIC, so it was not anybody in the bridge.

198. Q. There is a primary outlet in CIC?

A. Yes, sir.

199. Q. You have testified that you observed the HOBSON changing course to the left when she bore 350 degrees relative. Is that correct?

A. I saw the HOBSON coming left. In other words, she was in a turn at that time. I estimate her relative bearing was 350.

200. Q. At that time what was the heading of the WASP?

A. The heading of the WASP was approximately, I would say, 260, and actually we had steadied on that course at that time.

201. Q. Then, the true bearing of the WASP when you first sighted her was 250?

A. The WASP, sir?

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202. Q. Of the HOBSON?

A. When I first sighted her the bearing was 250.

203. Q. If she bore 250 relative you were on course --?

A. Not relative--true bearing.

204. Q. True bearing of the HOBSON was approximately 250 degrees true?

A. My answer is that would follow.

205. Q. From the diagram will you estimate what the range of the WASP was at the time you first sighted the HOBSON?

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Pardon me, just a moment. Are you referring to Exhibit 66?

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: Yes, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Let the record show that counsel is referring to Exhibit number 66.

CAPTAIN ^{b-6} A PARTY: I would like to ask counsel to clarify what he means, "First time," is he talking about the moment just before the collision or the light he previously testified he saw at the start of the turn or shortly --.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: I believe the witness testified to the effect that when he noticed the HOBSON at about the time she bore 350 degrees relative, thereupon he said, "Captain, we are in trouble." The Captain said, "ALL BACK EMERGENCY," is that correct?

CAPTAIN ^{b-6} A PARTY: Thank you. Can you identify the time in relation to the collision?

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: May it please the court, I think in the interest of the record, I will request that counsel address their remarks to the court. If the question isn't clear, a proper objection should be made.

COURT: Counsel for the various parties will address their remarks to the court.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: I withdraw that question.

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3-6 yeoman, second class, U.S. Navy, entered
as reporter.

Questioning continued by counsel representing Lieutenant
Commander Tierney:

206. Q. From the diagram, will you estimate what the range to
the HOBSON was when she was bearing 250 degrees true or 350 degree
relative?

A. It would be necessary for me to refer to the chart.

207. Q. By all means, please refer to it.

A. (Indicating Exhibit 66). According to this previous line
"D" which we drew on this Exhibit 66, we laid off a line 250 which
might indicate the bearing of the HOBSON. We drew this line "D"
which would make this our projected course line of 250 and at dif-
ferent moments, it also served as a bearing line. At this point
indicated that we would be on - say, course 250, but backing things
up at this point where the HOBSON would bear approximately 250, at
the distance I estimate to be about 800 yards. From this diagram
it would seem that the distance would be about 2800 yards, but I
would consider this just a moment. There is something wrong with
the drawing I have done. There is a question in my mind; one,
the position of the HOBSON; and two, the bearing fixed at the posi-
tion of the WASP or to the converse of that. Now, I see that we
were very nearly on the heading 260 which would mean that we could
not be back here which is referred to as "A", or nearly there.
Therefore, we must have been somewhere in here, which would put
the distance from the WASP to the HOBSON approximately 830 yards.

208. Q. If that were the distance to the HOBSON, according to
the diagram, what would her relative bearing be? What was his
relative bearing on the line which you just measured?

A. I might say his relative bearing is only an estimate. Let
us allow 5 degrees error on it. In other words, you are asking me
for an estimate of bearing to fix the position of a ship in here
where time is crucial. If there were 10 degrees to the left of
that, which it appears to be, then the range would be approximatel
1000 yards. So that was an estimate and that is all it was.

209. Q. Then, from your analysis of this problem, Lieutenant
time is very crucial; exact ranges and bearing are very crucial.
A few seconds error difference on that chart may make a great
difference in many things?

A. It is entirely possible, yes.

210. Q. At those times were ranges and bearings on the
HOBSON taken?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

211. Q. Times are very crucial are they not?

A. Yes, sir.

212. Q. If the Commander of the Task Unit had changed course
to the left instead of the right, would there have been a collision
between the HOBSON and the WASP?

CAPTAIN 3-6 a party: I object to that, if it please the
court. I think the ground of objection should be obviously seen.

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COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNNEY: I wish to reply - there are no more grounds for that than the other questions we have had this morning, Admiral. If you turn left or turn right

COURT: Do you care to phrase that, "In your opinion" or something, or do you wish the question to stand as it is.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNNEY: I will let the question stand as it is.

CAPTAIN ^{B-X}: I objected to it, Admiral, on the ground that it would have had to assume what the whole formation would do in making such a turn. If you assume that one portion of the formation did something wrong after the turn to the left, you would have one answer, and if he turned to the right, you would have a different answer.

The court was cleared. The court was opened and the court announced that the objection was sustained.

213. Q. Did you give the order to the junior officer of the deck to transmit ~~S~~ signal relating to course 250 shortly before the collision? ^{W-2}

A. No, I don't believe I did.

214. Q. Did you recall anyone giving such an order?

A. I believe the executive officer turned and told Mr. ^{B6} to repeat it on the secondary tactical circuit.

215. Q. Now, the commanding officer testified yesterday that the second order, the order of Commander ^{B6} followed the original transmission by a period of about 20 seconds. Would you say the interval was greater or less than that?

A. I feel that it would be very difficult to pin it down to within a few seconds in the elapsed time of those two statements. There may have been less time. It is very difficult to judge.

216. Q. Now, after the executive officer had requested the message be transmitted over the secondary tactical circuit, then what happened, as you observed it?

A. I ordered the steersman to come left to course 250. I put my binoculars on the HOBSON and observed her turning towards us, coming in a left turn towards us, and I said, "Captain, we are in trouble." And almost the same time the Captain was ordering "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY", and that is what happened.

217. Q. It was about the time then that this second transmission of the message was ordered that you first observed the HOBSON start swinging left?

A. Is that your question, sir?

218. Q. Yes.

A. Was it the time of the second transmission that I first observed the HOBSON swinging left?

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219. Q. Yes.
A. That is approximately correct.

220. Q. Was it a little before or a little after?
A. Perhaps a little before.

221. Q. So then, do you wish to revise your testimony now to the effect that your observation of the HOBSON when she was swinging left was prior to the time the executive officer ordered the second transmission. Was this actually the time you were observing her?

A. I don't know that there is any difference in the testimony. Some question in my mind as to the order there--which came first. They were very close together so I don't know that it would matter.

222. Q. Are seconds crucial in this problem, Lieutenant?
A. I would say they are, yes.

223. Q. So maybe it makes a difference, does it not?
A. Possibly.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *Be*, party:

224. Q. Mr. *Be*, from the time that the original turn to 260 commenced until the time of the collision, did you receive any reports from the junior officer-of-the-deck or the lookouts concerning the location of either the HOBSON or the RODMAN?
A. No, sir, we did not.

225. Q. With regard to the position of the HOBSON at various times--I would like to be sure I am correct as to your testimony at the commencement of the turn when the WASP was on 102, you observed the HOBSON bearing 245 degrees true, is that correct?
A. At the commencement of our turn to 260 I observed--No, I did not observe her.

226. Q. You didn't observe her?
A. At the commencement of the turn, no.

227. Q. But if she were on station at the time the turn commenced, that would have been her correct true bearing?
A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

228. Q. During the turn when the heading of the WASP was approximately 160, you observed the HOBSON bearing 250 true?
A. Yes, sir.

229. Q. Was that an estimate of bearing or is that the one you took?
A. That was an estimated bearing, yes, sir.

230. Q. Then, as the heading of the WASP was approaching 260 in the turn, you observed the HOBSON crossing your bow from your starboard quarter, is that correct?
A. That is correct.

231. Q. Now, could you possibly identify the heading of the ship any closer than saying you are approaching 260? Have you any idea about how far off that heading you were at the time?
A. I would say that I believe that we were to the right of 250. I am not entirely positive, but I believe that is so.

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232. Q. And roughly, the true bearing that you can get at that time would be 255--between 250 and 260? She was dead ahead wasn't she? I mean, that is what you said?

A. She was crossing very rapidly.

233. Q. Then, after you were on 260, you observed her at that time and her bearing again was approximately 350 relative and at that time she was making the turn?

A. That bearing was estimated.

234. Q. When you observed the HOBSON that last time, you said that you did not see a bow wave, is that correct?

A. No, I don't believe I did. I just barely could see the outline of the superstructure. In other words, I could barely make out the fact that the ship was heading this way, but I saw enough of it to be sure that that was happening.

235. Q. Did you see the water under her stern or wake?

A. The wake on the stern?

236. Q. The wake of the ship?

A. I don't recall because as soon as I got that picture, the instant, I said what I did and the Captain did what he did.

237. Q. When you observed her you got no impression at that time as to how she was turning?

A. My impression of how she was turning was not gotten from her wake.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

238. Q. Mr. *B-6*, was this turning maneuver during which the collision occurred a routine maneuver?

A. It was a routine turning maneuver.

239. Q. Was the WASP the guide during this turn?

A. She was the guide.

240. Q. Did you tell us that the visibility was unlimited?

A. I did testify that the visibility was unlimited.

241. Q. Now, under those circumstances of a routine turn, with the carrier as a guide and visibility unlimited, do you know of any directives or instructions or orders that the OOD should take continuous radar ranges and bearings on the plane guards?

A. No, I know of no such directives.

242. Q. Under those circumstances, was it the practice on the carrier WASP for CIC to take continuous ranges and bearings and transmit them to the bridge?

A. No, it was not.

243. Q. Do you have an SG repeater on the bridge?

A. I do have an SG repeater on the bridge, yes, sir.

244. Q. Do you yourself use that to get ranges and bearings on the plane guards?

A. Well, several times before we made our turn I checked the stations of the plane guard SG repeater.

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245. Q. Did you do so during the turn?

A. No, I did not.

246. Q. Why didn't you do that?

A. Well, we had the ships visually and I felt that having the visually, then I can determine what they are doing faster than I could determine what they were doing if I were getting the plots of the positions of the plane guard^s on the radar repeater. Now, as I understand it the sweep of the SG radar is 5 rpm. That would be one sweep every 12 seconds, and maneuvering in close, any time we are tracking a target on radar it requires three and, sometimes not less than 4 minutes to determine the first estimate of a relative motion line and under those circumstances I felt that we also had the repeater hooded so as not to put any light on the bridge so that it would be dark, and I felt that the fact was that I was able to tell by looking at the HOBSON what she was doing. My determination there was obtained considerably faster than if I had been plotting the relative motion of the ship on a radar repeater.

247. Q. If CIC had been taking continuous ranges and bearings and there had been no failure of the equipment during the turn, and they had interpreted those ranges and bearings and communicated them to your talker on the bridge through their talker in CIC, do you feel that you would have been able to apprise the situation sooner than you were able to do by visual means which you did use?

A. No, I think it would have been much later.

248. Q. Will you amplify your answer as to what goes on in CIC in a general way when they are taking these ranges and bearings and how that information gets to you?

A. Well, there is a question in my mind now. You are talking about CIC procedures? Well, I can say that from the ranges and bearings obtained from the SG radar and plotted, a relative motion would be established, and that is the procedure used, and of course, the SG radar by revolving at a rate of 5 revolutions per minute we are all in the same situation in that we get one sweep every 12 seconds. We get a new track on the scope every 12 seconds and consequently they would face the same problem that I would be facing on the bridge using radar. The plots are made and the relative motion line established. Now, from my experience I have discovered that it takes considerable time to establish accurately a relative motion line. That fact, I think, is well known.

249. Q. Between the time that you recognized the dangerous situation and the time that the commanding officer ordered ALL BACK EMERGENCY, did you have an opportunity yourself to take any sort of emergency action?

A. No, I didn't.

Reexamined by the counsel for the court:

250. Q. Wouldn't the time it takes to establish a relative movement line on radar depend on how fast the range is opening or closing?

A. To a certain extent, yes, sir.

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251. Q. If two ships are closing at 50 knots, would it take 3 minutes to establish relative movement lines, do you think?

A. No, sir.

252. Q. While you were on the course of 102, did you take ranges and bearings on the HOBSON to assure yourself that she was on proper station?

A. Yes, sir.

253. Q. And was she?

A. Yes, sir.

254. Q. Do you know whether the ALL BACK EMERGENCY signal was promptly rung up on the engine order telegraph?

A. Yes, sir, the Captain gave the order on the turn and it was rung up immediately.

255. Q. And do you know whether it was immediately answered?

A. Yes, sir, I believe it was.

256. Q. Did the man on the engine order telegraph, the lee helmsman or anybody in the pilot house, sing out that the signal had been answered or give any indication that you recall?

A. No, I just don't recall that.

257. Q. In one part of your cross-examination, you spoke of observing the HOBSON and spoke of a normal port to port passing of the HOBSON and the WASP. You didn't expect the HOBSON to pass you port to port did you, if she was going to get on station on time?

A. No, sir.

258. Q. You didn't intend to convey that idea?

A. No, that was not the way the question was asked. But I did not intend to convey that idea at all, no, sir.

259. Q. With reference to the signal regarding the course of 250, as I understand the sequence of events, and correct me if I am wrong, the Captain put out the signal regarding course 250 over the primary tactical voice circuit; the executive officer passed that information to Mr. ~~5-6~~ who was on the secondary tactical, and told him to put that out over the secondary tactical, and you gave the necessary order to the helmsman to put that signal, or your interpretation of that signal, into effect?

A. Yes, sir.

Examined by the court:

260. Q. Lieutenant, in your earlier testimony you stated, the court believes, that times of events in the log were estimates by yourself?

A. Yes, sir.

261. Q. Will you explain that somewhat more fully? Do you mean you used certain items such as the quartermaster's notebook?

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A. I will clarify that this way: I did not use the quartermaster's notebook because I disagreed with it and the entries there, and I requested the engineering watch officer who was on, and tried to determine when he received the signal and he made an estimate as to how long it took us to make the turn and I entered that time in my log.

262. Q. Are you of the opinion that a carrier, even though she be not guide, has the right of way over her plane guards at all times?

A. It is my understanding that the - Is this at all times?

263. Q. The court will repeat the question. Are you of the opinion that a carrier, even if not the guide, has the right of way over her plane guards at all times?

A. I just quite think - Well, no, sir. I wouldn't say she had the right of way at all times.

264. Q. When ships are maneuvering together at night, what steps do you think should be taken to prevent collision if you were officer of the deck?

A. The measure I would take would be to try to keep the ships maneuvering around me within my vision at all times to determine what they are doing.

265. Q. Well, to be more specific, how would you accomplish that? By bearings and so forth? What is the provision on board ship to prevent collision when operating with some other vessel?

A. Well, we can generally check the bearings to see what the bearing is doing. Whether it is steady or not, and then of course determine the range, whether he is crossing or not. Those two facts determine whether or not there will be a collision.

266. Q. Well, the International Rules of the Road make provisions for other precautions. Do you know some of those?

A. Yes, sir. One, there is the navigational lights, in general, including the side lights and range lights. Then certain rules that apply as regards to privileged and burdened vessel and the rules which apply when two vessels are head on.

267. Q. The court is not asking for a complete resume of the Rules of the Road, but on board a ship there are things done on that to minimize the danger of collision when two ships are together. You named bearings. You named lights. Do you know any others?

A. The most important is to know where the other ships are at all times.

268. Q. How would you know where the other ships are?

A. Well, if you look through your glasses or take a range or bearing.

269. Q. You consider that whistle signals are appropriate under some circumstances?

A. Yes, sir.

Recross-examined by *B-6* party:

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270. Q. In your answer to the questions the court propounded last, would this depend on whether the ship was operating under normal peacetime conditions or whether it was operating in simulated or actual wartime conditions at night?

A. They would definitely differ.

271. Q. I might ask, if I may - you mentioned in your previous testimony that the executive officer had told Mr. ^{B-6} to repeat certain orders previously given the captain. Do you know of your own knowledge whether that was actually done?

A. I do not know.

272. Q. You do not know whether it was repeated or not?

A. No, sir.

273. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether the signal ever went out even over the primary circuit?

A. I saw the transmission made. As to whether it went out, that is another question. I don't know.

274. Q. The circuit being used for the ordinary transmission at the time was the secondary circuit?

A. Yes, sir.

275. Q. And that was due to the fact that the RODMAN had indicated that its transmitter was out on the primary circuit?

A. Yes.

Recross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

276. Q. I believe you stated that when the WASP was approaching the heading 260, the HOBSON was swinging rapidly across your bow, is that correct?

A. Yes.

277. Q. Earlier you stated that the helmsman eased the rudder about 20 degrees before coming to his final course and that that eases the swing, is that correct?

A. It is a question of how much and I don't know. It would naturally ease the swing of the ship somewhat, yes, sir.

278. Q. Then what is the effect of meeting the rudder?

A. Meeting, when you say "Meet her". The effect of that is to arrest the swing.

279. Q. When is the command generally given?

A. About 10 degrees before the heading is reached. I think that would depend to some extent on what type of ship you were coming.

280. Q. Then when the ship is approximately on her heading, is it not swinging rapidly.

A. No, indeed.

281. Q. Now, was the HOBSON moving from port to starboard or from starboard to port when you steadied down?

A. I would say this: The bearing was changing left.

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282. Q. The bearing was changing left?

A. Yes, which would be a starboard to port.

283. Q. Was he ahead?

A. No, she was not dead ahead. In other words, the very instant we were on course 260 was the HOBSON dead ahead?

284. Q. No, you said that you had steadied on course 260 and the HOBSON was dead ahead swinging rapidly from starboard to port

A. We had - I would say we had gone to the right of 250 and at 250 the order was given to ease at that time and the ship had begun to slow and when I saw her pass ahead. At that time I didn't know the precise heading of the ship.

285. Q. Now, to bring two ships into collision, does the true bearing have to remain approximately constant?

A. Yes, sir.

286. Q. If a ship's heading is steady or almost so, then any change of relative bearing of the two ships will cause a change in true bearing, will it not?

A. Yes.

287. Q. Now, you have stated that the relative bearing of the HOBSON was changing rapidly from starboard to port. As the heading of the WASP slowed down and retarded at straight ahead, and now, from that, are we to infer that the true bearing of the HOBSON was changing rapidly from starboard to port?

A. Well, I wouldn't say the true bearing would be changing rapidly. I do believe that it was changing.

288. Q. When did the true bearings steady?

A. That is something which I cannot answer precisely.

289. Q. Would it have been possible that the rapid transfer of the HOBSON across the bow of the WASP was due to the changing of the heading of the WASP?

A. I don't think we were swinging quite that fast.

290. Q. But you were swinging still?

A. Yes, sir.

Recross-examined by Lieutenant B-6, a party:

291. Q. With regard to the times of events in the log and the time of the beginning of the execution of the turn - you started the turn. Now, that time is precise, is that correct? Was that the time recorded?

A. You are referring to the entry in my log. I believe so, approximately 2220. Now, I say that because the conduct of flight operations is a certain routine which we go through. When 20 minutes before we do something; 10 minutes before we do something 2 minutes before we do something or before launching and recovery time we have a certain time and thing to do, so to the best of my knowledge, those times entered in there are accurate.

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292. Q. I believe you said you had been reminded of that by the executive officer?

A. That is true. He made some statement.

Recross-examined by Lieutenant *36*, a party:

293. Q. It is possible for the WASP to make a turn of 158 degrees without easing the rudder somewhere in the turn before coming to a new course?

A. No, it is a part of conning a ship onto the new course, if you hold your rudder continuously you would go around in circles.

294. Q. When the HOBSON made the abrupt turn to the left toward the WASP, according to the sketch, at a distance of less than 1000 yards with a speed of approximately 25 knots, in your opinion could CIC on the WASP have possibly computed that relative movement and communicated it to you before you saw it yourself?

A. No, I don't believe so.

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney objected to the question.

The party withdrew the question and rephrased it.

295. Q. When the HOBSON made an abrupt turn to the left toward the WASP at a distance which you estimate to be less than 1000 yards and which you estimate to be 25 knots, could CIC on the WASP have possibly computed that relative movement and have communicated that information to you before you yourself saw it?

A. My answer is no, I do not believe that combat could have given me the picture which I saw before I saw it.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

296. Q. You have referred to some conversation with the engineering watch officer and some reference to the engineer's bell book in connection with your reconstructing your estimates of times of the sequence of events which you put in your log. Do you know whether at the time of the collision there was any difference between the engineroom clock and the bridge clock?

A. No, I do not.

297. Q. You do not --

A. No, sir.

298. Q. Your time of 2220 in making that turn is taken from the bridge clock or the engineer's clock?

A. It would be from the bridge clock, sir.

299. Q. And certain subsequent times in your log are taken from information furnished you by the engineering watch officer at times he took from the clock in the engineroom?

A. Yes, sir, and also my own estimate of what they were.

300. Q. But they are based in part on times observed on the clock in the engineroom?

A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

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301. Q. Do you know whether anybody after the collision checked the variation or any variation of the various clocks on the bridge or engine room from local zone time?

A. No, I do not.

302. Q. Do you know when the last time they were checked for accuracy with local zone time?

A. No, sir.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as a party.

The court then, at 1203, took a recess until 1330, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, and the parties to the inquiry and their counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

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, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, file number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. _____, Commander, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer of the U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. And were you the Executive Officer of the WASP on 26 April 1952?

A. I was.

3. Q. Will you state your naval and marine experience?

A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1933. I was out of the service for two years and returned in 1935, and went through Pensacola and then to battleships for two years. I was in patrol squadrons until after the war. I had command of a small seaplane tender for a year. I spent three years in the Bureau of Aeronautics, and I reported to the WASP.

4. Q. Were you on the WASP - - or, the bridge of the WASP at the time she collided with the HOBSON?

A. I was.

5. Q. Would you describe the sequence of events leading up to that collision, sir?

A. May I use my notes?

6. Q. Yes, sir.

A. (witness reading) "I left my room at about 2210 knowing that the recovery was scheduled for 2230. I went out on the open bridge and observed that the Captain was there, LTJG _____ was OOD and LT _____ was JOOD. The Captain was standing by the port gyro repeater, _____ about in the center of the bridge and _____ was on the starboard side listening to the secondary tactical circuit with the hand set although the loud speaker was turned on. The night was extremely dark and there was a high overcast but visibility was good. A short time after I arrived on the bridge _____ told _____ to give the turn signal to the two plane guards. The signal was given by LT _____ over the secondary tactical circuit. It was repeated once, then both plane guards acknowledged receipt of the signal. Then the signal to execute was given and it was acknowledged by both DMS's. We commenced our turn with the order 'right standard rudder.' At this time I noted the position of each of the plane guards by the red truck lights. One was on the starboard quarter and one was on the port bow. As we started our turn I heard the HOBSON call and ask if we wished her to take plane guard station for recovery. The Captain said to give them an affirmative and I passed that word on to LT _____. Everything seemed to me to be progressing as it should be. As we straightened out on course I again observed the red truck lights of the two plane guards, one was on the port bow and one was on the starboard quarter. I was watching the red light on the quarter when I heard the Captain give the order 'All Engines Back Emergency.' I looked around to

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see the red truck light of the HOBSON disappear from view under the overhang of the flight deck and the bow appear on our starboard side. I thought for a second that the DMS might clear, then I felt and heard the crash. The HOBSON heeled over to port and the bow swung slowly around on our starboard bow. I never saw the stern but the bow rose slowly out of the water. Collision was sounded right after the impact. When we were practically dead in the water the Captain gave the order "to stop all engines!"

7. Q. Commander, were you or did you participate in any maneuver or in the activities on the bridge other than to relay to the Junior Officer of the Deck the Captain's affirmative answer to the HOBSON query - - in other words, were you taking any bearings or were you giving any - - relaying orders to the helm or - - -?

A. No, sir, I was not taking any action of that nature.

8. Q. Do you recall the Captain making a transmission over the primary tactical circuit that involved a course of 250?

A. I am not entirely clear in my memory that I definitely heard the Captain say - - give the signal to come to a course of 250. In the conversation among the people who were in the bridge, that was brought out, and I may have heard it but I am not clear on that part. I am not positive that it was not given by Lieutenant

9. Q. Lieutenant - - being the JOOD on the secondary tactical circuit?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. You testified that you observed the red truck light on the HOBSON. Did it seem to you to be in a dangerous position?

A. All the time that I observed it - - what lights appeared turned out to be the HOBSON's truck lights, it never occurred to me that there was any danger of collision.

11. Q. And can you estimate the angle at which the WASP struck the HOBSON?

A. I would say it was close to 90 degrees. It appeared that the HOBSON was square across our bow.

12. Q. Do you know what part of the HOBSON the WASP struck?

A. It must have been slightly abaft of amidships because I could see a large part of the bow on the starboard side of our flight deck.

13. Q. At the time of impact?

A. At the time of impact.

14. Q. Do you know whether the HOBSON broke in two?

A. I can't say.

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15. Q. Will you describe all the emergency orders you heard immediately prior and immediately after collision?

A. The first emergency order was, of course, the order the Captain gave, "All Engines Emergency Back." Immediately after that, the crash "Collision" was sounded; following that the fire and rescue party was called away and I believe those were the only general alarm signals that were given over the general alarm system. The people were gathering on the flight deck and the men on the bridge directed them to drop life jackets, life rafts and life nets.

16. Q. Do you remember the order "Turn on all lights?"

A. The order to turn on all lights came immediately after the collision. I believe the Captain said, "Sound Collision," and then he said, "Turn on all lights." In that order.

17. Q. And then "Man Overboard," or do you remember?

A. Well, there were several shouts of "Man Overboard," but I don't believe that signal was passed by the boatswain's mate.

18. Q. Did you -- when you came to the bridge, did you receive any information at all as to the bearing of the HOBSON and the RODMAN or the general situation, or were you merely on the bridge as an observer?

A. I did not receive any information from any one on the bridge as to the bearings of the two plane guards. I could see the red truck lights -- I knew where they were supposed to be; I knew that we were supposed to turn into the wind to recovery aircraft and I knew where the plane guard stations would be when we had completed our turn.

19. Q. Did you observe any one on the bridge during that time taking any bearings on either the HOBSON or the RODMAN?

A. No, there was no one on the open bridge taking any bearings, because I was standing right by the starboard pelorus.

20. Q. Do you recall any ranges on either of the two ships coming up from combat?

A. I don't recall if any came up.

21. Q. Were you in a position to observe the rudder angle indicator?

A. Yes, I was.

22. Q. Do you know whether standard rudder was used during or on that maneuver?

A. Standard rudder was used during the entire maneuver.

23. Q. I show you a plot on the blackboard marked Exhibit 66, which is -- or, which represents the commanding officer's opinion of the probable track of the WASP from the start of that maneuver to the point of collision. Do you agree with that plot or drawing?

A. Yes, I agree with that.

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24. Q. The other track on that exhibit is the commanding officer's opinion of the HOBSON. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the events leading up to the collision that you could express an opinion as to whether that is in agreement with your ideas of the situation?

A. Well, my opinion is based on what I have heard from the people who were on the bridge of the HOBSON. I don't see how it could have happened any other way.

25. Q. Do you have in your possession Standing Orders given to the officers of the deck on the WASP?

A. I do not have it right here. I have sent for it. The navigator is bringing it over. This is the Ship's Organization.

26. Q. Ship's Organization of the WASP?

A. Yes.

27. Q. Would you produce it?

A. Here it is.

At this point the Ship's Organization Book of the U.S.S. WASP was marked Exhibit 79 for identification to be introduced at a later time.

Examined by the court:

28. Q. Would you give the court your estimate of the state of training with respect to operations such as the WASP was engaged --the state of training of the crew, officers and men?

A. Admiral, I believe that our state of training was as far advanced as any other carrier in the Atlantic Fleet. We have just finished two months at Guantanamo undergoing training. We got a relatively high mark for all operations at Guantanamo, and it's my personal opinion that our training was just as good as, if not a little better, than any other carrier in the Atlantic Fleet.

29. Q. Can you describe such parts of the rescue operations as you saw with particular reference to the WASP's part in it?

A. Yes, sir. I requested permission from the Captain to leave the bridge and go down to the hangar deck shortly after the HOBSON disappeared. By the time I was down there, the deck edge elevator had been lowered. The water was covered with all types of life saving equipment. There were already six boats in the water and plans were being made to have two more boats in the water. The boats in the water were the Captain's gig; there were two whale boats, three motor launches, and the two personnel boats. The two personnel boats were in the water shortly after I got to the hangar deck. Each boat was manned by an officer and the Air Group Commander himself went out in one of the personnel boats to take charge of all the boats. He had radio communications equipment with him, and the edge of the hangar deck--the outside, was manned by men from the WASP who were attempting to bring the men aboard, and as soon as the man was brought aboard he was covered with blankets and put in a stretcher, if need

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be, or if he was able to walk and taken immediately to sick bay. From there they were scrubbed down and put to bed and examined for their condition. It seemed to me a very short time before we had picked up everybody we could find, and, of course, I had no way of measuring time at that instant. By the time that we had to get underway to retrieve or recover aircraft, they were flying around, I think that everybody was saved who was going to be saved.

Cross-examined by *Blo*, a party:

30. Q. Directing your attention to the period immediately prior to the collision and the period after the collision during which you were on the bridge, was there any confusion or undue excitement shown by personnel on the bridge?

A. Well, I would say that there was no undue confusion. Of course any accident of that nature is going to cause momentary awe in everyone's mind because it's so totally unexpected, but as far as confusion, I don't believe there was any confusion.

Cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

31. Q. About how long was it from the time of collision until the WASP was dead in the water?

A. I observed the WASP was dead in the water before the HOBSON bow sank out of sight which would make it less than four minutes -- four minutes is the length of time that it was afloat.

32. Q. Did you feel the engines going astern before the WASP and HOBSON collided?

A. I don't recall that I could feel the engines going astern. It's rather difficult to feel the movements of the engines from the location on the bridge.

Reexamined by counsel for the court:

33. Q. Do you have in your possession a copy of an official report, ^{copy} from Commander Destroyer Flotilla 4 to Commander Cruiser ^{Division 4} which the WASP received through official channels which gives a narrative -- a summary of the search and rescue operations?

A. Yes, sir.

34. Q. Would you produce it, sir?

A. Here it is.

At this point the report from Commander Destroyer Flotilla 4 to Commander Cruiser Division 4 which gives a summary of the search and rescue operations, was marked Exhibit 80 for Identification.

The report was submitted to the parties, and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

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LIEUTENANT ^{B-6} A PARTY: If it please the court, I would like to object to the introduction of this report in evidence. Paragraph 8 of the report states that the RODMAN had lowered no boats. The evidence before the court from several officers and men of the HOBSON is to the effect that they were rescued by a motor launch boat from the RODMAN, and I think that this report is inaccurate in that respect, and I think in due fairness to the RODMAN this should not be a part of the record.

The counsel for the court replied.

The court was cleared. The court was opened and all parties to the inquiry entered. The court announced that the objection was not sustained and the report would be admitted in evidence as Exhibit 80.

There being no further objection, it was so received, and is appended marked Exhibit 80.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness was called by the counsel for the court, entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, file number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. ^{B-6}, Lieutenant, USNR, ^{B-6} USS WASP.

2. Q. State your marine and naval experience.

A. The first year I was ⁱⁿ NROTC school for reserve officers, and I got recognition school and then after that I boarded the ALASKA for two years; then I was discharged, and I was a civilian for about four or five years before I was recalled.

3. Q. You served on board the USS ALASKA?

A. Two years.

4. Q. In what capacity?

A. As a gunnery division junior officer--twenty millimeter division.

5. Q. And then you were released to inactive duty?

A. That's right.

6. Q. And then when were you recalled?

A. June 19th, last year, 1951.

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7. Q. And what had been your service since that time?
A. I reported to the pre-commissioning detail for the WASP and then aboard the WASP after it was commissioned.

8. Q. And have been aboard ever since?
A. Yes.

9. Q. Were you aboard on the 26th of April 1952?
A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. Did you have a watch or were you in a duty status on the evening of 26 April?
A. Yes, sir, I was Junior Officer of the Deck.

11. Q. And what time did you assume those duties?
A. At approximately 10 minutes to 8 - - 1950. wof

12. Q. 1950?
A. 1950.

13. Q. And what did your duties during that watch consist of?
A. Primarily I was manning the secondary tactical circuit which was being used that evening.

14. Q. And you were manning that secondary circuit from the time you assumed the duties as Junior Officer of the Deck up to the collision?
A. Well, not immediately after I came on watch. The first radi message was sent out by the Officer of the Deck, and after that then we headed back out of the wind after the first launch; from then I was the only one that sent out any messages over the circuit until after the collision.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

15. Q. Now, Mister *B-6* starting at the point of approximately 30 minutes before the collision, will you relate, to the best of your recollection, what messages you sent to the HOBSON, and received from the HOBSON over the secondary tactical circuit?

A. Yes, sir. I have the notes here. I wrote the messages out before I sent them so in most cases I would have them.

16. Q. Those are your original notes made at the time you sent out these various messages to which you are going to testify?

A. No, most cases - - some of them I sent before, but primarily that's what it is, yes, sir.

17. Q. All right?

A. Well, at 2010 or 2210, I mean, at 2210, sent out the preliminary information signal "FOX CORPEN 265 TACKLINE FOX SPEED 27," and that was rogered for by "Underpass" and "Northwest."

18. Q. Was that the HOBSON - - -?

A. Yes, sir.

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19. Q. All right, sir:

A. And then approximately 2215 I sent out the following message "FOX AT THE DIP EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN 260 TACKLINE SPEED 27." That was rogered for by both of the ships. At approximately 2220, I sent out the message "MY TURN 260 TACKLINE SPEED 27 STANDBY EXECUTE EXECUTE TURN 260 TACKLINE SPEED 27," and that was rogered for; and then shortly after the turn had commenced, why, we got a message from the HOBSON "Do you want me to assume plane recovery station?" I am not sure that was the exact wording, but that was the import of the message, and I asked the Officer of the Deck, who, in turn, asked the executive officer, and received the reply affirmative so I sent that back to the HOBSON to that particular question.

20. Q. Right at that point, do you know whether the Officer of the Deck asked the executive officer or asked the Captain for a reply to that query?

A. It's my recollection of it now, that he asked the executive officer.

21. Q. And the executive officer gave an affirmative without referring that matter to the Captain?

A. That's my present memory of it. The Captain was over on the other side of the bridge, on the port side of the bridge, and it could have been that he asked him and I just couldn't see it.

22. Q. Was the Captain in your view?

A. He was just across the bridge from me -- I was on the starboard side of the bridge, and the Captain was over on the port side by the gyro repeater.

23. Q. So you don't know -- as I understand your testimony, is to the effect that it's your impression that the executive officer answered that query, but that it could have been the Captain that answered and the executive officer merely relayed his affirmative?

A. That could have been. I couldn't say for sure because the executive officer could have looked at the Captain and just gotten some kind of consent from him.

24. Q. What was the next signal?

A. Then during this period I was keeping the hand set up to my ear to hear any transmission and I was also watching the course of the HOBSON -- relative bearings of the turn -- as the turn progressed, I followed the HOBSON around the turn as long as I could until it passed over from my line of view from the starboard side over to the port side of the ship relative at which time I could no longer follow her because I was over on the starboard side of the bridge, and I assumed the turn was approximately completed -- I couldn't tell because I couldn't see the repeater from where I was. The Captain sent out the message "MIKE CORPEN 250" and --

25. Q. Over what circuit?

A. Over the primary tactical maneuvering circuit. The hand set -- it is right there on the port side right by where he was standing.

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26. Q. And did you hear that message receipted for by either of the two ships in company?

A. No, sir. I didn't hear it. I was in a position where I couldn't hear any reply. And the executive officer who was standing on the starboard side just in front of me looked at me and told me to repeat that particular message over the secondary circuit, and I wanted to assure myself that that was what he wanted after I was just about ready to repeat it when I heard the Captain give "All Engines Emergency Back," and so I never sent it out.

27. Q. Now, you speak of assuring yourself that that's what he wanted or that was the transmission that he wanted. How did you assure yourself?

A. Well, that I don't recall for sure -- I mean, I just know -- the only thing or point I was trying to make was that I know there was a short -- I just wanted to be sure -- to repeat that transmission that the Captain had just out on the primary circuit.

28. Q. And in summation you obtained a verification?

A. That's what he wanted and it was just at the time that I was ready to send that out that I heard the Captain give the order to the lee helmsman "All Engines Emergency Back," so I never transmitted it on the secondary.

29. Q. Now, you spoke of observing the HOBSON, were you doing that under the orders of anyone?

A. Yes, sir, the Officer of the Deck told me to watch the HOBSON as the turn progressed.

30. Q. And did you observe the HOBSON through a pelorus or any other instrument?

A. I -- not through the pelorus, but I believe at that point I used my binoculars, although I couldn't say for sure because I had been using them on and off all evening, and I can't definitely place that particular time; but I could see out on the starboard quarter just after I had started the turn and could make out the red truck lights and I followed those.

31. Q. Did you make out the shape of the ship, or do you recall?

A. Very little, no, sir. I didn't. Primarily, what I could see was the truck lights and a short part of the mast that projected up above it -- that was really all I could make out distinctly because it was very dark at that time.

32. Q. Did you know the heading -- could you tell the heading the HOBSON was on as you observed it?

A. Just that I knew where -- as I said, a short time before that, I had been checking it in the pelorus and checking the bearing and range so I knew where it was, and when I looked back I found it -- that it was in position immediately, and followed it around, but aside from that I couldn't be sure of the exact heading at any time because I just couldn't make out the shape of the ship.

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33. Q. Did you check the bearing when it was - - when your course was 102?

A. That's correct.

34. Q. And had you checked that bearing visually?

A. Yes, sir. On the starboard pelorus.

35. Q. And you checked the range. Did you check that visually or how?

A. No, sir, that was from combat.

36. Q. Was that information sent up to you from combat?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. After you started your turn, did you get any ranges from combat to the HOBSON?

A. I didn't get any after the turn had started, no.

38. Q. Did you hear any passed over up from combat?

A. No, I didn't.

39. Q. And after you started the turn, did you check the bearing of the HOBSON through any instrument whatever?

A. No, sir.

40. Q. Merely with your naked eye or possibly through binoculars?

A. That's right.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

41. Q. Now, after the HOBSON had passed out of your view from starboard to port, will you relate all of the orders you heard given by the commanding officer?

A. Yes, sir. The first one would be the radio transmission that I have already given you and then after that there was the order to the lee helmsman "All Engines Emergency Back," and then shortly after that - - immediately after the impact, the order - - the next order to the lee helmsman was "All Engines Stop." I don't remember the exact order of those - - I just know - - I can recall most of the orders that were given, but not the exact orders. First: "Collision Quarters" and "Man the Life Boats" and then "Man All boats," "Light Ship," "Lights and Search Lights," "Call Away the Fire and Rescue Party." Those are all that I can recall.

42. Q. Now, the last transmission or the transmission that you spoke of as hearing the Captain give, was that after the HOBSON had passed from your view on the port bow?

A. Yes, sir.

43. Q. Could you estimate how long after?

A. It would be difficult for me to give any too exact estimate, but I would say roughly a couple of minutes.

44. Q. Two minutes?

A. Approximately. Somewhere along about two minutes or so.

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45. Q. Do you know the ship's heading at the time of that transmission?

A. No, sir, I don't. I couldn't see -- there was no compass repeater that I could see from where I was standing so I had no way of knowing.

46. Q. When you heard the Captain give the order to stop all engines, do you know whether the WASP had any way on?

A. Not for sure. It was really hard to tell because by that time the collision had occurred and I could see the bow section of the HOBSON coming around along the starboard side of the WASP and it's just hard to tell although I assumed there must have been some way, but shortly after that I would say for sure that there wasn't any. I could tell when I looked out, that there wasn't any, but at that time it would be hard for me to state exactly.

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^{B6} yeoman, third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, entered as reporter.

47. Q. Do you know whether the HOBSON broke in two?

A. Well, at the time --

48. Q. From your own knowledge.

A. At the time I couldn't tell. I didn't know at that time. At that time I didn't realize it. In fact, I thought that perhaps we had just hit the fantail and what it was doing was heeling over some. That was my first impression.

49. Q. Do you know from your personal observation at a later time that the HOBSON broke in two?

A. Well, on the starboard side of the bridge from where I was I couldn't tell for sure. All I could see was the bow section as it sank, so I couldn't tell.

Cross-examined by Captain ^{B6}, a party:

50. Q. You say, Mr. ^{B6}, you were manning the secondary circuit from a time prior to the time the turn movement from course 102 to the new course 260 occurred, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

51. Q. Was the secondary circuit the one used to give the messages sent out regarding this turn signal?

A. That is correct.

52. Q. Do you know why the secondary circuit was being used instead of the primary circuit?

A. I was told when I relieved the watch that one of the destroyers was not up on the primary circuit and that is all I was told. In other words, that the secondary was being used as the primary for that night maneuver because one of the destroyers wasn't up on the primary.

53. Q. If I understand you correctly, you said you at no time sent out over the secondary circuit any signal relating to a course 250.

A. That is correct.

54. Q. Did you remain on the bridge after the collision had occurred?

A. Yes, I did.

55. Q. Would you describe in a narrative form what observations you made of the rescue operations.

A. Well, as I say, first the various orders that I have already given were given in quick succession, and I don't know just exactly what orders went over the ship's announcing system, and for a while I stayed right on the bridge so I couldn't observe that until Mr. ^{B6} came over and sent word to the other destroyer about the collision and then I went into the pilot house and started in to get the names of the people who had been on the bridge and then Mr. ^{B6} took that over, so from then on I stayed either out on the so-called open bridge or the starboard wing so I would be right

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by the secondary hand set in case there were any more radio dispatches to go out to the RODMAN and during that period I could see the scene. Almost immediately there were boats in the water and there were a number of life rafts and life jackets and inflatable life rafts like the aviators had and equipment, flotation gear, was completely covering the area and it was covered with a deep layer of fuel oil and during that period the searchlights from the WASP were playing over all the area and also some of the much weaker signal searchlights were going back and forth and picked up various survivors and pointed them out by holding them on them until a boat came to pick them up and then go over on somebody else, and during that period there were some radio messages from the RODMAN asking us if we had a survivor in the searchlight so they would know to direct somebody over and whether we were trying to find some more survivors. That went on, boats kept circling wider and kept going back and forth and any time a searchlight would stop one of the boats would go over in that area and see if there was anyone. That continued and the RODMAN then came over on the starboard beam and they also put some boats in the water and were using their searchlights to help with the operations. I was told on the bridge the boats were signaling them. Some of them wanted to know what to do and were asking the signal bridge what they should do and any further orders, and they were told to standby and keep searching until they got some final order and during that period it was decided that it would be essential to try to recover the planes if we could do it at all and the boats were told to standby and continue searching.

56. Q. The planes were running low on gas at that time?

A. Yes, that is correct. As I understand it, they were practically down to the minimum safety factor, so the boats were told to standby, the units from the main task force were approaching and they would be there, and to standby with them, and we would go out and recover the planes.

57. Q. In spite of the damaged condition of the WASP and low fuel condition of the planes, was the plane recovery successful?

A. Well, I had left the bridge before that. I had been relieved and had left the bridge before that actually took place.

58. Q. You subsequently learned some of the planes had safely returned?

A. Yes, I was told it had been very successful, there were no hitches at all. It had gone very well.

59. Q. Directing your attention back now to the earlier portion of your testimony when you mentioned seeing the light of the HOBSON as it proceeded from the starboard side over to the port side of the WASP, were you at any time able to see the hull of the HOBSON?

A. Not distinctly enough so I could really make out anything more than a black form, not so I could make out what its heading was at any time.

60. Q. The water looked very black and the hull merged into the water?

A. It was very dark and the water was dark and it was of course toward us down on the horizon, so none of the hull was projecting up above the horizon, just the mast.

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Cross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

61. Q. What is your civilian occupation, Lieutenant?

A. I am a teacher.

62. Q. What is your field?

A. Political science.

63. Q. Have you had any training in physics?

A. No special training, just have taken some courses.

64. Q. Do you know what candlepower means?

A. Yes.

65. Q. What does it mean?

A. In general the intensity of light you mean?

66. Q. That is exactly what I am talking about. If a light has twice the candlepower of another light, will the intensity of the light with the greater candlepower be greater?

A. Yes, sir.

67. Q. Now if I take one light which is a red light and in back of it I put another red light on a dark night, do you think that the intensity of the illumination would be increased?

A. Yes.

68. Q. There is in the record testimony to the effect that the truck lights on the HOBSON were fore and aft and ran along the center line of the ship. The distance between the lights has been said to be between three and six feet. Now assume, Lieutenant, that you were looking at the HOBSON from this angle (indicating) initially and then the HOBSON turned toward you so that instead of looking at the lights broadside in this (indicating) way you looked at the lights in line, would the intensity of these lights appear to increase?

A. Well, I would assume that would be the logical conclusion in that case, yes.

69. Q. Have you ever looked at this diagram of the collision before?

A. I think that a very similar diagram was shown to me, yes.

70. Q. Have you studied it carefully?

A. I just glanced at it for a short time.

71. Q. Could you come up please.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Let the record show that counsel is referring to Exhibit 66.

Q. (continued) Will you look at that. This is the track of the HOBSON. This is the track of the WASP.

CAPTAIN ^{B-6} If it please the court, I hate to interrupt at this time but I think it should be pointed out again this is the best estimate of the Captain and not necessarily a true statement.

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COURT: The court takes cognizance of that. The exhibit is an estimate.

Q. (continued) As you observed the HOBSON steaming down this track where was your position on board the carrier?

A. I was on the starboard side of the bridge.

72. Q. At that time, Lieutenant, just putting yourself on board the carrier, were you looking at those lights head-on on the HOBSON?

A. I really couldn't say. At that distance I really couldn't make out the relative position of the two lights. They just more or less merged. I couldn't use those for a guide to check very carefully on the heading.

73. Q. Could you pick out any place on this line of the HOBSON wherein she is pointing directly toward the WASP? Take your time. Now remember we have two ships. They start here at 2221; they are here at 2223; they are here at 2224. Now, could you show me at any time on this track of the HOBSON where it would be pointing directly toward the WASP?

A. The only point I can see -- I am not sure I understand what you mean by pointing directly. The only time I can see would be approximately here (indicating). They would be on directly opposite course.

74. Q. Will you -- right there you say?

A. I am not sure just what you mean.

75. Q. Right here you say?

A. By pointing at it -- I mean they would be on directly opposite courses. I don't see any other point where I would say the HOBSON was pointing at the WASP.

76. Q. If the WASP were here at this point at 2224:30 approximately and the HOBSON were here at 2224:30 approximately, would the HOBSON then be pointing directly at the --

A. Yes, I can see what you mean now.

COURT: The question was: Would it be pointing?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: I would like to indicate that point on the chart if I might, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: The thing I objected to this morning was drawing these lines. If he wants to mark the points he has indicated by an "E" and an "F" counsel for the court has no objection.

COURT: So mark them.

77. Q. Could you put the point where the HOBSON was when she was pointing directly toward the WASP? If the WASP were at this position -- will you indicate that position, please, with the letter "E" -- and if the HOBSON were in this position -- indicate with an "F" -- would the HOBSON be pointing directly toward the WASP? (Witness so marks Exhibit 66).

A. If they had been in those two positions, yes.

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Cross-examined by Lieutenant *Bt*, a party:

78. Q. Mr. *Bt*, have you ever stood top deck watches?
A. No, sir.

79. Q. Do you remember approximately how long you have stood watches as Junior Officer of the Deck?

A. The whole time that I have been on the WASP I have been standing them, I am quite sure.

80. Q. During your experience in the Navy during the war you never stood any deck watches?

A. No, I didn't. I stood gunnery watches.

81. Q. Did I understand you to say there were no means available on the starboard side of the bridge with which you take bearings?

A. No, I didn't say that. I said that early in the evening I had taken two bearings on the HOBSON.

82. Q. You could have taken bearings on the HOBSON during the turns. You have the means available to you.

A. It is out on the open part of the bridge along the starboard side and I was manning the secondary tactical hand set and so for that reason there was no way to get to the pelorus. I couldn't stand by the hand set and also be out on the pelorus.

83. Q. Then if you manned the hand set in the position in which it was located, it was impossible for you to take accurate and true bearings.

A. That is correct.

84. Q. Did you maintain a log of outgoing or incoming messages?

A. We didn't up on the bridge. It was my understanding that CIC did maintain such a log. They kept a watch on that circuit and did log the various transmissions.

85. Q. Do you know whether they actually did or not?

A. I don't know that evening. I know it was customary to do that.

86. Q. Was it to all circuits?

A. I don't know exactly what set up they had down in combat. I know they ordinarily monitored the primary maneuvering circuit and did keep a log on it and also as far as I know their own net they monitored, but I am not sure just about what provision they had down there for keeping a log.

87. Q. On the bridge did you maintain a log of the transmissions of the primary circuit?

A. No, sir, other than the only thing they would have kept would be the quartermaster's log and orders to the helm of the ship.

88. Q. Where you were standing during this turn was it possible at any time for you to know the heading of the ship?

A. Of the WASP? No, it wasn't. I couldn't see any compass readings.

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89. Q. Did you have any means available to you to know the rudder angle?

A. There is a rudder angle indicator on a control panel that is out there but I was in such a position so that most of the time the executive officer was standing right out there, and I couldn't see that.

90. Q. How far on the port bow did the HOBSON have to be before you lost sight of it?

A. Well, from my position on the bridge it is rather difficult to give an accurate estimate because you are far enough over on the starboard side so it is really difficult to estimate just where amidships is, but the closest I want to say definitely is that it was just passing over from the starboard side to the port side.

91. Q. As I remember it, you lost sight of the HOBSON about the time that it crossed your bow.

A. Approximately. As I say, from the position on the extreme starboard side of the ship, I wouldn't want to make any more positive statement than that.

92. Q. Could you ever see the wake of the HOBSON?

A. Not so that I clearly remember exactly. I think at the first I could make out a slight white wake behind it but as I say it was very dark. Whether I actually saw the wake or at which time I did previously see it and am now projecting it up to that time.

93. Q. At the time the HOBSON crossed the bow and you lost sight did you have any impression regarding its range as compared to the range at the beginning of the turn?

A. Yes. As far as I could tell at the time, considering the conditions, the lighting conditions, and the fact that all I had to estimate from was the truck lights, it seemed to be making a perfectly normal relative movement and maintained approximately the same range it had at the beginning.

94. Q. Then you didn't feel when you saw it, it was closer than 3000 yards?

A. No, sir, I didn't. During the whole time it seemed to be following what I would expect to be the normal relative motion for that type of turn.

95. Q. Were you in a position where you could hear the orders to the helmsman?

A. Well, I couldn't repeat them exactly. Of course, I knew approximately what was going to be given, so when I heard an order to the helm -- I could say that that probably was what it was but I couldn't word them exactly.

96. Q. Could you hear what the steersman said?

A. No, that would be -- in some cases I could, but at other times I couldn't because he would be repeating it more toward the port side of the ship where the Officer of the Deck and the Captain were standing, and it would go through the little port holes around the pilot house.

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97. Q. Do you know if prior to the collision he ever reported he was steady on his course?

A. No, I couldn't say that.

Re-examined by counsel for the court:

98. Q. Mr. _____, what are your duties as Junior Officer of the Deck?

A. Well, the duties as Junior Officer of the Deck would vary from one Officer of the Deck to the other because it would depend on just what he wanted the Junior Officer of the Deck to do, and different Officers of the Deck have different ways of using the Junior Officer of the Deck.

99. Q. And you were confining your duties to manning a hand set on the secondary tactical voice circuit on the orders of the Officer of the Deck?

A. That is correct, and after the turn began I was watching the course, relative motion of the HOBSON as ^{we} went around in the turn.

100. Q. But still maintaining your duty at the hand set of the secondary tactical circuit?

A. That is correct.

101. Q. And from the position that you have to assume in manning that hand set a pelorus or other instrument through which you can take a true bearing, is not accessible, is that right?

A. That is correct.

Recross-examined by Captain _____ a party:

102. Q. Did you report to the Officer of the Deck when you lost sight of the HOBSON?

A. Not that I recall.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant _____, a party:

103. Q. What did you think Lieutenant _____ meant when he told you to watch the HOBSON?

A. Just to see that the HOBSON was starting in its turn and that the relative motion of the HOBSON was along the line that would be expected in the type of maneuver we were making.

104. Q. Did you feel that he meant for you to stop watching the HOBSON when it crossed the bow?

A. Well, the only reason that I did that is, as I said, that he had told me previously to keep the hand set up to my ear so I could hear any transmissions over it during flight operations. If there is any noise from the planes on the flight deck it is easy to miss a transmission coming in over the speakers or if at the particular time an order was given to the helm or lee helmsman so he had told me to keep the hand set up to my ear.

105. Q. You didn't have any planes taking off at that time?

A. No, sir.

106. Q. You said you understood Lieutenant _____ to mean you should ascertain that the HOBSON had started in its turn?

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A. Yes, sir, that was--that is normally--when an Officer of the Deck told me that, that is normally what I understood, to make sure, when your plane guard and you started your turn, that the destroyer accompanying the WASP was also starting on the proper turn for that particular course.

107. Q. On this occasion had you ascertained that fact?

A. I watched the truck lights on the HOBSON to see that they were as closely as I could estimate keeping the range and following what would be a normal relative movement for the particular turn we were making, which was a sharp turn to the right.

108. Q. And by your observation of the truck lights on the HOBSON, you came to the conclusion that she was turning right as you were turning right?

A. I could make out she kept the range and the relative motion was such. That was what I assumed as far as I could see.

109. Q. And you got no range from combat?

A. I didn't get any range from combat.

110. Q. And the truck lights that you spoke about were so far distant that you couldn't ascertain any space between?

A. Not clearly enough so I could use that as an actual guide because they tended to merge the whole time and I really couldn't make them out to use them to estimate the angle between.

111. Q. Then as I understand your testimony, you came to the conclusion that the HOBSON was making a right turn simultaneously with you merely by a seaman's eye bearing on the truck lights of the HOBSON.

A. That is right.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, serial number, branch of service and present duty station.

A. *B-6* Ensign, U. S. Naval Reserve, *DT*

2. Q. Your present duty station?

A. USS WASP.

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3. Q. State your naval and ~~military~~ experience.

A. I have been in the Naval Reserve since February of last year. I went to the Officer Candidate School in Newport in November, graduated in March and had been assigned to the WASP ever since.

4. Q. Since March 1952?

A. Since March 1952.

5. Q. Did you have a watch on the night of 26 April 1952?

A. Yes, sir, I was JOOW.

6. Q. And what time did you come on duty?

A. I came on duty approximately 1940.

7. Q. And where did you stand that duty?

A. From 1940 until approximately 2130 I stood the duty in the pilot house and after 2130 I went up on the bridge and was there until the time of the collision.

8. Q. You were out on the open bridge from 2130 until the time of the collision?

A. Actually that would be until 2228.

9. Q. Where were you standing with reference to the commanding officer?

A. He was on the port wing of the bridge and I was on the starboard wing, and I was behind the captain.

10. Q. He was on the port wing and you were on the starboard

A. I was on the starboard wing near the exit door.

11. Q. Where were you standing with reference to Lieutenant Ingraham?

A. I was behind Lieutenant ~~B-O~~. He was also on the starboard wing of the bridge.

12. Q. Were you in a position to hear the orders to the steersman and to the engine order telegraph and observe whether those orders were carried out?

A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

13. Q. Commencing with about 2200 will you relate the sequence of orders to the helmsman?

A. Yes, sir. As best as I can recall around 2215 Mr. ~~B-G~~ gave the order to the JOD to give over the primary or secondary tactical --

14. Q. I asked you what orders to the helmsman.

A. Excuse me. The orders to the helm were RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER at the time of the execution which was approximately 2220, and the following that --

15. Q. Had there been a turn signal 260 given and executed?

A. Yes, sir, there had.

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16. Q. And what was the order to the helmsman on that signal?
A. RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER.

17. Q. And were you in a position to observe the rudder angle indicator?
A. No, sir, I wasn't.

18. Q. Did you hear any other orders to the helm after that order and before the collision?
A. Yes, sir, I believe Mr. ~~W~~ said "EASE TO FIVE, THEN COME TO 260."

19. Q. Do you know whether the WASP ever steadied on 260?
A. No, sir, I am not sure about it.

20. Q. During this time and after the execution of the turn signal did you hear any query come over by voice from the HOBSON?
A. I am not sure what ship it was, but one of the two destroyers signaled us and asked if they were to assume plane guard station. I believe that was the HOBSON and we answered them in the affirmative.

21. Q. Was to assume plane guard station or plane guard recovery station?
A. I believe it was plane guard recovery station.

22. Q. That is your best recollection?
A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. Were you aware before the execution of that turn signal - were you aware of the location of the HOBSON?
A. Yes, sir, I was.

24. Q. During the time did you observe the red truck lights of the HOBSON?
A. I didn't observe them until they appeared off our port bow.

25. Q. Originally they were on your starboard quarter?
A. Yes, sir.

26. Q. And they became lost to your view or were you just not observing?
A. At the particular time I was looking straight ahead. I was observing the lights of the other destroyer.

27. Q. And then the next time you saw the HOBSON's lights they were off your port bow?
A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. Moving in what direction?
A. Moving from port to starboard.

29. Q. Port to starboard. And how long before the collision was that?
A. Sir, the time there, I couldn't make an accurate estimate.

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30. Q. It was almost immediately?

A. It wasn't almost immediately. The first thing I noticed was the red light, and I didn't think anything was wrong with it. I assumed that was the RODMAN, as a matter of fact, and it was to me a very hard night to judge any depth whatsoever. It was extremely black. The next thing I noticed the light appeared to be getting slightly brighter and before that the Captain gave EMERGENCY BACK.

31. Q. When you first observed the HOBSON to the right on your port bow did it have any relative movement that you observed or was the relative movement to the right?

A. The relative movement was to the right at a very slow rate.

32. Q. Very slow from the time you first observed it?

A. Yes, sir.

33. Q. Could you estimate the lapse of time from the time you first observed that light to its relative movement to your right and until it grew brighter and the Captain ordered ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY?

A. It was a relatively short time, sir. I wouldn't be able to accurately estimate that.

34. Q. A minute or seconds.

A. I would say possibly a minute.

35. Q. After the Captain ordered ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY what were the next orders he gave and what other orders did you hear?

A. The next order I believe, sir, is COLLISION QUARTERS and ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY STOP.

36. Q. Did you hear a signal MAN OVERBOARD?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. FIRE AND RESCUE PARTY AWAY?

A. Yes, sir.

38. Q. MAN THE LIFEBOATS?

A. Yes, sir.

39. Q. TURN ON ALL LIGHTS?

A. Yes, sir.

40. Q. Just answer this question yes or no. Did you hear any message transmitted that related -- during this time from the time of your turn signal 260, did you hear any message transmitted that related to a course 250.

A. No, sir, not that I remember.

41. Q. Were you able to tell or do you know what the heading of the ship was at the time of collision?

A. I assumed, sir, it was very near 260. That is what I thought.

42. Q. Had you been watching any gyro repeater?

A. From my position I could see no gyro repeater.

43. Q. Then that is your impression?

A. Yes, sir.

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44. Q. You were standing right behind Lieutenant B-6 who had the secondary tactical hand set in his hand?

A. That's right, sir.

45. Q. Did he receive for transmission, that you remember, during the period you described, any order relating to a course of 250?

A. No, sir.

46. Q. He didn't receive it or don't you remember?

A. I remember he didn't send any.

47. Q. Do you remember him getting one?

A. You mean from the Captain, sir?

48. Q. Or from any other officer on the open bridge.

A. Not that I remember.

Cross-examined by Captain B-6, a party:

49. Q. Mr. B-6, as far as the general nature of your duties are concerned or were concerned, at that time it was a question of instruction, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

50. Q. You received orders from the Officer of the Deck to practice on something for awhile? The plotting, I believe you were doing.

A. Maneuvering board.

51. Q. Maneuvering board, and what I am getting at is you had, as I understand it, no duties connected with the maneuvering of the ship or assigned to you to stand as a lookout or watch for any particular thing.

A. No, sir, I have no specific duties unless the Officer of the Deck or the Captain tells me.

52. Q. It was just a matter to be up there and observe what was going on and go through any practice exercises that are assigned to you from time to time?

A. That's right, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B-6, a party:

53. Q. Were you standing aft of Lieutenant B-6?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

54. Q. About how far behind him were you?

A. Probably three feet.

55. Q. About three feet. Had you been in that same position since you had come on the bridge?

A. When I first came on the bridge I was working maneuvering board problems at the table on the bridge and when the Captain came on the bridge I stepped back by the searchlight talker to clear the bridge for anything he might want to do.

56. Q. Were you in that position behind Lieutenant B-6 before the commencement of this turn to 260?

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A. Yes, sir, I was.

57. Q. At that time could you see the RODMAN?

A. Yes, sir, I could if I looked around behind me and the searchlight talker.

58. Q. And where was the searchlight talker in regard to you?

A. Excuse me. I was talking about the HOBSON. I could see the RODMAN if I stepped forward.

59. Q. How far?

A. Just lean my head forward.

60. Q. Was there anything which would obscure Lieutenant Ingraham's view that would not obscure your view from the bridge?

A. I don't think so, sir.

61. Q. In your opinion from where Lieutenant *SB* was standing could he have seen the RODMAN?

A. I would think he could, sir.

62. Q. Do you know if he changed his position from the time the turn commenced until the time of the collision?

A. He might have moved in various small areas. He didn't go from one side of the bridge to the other, sir.

63. Q. Can you estimate how far the HOBSON was on your port bow when you first saw him?

A. When I first saw it, sir, it seemed far enough away that I thought nothing was wrong.

64. Q. I am not talking about the range. Can you estimate the angle between the bow of the WASP --

A. Possibly 15°.

65. Q. About 15° on the port bow.

A. On the port bow.

66. Q. Do you know what the relative position of the HOBSON would have been after the turn was completed and it was on station?

A. Its relative position would be on our starboard quarter, sir. The RODMAN or the HOBSON?

67. Q. The HOBSON.

A. Yes, sir.

68. Q. Now the HOBSON was on your starboard quarter at the commencement of the turn, wasn't it?

A. That is correct, sir.

69. Q. And it was your understanding that it would be in that same relative position at the completion of the turn?

A. That is what I thought, sir.

70. Q. Did you have any means with which you could take accurate true bearings on the HOBSON?

A. From the position I was at?

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71. Q. From the position you were standing.

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make a further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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B-6 yeoman, first class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. B-6, SN, B-6, U. S. S. WASP, quartermaster striker.

2. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, B-6?

A. Well, I've come back about a year ago, sir, about two years now. I was in during the war - I was out for four years.

3. Q. How long did you serve during the war?

A. Three years, sir.

4. Q. And how much of that time was at sea?

A. Most all that time, sir.

5. Q. And you have been back two years?

A. Yes, sir. I was in the Reserves. I went Regular this year.

6. Q. How long have you been back on active duty?

A. About a year and a half, now I should say.

7. Q. How much of that time has been at sea?

A. All of that time.

8. Q. How long have you been aboard the WASP?

A. Since recommissioning, sir, in October.

9. Q. Of 1951?

A. That's right, sir.

10. Q. Now, on the night of - the evening of 26 April 1952, did you have a watch?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. What was that watch?

A. That was the quartermaster watch.

12. Q. You were quartermaster of the watch?

A. That's right, sir.

13. Q. And as quartermaster of the watch what were your duties?

A. Keep the log, sir, keep the quartermaster's notebook and weather log, sir.

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14. Q. And what time did you assume that watch?
A. At 1945, sir.

15. Q. Now, directing your attention to approximately 2200?
A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. On the evening of April 26, what was the course and speed of the WASP?
A. The course and speed was 102°, sir, and 25 knots.

17. Q. Who was the officer of the deck?
A. Lieutenant *By*.

18. Q. Will you state to the court, after 2200 when you were on course 102, what orders you heard the Officer-of-the-Deck give to the helm?

A. We were on that course as close as I could get until about 2220 when we changed course and changed speed about the same time to 27 knots.

19. Q. And what orders did you hear the Officer-of-the-Deck give to the steersman?

A. Well, they gave right standard rudder, sir. I'm not too sure of that.

20. Q. Your impression is that right standard rudder - ?
A. Yes, sir.

21. Q. Did you observe the rudder angle indicator?
A. No, sir, I was writing in the log at that time.

22. Q. You were engaged in writing in the log, by that you mean the quartermaster's notebook?
A. Notebook, yes, sir.

23. Q. Did you hear Mr. *By* give any change of speed orders?
A. Yes, sir, to change speed to 27 knots, sir.

24. Q. Did he do that by an order to increase so many turns or was the order to 27 knots?

A. I believe, sir, he rang up turns for 27 knots.

25. Q. Did he ring them up on the engine order telegraph?
A. Yes, sir.

26. Q. Were you in a position to observe whether that order was promptly answered by the engine room?

A. Yes, sir, it was promptly answered - I mean I could hear the bells which acknowledged from the engine room - it was acknowledged.

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27. Q. Now, after that order of right standard rudder, do you know whether the steersman reported the fact he was settled down on any particular course or not?

A. No, sir, I couldn't say for sure, sir.

28. Q. Do you know whether the ship ever settled down on any -

A. I believe it did, sir, I wouldn't be too sure about that either.

29. Q. It is your impression that it did steady on course?

A. Yes, sir.

30. Q. Do you know the course?

A. 260.

31. Q. Did you hear any orders as to the helm relating to a course of 250?

A. Yes, sir. To my impression 255, as coming around into the wind and the wind, I believe, the wind was 255. It would have been better to pick up planes at that course.

32. Q. Who issued that order?

A. I believe Lieutenant B-6.

33. Q. Do you know - remember the wording of that order?

A. No, sir, I don't.

34. Q. Do you know whether the ship had changed its heading in response to that order by the time of collision?

A. I couldn't be sure of that, sir.

35. Q. And what was the next order you heard?

A. Well, that was.

36. Q. After that?

A. The speed change, sir, right after that.

37. Q. What was the speed change after Mr. B-6 ordered change - regarding 250 - 255?

A. I wasn't too sure of that, sir.

38. Q. To refresh your recollection, wasn't the speed order given at the same time the order to change course to 260 or do you know?

A. I don't know that, sir.

39. Q. What was the next order you heard?

A. Well, the next order I heard, sir, was the "EMERGENCY BACKING DOWN OF ALL ENGINES", sir.

40. Q. And who gave that order?

A. I believe Captain B-6

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41. Q. Was it promptly rung up on the engine order telegraph?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
42. Q. By whom?
A. By the lee helmsman, sir.
43. Q. Was it promptly answered by the engine room?
A. Yes, sir.
44. Q. Did you hear the bells?
A. I heard the bells.
45. Q. Did you hear the helmsman - lee helmsman sing out that it had been answered?
A. Yes, sir.
46. Q. And then what was the next thing you saw or heard?
A. Then the next thing was the crash, sir, then we had stopped all engines and Captain *B* had ordered all engines stopped.
47. Q. That was after - - -?
A. Almost immediately.
48. Q. After the collision?
A. Yes, sir.
49. Q. Did you hear any orders relating to collision quarters?
A. Yes, sir, that we gave collision quarters on the ship - on the whistle, sir, immediately.
50. Q. On the ship's whistle?
A. A blast on the ship's whistle.
51. Q. How many blasts of the ship's whistle?
A. That was after - I think two. W
52. Q. After collision?
A. The minute we collided.
53. Q. Who gave that order, sounded two blasts on the ship's whistle?
A. Captain *B* ordered the collision blast and then collision quarters. That is as close as I remember.
54. Q. Did you see anybody pull the whistle?
A. I think I heard - yes, sir.
55. Q. Did you hear any other emergency order given by the commanding officer?
A. Yes, sir, to get all life rafts - let them go.

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56. Q. Light ship?

A. Light ship, yes, sir.

57. Q. Fire and rescue party?

A. Yes, sir, damage control.

58. Q. The smoking lamp is out?

A. Yes, sir.

59. Q. Various other orders?

A. Almost immediately, sir.

60. Q. I hand you a document marked Exhibit 67 and - what purports to be the quartermaster's notebook for the 20 to 2400 watch on 26 April, and purports to be signed by B-

Is that your signature?

A. Yes, sir.

61. Q. Is this document the one you were using as the quartermaster's notebook?

A. Yes, sir.

62. Q. In which you were making entries that you just mentioned?

A. Yes, sir.

63. Q. I notice that starting with 2220 - will you read to the court all the entries through the entry at 2247?

A. Yes, sir. "2220 - Have course change 250° True."

64. Q. 2220?

A. Yes, sir. The speed change I didn't get in there. At 2220 I crossed out "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY." "2222", I crossed out 2220, I realized at 2220 we made the course change. I have 2224 collision with the U. S. S. HOBSON, that was wrong - I crossed all that and made a correction, that was on my own, sir. "2229", I have "lowered all life boats." "2237, number 2 raft boat in the water." "2238," that was the word I got, I had not actually observed that. Well, here "2222, was away fire and rescue party;" and "2245, sighted raft of men abeam to starboard." "2245, deck and fire parties report three men in the water on the port side," - that was at "2247."

65. Q. I notice at 2220, you have "changed course 250°", does that - was that course change in error?

A. Yes, sir, it was.

66. Q. Is the time, I think you testified that course change should be 260?

A. 260.

67. Q. And you're positive of that?

A. Yes, sir.

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68. Q. Is the time accurate?

A. Well, it is as accurate as I could get it. It is a little hard to see the clock - it was pretty dark even though the radium dial, I mean that was fairly close, sir.

69. Q. Did you make that 2220 entry before or after collision?

A. Well, that was before we changed course, sir.

70. Q. I know.

A. Yes, sir, that was before.

71. Q. You actually made that entry after collision?

A. Yes, sir. I was just about to finish logging a summary court-martial report, sir.

72. Q. Prior to making this entry 2220 you were logging an entry relating to the publication of the findings and sentence of a summary court-martial of certain summary courts-martial cases?

A. That is right.

73. Q. Were you actually engaged in writing that entry at the time of collision?

A. No, sir. I had just about finished when we changed course. See, I mean, I noted the course change then I finished right up - I had just finished it when the collision --.

74. Q. That -- What I'm not clear on in your testimony, B-6, is this course change at 2220?

A. 2220, that is right, sir.

75. Q. Did you actually make that entry in this book before or after collision?

A. No, that was before collision.

76. Q. You actually write it down before collision?

A. Yes, sir.

77. Q. Now, the entry "ALL ENGINES STOP - BACK EMERGENCY"?

A. Yes, sir.

78. Q. Was that entered before or after collision?

A. Well, all engines back emergency was before the collision, sir, and all engines stop was the time we hit.

79. Q. That was the sequence in which they came. Did you actually write the entries in this book before or after the collision?

A. "ALL EMERGENCY BACK", I wrote down before.

80. Q. You mean you actually wrote that down before? - I'm not trying to confuse you.

A. No.

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81. Q. ⁷⁶ what I'm trying to get at, did you actually do this writing, first the 2220, did you actually do that before collision?

A. That was a course change, yes, sir.

82. Q. Now, the entry that you wrote 2220, and a line is drawn through it and 2222 written?

A. That is right.

83. Q. "ALL ENGINES STOP" and "BACK EMERGENCY", did you actually write that entry before or after collision?

A. Well, "ALL EMERGENCY BACK", that was before, sir.

84. Q. You mean you actually wrote it down before the ships collided?

A. Yes, sir, that is when we backed down emergency.

85. Q. You immediately wrote it down, the ships at this time had not collided?

A. That is right, sir.

86. Q. And had you looked at the clock when you wrote down this 2220 entry?

A. Yes, sir.

87. Q. And you put that time down to the nearest minute?

A. That is right, sir.

88. Q. Then where you have got the entry 2222, is that 2222 your best judgment of the time or did you decide later that it was the time or did you look at the clock when you wrote that entry down?

A. Yes, sir, I looked at the clock, sir.

89. Q. You looked at the clock and wrote down the time; you are positive of that - get it straight, I'm not trying to confuse you - take your time on this. You actually looked at the bridge clock and the bridge clock was 2222?

A. That is right, closest I could see it, sir. I mean it was - it was dark in there, sir, it has a radium dial - I was a little excited at the time.

90. Q. And could you actually see the clock or is that your best judgment?

A. That was my best judgment by the clock, sir, to the exact minute.

91. Q. And then this entry that you've got, 2222, that was scratched through?

A. Yes, sir.

92. Q. And 2224?

A. 2222, I'm pretty sure was a course change, but the collision - I looked at the clock - I was a little nervous at the time.

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93. Q. As a matter of fact, you feel certain of the 2220 time?
A. Yes, sir.

94. Q. You're not certain of these other times?
A. Yes, sir.

95. Q. And these lines through these figures and the error in the figures as you first wrote them down was due to your excitement?
A. Yes, sir.

96. Q. At the time?
A. Yes, sir.

97. Q. And you are not certain about those times?
A. No, sir.

98. Q. And you are not certain about the lapse of time between BACK EMERGENCY and the collision?
A. No, sir.

99. Q. And you're not certain about - or are you - whether the collision occurred before the Captain gave the order - before the order "STOP ALL ENGINES"?
A. Only immediately, sir, when we hit.

100. Q. After you hit, that's when he gave the order?
A. Yes, sir.

101. Q. "ALL ENGINES STOP"?
A. Yes, sir, that is as close as I can remember.

102. Q. I'm asking because you've got "ALL ENGINES STOP" before collision?
A. No, sir, that is not correct, sir.

Cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

103. Q. ⁷⁶ from your resume' of the events as they occurred as the WASP began her turn do you feel that your ship was backing down for over a minute before she hit?
A. Oh, yes, sir, I believe so.

104. Q. And how long would you say it backed down after the collision occurred?-did she continue?
A. I couldn't be too sure of that.

105. Q. About a minute?
A. Yes, sir.

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Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

106. Q. Did you take the weather observation entered in the log?

A. Yes, sir.

107. Q. All those were furnished?

A. From the time I went on watch.

108. Q. How often did you make those?

A. Made them on the hour.

109. Q. On the hour?

A. Yes, sir, but the wind report came from aerology every time the OD asked for it. That was probably about ten or fifteen minute intervals.

110. Q. You are the one who made the observation regarding the condition of the sea?-so forth.

A. Yes, sir.

Neither counsel for the court, the court nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. *B-6* *B-6*, deck seaman.

2. Q. Branch of service?

A. U. S. Navy.

3. Q. Present duty station?

A. U. S. S. WASP.

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4. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, B-6 ?
A. Seven and one-half years.

5. Q. All active duty?
A. All active duty.

6. Q. How long have you spent at sea?
A. About five years or a little better.

7. Q. And when were you attached to the WASP?
A. October 23, 1951.

8. Q. Did you have any watch on the night - the evening of April 26?
A. I did.

9. Q. What watch?
A. I had the 20 to 24 hundred helmsman watch.

10. Q. Now, directing your attention to approximately 2200 on the evening of April 26, please state to the court what course you were on and what orders you received from the Officer-of-the-Deck or the Commanding Officer?

A. At approximately 2200 we were on course 102° and some time after that we made a course change. I believe the orders came from the Captain - I wouldn't say too sure because I couldn't see too well.

11. Q. What order?
A. First "right standard rudder" and after the ship started swinging to the right the word came that the new course would be 260.

12. Q. And what degree rudder angle did you use to execute that order "RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER"?
A. I used ten degrees standard rudder.

13. Q. How long in the turn did you maintain that ten degree right rudder?
A. About to 246° on account of the ship had been steadily swinging pretty good - easing your rudder there.

14. Q. Easing the rudder on 246°?
A. Down towards zero.

15. Q. And then what other orders did you hear?
A. Came to about 250° - 255°, got the order to "meet her". I put the rudder left ten degrees.

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16. Q. Then what?

A. I seen that wasn't going to check it. I put it a little more. The ship's heading stopped at about 261°.

17. Q. 261°?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. And had she steadied on 261° - 260°?

A. When the ship's heading swung back to the left, to 260°, then I received the order to come left to 250°.

19. Q. And had you started to come left to 250°?

A. The ship was already swinging back to 260° when I received the order to come left to 250°. I didn't use much rudder, it was already swinging to the left.

20. Q. You maintained ten degrees right rudder?

A. No, sir, I didn't use ten degrees, I didn't want to use it to start the ship swinging back and forth.

21. Q. I thought you said you used ten degrees - ?

A. When the ship was swinging I used ten degrees or a little more to check the ship, stop the swinging of the ship.

22. Q. Then you eased off again?

A. After the ship had stopped easing back to 260°, you take your rudder back, ease her back down.

23. Q. At that point what rudder angle were you using?

A. It was coming back to 260°, I eased the rudder down to zero. When I received the order to 250° I moved the rudder back to the left about seven degrees to carry it on over.

24. Q. Seven degrees left rudder?

A. About that, yes.

25. Q. And then what was the next order you heard either to the helm or to the engines?

A. After first starting to the left I heard the order to the lee helm "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK".

26. Q. And what was the heading of the ship at that time?

A. We had only swung left three degrees - four degrees from 261°.

27. Q. And then what, if any, orders were given to the helm at that time?

A. None; the last order given to me was come left to 250°.

28. Q. And what did you do when the order "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY" came?

A. I left the rudder right where it was, seven degrees left - slightly swinging left when the collision occurred.

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29. Q. And do you know the ship's heading when you struck?
A. If I remember correctly it was 275°.

30. Q. 275°?

A. 257.5°. I couldn't be sure. If I'm not mistaken that is what it was.

31. Q. You didn't or did you see the HOBSON at any time before collision?

A. When the order "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY" happened I looked out the port hole and I saw a red light, I thought it was just a plane or something. It never crossed my mind being the HOBSON or anything. I didn't pay much attention.

32. Q. Off the port bow?

A. Directly in front. It was directly right straight ahead of us.

33. Q. Could you estimate the lapse of time between "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY", and collision?

A. It was a very short period of time. I would say it was a matter of just a few seconds or maybe a minute.

34. Q. Are you certain that your heading - you are certain the heading of the ship was not to the left of 257° at the time of collision?

A. No, sir.

35. Q. You're positive of that?

A. I'm positive of that.

36. Q. In answering this just answer "yes" or "no". Did you hear any message transmitted over the voice circuit while you were on watch?

A. No, sir.

37. Q. And did you hear the order "collision quarters"?

A. I did.

38. Q. Was a whistle signal sounded?

A. I don't believe it was. I believe it was just passed.

39. Q. Do you recall whether it was before or after the collision that the order was given "ALL ENGINES STOP"?

A. I think that was after the collision.

40. Q. Did you hear various other emergency orders, smoking lamp is out, man overboard?

A. Yes, sir.

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41. Q. Man all life boats--man all boats?
A. I did, sir.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, and present duty station.

A. 3-6 , boatswain's mate third, D-6 . USS WASP.

2. Q. And you are U. S. Navy?

A. Yes, sir; U. S. Navy.

3. Q. State briefly your Navy experience?

A. Just deck seamanship.

4. Q. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. Six years.

5. Q. And what duty have you had?

A. Destroyer duty and repair ships.

6. Q. How long have you been aboard the WASP?

A. September.

7. Q. September, what year?

A. --October of '51.

8. Q. Did you have a watch aboard the WASP on the night of April 26, 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. What was that watch?

A. Boatswain's mate of the watch.

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10. Q. State to the court everything you heard in the way of an order and everything that you observed from the time of about 2200 on that evening?

A. Well, taps - I piped taps. The next word I heard was "change course to 260°."

11. Q. Who gave that order?

A. The Officer-of-the-Deck.

12. Q. Go ahead, what others?

A. Ring up 208 RPM's. The next word I heard was "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK."

13. Q. Any other orders?

A. "ALL ENGINES STOP."

14. Q. Did you hear any orders by the Officer-of-the-Deck or the Commanding Officer regarding steadying on any particular course?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. Did you notice the ship's heading on the repeater during any of this time?

A. No, sir.

16. Q. Did you hear any order given regarding 250° course?

A. No, sir.

17. Q. Do you have any ideas as to the length of time between the order "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK" and the time of collision?

A. I don't - just a matter of seconds.

18. Q. You wouldn't be able to estimate the time?

A. No, sir.

19. Q. Did you hear the Commanding Officer give any other orders after collision quarters?

A. Yes, sir, let go all life rafts.

20. Q. And there were other emergency orders given?

A. Yes.

21. Q. Did you pass any words on the voice circuit during your watch after 2200?

A. Yes, sir, all the drills.

22. Q. Name the particular drills which you did order?

A. Well, collision quarters, fire and rescue orders, smoking lamp is out, let go all life rafts.

23. Q. Do you recall any word - order regarding man overboard?

A. Yes, sir. The port side - man overboard, port side.

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24. Q. How about light ship?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. Did anybody man the searchlights?

A. Turned on all searchlights.

26. Q. Do you recall any other orders?

A. No, sir.

27. Q. What was the general attitude of the watch during this period after all engines emergency back was given, were the members of the watch relatively alert, excited or what would you say?

A. They were calm, sir.

28. Q. You would say they were calm?

A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

29. Q. Did you ever see the HOBSON prior to the collision?

A. No, sir, I didn't.

Neither counsel for the court, the court nor the parties to the inquiry desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to ~~state~~^{say}.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. *B-6* *B-6*, quartermaster striker on the signal bridge

2. Q. Your service number is *B-6*

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. And to what vessel are you attached?

A. The WASP.

4. Q. And were you attached to the WASP on the 26th of April, 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

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5. Q. How long have you been in the Navy?

A. October 13 of '50.

6. Q. How much of that time has been spent at sea?

A. Since the WASP was put in commission. - September.

7. Q. September?

A. September 10, '51.

8. Q. September 10, 1951. Did you have a watch on the evening of 26 April 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. And what was that watch?

A. I was JX circuit talker for the starboard searchlight - talker over the JX, the port and starboard searchlights each had phones on.

10. Q. JX sound power^{ed} phones?

A. Yes, sir. WJG

11. Q. Were you wearing a headset?

A. Yes, sir, just a headset.

12. Q. And speaker?

A. Yes, sir.

13. Q. And those phones were connected with what?

A. Starboard searchlight.

14. Q. Were any other stations on that circuit?

A. Not that I know of, sir.

15. Q. And where were you stationed?

A. In conn.

16. Q. On the open bridge or in the - - ?

A. In the pilot house.

17. Q. Did you see the HOBSON before the collision?

A. When the Captain gave the order "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY" I saw a light coming across - I thought it was a plane, then we hit, then I knew it was a ship.

18. Q. When the Captain gave "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK", you saw the red light moving?

A. Yes, sir, from port to starboard.

19. Q. Across your bow?

A. Yes, sir.

20. Q. Then came the collision, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

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21. Q. Up until that time you hadn't seen the HOBSON at all?
A. I might have seen it before I was on watch.

22. Q. Minutes preceding this accident?
A. No, sir.

23. Q. Did you hear any of the orders transmitted to the helmsman or to the engine room?
A. I heard the order to the engine room to back.

24. Q. I mean before that order? - Hear any others?
A. I heard - I couldn't repeat the orders because I wasn't there for that purpose. I heard some orders given out - I couldn't repeat the orders as was given, sir.

25. Q. And what did you do after the collision?
A. Well, I asked the Captain - I think, "Should I turn on the searchlight - port searchlight and starboard searchlight?" And it was a matter of seconds before one came on - a short circuit or something, it didn't go on right away. I took orders from there on from most of the officers out there on how to train the searchlights.

26. Q. You asked the Captain after he had given the order?
A. I believe it was the Captain.

27. Q. He had previously given the order to man searchlights?
A. Passed the word, "Man the searchlights - port and starboard searchlights."

28. Q. Do you know anything, *B-6* of events leading up to this collision?
A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

29. Q. When you looked up and saw this light where was it in relation to the bow?

A. Port, sir, cutting across - it all happened so fast. I thought it was a plane at first. I looked around and it hit about that time. When it hit I was kind of shook up - went out on the bridge for awhile. I came outside and the HOBSON's bow was on the starboard side just going down - the remaining - I remember seeing the "26", the last thing.

30. Q. Did you look up as soon as you heard the order - the order to the engine room on the engine order telegraph?

A. Yes, sir. I was back on the starboard side of the bridge, sir.

31. Q. How long would you estimate it was between that time and the collision?

A. I couldn't say off-hand. I couldn't give the approximate time on that, sir.

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32. Q. Do you have any idea how far on the port bow the light was?

A. I couldn't say, sir.

33. Q. No estimate of the bearing?

A. I couldn't give a direct estimate - I couldn't say anything. At that time I was on the port side, it was dark and - light in the dark, I can't estimate the distance away. I would say the bearing was 350 - 350.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. *B-6*, RDSN, U. S. S. WASP, U. S. Navy.

2. Q. And were you attached to the WASP on April 26, 1952?

A. That is correct.

3. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, *B-6*?

A. Been in the Navy on active duty since May, 1951.

4. Q. That is your original active duty with the Navy?

A. On active duty.

5. Q. How much of that time has been spent at sea?

A. I have been to sea just on the WASP.

6. Q. And when did you become attached to the WASP - when were you ordered to report to the WASP?

A. I reported to the WASP a couple of weeks before she was commissioned.

7. Q. Some time in September - August or September of 1951?

A. Around August.

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8. Q. Of 1951?

A. Yes, sir, that is right.

9. Q. Did you have any watch on the evening of April 26, 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. And what was that watch?

A. I had the CIC watch from 2000 to a quarter to ten, and a quarter of ten until 12 at the bridge.

11. Q. You had the CIC watch from - -?

A. That was a split watch.

12. Q. From 2000 to 2145?

A. That is right, sir.

13. Q. And then from 2145 what watch did you have?

A. Bridge watch.

14. Q. What were your duties on the bridge?

A. My duties on the bridge was to man the LJS phone, relay messages from combat to the conn.

15. Q. Otherwise you were relaying - you are speaking of a JS phone, sound-power phone that you wore on your head - a headset in the pilot house?

A. (The witness indicated in the affirmative.)

16. Q. You were connected with combat?

A. That is right.

17. Q. And where did you say you were in the pilot house - you were stationed in the pilot house?

A. That is right, sir. 909

18. Q. Do you recall any orders that were given or with your headset could you hear any orders given by the Officer-of-the-Deck to the helmsman during the time you were on watch in the pilot house?

A. I couldn't get the orders clearly as the helmsman himself would probably get them.

19. Q. Did you hear any at all?

A. Only course changes.

20. Q. What course changes did you hear?

A. I heard change to course 250°, and left to 260° - 250° right rudder. I couldn't hear too well.

21. Q. You heard "right rudder"; was the order "right standard rudder" - "standard right rudder" or was it to come to 260°, or do you recall?

A. I don't recall clearly.

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22. Q. Do you recall any other orders to the helm other than that order you say "come right to course 250 - 260"?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. While you were the talker on the bridge, did combat pass up any information to relay to the Commanding Officer or the Officer-of-the-Deck?

A. Not to my knowledge, sir.

24. Q. If combat had passed up any such information would it ordinarily have come over the phones you were wearing?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. And during the time you were on watch from 2145 to the time of collision, you got no information whatever from combat over the sound-power^{ed} phones you were wearing?

A. I can't remember any, sir. wq

26. Q. Were any questions asked combat by anyone in authority on the bridge that you remember?

A. I can't think of any.

27. Q. Do you recall hearing the Commanding Officer issue the order "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY"?

A. I recall that.

28. Q. And then what happened or what did you see that took place?

A. When I heard that order, I looked out of the hatch that was - or the port hole rather that was in front of me, sir, and I saw a red light. The first thing that came to my mind was "it was a plane", then right after there was a rumble - a rumbling.

29. Q. A rumble, a distinct rumble?

A. I saw the mast swing over the starboard bow with the red light on, then a sheet of metal, what appeared to be a sheet of metal shot right up out of the water on the starboard bow then faded away. wq

30. Q. Piece of metal shooting up; do you know whether that was the bow of the HOBSON?

A. Probably was. I was so confused, bewildered, I didn't know.

31. Q. Do you recall anything else in connection with this incident?

A. Right after I witnessed that, I pulled my head back in and I'm not sure whether it was my imagination or what but I remember a flash - no explosion - two or three flashes.

32. Q. That is all you remember?

A. Yes, sir.

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Cross-examined by Lieutenant B-6, a party:

33. Q. Do you have any station other than combat on your phones?

A. There is combat, lookouts and several other stations. Combat and lookouts are usually the only stations that I received.

34. Q. Just because the others didn't make any report is that the reason you don't hear them?

A. That is correct.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B-6, a party:

35. Q. Did you hear anything come in from the lookouts after the commencement of this turn?

A. All they were reporting was approaching planes, bearings and relative ranges.

36. Q. Didn't you hear any - - didn't you hear any report on surface ships during that time?

A. No, sir.

37. Q. Sure about that?

A. Yes, I can't remember any.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

38. Q. You heard no - in other words, if I understand your testimony correctly you received or sent no transmissions over your phone during the time you were on watch in the pilot house?

A. I received those plane contacts.

39. Q. Plane contacts?

A. Gave them right to the Officer-of-the-Deck.

40. Q. No information about surface contacts?

A. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

Examined by the court:

41. Q. Did you receive any communication shortly before the collision relative to any radar being out of commission?

A. No, sir, I don't believe so.

Cross-examined by Captain B-6, a party:

42. Q. You said you are not sure you did; you're just not positive, is that it - one way or the other? In answer to the court's question you said you were not sure - the question on surface contacts?

A. The question on surface contacts?

43. Q. Yes.

A. I'm not positive - I'm not positive.

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44. Q. You were asked a question by the court as to whether you got word over the phone shortly before the collision that the radar was out; what was your answer?

A. I'm not sure of receiving a message.

45. Q. You say you are not sure?

A. Yes, sir.

46. Q. Then my next question was: You're not sure whether you did or not - sure whether you didn't?

A. That is right, sir.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness. wpf

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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B-6 yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number and present duty station.

A. *B-6*, seaman apprentice, *B-6*, deck division

2. Q. State the branch of service to which you belong? U. S. Navy, or U. S. Naval Reserve?

A. U. S. Naval Reserve.

3. Q. And to what vessel are you attached?

A. USS WASP.

4. Q. Were you attached to the WASP on 26 April 1952?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

5. Q. How long have you been on active duty or how much active duty have you performed in the Navy?

A. About 14 months.

6. Q. And how much of that has been at sea?

A. 9 months.

7. Q. Then, when did you report to the WASP?

A. About March 20th.

8. Q. 1952?

A. Yes.

9. Q. Did you have a watch on the evening of 26 April?

A. Yes, I did.

10. Q. What was that?

A. Messenger watch.

11. Q. Where?

A. On the bridge.

12. Q. On the open bridge?

A. No, in the pilot house.

13. Q. Directing your attention to about 2200 of 26 April, was the WASP on a course of 102?

A. Yes, it was.

14. Q. Then, did you hear any orders to the helm to change course?

A. YES.

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15. Q. What were those orders?
A. Change course to 260.
16. Q. Was the order CHANGE COURSE TO 260 given or was a rudder order given? RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER?
A. I think it was 260 - course 260.
17. Q. What was the next order you heard?
A. It was to change course to 250.
18. Q. Do you know whether the ship had reached course of 260 before the order came to change course to 250?
A. No, I don't.
19. Q. You weren't watching the gyro repeater?
A. I wasn't really watching it, no.
20. Q. And after the order to change course to 250, did you look at the repeater then?
A. Yes.
21. Q. And what was the heading of the ship at that time?
A. 259.
22. Q. And you continued to watch the gyro repeater?
A. No, I didn't.
23. Q. Did you hear any other order given to the helm or to the engines?
A. The next order I heard was ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK.
24. Q. Then what happened?
A. Then I saw the collision.
25. Q. The collision occurred?
A. Yes, sir.
26. Q. Do you know the reading of the gyro repeater at the time of the collision?
A. I would say it would be around 257. The ship had started swinging to the left before we hit.
27. Q. Did you observe the compass?
A. No, I didn't.
28. Q. Do you know of any other events that took place on the bridge during this period, Bates?
A. Well, just the emergency orders for the collision.
29. Q. Various emergency orders after the collision?
A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B6 party:

30. Q. Did you ever see the HOBSON before the collision?
A. No, sir.

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Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. Seaman, U. S. Navy.

2. Q. And you are attached to the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. Were you attached to the WASP on 26 April 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, ?

A. Well, I reenlisted. I was out 4 years and went out into the Reserves and came back in. No, that was September 8, 1951.

5. Q. How much of your time have you spent at sea?

A. Well, after I left the Receiving Station at Norfolk, I was there about 2 weeks, I came aboard the WASP.

6. Q. Did you have a watch on the evening of April 26, 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. What was that watch?

A. I was helmsman under instruction.

8. Q. And you were on the engine order telegraph?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. On what is known as the lee helm?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. Starting at about 2200 on the evening of April 26, will you state to the court everything you heard, saw and did? All the orders you heard? Just what happened?

A. Well, before we changed course we were at 189 rpms, flank speed, and then when we got the change of course we went to 208 rpms, flank speed. I don't remember the course--the degrees.

11. Q. It was a change of course?

A. Yes, sir.

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12. Q. You went to 208 rpms. How many knots would that be?

A. I think that is 27 knots. And then they had a small change of course. I don't remember that.

13. Q. In what direction?

A. To the left. And about that time - - I mean it was maybe a minute after - - I had just got his course change and then I got the order ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK.

14. Q. And did you promptly ring that order up?

A. I rung it up on one and the guy standing beside me rang up the other.

15. Q. What was his name?

A. B-C.

16. Q. And did the engineroom promptly acknowledge that?

A. Yes, sir.

17. Q. ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. Go ahead. Then what happened?

A. Well, the next I think was the collision itself. And then collision quarters, I think, was sounded and then ENGINES STOP. I rung up one of those and the other lee helmsman rung up the others.

19. Q. And those orders were promptly acknowledged?

A. Well, one of them was not. I had to call down for that one.

20. Q. That was the stop signal?

A. Yes, sir, but it answered up right after I called down.

21. Q. But you don't recall any of the changes in course, but you do recall that there was some changes in course?

A. Yes, sir, but I don't remember the degrees.

22. Q. And you don't know the heading of the ship at any time during that period; how far she swung one way or the other?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. Is that all you know about this incident?

A. Well, except the orders for life rafts.

24. Q. Various emergency orders given after the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B-C, party:

25. Q. Did you see the HOBSON prior to the collision?

A. No, I didn't.

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Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: Well, when we hit it seemed like to me it was stopped. I mean, after it hit it seemed like we stopped.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

26. Q. In other words, you think immediately after you hit the ship lost headway, is that it?

A. That's right, sir.

27. Q. Have you anything further?

A. That is all.

Cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

28. Q. Could you estimate how fast the ship was going when it struck?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. First name first?

2. Q. Yes.

A. *B-6*, seaman, *B-6*, USN.

3. Q. Attached to the USS WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, Wagner?

A. I have been in the Navy 5 years.

5. Q. How much of that time has been spent at sea?

A. I just joined the WASP in June, 1951, I was a reserve for 4 years.

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All redactions
are B-6

6. Q. You were in a precommissioning detail of the WASP?
A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. And your only sea duty was since the WASP put to sea, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. Did you have a watch on the WASP on the evening of the 26th of April?
A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. What was that watch?
A. Lee helmsman.

10. Q. Were you on duty there with B-6?
A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. On the engine order telegraph?
A. We switched around. We were instructing him.

12. Q. Will you, starting with about 2200 on the night of 26 April, state to the court everything you observed or did and the orders you received?

A. I had just turned the wheel over to just before the change of course to recover the aircraft, and I was standing between him and - between him - the wheel and the console, and Mr. gave the order STANDARD RIGHT TEN DEGREES.

13. Q. STANDARD RIGHT RUDDER?

A. RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER, and then told him that the course would be 260. I wasn't observing much then and I was calling off the degrees. When we got near 260 he told him to come left to 250.

14. Q. Mr. told the helmsman that?

A. Yes, sir, and after that I heard the Captain give the order EMERGENCY BACK. I took the starboard engines and took the port and we rang up EMERGENCY BACK, and then the Captain said, "Sound the collision." I sounded the collision. I didn't know it was a ship at the time. I thought it was an airplane, and just after he gave the EMERGENCY BACK I looked up and saw this red light going by forward and I thought it was an aircraft because we were talking about some aircraft having trouble. After I sounded the collision, I still thought it was an aircraft, and I went out on the starboard side and saw that it was the HOBSON.

15. Q. Now, when you rang up the order ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY, was it promptly answered on the engine order telegraph that you were manning?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. And as the ship was swinging into its turn from 102 to 260, you say was continuously singing out the reading of the compass as it came around?

A. If I remember right, he was.

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17. Q. Do you recall if he ever informed Lieutenant *BE* that the ship was steady on 260?

A. No, sir.

18. Q. Had it come to 260 by the time - - -

A. No, sir, I don't remember.

19. Q. You don't remember?

A. No.

20. Q. Do you know what the heading was at the time of the collision?

A. No, sir, I don't.

21. Q. And this red light you spoke about passing your bow was going from port to starboard?

A. Yes, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness made the following statement: The Captain gave the orders to EMERGENCY STOP. Number 2 shaft did not respond right away.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

22. Q. That was on the stop signal?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. The stop order?

A. EMERGENCY STOP was given and it did not answer up right away. We had to contact main control and from there told him number 2 did not answer right away, then it answered up.

24. Q. Anything further?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 1730, adjourned until 0830 the next day, 15 May 1952.

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SIXTH DAY

U. S. Naval Supply Depot
Bayonne Annex,
U. S. Naval Base,
New York, New York
Thursday, 15 May 1952.

The court met at 0830.

Present:

Rear Admiral , U.S. Navy,
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, and
Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, members.

Lieutenant Commander , U.S. Naval Reserve
counsel for the court.

Commander U. S. Navy, advisor to the
counsel for the court.

Lieutenant U. S. Naval Reserve, assistant to
counsel for the court.

Captain , U. S. Navy, party to the in-
quiry and his counsel.

Commander , U. S. Navy, counsel representing
Lieutenant Commander William J. Tierney, U. S. Navy.

Lieutenant , U. S. Naval Reserve, party
to the inquiry and his counsel.

Lieutenant U. S. Naval Reserve, party to the
inquiry and his counsel.

, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were
present.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly
sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court.

1. Q. State you name, rank, serial number, branch of service
and your present duty station.

A. Commander U. S. Navy, USS
WASP, navigator.

2. Q. Would you describe your naval and marine experience?

A. I began flight training in 1939, going through Pensacola
in 1940; finishing there in March 1941; I reported to VP71.

3. Q. When were you commissioned?

A. I was commissioned in January 1941. I reported to VP71 in
March 1941, spending those months until--until December 9, 1941,
in the North Atlantic. The squadron then being transferred to
the Pacific. I remember that--Getting a little ahead of myself
there. I remained in VP71 in 1943 until we split the squadron,
half of us going to VB-104 until November

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(continued.) 1943 when I went to the Staff of Commander Air South Pacific. I remained there until February 1944 when I returned to the States. I went to the Naval Air Station, Hutchinson, Kansas, remaining there until April 1946. Then transferred to FAETULANT, remaining until 1948 when I went to Line School, General Line School in 1949. I went to the University of North Carolina, in the NROTC unit there until 1951. I was transferred to ComAirLant for temporary duty before reporting to the WASP and I have been on the WASP since it was commissioned. wpl

4. Q. In September 1951?
A. In September 1951.

5. Q. And you were aboard the WASP on the 26th of April 1952 at the time of collision?
A. That is correct.

6. Q. Where were you at ^{the} collision?
A. I was in the chart house. wpl

7. Q. Have you, at the request of the counsel for the court, prepared certain data, tactical data, with regard to the WASP?
A. I have. wpl

8. Q. Will you produce them, sir?
A. Here they are.

The reporter was requested to mark the document containing the tactical data, Exhibit 82 for identification. It was so marked.

9. Q. On what were these figures based?
A. Based on tactical data derived by the David Taylor Model Basin on tests with the USS ORISKANY. These tests were made--I believe they were made in the early part of 1950. It doesn't have a date, the exact date of the test. Early part of 1951. The ORISKANY is the sister ship of the WASP. Our characteristics are the same as far as the hull is concerned.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel of the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 82.

10. Q. I have shown the exhibit to the parties --

LIEUTENANT B-6 One question I would like to ask. What speed is the stopping ~~time~~ based on? wpl

WITNESS: Based on 25 knots.

Examined by the counsel for the court (continued):

11. Q. This is computed with six boilers on the line?

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A. Yes; the line from which that was taken gave the curves which I used with 500 to 525 pounds of steam, gauge steam, and we had 600 pounds so we were using full backing power that night, and the curves from which I took that data are applicable to that steam pressure.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

12. Q. Will you read into the record the tactical data on Exhibit 82 and make any elaborations thereon you desire?

A. The average rate of swing--that is the average rate of the change of degrees determined from the tactical data, is approximately 47.4 degrees per minute, change in heading at a speed of 25 knots.

13. Q. With rudder angle of?

A. Rudder angle of 10 degrees, and at that speed the tactical diameter is 1540 yards. The transfer at that rudder angle and speed is 620 yards. The advance is computed to be 1320 yards. Time and distance to stop from the time that all engines backed emergency has been given and with at least 500 pounds of steam pressure, is computed to be 135 seconds before the ship is dead in the water, and the distance that it would probably travel before stopping, at an approach speed of 25 knots, is considered to be between 1050 and 1100 yards.

Cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

14. Q. In the deceleration data, is the time measured from the instant it--the order is given from the bridge?

A. It is determined at the instant that the signal on the annunciators is rung up: ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK.

Examined by the court:

15. Q. Commander, you testified that this data is measured from the moment it is rung up on the engineroom telegraph. Now, think carefully; is this correct? Suppose that the engineroom was slow in handling the throttle.

A. There is, of course, a human element, Admiral, which would offset these figures. The data that this is derived from is computed from the time it was received in the engineroom and the throttlemans actually performed these manuevers at that time.

16. Q. You mean these figures are computed the moment the engineroom executes the signal?

A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Captain B-6, party:

17. Q. Is it from the time that you execute this signal in the engineroom or from the time that they receive the signal in the engineroom?

A. The data, as determined in the book, has the execution and the performance of that execution practically simultaneous. In other words, the people are alerted that there will be this backing manuever, so it must appear to be that when the order is rung up on the engine order telegraph, there is no delay except that human delay.

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18. Q. There is an allowance made for the individual times of these figures, is there not?

A. It is not indicated, but there is a lag, although it does not indicate it in the data. It is computed from the time of the execution and the engineroom performs that execution practically simultaneously.

19. Q. You say practically. When is the stop watch started down there in that test?

A. These figures were computed and the following qualification is made: "Delay in execution by the throttle was reduced to a minimum by having the throttlemans alerted and standing by for the signal from the bridge."

20. Q. They took that factor into consideration by having him alerted, but what I am getting at; the time after they were alerted, considering the time--a very short period between the moment the signal was received in the engineroom and the moment being alerted, they got over and worked the throttle?

A. That is correct. The curves indicate a delay--No, the curves do not indicate a delay from the moment the order to execute and the actual actuating of the throttles.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

21. Q. Then, as I understand you, sir, the times and distance that you have given are from execution?

A. From execution.

22. Q. Of the signal?

A. Yes.

23. Q. By the engineroom?

A. Yes.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

24. Q. I hand you a document that has been introduced as Exhibit 72, and ask you if it was the chart in use aboard the WASP at the time of collision?

A. It is.

25. Q. It is really a navigational plot, rather than a chart, isn't that correct?

A. It has my navigational plot on it. It is a plotting sheet.

26. Q. Was it the only chart in use at the time?

A. Yes.

27. Q. By whom were these drawings and fixes made on this chart?

A. All were made by myself.

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28. Q. And it shows the track of the WASP up to the point of the collision?

A. It does.

29. Q. And shows the correct latitude and longitude of the collision?

A. The DR track.

30. Q. What was the last fix you took, sir?

A. My last fix was at 1640.

31. Q. And how did you obtain that fix?

A. By sunline.

32. Q. And the rest of the track is a dead reckoning track?

A. It is a DR track.

33. Q. Commander, as navigator, do you know whether, at the time of collision, there was any error in the various clocks in the engineroom, on the bridge, in combat, between true local zone time?

A. I have no reason to believe that there were.

34. Q. Immediately after the collision, or a short time thereafter, do you know whether any check was made of these clocks with local zone time?

A. No; no check was made by me or my quartermasters of the clocks as to their accuracy.

35. Q. In other words, there could be some variation between the time shown on the clock in the engineroom and the time shown on the clock on the bridge and the clock in combat?

A. There could have been a variation.

36. Q. Do you know whether, on the evening of the collision, there had been any night orders written for that night?

A. There had been no night orders written.

37. Q. But a night order book is kept aboard the WASP, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

38. Q. And just hadn't been written up for that night?

A. Night orders are generally not written until operations are over with and they were not over with that night.

39. Q. Now, will you give your opinion as to the state of training of the officers and crew aboard the WASP with particular reference to the men in your division?

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A. Well, I consider the quartermasters to be, largely, very competent. I have one chief petty officer. I have four first class petty officers, two of them recently made. I have nine rated men, with the total of twenty-six men. I consider that at the present time I have a competent division of quartermasters. I consider that my assistant navigator is well qualified in navigational matters.

40. Q. In general, what is your opinion as to the state of training of the officers and crew of the WASP?

A. In my opinion, I think the training is very high.

41. Q. Was a gyro record book being kept, sir?

A. It was.

Recross-examined by Captain *R. K.*, party:

The reporter was requested to mark a dispatch Exhibit 83 for identification. It was so marked.

42. Q. You have testified in regard to the state of training and readiness of the officers and men aboard the WASP. Without asking you to read aloud at this moment, would you glance at this and tell me if you recognize that dispatch?

A. Yes, I do. I received a copy of it.

43. Q. Would you tell from whom it was sent and to whom it is addressed?

A. It is from Commander Destroyer Flotilla FOUR to USS WASP.

44. Q. Will you tell me the date this message was sent?

A. It was sent on 23 April 1952.

Captain *B. W.*, party, submitted the dispatch to the other parties, to the counsel for the court and to the court, and offered said dispatch into evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 83.

45. Q. Before I ask you to read this, will you tell the court to what this message relates?

A. It is a result of the activity on the part of the WASP. Shortly after leaving Norfolk we engaged in flight operations with the Task Unit of which Commander Destroyer Flotilla FOUR was the OTC. We conducted these operations in the search, as I recall, for the rest of the Task Group coming down from Boston to rendezvous with us. This dispatch is the result of our flight operations at that time.

46. Q. Who was the OTC of the group involved during flight operations?

A. Captain *B. W.* was OTC during flight operations.

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47. Q. How many destroyers were involved with the WASP in that flight operation under Captain ¹³⁻⁶ command?

A. I believe there were about eight.

48. Q. Were there not nine destroyers actually involved in that
A. I cannot remember the exact number of destroyers.

49. Q. To the best of your knowledge, it was eight or nine?
A. Eight or nine, yes, that is correct.

50. Q. Now, would you again read from whom the message was sent, to whom it was sent and read the message itself?

A. This message: "From ComDesFlot FOUR; to: USS WASP; routine message in plain language, dated 23 April. YOUR SHIP WAS HANDLED AND YOUR PLANES WERE FLOWN IN TRUE VETERAN STYLE X YOU ARE CERTAINLY READY FOR THE MED X"

Reexamined by the court:

51. Q. Commander, do you have a routine on board ship for checking and setting the clocks each day?

A. Not every day, Admiral. Our clocks are 8-day clocks. They are all wound and checked each week. CIC clocks, bridge clocks, pilot house clocks and engineroom clocks are checked daily.

52. Q. Were there any errors, and if so, then state them, in the master compass or any of the bridge repeaters on the night this collision occurred at the time of the collision?

A. There were no errors in the bridge repeaters and the master compasses.

53. Q. Referring to the message you have just read, what time were those flights conducted--day or night?

A. Conducted at dawn, sir.

54. Q. Can you amplify that? Dark? Daylight?

A. It was daylight.

55. Q. Will you state to the court all you know about this collision and the events immediately preceding the collision?

A. I was in my chart house where I had previously, or rather just before we began to conduct flight operations, trying to see if I could pick up the Task Group on radar. I knew that we could perhaps be within radar range of them and I wanted to check my position. I knew we were planning to recover planes at 2250. At 2220, my quartermaster called and gave me the change in course. During flight operations I always attempt to keep a fine hand plot of our position because if we are conducting flight operations at very frequent intervals quite an error in the DR can result because of the tactical diameter of the ship, almost 3/4 of a mile at every turn, so during flight operations, I have attempted, in my navigation to keep as fine a hand plot of our position as I can. I was standing by the chart desk when the quartermaster gave me course 260. When I received that, I watched the repeater until it appeared to be steady on the course and then I

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(continued.) plotted it. I had just plotted my change of course when I felt the impact of the collision. I, at first thought we had had a plane crash and I went out and looked up on the flight deck until they sounded collision quarters, at which time I went through the pilot house on the wing of the bridge and saw that we had collided with the ship.

56. Q. Did you note the time you felt the impact of the collision?

A. No, sir; I did not note the time I felt the impact of the collision. But from experience, I have found that it takes approximately five minutes to make a turn of 180 degrees. And the time that we executed or rather the quartermaster called me, we were changing course, it was 2220, and I would say that the collision occurred in the vicinity of twenty-five minutes past 10:00 o'clock.

Recross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6* a party:

57. Q. Up to the collision had anybody reported to you that the turn had been completed and that you were on your new course?

A. No, I do not get that information from the quartermasters. I was watching my repeater and when I see that it is steady, I know that we are on our new course.

58. Q. Did you notice the heading of the ship at the time of the collision?

A. At the time of the collision, no; but just prior to it the heading was 260. I watched it enough to see the repeater steady down on that course.

Recross-examined by Captain *B-6* a party:

59. Q. In addition to the dawn operation that you mentioned, was this message also in regard to operations on the afternoon of the 22nd, flight operations?

A. I would presume so. We conducted flight operations on the afternoon prior to that and we had afternoon flight operations and operations the next morning. *ms*

60. Q. And during these operations also, Captain *B-6* had command of this group of destroyers you referred to?

A. He was the OTC during the flight operations.

Re-examined by the court:

61. Q. Do you know whether the flight operations and the launching which preceded the recovery were conducted in darkness or daylight?

A. We took off at about 2030. There may have been a faint light at that time, but I do not recall, Admiral. I hardly doubt it though.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

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