3 September 1987

Fourth Endorsement on RADM Grant Sharp, USN, ltr 5102 Ser 00/S-0487 of 12 Jun 87

From: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
To: Secretary of Defense

Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

Ref: B1

1. (U) Forwarded.

2. (U) The proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer, as modified by the subsequent endorsers, are approved.

3. 

B1

4.

B1

William J. Crowe, Jr.
ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY
CHAIRMAN

CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES
DECLASSIFY OADR
UNCLASSIFIED

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on RADM Grant Sharp, USN, ltr 5102
Ser 00/S-0487 of 12 Jun 87

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Secretary of Defense
Via: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

Ref: (b) CNO ltr Ser 00/7S300177 of 24 Jun 87 to CINCLANTFLT
(c) GC, DoD memo to SECNAV dtd 1 Jun 87 (NODAL)

1. (U) Forwarded.

2. (U) I have reviewed the basic investigation and, except as noted below, concur in the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as modified in the first endorsement.
   a. B1
   b. B1
   c. B1

Classified By: Multiple Sources
DECL: OADR
Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

d. B1

e. B1

f. BS/B6

3. (U) By copy of this endorsement, the following commanders
are directed to take the indicated recommendations for action:

a. B1

b. B1

c. (U) COMNAVSUPSYSCOM:

B-5

d. ( ) COMNAVSEASYSCOM:

B-5

referred

above to the Fleet Commanders and COMNAVSUPSYSCOM, respectively,
for action.
Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

e. (U) CNET: All B1 SAR, medical response, and casualty recommendations.

f. (U) CINCLANTFLT: Recommendation C-5 (additional awards).

g. B1

h. B1

4. B1

5. (U) As requested and by reference the Secretary of the Navy is compiling the information and records necessary to support the U.S. Government claim against Iraq for all damages resulting from the attack on USS STARK.

6. (U) The Navy will continue to review and assess lessons learned -- positive as well as negative -- from this incident. This will be an ongoing process with after-action initiatives and corrective action being taken when warranted.

7. (U) The primary focus of this report is correctly on STARK itself. The larger questions concerning the chain-of-command structure best suited to providing effective operational command and control over MIDEASTFOR units are being examined separately.

8. (U) Finally, I am free, however, to personally recognize the exceptional individual courage and competence exhibited by the surviving STARK crewmembers involved in her damage-control effort. Their action was in keeping with the highest Navy traditions and most probably saved the ship.

C. A. H. TROST
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Copy to:
SECNAV
USCINCCE
CINCLANTFLT
CINCPACFLT (complete)
CINCUSNAVEUR (complete)
CNET (complete)
COMNAVSUPSYSCOM (complete)
COMNAVSEASYSCOM
COMUSNAVCENT
COMIDEASTFOR
SECOND ENDORSEMENT ON Rear Admiral Grant Sharp's ltr of 12 June 1987

From: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
To: Secretary of Defense
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Operations
(2) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 May 1987 (U)

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded.

2. (U) By this endorsement, the Chief of Naval Operations is requested to review, comment on, make recommendations and take such action as he may deem appropriate with respect to all aspects of subject investigation as may be within his responsibility.

WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.  
ADMIRAL, US NAVY  
CHAIRMAN

Copy to:  
SECDEF  
USCENTCOM  
COMNAVCENT  
COMMIDEASTFOR
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: USS STARK Investigation

The procedures followed in the subject report are approved and the report is returned for any additional action that may be appropriate, particularly with respect to the recommendations contained therein.

The Department of the Navy is assigned responsibility for custody of the report and for response to public inquiry.

Attachment

cc: CJCS

RECEIVED

SF-20
8-11-86
HH 4-16
1987

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED
FIRST ENDORSEMENT ON Rear Admiral Grant Sharp's ltr of 12 June 1987

From: Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
To: Secretary of Defense
Via: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
ATTACK ON USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

1. (U) Readdressed and forwarded.

2. (U) The proceedings of the investigation are approved. The
findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations are approved except as
noted below:

a. B5/

b. B5

B1

c. B1

UNCLASSIFIED
3. (U) The following actions by USCINCCENT apply to the recommendations in the investigation:

a. (U) Appropriate action to implement recommendations A-1.3, A-1.6a, and A-1.6d will be taken in the near future.

b. 

c. (U) Recommendation A-1.6c will be implemented periodically as determined by CMEF.

GEORGE B. CRIST
General, USMC
Commander in Chief

Copy furnished to:
1. CNO
2. COMNAVCENT
3. COMMIDEASTFOR
From: Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, USN
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Central Command

Subj: FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON THE USS STARK (FFG 31) ON 17 MAY 1987 (U)

Ref: (a) USCINCCE CENT Appointing Order of 19 May 1987

Encl: (1) Record of Proceedings (w/List of Effective Pages) / Exhibits
(2) USS ACADIA 031800Z Jun 87 (U)
(3) USS ACADIA 061610Z Jun 87 (U)
(4) USS ACADIA 061048Z Jun 87 (U)
(5) COMNAVSEASYSCOM 022230Z Jun 87 (U)
(6) CDR BAMC FT SAM HOUSTON TX 052140Z Jun 87 (U)
(7) B
(8) B-LB
(9) COMIDEASTFOR 242157Z MAY 87 (U)
(10) COMIDEASTFOR 211945Z MAY 87 (U)
(11) USS WADDELL 181125Z MAY 87 (U)
(12) COMNAVSurfFlant Damage Assessment Team Leader Memo of 9 Jun 87 (U)
(13) B5/B6
(14) B6
(15) Affidavit of JAGC, USNR of 9 Jun 87 (U)
(17) B1

1. (U) As directed by reference (a), a formal investigation was convened on 26 May 1987. The original record of proceedings and additional documents are forwarded as enclosures (1) through (17).

2. (U) The Investigating Officer, after inquiring into all facts and circumstances connected with the incident which occasioned the investigation, and having considered the evidence, submits the following executive summary of attack, preliminary statement, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations:

Executive Summary of the Attack

1. (U) On the evening of 17 May 1987, shortly after 2100 local and while on routine patrol in the central Persian Gulf, USS STARK (FFG 31) was hit by two Exocet anti-ship cruise missiles. The missiles were fired by a single Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter. The
attack was unprovoked and indiscriminate. STARK was--and had been--in international waters, well outside the Iraqi and Iranian declared war zones.

3. (U) After gaining radar contact and ESM, STARK's combat information center kept a constant, real-time track of the aircraft. The Iraqi fighter changed course and speed several times. Each change brought the fighter closer to STARK. When the aircraft was thirty miles away, the fighter turned east and flew toward STARK. Less than five minutes later, the ship was hit by two Exocet cruise missiles, the second missile arriving 30 seconds after the first.

4. (U) When the Iraqi fighter first began closing STARK's position, the Tactical Action Officer and other watch standers assumed the aircraft would fly benignly by, passing no closer than 11 nautical miles from STARK. The watch organized themselves to collect data for the Marine-Air Report they would later be required to submit. The Tactical Action Officer gave little or no credence to the possibility that the Iraqi fighter would indiscriminately attack STARK, even though it was known to be capable of firing Exocet with a nominal range of 38 nautical miles.

5. (U) The Executive Officer entered CIC on routine business approximately five minutes before the attack occurred; and, he remained in CIC near the TAO station until the first missile hit. He did not inform himself of the tactical situation; and, therefore, did not feel that there was anything remiss in the way the watch was responding to the Iraqi fighter. The Executive Officer took no steps to redirect the actions of the TAO nor did he direct that the Commanding Officer be summoned to CIC.

6. In the waning minutes prior to the attack, the TAO attempted to increase STARK's combat readiness; but, it was too late.

When the aircraft began its attack run, the position of weapons' Control Officer was vacant. Before the position could be properly manned, the Mirage had already fired both Exocets and the first Exocet was nearing its terminal phase. The Fire Control Technician assigned to operate the MK-92 STIR fire
control radar and Close In Weapon System (CIWS) had previously left CIC on personal business; and, at the time of the attack, that position was also vacant. The Automatic Detector-Tracker system for the air search radar was inoperative: the STIR fire control radar was in stand-by and the MK-92 CAS fire control radar was in search mode and was never used to lock-on to the aircraft until the missiles were seconds away from impact; the Super Rapid Bloom- ing Offboard Chaff (SRBOC) was not armed until seconds before the first missile hit; and the CIWS was still in stand-by, having not

7. **At the time of missile launch, the AN/SPS-49 two dimension- al air search radar and the MK-92 CAS search radar were the only radars being used to track the aircraft. No fire control radars were locked-on and tracking the aircraft.**

9. **The Commanding Officer was aware that an Iraqi fighter was flying a ship attack profile southeasterly, over water, from Iraq toward the central Persian Gulf. He had visited CIC approximately 50 minutes prior to the attack and was informed about the Iraqi aircraft being reported by AWACS. About 15 minutes before the attack occurred, the Captain was on the bridge; and, he asked the JOOD to find out why COONTZ was reporting the Iraqi fighter's position, yet STARK had not detected the aircraft on radar. At that time, COONTZ had been reporting the aircraft's position every 3 to 5 minutes; and, according to the Commanding Officer's recol- lection of events that evening, his last known position of the Iraqi aircraft placed it approximately northwest of STARK and closing the ship. The Captain was not advised when CIC gained radar contact on the Iraqi fighter. At about 2058 local, the Commanding Officer left the bridge and went to his cabin, where he remained until the first missile hit.**

10. **(U) STARK never fired a weapon nor employed a countermeasure, either in self defense or in retaliation. Thirty seven members of STARK's crew died as a result of the attack.**
Preliminary Statement

1. (U) The investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on USS STARK (FFG 31) was conducted from two different perspectives. Rear Admiral David N. Rogers, USN, Deputy Director for Current Operations on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed a joint U.S.-Iraqi investigation conducted in Baghdad, Iraq, for the purpose of determining how, and under what circumstances, the Iraqi pilot executed the attack on STARK. Rear Admiral Grant Sharp, USN, Commander Cruiser Destroyer Group TWO, was appointed on 19 May 1987 by General George B. Crist, USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, to be the investigating officer for this formal investigation.

2. (U) The formal investigation was conducted in port Manama, Bahrain, first, aboard USS LASALLE (AGF 3), the flagship of Commander Middle East Force, and, later, aboard USS ACADIA (AD-42). In both cases, STARK was moored outboard the host ship.

3. (U) Rear Admiral Sharp, and an investigating team comprised of six officers, arrived in Bahrain on the evening of 20 May 1987. The investigation began on 21 May 1987; and, formal hearings were convened commencing 26 May 1987. STARK's Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Tactical Action Officer and CIC Watch Officer were designated as parties to the investigation. Formal hearings were completed and the investigation was closed on the evening of 05 June 1987.

4. (U) Concurrent with the formal hearings, a staff delegation from the U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee came to Bahrain and conducted an informal investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack on STARK. Their informal investigation lasted approximately three days. Parties to the formal investigation, acting on advice of their counsel, chose not to make statements to the staff delegation.

5. (U) The investigation by Rear Admiral Sharp inquired into all the events which occurred prior to, during and following the attack. There were specific, technically complex issues that required the investigating officer to call upon the professional expertise of the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, Navy laboratories and intelligence agencies located in the United States and to also use on-scene assistance teams and technical representatives. Particular issues that fell within this category included:

a. (U) Capability of the F-1 Mirage fighter aircraft to carry two Exocet cruise missiles.

b. [Incomplete entry]
c. B1

d. B1

e. (U) Determination of the operational status, and operational modes employed, for each of the above systems as they existed in STARK on the night of 17 May 1987.

6. (U) As the investigation progressed, the statements and testimony of the witnesses were woven together, along with transcriptions of various radio telephone transmissions, to form a chronology of the attack.

7. (U) In compiling the chronology, it was necessary to reconcile inconsistencies in time among different sources. The Narrow Band Secure Voice transmissions prior to the attack were recorded aboard USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG 29). In order to weave these radio transmissions into the chronology, it was necessary, in some cases, to advance the times recorded in STEPHEN W. GROVES' records by one minute. In other situations, events began in one particular interval and carried over to the next minute interval. When this happened, the event was placed into the chronology as close as possible to other events which were known to be occurring simultaneously with the original event.

8. (U) Certain items relevant to the investigation were not available to the investigating officer. Requests were submitted asking that the information be provided to Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command for inclusion in the report of investigation as appropriate. Those items include:

   a. Copies of medical record entries and undated reports of condition of the two injured personnel transferred to the United States for treatment, requested by enclosure (2).

   b. A detailed report of damage and cost to restore STARK to full mission capability, requested by enclosure (3).

   c. Autopsy and pathology reports, requested by enclosure (4).

9. (U) There are some inconsistencies among the exhibits because, as the investigation progressed, there were discoveries that increased the level of knowledge of the investigating team with regard to specific events and circumstances. The findings of fact, opinions and recommendations contain the investigating officer's best estimate of the evidence on record at the end of the formal investigation.
10. (U) Enclosures (5) through (17) contain information relevant to the investigation, but obtained or prepared after the adjournment of the investigation hearing.

11. (U) All times listed in the findings of fact and opinions are local time.

Findings of Fact

A. (C) Attack and Response: This section incorporates the body of facts concerning the mission, rules of engagement, combat systems equipment, combat systems doctrine and actions associated with the attack on STARK.

1. (U) STARK received an operations, ROE and Intel Brief from COMIDEASTFOR Staff in Djibouti 28 February 1987 prior to inchoping to Middle East Force. The brief addressed Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the potential threat to U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf. (CAPT B-6, p 13.)

2. (C) The CMEF Intelligence Briefer discussed how to recognize the classic Iraqi Ship Attack Profile (SAP). (CDR Brown, p 33.)

3. (C) The ROE briefer highlighted that the probability of deliberate attack on U.S. warships was low, but that indiscriminate attack in the Persian Gulf was a significant danger. (CAPT B-6, p 13.)

4. (C) The ROE briefer stated that ships were obligated to inform unknown aircraft of their identity and position in order to limit the possibility of indiscriminate attack. (CAPT B-6, p 11.)

5. (C) MEF ROE at the time of the attack were contained in CMEF OPORD 4000-85 and in COMIDEASTFOR 210719Z AUG 86. They provided, in pertinent part, that:

   a. "... the Commander has not only the right, but also the responsibility to take all possible measures and precautions to protect his unit."

   b. 'Nothing in these rules or in the absence of guidance herein, will be construed as preventing the responsible U.S. Commander from taking such action as is required by military necessity to defend his installation, aircraft, ship or unit from attack, or the imminent threat of attack.'

   c. "A Commanding Officer has the right to use necessary and proportional force in self-defense against the use of"
e. "Potentially hostile contacts shall be requested, via channel 16, 121.5 MHz, 243.0 MHz or any other available means, to provide identification and intentions."

f. "The initial communication with potentially hostile, unidentified air contacts should be a request for identity and intentions ..." (See finding 59 for the required content of the request) Requests for identity and intentions should be repeated until a satisfactory response is received or until a warning is appropriate. (See finding 63 for the warning requirement.)

g. "...

h. "You must ... be prepared to take graduated action as a situation develops. Do not stop after just one step: If there is no response to radio requests/warnings, do something to attract attention. Subsequent warning actions to be taken include:

i. "We do not want, nor intend, to absorb a first attack."

6. (U) ROE modifications have been issued subsequent to the 17 May 1987 attack on STARK.

7. (U) CMEF OPERATION ORDER 4000 requires ships to submit air warning reports called Marine-Air Reporting System (MAREPS) to CMEF whenever a ship issues a warning to an unidentified aircraft.

8. (U) MAREPS messages from STARK indicate that the ship had not locked-on with fire control radar to any aircraft prior to the attack since reporting to CMEF.

9. (U) CMEF sends updated Persian Gulf intelligence to ship's in MEF by two message systems: the weekly intentions message and the bi-monthly or as-necessary Force Intelligence Advisory. STARK received both these types of messages. (CDR. 26)

10. CMEF message 141902Z MAY 87 stated that the Iraqis had conducted a ship attack profile (SAP) in the central Persian Gulf and that CMEF expected the trend to continue at a low to moderate rate over the next two weeks. STARK received this message prior to the attack. (Exhibit 13.)
11. CMEF bi-monthly Force Intelligence Advisory message 161305Z May 87 discussed the Iraqi SAPs flown on 13 and 14 May 87 below 27-30 north latitude. This message, which was received by STARK before the attack, highlighted the possibility of an indiscriminate attack. (Exhibit 14.)

12. The CMEF Assistant Intelligence Officer discussed the Iraqi SAPs of 13 and 14 May 87 during a CMEF Intelligence briefing 16 May 1987. STARK's Commanding Officer attended this brief. (LCDR p 58.)

13. (U) STARK got underway from Manama, Bahrain, at approximately 0800 on 17 May 1987 and proceeded enroute to Radar Picket Station-South (RPS-South). (Exhibit 37, p 1; CAPT p 11.)

14. Two SAPs were flown by Iraqi aircraft on the morning of 17 May 87, prior to the attack on STARK. These SAPs were flown south of Farsi Island.

16. (U) On the evening of 17 May 1987, at approximately 2100, while on routine patrol in the central Persian Gulf as a naval unit assigned to the operational command of Commander Middle East Force (CMEF), STARK was hit by two EXOCET cruise missiles. Both missiles approached the ship from approximately 270 degrees true (330 degrees relative). (Exhibit 32, sec 4 of 5, p 1.)

17. (U) Both EXOCET cruise missiles were launched by a single Iraqi F1 "Mirage" fighter aircraft.

18. (U) At the time of the attack, STARK was in international waters, in position 26-47N/051-55E, well outside the Iraqi and Iranian declared war zones. (Ship position was reconstructed by plotting the satellite navigation position obtained at 2100 and dead reckoning along a course of 300 degrees true for 9 minutes using the speed recorded in the Engineering Bellbook.)

19. (U) Lieutenant U.S. Navy, was on watch in STARK's Combat Information Center (CIC), and had been for over an hour prior to the attack, serving as the TAO. (LT p 322.)

20. (U) ENS U.S. Navy was on watch in STARK's CIC, and had been for over an hour prior to the attack, serving as the CICWO and WCO. (ENS Wright, p 289.)
23. The AWACS assigned NTDS track number 2202 to the track associated with the Iraqi aircraft.

31. COONTZ routinely reported via NBSV that track number 2202 was an Iraqi aircraft flying a "ship attack profile." (Exhibit 131, p 5, 6, 7.)
32. (U) COONTZ's NBSV radio transmissions to COMIDEASTFOR were monitored in STARK's CIC. (Exhibit 131, p 10, 11.)

33. (U) At about 2015, STARK's Commanding Officer stopped in CIC and was briefed that there was an Iraqi aircraft flying over water in the northern Persian Gulf, heading south. The Commanding Officer, in CIC, told LT 1 B6 (TAO) to keep a close eye on track 2202. He reminded the TAO that a number of recent Iraqi sorties had been going further south. The Commanding Officer then departed CIC. (CAPT Brindel, p 391, 392.)

34. (U). At about 2024, USS STARK commenced a full power run, on course 300 degrees true. (Exhibit 37, p 5.)

35. (U) At about 2031, the Commanding Officer arrived on the bridge. (Exhibit 37, p 5.)

36. (U) At about 2050, FC3 B6, who was the WCC-1 (CAS) and CIWS Operator in CIC, departed CIC to go to the head. He did not notify either the TAO or the CICWO. FC2 B6, who was the senior Fire Control Technician on watch, gave permission for FC3 B6 to go to the head. (FC2 Collins, p 136.)

37. (U) At about 2055, the CO, on the bridge, asked the JOOD why CIC did not have radar video on the Iraqi aircraft. (CAPT Brindel, p 392.)

38. (U) At about 2055, the bridge called CIC on the 21MC requesting to know why STARK did not hold radar video on NTDS track 2202. In response to this, OS1 B6 reached over the shoulder of OS3 B6 who was the CIC Air Detector Tracker, and switched the SPS-49 air search radar to the 80 NM mode. (OS1 Duncan, p 102.)

39. (U) At about 2057, after CCS reported that the full power demonstration was short and not entirely successful, the Commanding Officer left the bridge and went to his cabin. (CAPT Brindel, p 392.)

40. At about 2058, on NBSV, CMEF asked all MIDEASTFORCE ships whether they held any ESM or other track data on the current Iraqi ship attack profile, track 2202. USS COONTZ responded negatively. (Exhibit 131, p 8.)

41.

42. (U) At about 2100, OS3 B6, who was the CIC Surface Detector Tracker, reported a surface contact to the bridge phonetalker/status board keeper.
Officer \( \beta \) \( ^{4} \) reported again at time 2104. The contact was bearing 298 at 21,100 yds on a course of 120, speed 8 knots. CPA of 200 degrees true at 1000 yds. This contact was later evaluated as a false contact by using the MK 92 CAS as a second source of confirmation. (OS3 \( \gamma \) , p 179, 180.)

43. \( \beta \) At about 2101 OS1 \( \beta \) was at the ASAC console. He had detected radar video \( \beta \)  

OS1 \( \beta \) correlated the video as being track 2202, but entered a new 'Air Unknown' symbol on the video (NTDS track number of the new symbol is unknown). He then directed OS3 \( \beta \) to assume responsibility for tracking the new radar contact. OS1 \( \beta \) remained at the ASAC console and prepared to record data for a MAREP regarding the aircraft. Commencing at 2101, OS3 \( \beta \) maintained a continuous real time track of the aircraft using the SPS-49 radar until impact of the first missile. (OS1 \( \beta \) p 102108.)

44. (U) At about 2102, OS1 \( \beta \) told LT \( \beta \) that the aircraft contact would have a 4 NM CPA. (OS1 Duncan, p 106.)

45. \( \beta \)

46. (U) At about 2103, when the F-1 was 43 NM from USS STARK, OS1 Duncan requested permission from LT \( \beta \) to transmit a standard warning to the F-1. The warning was to be transmitted on the Military Air Distress frequency. LT \( \beta \) responded to OS1 and said, 'No, wait'. (OS1 \( \beta \) p 106.)

47. (U) At about 2104, LCDR \( \beta \) STARK's XO, entered CIC. He was looking for LT \( \beta \) to discuss administrative matters relating to the Ship Control Department. The XO noticed that LT was busy and so he waited near the chart table to observe events in CIC. (LCDR \( \beta \) p 349, 350.)

48. (U) At about 2104, FC2 sent OSSN from CIC to find FC3 in order to get FC3 back into CIC and on watch. (FC2 Collins, p 136.)

49. (U) At about 2104, CMEF Duty Officer transmitted the following message to STARK via NBSV: 'USS STARK this is COMIDEASTFORCE, are you copying the details on track number 2202 at this time, over.' LT \( \beta \) replied, 'Affirmative, break, time 1302Z \( \beta \) radar video on track 2202. Evaluated Iraqi F-1 break holding radar video on track 2202, over.'
(This report was transmitted less than a minute after COONTZ reported a LAT/LONG position of track 2202 that correlated to STARK.: (Exhibit 131, p 10.)

50. (U) At about 2105, the Iraqi F-1 turned toward STARK. The range from STARK to the F-1 was approximately 32.5 NM. CPA to STARK would be nearly overhead. No one in CIC noticed this turn and that the aircraft was virtually on a constant bearing, decreasing range.

51. (U) At about 2107, the Iraqi aircraft launched the first Exocet cruise missile at STARK. (Exhibit 134, Encl 1, 2.)

52. (U) At about 2107, SN B6 detected radar video on the CAS. The CAS was in search mode. He correlated this video to the Iraqi F-1. (FC2 Collins, p 135.)

53. (U) At about 2107, FC2 B6 detected radar video on the CAS. The CAS was in search mode. He correlated this video to the Iraqi F-1. (FC2 Collins, p 135.)

54. (U) At about 2107, the TAO observed on radar the change in course executed by the Iraqi F-1 (the actual course change occurred approximately one minute before). He realized that the CPA would be very close. He directed ENS B6 to call the Captain; and, he directed OS1 B6 to issue warnings to the Iraqi aircraft. (LT B6, p 326.)

55. (U) At about 2107, ENS B6 attempted to call the CO in his cabin, but received no response. ENS B6 then called the bridge; the Captain was not there either. (ENS B6, p 290.)

56. At about 2107, LT B6 told ENS B6 to man the Weapons Control Officer (WCO) console. ENS B6 stepped over to the WCO console; but the XO was sitting at the console. ENS B6 asked the XO to get up so that he could sit down and assume duties as WCO. ENS B6 then sat down at the console and began to initialize the WCO mode. (ENS Wright, p 290.)

57. (U) At about 2108, the F-1 fired the second Exocet cruise missile at STARK. (Exhibit 140, p 1.)

58. (U) At about 2108, at the direction of the TAO, OS1 B6 made the following radio transmission to the Iraqi F-1 via Military Air Distress frequency: "Unknown aircraft this is U.S. Navy warship on your 078, (pause), for 12 miles, request you identify yourself, over." This transmission is not in accordance with CMEF msg DTG 210719Z Aug 86 (ROE) (Exhibit 140, p 1.)

59. (U) CMEF message DTG 210719Z Aug 86 delineates the exact wording of radio telephone transmissions CMEF units must make to
approaching potentially hostile or unidentified air contacts. The first warning should be a request for identity and intentions with the following transmission: "Unidentified air/surface contact on course--------, speed---------, (altitude----------), you are approaching a U.S. Navy warship operating in international waters bearing --------, range --------- from you. Request you establish communications, identify yourself and state your intentions." (Exhibit 16)

60.

B1

61. At about 2108, EWSN B-4 requested permission from LT B4 to go topside to arm the SRBOC launchers. EWSN B4 then departed from CIC, armed the launchers in about 45 seconds and returned to CIC. Launcher Control was in CIC.

62. (U) Again, at about 2108, at the direction of the TAO, OSL B6 issued the following warning to the Iraqi F-1 via the Military Air Distress circuit: "Unknown aircraft this is U.S. Navy warship on your 076 at 12 miles, (pause), request you identify yourself and state your intentions, over." This transmission is not in accordance with CMEF msg DTG 210710Z Aug 86. (Exhibit 140.)

63. (U) In accordance with CMEF msg DTG 210719Z Aug 86, the following warning will be transmitted if the contact: (1) Fails to communicate and continues to close or; (2) responds only with identity and his intentions are unclear or judged potentially hostile or; (3) Responds with his identity and non-hostile intentions but subsequently maneuvers in a threatening manner. Unidentified aircraft/surface contact (use identity if known) on course-----, speed-------, (altitude----------), you are approaching a U.S. Navy warship bearing--------, range ------- from you. Your identity is not known/your intentions are unclear (one or both), you are standing into danger and may be subject to United States defensive measures. Request you remain clear of me. Request you alter your course immediately to -------to remain clear."
66. (U) Neither LT \textcolor{red}{b} nor FC2 \textcolor{red}{b} brought CIWS into the 'AAW Manual' mode. CIWS was in 'stand-by' mode during the entire attack. \textit{(Exhibit 97, p 2; Exhibit 111.)}

67. \textcolor{red}{b} agreed with FC2 \textcolor{red}{b} s, saying 'Fine'. The XO concurred, saying, "Let him know who we are." \textit{(LT \textcolor{red}{b} , p 330, LCDR \textcolor{red}{b} p 353.)}

68. (U) At about 2109, SN \textcolor{red}{b} called 'MISSILE INBOUND, MISSILE INBOUND' on the JL sound powered circuit. This information was passed to the bridge and to the JL phonetalker in CIC, but not to the TAO in CIC. The Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD), LTJG \textcolor{red}{b} , also saw the missile homing in on STARK. \textit{(SN \textcolor{red}{b} p 253, LTJG \textcolor{red}{b} p 250.)}

69. (U) At about 2109, FC2 \textcolor{red}{b} locked on to the Iraqi aircraft with CAS. The aircraft was approximately 10 NM away. \textit{(FC2 \textcolor{red}{b} p 137.)}

70. \textcolor{red}{b}

71. \textcolor{red}{b} made the following radio transmission on NBSV: 'COMIDEASTFOR this is USS STARX, we have been locked-on to twice......' \textit{(ceased transmission). \textit{(Exhibit 131, p 11.)}}

72. (U) At about 2109 the first Exocet missile hit USS STARX. \textit{(LT \textcolor{red}{b} , p 330.)}

73. (U) At about 2109 General Quarters was sounded from the bridge. LTJG \textcolor{red}{b} observed the second missile inbound; grabbed the IMC and said, 'Inbound Missile, Port Side'. \textit{(LTJG \textcolor{red}{b} p 250.)}

74. (U) At about 2109, LT \textcolor{red}{b} (Support Officer) departed CIC. As he stepped out the door he saw Captain \textcolor{red}{b} coming out of
his stateroom. The Commanding Officer then entered CIC. (LT B-6, p 219, CAPT B., p 393.)

75. (U) At about 2109, the second Exocet missile hit STARK approximately 20 to 30 seconds after the first. (LT B-6, p 219, CAPT Brindel, p 393.)

76. B1

77. B1

78. B1

79. B1

80. B1

81. B1

82. (U) From 2058, when the aircraft was first detected, until 2109 when the second missile hit, STARK never maneuvered to unmask batteries, course remained 300 degrees true. (LTJG B-6, p 247.)

83. (U) No orders to assign weapons or engage the Iraqi fighter were issued by either the XO, the TAO or the WCO. (FC2 B-6, p 139)
84. Weapons systems available to STARK but not employed included:
   a. SM-1 MR missiles.
   b. MK75 76mm gun with 111 ammunition in the rotary magazine.
   c. CIWS with 111 rounds loaded.
   d. 50 Caliber guns.
   e. Super Rapid Blooming Off Board Chaff (SRBOC).

(FC2 p 126, 130, 137; exhibit 111, p 1.)

85. (U) No ordnance was fired in defense of STARK or in retaliation for the attack. (FC2 p 139; SN p 258.)

86. (U) Lieutenant , U.S. Navy, was designated in writing by the Commanding Officer, USS STARK (FFG 31), as a qualified Tactical Action Officer (TAO). (Exhibit 50, p 1.)

87. (U) ENS , U.S. Navy, was designated in writing as a qualified Weapons Control Officer (WCO) and Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO). (Exhibit 49, p 1.)

88. (U) The Executive Officer was authorized in writing to direct the TAO in time of danger or emergency. He could relieve the TAO and should do so should it, in his judgment, be necessary. (Exhibit 38, p 4-16.)

89. (U) The Executive Officer took no action to inform himself of the tactical situation after he entered CIC. (LCDR p 350, 351, 352.)

90. (U) The Executive Officer took no steps to redirect the actions of the TAO. (LCDR p 350, 351, 352.)

91. (U) The Commanding Officer was never informed that the ship had gained radar contact or ESM on the Iraqi aircraft; however, the Commanding Officer did know at approximately 2045 that an Iraqi Military aircraft was approximately 120 NM northwest of STARK, flying a ship attack profile southeasterly over water, toward STARK. (CAPT Brindel, p 393.)

92. (U) Thirty seven enlisted members of STARK's crew died as a direct result of the attack. (Exhibits 128, 65.)

93. (U) The claim by the government of Iraq that, at the time of the attack, STARK was located inside the Iranian declared war zone, is not correct. STARK was 20 NM outside the Iranian declared war zone.

94. 
98. (U) The MK-92 STIR radar was operational and in stand-by; but, was not used to track either the Iraqi F-1 or the Exocet. (FC2 B1 p 127, 136, 137.)

99. [Redacted] previously, the CIWS had intermittently failed Systems Operability Test (SOT) number five. This was later found to be caused by an improperly connected wire in the elevation resolver circuitry. The problem still existed when STARK got underway on 17 May 87. The Commanding Officer and the Combat Systems Department Head were aware of the problem, but did not submit a Casualty Report on the CIWS. (LT B1 p 358; CAPT Brindel, p 391.)

100. [Redacted] The Commanding Officer chose not to submit a CASREP on the CIWS because: (1) he was briefed by his Combat Systems Officer that the CIWS was operational in the Battle Short mode; and, (2) the component that was believed to be defective was on order through the supply system. (CAPT Brindel, p 391)

101. (U) There was a misperception on the part of STARK personnel that CIWS could not be fired for training or pre-action calibration unless the ship was in an area approved for gunnery services. (LT B1 p 360.)

102. [Redacted] STARK had not conducted a CIWS pre-action calibration (PAC) or fired the CIWS for training since 22 MAR 87. (Exhibit 92, p 4.)

103. (U) The maintenance requirement card (MRC) for PAC firing requires a periodicity of R-1M; CIWS was out of periodicity for PAC firing. (Exhibit 92, p 4.)

104. [Redacted]

105. [Redacted]
108. (U) The scheduled combat systems PMS for the week of 27 April 1987 and 4 May 1987 were completed with the exception of three scheduled PMS actions. (Exhibit 88, p 2.)

109. Radar Video Processing/Automatic Detection and Tracking (RVP/ADT) was out of commission and not utilized. (DS2 B-C, p. 266; OS3 B-C, 208.)

110. There was no CASREP submitted on the RVP/ADT. (CAPT Brindel, p 404.)

111. CMEF OPORD 4000 does not provide for procedures to request dedicated aircraft tracking, anti-air warfare or gunnery target services because those services are not available. (CMEF OPORD 4000)

112. The TAO, WCO, and OS1 believed that the set battle condition of readiness aboard STARK was CONDITION III WHITE. (LT B-C, p322, ENS B-C, p 322, OS1 B-C, p 100.)

113. The Commanding Officer believed that the set battle condition of readiness was CONDITION III YELLOW. (CAPT Brindel, p 394.)

B. (U) Post Attack Actions: This section incorporates the facts concerning post attack matters involving search and rescue (SAR), medical response, casualties, damage control, damage and required repairs.

1. (U) Search and Rescue (SAR), Medical Response, and Casualties.

1.1 (U) Five men went through a hole in the skin of the ship forward on the port side and were later picked out of the water. Those men were OSSN B-C, OSSN B-C, FC3 B-C, OS2 B-C, B-C and GMM1 B-C. (Exhibits 64, 57, 68, 69, 70, 128.)
1.2 (U) All five men who went overboard were in Combat Systems Berthing when the missiles hit. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70, 129.)

1.3 (U) Water and smoke entered Combat Systems Berthing from the hatch on the port side, which is the primary egress from the space to Ship's Control Berthing. (Exhibit 67.)

1.4 (U) When crewmen attempted to exit the compartment via the emergency escape scuttle, it opened only about an inch: it was not dogged. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70.)

1.5 (U) ET3 Bl, OS2 Br, and GMM1 Bl helped others don the EEBDs. (Exhibits 67, 129.)

1.6 (U) Visibility in the Ship's Control Berthing was very limited due to the thick smoke in the compartment and the lack of lighting. (Exhibits 68, 69, 70, 129.)

1.7 (U) OSSN Bl, OSSN Br, FC3 Bl, and OS2 Br received electric shocks before escaping from the ship. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70.)

1.8 (U) All five survivors used EEBDs to breathe before going into the water. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70, 129.)

1.9 (U) OSSN Bl, OSSN Br, FC3 Bl, and GMM1 Bl fell out of the ship accidentally. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 129.)

1.10 (U) OS2 Br jumped out of the ship intentionally. (Exhibit 70.)

1.11 (U) OS2 Br, and OSSN Bl found each other in the water and together they found one life ring with a strobe light attached and another life ring with a smoke float attached. (Exhibits 67, 70.)

1.12 (U) LT Br had thrown the life rings overboard. (Exhibit 67.)

1.13 (U) OS2 Br and OSSN Br heard calls from two different directions. When calls from one direction stopped, the men moved toward the others. (Exhibit 70.)

1.14 (U) OSSN Br and FC3 Br used their EEBDs for flotation devices. (Exhibits 68, 69.)

1.15 (U) The four men were picked up by a BDF SAR helo at 2650N/05146E. (Exhibits 67, 68, 69, 70; encl 11.)

1.16 (U) GMM1 Bl stayed afloat alone by swimming on his back until he was spotted by a BDF SAR helo at 2651N/05147E around 0900 and picked up at 0919 by the USS WADDELL. (Exhibit 129; encl 11.)
1.17 (U) Search and rescue and medical response began at about 2145, 17 May, when LCDR B-64, MC, USN, ASU Bahrain received a beeper call and reported to ASU. (Exhibit 64.)

1.18 (U) HC-2 Detachment 2 was notified at about 2150. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.19 (U) LCDR B-64, utilizing one hospital corpsman, HM2 B-64, to assist in getting medical supplies to the airport for further transfer to STARK. Another corpsman, HM1 B-65, stayed at ASU to arrange additional supplies and other details. (Exhibit 64.)

1.20 (U) Medical equipment taken to STARK on the first helo consisted of trauma boxes which had previously been prepared for mass casualty situations. Those boxes contained IV fluids, battle dressings, emergency medical instruments and medications. (Exhibit 64.)

1.21 (U) LT B-64, DC, USS LASALLE, took another set of trauma boxes to establish a casualty receiving area at the Bahrain International Airport (BIA) at 2300. (Exhibit 64.)

1.22 (U) The HC-2 Detachment 2 helo departed BIA at 2300. (Exhibit 63.)

1.23 (U) Reaction time from first notification until lift-off was 1 HR 15 MIN. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.24 (U) Air crew for the flight were:

- LT B-64 - Pilot in command. HAC right seat.
- LT B-64 - HAC left seat.
- ADC B-64 - 1st crew.
- AMHAN B-64 - 2nd crew. Wet swim.

(Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.25 (U) The helo carried extra OBAs and cannisters. (Exhibit 62.)

1.26 (U) USS WADDELL acted as on-scene commander. (Exhibit 62.)

1.27 (U) Radio communications were hampered by many units using frequency 243.0. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.28 (U) The first vectored sent to the helo was to a merchant ship six miles from STARK. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.29 (U) An attempt to establish the bearing to STARK using VHF ADF failed due to the helo's ADF providing an inaccurate indication. (Exhibit 62.)

1.30 (U) The aircrew located STARK when they noticed STARK's beacon. (Exhibits 62, 63.)
1.31 (U) The deck edge lighting worked, but lighting was otherwise inadequate for normal night operations. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.32 (U) LCDR B4 was lowered to the deck around 2345 along with medical supplies, OBAs and cannisters. (Exhibit 64.)

1.33 (U) HM2 B4 stayed on the helo to assist any injured who might be pulled out of the water. (Exhibit 64.)

1.34 (U) Before LCDR B4 arrived, HM1 B4 USS STARK, had set up a casualty receiving area in the hangar because smoke and fire had rendered STARK's medical department inoperative. (Exhibit 64.)

1.35 (U) Initial triage revealed B6 patients and several individuals with relatively minor injuries. (Exhibit 64.)

1.36 (U) When LCDR B4 arrived, the patients had already been receiving treatment from HM1 B4 even though Dickerson himself had B-6 (Exhibit 64.)

1.37 (U) After leaving LCDR B4 on STARK, the HC-2 crew conducted SAR operations for approximately 1 HR 45 MIN with no findings. (Exhibit 62.)

1.38 (U) When the HC-2 helo returned to STARK, the decision was made for the helo to return to BIA and not MEDEVAC the two B-6 patients because so much equipment would have had to be relocated in order for the helo to hover. (Exhibit 64.)

1.39 (U) At daybreak, fires onboard STARK were controlled enough to allow crew and equipment to move forward so the helo could hover over the flight deck. (Exhibit 64.)

1.40 (U) The two B-6 patients were MEDEVACed via the hoist. (Exhibit 64.)

1.41 (U) When LCDR B4 left with the patients the medical situation on STARK was stable and LASALLE was enroute to provide assistance. (Exhibit 64.)

1.42 (U) The two B-6 patients went to Salmaniya Medical Center. The four men rescued from the water by the BDF SAR helo were taken to the Bahrain Air Force Base and then to BDF Hospital. (Exhibits 64, 132.)

1.43 (U) The fifth man was recovered from the water by WADDELL in good condition. (Exhibits 64, 129, 132.)

1.44 (U) After evacuating the two B6 victims to BIA, the HC-2 helo continued to conduct SAR operations until 2100 10 May. (Exhibit 62.)
1.31 (U) The deck edge lighting worked, but lighting was otherwise inadequate for normal night operations. (Exhibits 62, 63.)

1.32 (U) LCDR B-6 was lowered to the deck around 2345 along with medical supplies, OBAs and cannisters. (Exhibit 64.)

1.33 (U) HM2 B-6 stayed on the helo to assist any injured who might be pulled out of the water. (Exhibit 64.)

1.34 (U) Before LCDR B-6 arrived, HML B-6, USS STARK, had set up a casualty receiving area in the hangar because smoke and fire had rendered STARK's medical department inoperative. (Exhibit 64.)

1.35 (U) Initial triage revealed B-6 patients and several individuals with relatively minor injuries. (Exhibit 64.)

1.36 (U) When LCDR B-6 arrived, the patients had already been receiving treatment from HML B-6, even though Dickerson himself had B-6. (Exhibit 64.)

1.37 (U) After leaving LCDR B-6 on STARK, the HC-2 crew conducted SAR operations for approximately 1 HR 45 MIN with no findings. (Exhibit 62.)

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1.43 (U) The fifth man was recovered from the water by WADDELL in good condition. (Exhibits 64, 129, 132.)

1.44 (U) After evacuating the two B-6 victims to BIA, the HC-2 helo continued to conduct SAR operations until 2100 18 May. (Exhibit 62.)
1.45 (U) Only five individuals incurred injuries requiring line of duty/misconduct determinations. All five incurred their injuries as a direct result of the attack. Three individuals incurred injuries which are potentially permanently disabling. Two men incurred injuries which caused them to miss more than 24 hours of duty. (Exhibit 64.)

1.46 (U) FC3

B–6

(Encl 6.)

1.47 (U) FC3

B–6

USN, incurred

(Encl 6.)

1.48 (U) HM1

B–6

B–6

USN, incurred

(Exhibits 64, 124.)

1.49 (U) FC3

B–6

B–6

USN, incurred

He was held at ASU for treatment until he returned to light duty on 30 May 1987. (Exhibits 64, 126.)

1.50 (U) FC3

B–6

B–6

USN, incurred

and returned to full duty 30 May 1987. (Exhibits 64, 125.)

1.51 (U) Recovery and identification of the attack victims began when three bodies were brought to the helo hanger onboard STARK. (Exhibits 65, 66.)

1.52 (U) LT : B–6 DC, led a team in a collection and identification process. (Exhibit 65.)

1.53 (U) Around 1500, 18 May 1987, the team began locating, identifying and transferring bodies. (Exhibit 65.)

1.54 (U) Team members included: LT B–6 DC, Team Leader, USS LASALLE; LT B–6 CHC, USS LASALLE; B–6 USS LASALLE; HM1 B–6 USS STARK, and an unnamed MIA from USS STARK. (Exhibit 65, 66.)

1.55 (U) The team bagged and tagged the bodies where they found them; LT B–6 acted as a recorder. (Exhibits 65, 66.)
1.56 (U) HM1 Bic and the MAA Petty Officer were the only STARK crewmembers utilized in the recovery and identification process. (Exhibits 65, 66.)

1.57 (U) The team dealt with only one body at a time and searched only one space at a time. (Exhibit 66.)

1.58 (U) If the two STARK Petty Officers could not agree on a visual identification, the team made a preliminary identification from other clues such as clothing stencils, jewelry engraving or initials, outer clothing stencils and the position in the compartment in relation to known bunk assignments. Some bodies were not identifiable locally. (Exhibit 65.)

1.59 (U) Twenty-three bodies were recovered and moved to LASALLE on 18 May. (Exhibits 65, 66.)

1.60 (U) Twelve bodies were recovered and moved to LASALLE 19 May. Another bag of body parts collected 20 May. (Exhibit 65.)

1.61 (U) The majority of bodies and parts were found in berthing space 2-100-01-L. (Exhibit 65.)

1.62 (U) Three bodies wearing EEBDs were found in the Ship's Control Berthing compartment (second deck) near the hatch connecting the 2nd and 3rd decks. (Exhibit 65.)

1.63 (U) Three bodies were found outside RICER. (Encl 16.)

1.64 (U) Three bodies were found in the Combat Systems Berthing compartment (third deck). (Exhibit 65.)

1.65 (U) Two bodies had been found face down in the water on the deck of the Combat Systems Berthing area by GM1 soon after the missiles hit and before he escaped. (Exhibit 129.)

1.67 (U) Three bodies in the Chiefs' Quarters appeared to have been killed by the heat or flame of the first missile. (Exhibit 65.)

1.68 (U) All bodies were transferred from STARK to LASALLE as they were found. (Exhibits 65, 66, 132.)

1.69 (U) On 20 May all bodies and remains were transferred from LASALLE to the AV-UNIT at BIA for loading onboard a C-141 for transfer to the U.S. Army Mortuary, Frankfurt, Germany. (Exhibits 65, 66, 132.)

1.70 (U) Bahraini officials waived the normal procedures for removing remains from Bahrain. (Exhibit 132.)
1.71 (U) Identification procedures used in the U.S. Army Mortuary, Frankfurt, Germany revealed that the remains of 36 people were received. The names of those 36 people are:

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<th>NAME</th>
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(Exhibit 128.)

1.72 (U) One person, OSSN (C6) , USN, (C6) is still missing at the time of this report and is presumed dead. (Exhibit 66.)

1.73 (U) OSSN (C6) was not identified by U.S. Army Mortuary, Frankfurt, Germany as being among the remains recovered. (Exhibit 128.)

1.74 (U) OSSN (C6) was not killed in the initial blast. (Exhibit 67.)
2. **DAMAGE CONTROL**

2.1 **(U)** STARK commenced a full power build-up at 2024; the material condition of readiness was YOKE. *(Exhibit 37.)*

2.2 **(U)** Engineering plant status at time of the hit was: NR 4, 5 firepumps OOC; 1A/B main engines on line; following auxiliaries in operation: NR 1, 3, 4 SSDG parallel in a ring bus; NR 1, 2, 3 firepumps; NR 1 HPAC; NR 1 LFAC; NR 1, 3, SFC (400Hz); NR 2 SFC in Standby. *(Exhibit 37.)*

2.3 **(U)** The first missile entered the port side of the ship at frame 110 but did not explode. Parts of the missile traveled through the ship and created a hole in the starboard hull exiting 20' forward of frame 172. The warhead was found on the second deck at frame 171. The second missile entered the ship at about the same location as the first missile and exploded about three feet inside the skin of the ship. *(Exhibit 79.)*

2.4 **(U)** Structural damage from the two missile hits is evidenced in the photographs and findings of exhibit 84. The structural damage of the ship's hull, bulkheads and superstructure on the port side frame 110 was caused by the explosion, blast and fragmentation of the second warhead. *(Exhibits 79, 91.)*

2.5 **(U)** Structural damage resulting from parts of the two missiles traveling through the ship from frame 100 to frame 140 is as follows: a severed eight inch stanchion; penetration of miscellaneous joiner bulkheads; penetration of transverse bulkheads at frame 140; compromised watertight integrity; cracked arresting stakes; and destruction of firemain cut-out valve 2-106-2, severing the port firemain. *(Exhibits 90, p 1, 91.)*

2.6 **(U)** Immediate fire damage caused by the rapid burning of the unexpended fuel from the two missiles included the following spaces: ship's control berthing (2-100-01-L), CPO Quarters (2-152-0-L), Barber Shop (2-140-1-Q), RCN Lounge (2-100-01-L), I. C. Gyro Rm (2-79-0-C), and the port side bridge wing. *(Exhibit 90 p 2.)*

2.7 **(U)** Each missile injected approximately 300 pounds of propellant into the berthing complex. The combustion of 600 pounds of burning propellant resulted in a near instantaneous heat release of approximately 12 million BTU’s. *(Exhibit 90, p 2.)*

2.8 **(U)** The first missile (dud), was more damaging than the second missile (detonation) because it injected burning propellant further inside the ship. The second missile's warhead detonated just inside the ship and vented some of its thermal energy back out through the exterior of the ship. *(Exhibit 90, p 3.)*

2.9 **(U)** The fire originated in ship's control berthing (2-100-01-L) and spread to Ricer (1-100-0-Q) and CIC (01-113-0-C). *(Exhibit 90, p 3.)*
2.10 (U) The engineering plant status immediately after the missiles hit was as follows: IA/B main engines on line; following auxiliaries in operation: NR 1 and NR 3 SSDG in parallel, NR 4 SSDG secured due to arcing in NR 4 SWBD; no fire pumps on the line; status of other auxiliaries unknown. (Exhibit 133.)

2.11 (U) Smoke quickly filled spaces from the bow aft to frame 212. (Exhibit 133.)

2.12 (U) Immediately after the first missile hit, the Executive Officer proceeded to the bridge, saw flames on the port side of the bridge and ordered the jettisoning of the Stinger missiles and 50 caliber ammunition located on the O3 level due to the danger of ignition from intense heat. (Exhibit 94.)

2.13 (U) Several Stark crewmembers threw life rings and strobe lights over the side when they heard "Man Overboard" shouted. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)

2.14 (U) Immediate effects in other parts of the ship included an explosion in the forward section of the CPO Mess that filled the compartment with smoke; officers' country filled with smoke; the decks forward of the explosion in flames; fire spreading through the mess line and the starboard passageway forward of the mess line; smoke filled Repair 5 and Repair 2 areas; and firemain pressure was reduced to 60 psi due to a ruptured firemain forward. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)

2.15 (U) Radio communications were lost. PRC radios from aircrew survival vests were used to establish communications with USS WADDELL, the on-station AWACS, and the AWACS controller on military air distress (MAD) frequency 243.0 mhz. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)

2.16 (U) The Engineer Officer was in Central Control Station (CCS) when the first missile hit. CCS experienced a loss of communications almost immediately, although XIJ communications with the bridge (relaying orders to after steering) were maintained until the bridge was abandoned due to intense heat. 2JU communications with main spaces were never lost, and 2JZ communication with Damage Control Central and repair lockers 3 and 5 was maintained from CCS. When GQ sounded, NR 3 SSDG was started and main engines were put on Battle Override. Main spaces were manned by junior personnel so that senior personnel could fight fires. Repair 2 effectiveness was degraded due to a number of senior personnel killed. After the first hit, the ship shifted to Battle Override and started setting Zebra on the firemain due to loss of firemain pressure. After the second hit, non-vital equipment was secured. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)

2.17 (U) HTl O'Keefe working with air detachment crewmen, attempted to start a P-250 when CCS reported a loss of firemain, but the ship was still going too fast to keep the suction hose in the water. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)
2.18 (U) Zebra was set at 2120. (Exhibit 37, p 3.)

2.19 (U) The Commanding Officer positioned himself on the bridge to monitor firefighting efforts both fore and aft. The Executive Officer positioned himself on the flight deck to direct firefighting efforts aft of the missile hit. (Exhibit 133, p 3.)

2.20 (U) The Commanding Officer made the decision to treat the missile hit as a major conflagration. (Exhibit 133, p 3, Exhibit 94.)

2.21 (U) Damage Control Central (DCC) was manned although the flight deck was used as a central control and information point. (Exhibit 133, p 3.)

2.22 (U) The DCA arrived in DCC at 2130, 21 minutes after the missiles hit. (Exhibit 133, p 3.)

2.23 (U) At 2138, firemain pressure of 120 psi was restored aft of frame 180 by starting NR 1, 2, and 3 fire pumps and isolating the firemain at frame 180 and 232. This action prevented firemain supply from reaching missile magazine sprinkling system. (Exhibit 133, p 4, Exhibit 37.)

2.24 (U) The Commanding Officer ordered all engines stopped at 2303 so the P-250 on the foc'sle could maintain suction. He also ordered the flooding of the missile magazine; but this could not be accomplished due to the loss of firemain forward. Instead, to cool the missiles, a hose was used from the O2 level. (Exhibit 133, p 4.)

2.25 (U) The lack of communications between the foc'sle and the after part of the ship, combined with a hole on the port side and a white hot deck on the starboard break, forced LT to physically go up and over the bridge wing at the starboard UNREP station to make reports to the Commanding Officer and to get OBA cannisters and gas for his P-250 pump. (Exhibit 133, p 4.)

2.26 (U) Firefighting efforts were coordinated from the flight deck aft, facilitated by the movement of firefighting equipment to the flight deck and the organization and rotation of 4-6 man hose teams. Initial efforts centered on the wardroom and CPO Quarters, although initial attempts were frustrated by intense heat and smoke in both areas and a shortage of OBAs and cannisters. (Exhibit 133, p 4.)

2.27 (U) STARK experienced a maximum list of approximately 16 degrees. (Exhibit 133, p 4.)

2.28 (U) STARK received a salvage tug was alongside at 2330. The Executive Officer directed the salvage tug forward to cool STARK's
starboard side with water cannons in the vicinity of the missile magazine. The tug also provided a 2 1/2' hose which was used to cool missiles inside the magazine. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

NOTE: The following events occurred on Monday 18 May 1987:

2.29 (U) A class 'B' fire in AMR1 was reported at 0029 and was extinguished at 0058 with Halon. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.30 (U) Desmoking efforts included running STARK's main engines with their module doors open to create negative ventilation and help desmoke the mess decks. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.31 (U) STARK exhausted its supply of OBA cannisters aft at 0114. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.32 (U) The COMIDEASTFOR helicopter ('Desert Duck') was used to deliver LCDR (Doctor) and extra OBA cannisters, and to transport injured personnel. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.33 (U) High temperature alarms were activated in the 76 MM magazine and the MK 13 MOD 4 missile magazine. Although the CO ordered the MK 13 MOD 4 Missile magazine sprinkler system activated, loss of firemain forward rendered the system inoperable. (Exhibit 133, p 11.)

2.34 (U) At about 0134, WADDELL arrived on the scene and delivered medical and damage control supplies to Stark via motor whaleboat. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.35 (U) When STARK's angle of list reached sixteen degrees, the XO organized a dewatering party and directed that holes be cut in the bulkheads above the main deck to dewater spaces and prevent any increased angle of list. (Exhibit 133, p 6.)

2.36 (U) Stark did not have enough men to support reflash watches until Rescue and Assistance teams from Waddell and Conyngham arrived. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)

2.37 (U) Firefighting efforts included cutting holes in the deck to insert applicators into spaces made inaccessible by fire and blast damage. Dewatering efforts included punching holes in bulkheads to provide exit routes for water. (Exhibit 133, p 7.)

2.38 (U) Forward spaces were flooded from a firemain rupture after NRI firepump had been restarted to regain firemain pressure. (Exhibit 133, p 7.)

2.39 (U) Combat Systems berthing were flooded to the overhead as a result of free communication through the port side of the ship into ship's Control Berthing. (Exhibit 133, p 8.)

2.40 (U) WADDELL, CONYNGHAM, REID, and USS LASALLE provided OBA cannisters to Stark. (Exhibit 133, p 5.)
2.41 (U) WADDELL, CONYNGHAM, LASALLE and REID provided Rescue and Assistance teams to STARK. (Exhibit 133, p 6.)

2.42 (U) STARK maintained electrical power throughout the entire damage control evolution. (Exhibit 133.)

2.43 (U) STARK was towed by CONYNGHAM to a position in Sitra Anchorage alongside LASALLE. (Exhibit 133, p 8.)

2.44 (U) Small fires continued to ignite onboard STARK for up to 48 hours after the missiles hit. (Exhibit 133, p 15.)

2.45 (U) No serious injuries or loss of life were incurred during STARK's damage control effort. (Exhibit 133.)

2.46 (U) All of STARK's officers and Chief Petty Officers were general damage control (DC) qualified. (Exhibit 82, p 1.)

2.47 (U) Even though STARK crewmembers may have been general DC qualified at a previous command, STARK required full requalification upon reporting aboard. (Exhibit 82, p 2.)

2.48 (U) All PQS charts were posted at their respective repair lockers. Each man in each repair locker was qualified for his assigned position. (Exhibit 82, p 2.)

2.49 (U) Damage control PMS accomplishment rate for 1st quarter 1987 as of the week of 11-13 May was 96% (accomplishment factor). NAVSAFECECEN validated this percentage with five damage control spot checks after the incident. All checks were satisfactory. (Exhibit 133, p 3.)

2.50 (U) Repair party training was conducted on a regular basis. (Exhibit 82, p 4.)

2.51 (U) COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3541.1B does not provide specific repair party Manning requirements, the ship's Manning document required 18 men in Repair 2, 18 in Repair 3 and 19 in Repair 5. STARK had twenty four fully qualified men assigned to each repair locker. (Exhibit 82, p 4.)

2.52 (U) All repair lockers had inventory lists posted. (Exhibit 82, p 4.)

2.53 (U) COMNAVSURFLANTINST 3541.1B requires OBA's and canisters in each shipboard repair locker and refers the ship to its own AEL to determine individual Repair Locker allowance requirements. STARK's AEL refers to the SNSL (stock number sequence list) for OBA allowance and indicates an allowance of six canisters per OBA. STARK's SNSL listed an allowance of 18 OBA's and therefore 108 OBA canisters. STARK had 34 OBA's and 331 canisters on board at the time of the attack. (Exhibit 82, p 4.)
2.10 (U) The engineering plant status immediately after the missiles hit was as follows: 1A/B main engines on line; following auxiliaries in operation: NR 1 and NR 3 SSDG in parallel, NR 4 SSDG secured due to arcing in NR 4 SWBD; no fire pumps on the line; status of other auxiliaries unknown. (Exhibit 133.)

2.11 (U) Smoke quickly filled spaces from the bow aft to frame 212. (Exhibit 133.)

2.12 (U) Immediately after the first missile hit, the Executive Officer proceeded to the bridge, saw flames on the port side of the bridge and ordered the jettisoning of the Stinger missiles and 50 caliber ammunition located on the 03 level due to the danger of ignition from intense heat. (Exhibit 94.)

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2.16 (U) The Engineer Officer was in Central Control Station (CCS) when the first missile hit. CCS experienced a loss of communications almost immediately, although XLJ communications with the bridge (relaying orders to after steering) were maintained until the bridge was abandoned due to intense heat. 2JV communications with main spaces were never lost, and 2JZ communication with Damage Control Central and repair lockers 3 and 5 was maintained from CCS. When GQ sounded, NR 3 SSDG was started and main engines were put on Battle Override. Main spaces were manned by junior personnel so that senior personnel could fight fires. Repair 2 effectiveness was degraded due to a number of senior personnel killed. After the first hit, the ship shifted to Battle Override and started setting Zebra on the firemain due to loss of firemain pressure. After the second hit, non-vital equipment was secured. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)

2.17 (U) HT1 O’Keefe working with air detachment crewmen, attempted to start a P-250 when CCS reported a loss of firemain, but the ship was still going too fast to keep the suction hose in the water. (Exhibit 133, p 2.)
2.54 (U) EEBD's worked and saved lives, but wet hands required the men to use their teeth to open them. (Exhibit 114.)

3. Damage and Required Repairs

3.1 The following areas are a total loss in terms of structural and fire damage resulting from the two missile hits: FR 100-123 port bridge wing, 01-100-0-L CO Stateroom; 01-113-0-L CIC, 1-100-0-Q Ricer, 1-132-1-Q SPS-49 Cooling Room, 1-100-1-Q Fan Room, FR 100-140 Main Deck, 2-140-1-Q Post Office, 2-140-0-Q Barber Shop, 2-100-0-L Lounge, 2-124-1-L Crew Berthing, 2-100-2-L Dressing Space. Additionally, ten watertight doors/hatches and ten vertical and horizontal structural members must be replaced. (Exhibit 84, 88.)

3.2 The following are severe structural and fire damaged areas which will require major structural work and replacement of most equipment/furnishings: 02-100-0-C Pilot House, 02-116-2-C Chart Room, 02-116-1-Q MX 92 Equipment Room, 01-140-0-C Sonar Control Room, 1-164-1-L Officer Stateroom, 2-140-2-Q CMS Vault, 2-140-4-Q Ship Store, 2-171-3-L Crews Berthing, 2-171-1-L Crews Berthing and 2-171-0-L Crews Berthing. (Encl 9; exhibit 88.)

3.3 The following are moderate structural and fire damaged areas which will require overhaul/replacement of some equipment and furnishings: 01-151-0-Q Electronic Cooling Equipment Room, 01-156-1-C Radio Transmitter, 01-156-0-G Communications Center, 2-165-2-L CPO Lounge, 2-152-2-L Medical Treatment Room, 3-100-0-L Crews Berthing, 3-100-1-L Lounge. (Encl 9; exhibit 88.)


3.5 CIWS local control; sonar equipment room; SPS-55, EW and TACAN equipment room; gun mount local; torpedo magazine and tube; STIR Radar Room; and gun mount local received no damage. (Encl 9.)

3.6 The majority of the Combat Systems are severely degraded due to electronics damage from fire, smoke and water. (Exhibit 88, 90.)

3.7 The MK-13 GMLS magazine was sprinkled by a portable fire hose. Local weather conditions delayed offload efforts, hampered clean-up evolutions and allowed accelerated corrosion in the magazine. Magazine requires a fresh-water flush in accordance with NSWSES procedures. (Exhibit 88.)

3.8 Main Propulsion damage is as follows: Main Propulsion engines suffered salt water damage, smoke damage and soot ingestion. Water washing returned engines to full operational
status. Ship control console (Bridge) is estimated to be beyond repair. Damage control console - all sensors forward of frame 212 are destroyed or unreliable because of heat damage. Fuel control console, fire-fused sounding tubes and destroyed TLI cables for forward fuel tanks make accurate soundings impossible. (Exhibit 90.)

3.9 - Based on the COMNAVSURFLANT Damage Assessment Team findings, SUPSHIP Jacksonville FL and PERA Philadelphia PA estimate an initial cost of $77,000,000 excluding the cost of Government furnished equipment (GFE) which is $65,000,000. Therefore, the total ROM estimate is $142,000,000. This should be considered a class 'F' estimate, which is accurate within 40%. (Encl 5, 12.)

OPINIONS

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19.

BS/Bl

Bl

BS
C. Valor and Achievements

1. (U) The following USS Stark crewmembers were awarded the Navy/Marine Corps Medal on 30 May 1987 by VADM Commander, Naval Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet:

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<tr>
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2. (U) The following USS Stark personnel were awarded the Purple Heart:

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<tr>
<th>FC3</th>
<th>Doran H. Bolduc, USN (DECEASED)</th>
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<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>Bradi O. Brown, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BM1</td>
<td>Jeffrey L. Calkins, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC3</td>
<td>Mark R. Caouette, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>John A. Ciletta, Jr., USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SR</td>
<td>Brian M. Clinefelter, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS3</td>
<td>Antonio A. Daniels, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ET2</td>
<td>Christopher Deangelis, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC3</td>
<td>James S. Dunlap, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STGSM</td>
<td>Steven T. Erwin, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RM2</td>
<td>Jerri B. Farr, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMCS</td>
<td>Stephen Kiser, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMCS</td>
<td>Vernon T. Foster, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMSA</td>
<td>Dexter D. Grissett, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FC3</td>
<td>William R. Hansen, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMG3</td>
<td>Daniel Homicki, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSSN</td>
<td>Kenneth D. Januzik, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS3</td>
<td>Steven E. Kendall, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<td>SM1</td>
<td>Ronnie G. Lockett, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMM1</td>
<td>Thomas J. MacMullen, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EW3</td>
<td>Charles T. Moller, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jeffreil L. Phelps, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS1</td>
<td>Randy E. Pierce, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GM3</td>
<td>James Plonsky, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ET3</td>
<td>Kelly R. Quick, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMSN</td>
<td>Earl P. Ryals, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCCS</td>
<td>Robert L. Shippee, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMSA</td>
<td>Jeffrey C. Sibley, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS3</td>
<td>Lee Stephens, USN (DECEASED)</td>
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3. (U) The fact that USS Stark suffered no deaths or serious injuries in connection with their damage control efforts is directly attributable to the clear thinking, exceptional courage and extraordinary heroism displayed by many of its officers and crewmembers.

4. (U) The men who contributed significantly to USS Stark's defense and damage control efforts should be recognized and awarded for their outstanding performance.

5. (U) Recommend the following officers and crewmembers of USS Stark be recognized for their performance with the appropriate award listed below:

a. The Navy Cross (Posthumously):
   ET3  B-6  USN

b. The Silver Star (Posthumously):
   SN  B-6  USN

c. The Purple Heart:
   HM1  USN
   OS2  USN
   LCDR  USN
   GMM1  USN
   MR3  USN
   OSSN  B-6  USN
   FC3  USN
   STG3  USN
   OSSN  USN
   LT  USN
   OSC  USN

d. The Meritorious Service Medal:
   LTJG  B-6  USN
   LT  USN

e. The Navy Commendation Medal:
   GSM2  B-6  USN
   MS2  USN
f. The Navy Achievement Medal:

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6. The award recommendations will be submitted by the investigating officer to COMNAVSURFLANT for consideration.

D. Accountability:

1. BS 186
7. A claim should be made against the Government of Iraq for all damages that resulted from the attack on STARK, including:

   a. Personal compensation for injured and deceased service members, and;

   b. The cost to restore STARK to full mission capability and to repair or replace all items damaged, including personal possessions of crew members.

   GRANT SHARP