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GLOSSARY

(A)

AGER
 Auxiliary Environmental Research Ship.

AGI
 Soviet Intelligence Collection Ship.

AGTR
 Auxiliary Technical Research Ship.

AIG
 Address Indicating Group. A published list of message addresses.

AKL
 Light Cargo Ship.

ANNUNCIATOR
 Engine Order Telegraph. A mechanical device to transmit engine orders from the pilot house to the engine room.

AOIC
 Assistant Officer in Charge; also AOinC.

AOinC
 Assistant Officer in Charge; also AOIC.

ASW
 Antisubmarine Warfare.

AZIMUTH
 The direction to an object expressed in degrees. Bearing.

(B)

BANNER
 USS BANNER (AGER 1).

BLUE HOUSE
 Official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea. Term used to refer to the incident of 21 January 1968 wherein North Korean infiltrators attempted to assassinate the ROK President at the Blue House.

BREEDER
 Code word for world wide AGER operations.

BRIDGE
 The command center of a ship underway.

BULKHEAD
 A wall within a ship.

BUSHEIPS
 The Navy Bureau of Ships.

(C)

CAGO
 Casualty Assistance Cells Officer. An officer trained to advise relatives of military personnel injured or killed on active duty.

CASUALTY
 An equipment failure or malfunction. An injured or wounded person.

CG
 Commanding General. Center of Gravity.
CHICOM  Chinese Communist.

CHOP  Change of Operation control. To enter the area and control of a different commander. To approve an item prior to passing it up the chain of command.

CHRONOMETER  An accurate timepiece.

CIC  Combat Information Center. A shipboard center to collect and evaluate tactical information.

CINCPAC  Commander in Chief, Pacific. The Commander of all U.S. Military Forces in the Pacific area.

CINCPACAF  Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force.

CINCPACFLT  Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Commander of all U.S. Naval Forces in the Pacific Area.

CLICKBEETLE  Q Code word for AGER operations (USS RANGER) Cancelled 1 JAN 1966 and superseded by "ICHTHYIC".

CNFJ  Commander Naval Forces, Japan; also COMNAVFORJAPAN.

CNO  Chief of Naval Operations. The highest post occupied by a U.S. Naval Officer.

CO  Commanding Officer.

COLLATERAL INTELLIGENCE  All intelligence other than SIGINT.

COMINT  Communications Intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than those intended recipients.

COMNAVFORJAPAN  Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan; also CNFJ.

COMNAVFORKOREA  Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea.

CONSEC  Communications Security.

CONSERVGROUP  Commander, Service Group.

CONSERVPAC  Commander, Service Forces, Pacific.

CONSEVENTHFLT  Commander, U.S. SEVENTH Fleet.

CONTRAC  Command and tactical publications for Navy use.

COMTRAPAC  Commander, Training Force, Pacific.

COMUSKOREA  Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea.

CONN  Control. Actual control of a ship. To issue orders to the helm.
CONTACT
An object detected by any means visual or electronic.

CPA
Closest point of approach.

CPX
Command post exercise. An exercise involving the commander, his staff and communications within and between headquarters.

CREW
All of the officers, enlisted men and the two civilians embarked in PUEBLO.

CRITIC
A critical intelligence message containing information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which affects the security or interests of the U. S. to such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of the President.

CRITICOMM
Critical intelligence communications system.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC
Pertaining to secure communications through the use of ciphers and codes.

CRYPTOLOGIC
Pertaining to communications intelligence and communications security.

CT
Communications Technician.

CTE
Commander Task Element.

CTF
Commander Task Force.

CTF-96
COMMFORJAPAN'S task force designation for surveillance operations.

CTU
Commander Task Unit.

CTU 73.1.1
Commander, Service Group THREE representative in Sasebo, Japan.

CVA
Attack Aircraft Carrier.

CVS
Antisubmarine Aircraft Carrier.

(D)

DAY SHAPES
Small structures or objects of various descriptions and colors displayed aloft by vessels fishing, dredging, at anchor, or conducting hydrographic operations.

DCA
Damage Control Assistant. An assistant to the Engineering Officer responsible for coordinating a ship's repair effort during battle.

DIA
Defense Intelligence Agency.
UNCLASSIFIED

DIRLAUTH
Direct liaison authorized.

DIRNAVSECGRUPAC
Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific.

DIRNSA
Director, National Security Agency.

DNII
Director of Naval Intelligence.

DPRK

DR
Dead Reckoning. A method of navigation in which course, speed and time are applied to a previous fix to yield a DR position.

DRIFT
The deviation from a steered course and speed due to wind and/or current.

DTG
Date Time Group. A series of six numbers indicating the date and time a message was accepted for transmission; also used as a message identification number.

EASTPAC
Eastern Pacific Area.

ECM
Electronic Counter Measure.

ELINT
Electronic intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications, electromagnetic radiations.

EMCON
Emission Control. The control of Electronic Emissions.

FLEETPAC
Fleet Airborne Electronics Training Unit, Pacific.

FBIS
Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

FIX
The position of a ship at a particular time. A point on a chart indicating the time when the ship occupied that position. To ascertain the ships position.

FLASH
The highest message priority.

FLYING BRIDGE
A second bridge, located above the bridge and pilot house, on some ships.

FRAG ORDERS
Fragmentary order. An order, usually a message to a subordinate providing brief, specific instructions in implementation of an operation order. Similar to the Navy's Sailing Orders.

FRAME
A structural member of a ship running athwartships.

FOUNDER
To sink.
(g)

GENSER
General Service.

GENERAL QUARTERS
Battle Stations; also G. Q.

GENERAL SERVICE MESSAGE
Also GENSEN Message. A message transmitted over regular communications circuits as opposed to SPINTACOM or CRITICOM circuits.

GOFI
WESTPAC operational intelligence broadcast.

G. Q.
General Quarters. Battle Stations.

GRAVY BOAT
Nickname for “Research operations in an ocean environment to support oceanographic electromagnetic and related research program.”

GYPSY TEA ROOM
A room set up with food, beer and wine, in which the North Koreans held a short interview in a friendly and civilian atmosphere; also House of Doors.

(h)

HAZARDOUS DUTY ALLOWANCE
A reduced allowance of registered publications authorized for ships operating under hazardous conditions.

HEAD
Compartment of a ship having toilet facilities. Now, generally, any compartment having toilet facilities.

HELL WEEK
A period of severe mistreatment just prior to repatriation.

HOUSE OF DOORS
Gypsy Tea Room. A short interview in civilian atmosphere with wine and beer.

HYCOM
A high frequency voice communications net; also HICOM.

(i)

I.A.W.
In accordance with.

ICHTHYIC
Code word for AGER operations in the Pacific after 1 JAN 1968 (Supersedes “Click-beetle”).

ICHTHYIC I
Mission of PUEBLO commencing 10 January 1968.

ICHTHYIC II

IFF
Identification Friend or Foe. Part of radar set.
Inspection and Survey. An inspection of a ship by a Board of Inspection and Survey to determine the ship's material condition.

INTSUM

(C) Intelligence Summary.

(J)

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JOPREP

Joint operations report. A group of reports required by JCS. (See OPREP-3).

JRC

Joint Reconnaissance Center.

JV

A sound powered telephone circuit; also 1JV.

(K)

KORCOM

Korean Communist.

(L)

LAY TO

To drift with no way on.

LOG

A record, usually in book form. To make an entry in a LOG.

LOI

Letter of Instruction.

LOLAN

Radio navigation system and/or equipment. Long Range Navigation.

(M)

1MC

The general announcing circuit throughout a Navy ship. Provides one way communications from Bridge or Quarterdeck.

MIDPAC

Mid-Pacific area.

MIG

Any of the Soviet-built fighter aircraft designed by Mikoyan and Gurevich.

MOTU 3

Mobile ordnance and electronics training unit, Sasebo, Japan.

(N)

NANSEN CAST

A method of oceanographic sampling in which NANSEN bottles are lowered to take water samples.
NAS  Naval Air Station.
NAVCOMMSTA  Naval Communications Station.
NAVOCEANO  Naval Oceanographic Office.
NAVSECGRU  Naval Security Group; also NSG.
NAVSECGRUACT  Naval Security Group Activity; also NSGA.
NAVSECGRUDET  Naval Security Group Detachment also Security Group detachment (SECGRUDET) or Research Detachment.
NAVSHIPS  Bureau of Ships publication or directive.
NFOIO  Naval field operational intelligence office, Washington, D.C.
NSA  National Security Agency.
NSG  Naval Security Group; also NAVSECGRU.
NSGA KAMISEYA  Naval Security Group Activity, Kamiseya, Japan.
NWP  Naval Warfare Publication. A series of publications on Naval Warfare.

OBA  Oxygen Breathing Apparatus. Equipment used for entering smoke or gas filled compartments.
OIC  Officer In Charge, also OinC.
OinC  Officer In Charge, also OIC.
ONI  Office of Naval Intelligence.
OOD  Officer of the Deck. The officer on watch in charge of the ship.
OPCON  Operational Control.
OPERATION ORDER  A standing order issued by a commander to effect the coordinated execution of an operation; also OPORD.
OPERATOR CHATTER  Informal operator-to-operator messages.
OPNAV  Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. (CNO).
OPORD  Operation Order.
OPREP-3

The third of five formatted operational reports designed for rapid transmission and handling of designated information to the Department of Defense and intermediary headquarters. OPREP-3 format is used to report any incident which may cause international repercussions. It is identified by the flag-word line, "OPREP/OPREP-3/PINNACLE/AGER-2/001."

OSD
Office of the Secretary of Defense.

OPTAR
Operations Target. The normal quarterly financial allowance of a command.

(P)

PACOMELINT CTR
Pacific Command Electronics Intelligence Center, located at Puchu, Japan; also PEC.

PALM BEACH
USS PALM BEACH (AGER 3).

PEC
Pacific ELINT Center; also PACOMELINT CTR.

PENDANT NUMBER
Hull number of a ship or boat.

PEO
Patrol craft, escort.

PCRS DRAKE
Primary CRITICOM Relay Station, Camp Drake, Japan.

PCS
Permanent Change of Station. Orders to a new command, (not TAD).

PILOT HOUSE
An enclosed space adjacent to the bridge of a ship, containing the ship's helm and engine controls.

PINEROOT
A code word relating to the integrated naval surveillance and intelligence ship program, (Super-seded by "ICHTHYIC").

PINNACLE
Flag word for an OPREP-3 report. (See OPREP-3).

P/N
Pendant number. Hull number.

PUEBLO
USS PUEBLO (AGER 2).

(Q)

QUARTERDECK
The command center of a ship in port. The post of the Officer of the Deck in port.

(R)

REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS
Publications accounted for under the RPS system.
RESEARCH DETACHMENT

RESEARCH SPACES

RHUMB LINE

ROK

ROUND

RPS

SAILORD

SAR

SCUTTLE

SECGRUDET

SEER

SET

SHOULDERING

SI

SIGCR

SIF

SIGINT

SITREP

SO-1

SOD HUT

(1) Term used throughout the open record in lieu of SECGRUDET aboard PUEBLO; also NAVSECGRUDET Naval Security Group Detachment.

Security Group spaces also SOD HUT.

A line on the surface of the earth cutting all meridians at the same angle. A ship's track of constant heading.

Republic of Korea. South Korea.

One complete cartridge of ammunition. One shot.


Sailing Order.

Search and Rescue.

To sink a ship from within by intentional flooding. A small opening with water-tight lid.

(1) Security Group Detachment; also Naval Security Group Detachment (NAVSECGRUDET); also Research Detachment.

Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape. A type of training given to aircrews and others who may find themselves in a hostile country.

The direction of displacement due to wind and/or current.

Ship maneuvering in an effort to direct the course of another ship.

Special Intelligence.

Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement.

Selective Identification Feature. The coder section of the radar IFF equipment.

Signal intelligence, including electronics intelligence and communications intelligence.

Situation Report.

Soviet Submarine Chaser. A small fast coastal escort of about 147 feet in length.

Name for Security Group spaces on AGES; also Research Spaces.
Sea of Japan.

A term synonymous with the term COMINT (communications intelligence).

A report of an incident or of an item of information.

Ships Repair Department.

Special Security Officer.

Ship Repair Facility.

Senior U. S. Liaison Advisor, Seoul, Korea.

Temporary Additional Duty. Temporary duty away from one's permanent duty station.

Technical Guidance Unit.

A small fast boat equipped with torpedos.

Antiaircraft Artillery; also AAA.

Uniform Code of Military Justice.

United States Intelligence Board. The highest intelligence group in the U. S.

U. S. Navy Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron ONE, based at Atsugi, Japan.

Western Pacific area.

UNCLASSIFIED
From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Vice Admiral Harold G. BOWEN, Jr., USN, 072395/1100

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the circumstances relating to the seizure of the USS PUEBLO (AGER 2) by North Korean Naval Forces, which occurred in the Sea of Japan on 23 January 1968, and the subsequent detention of the vessel and the officers and crew

Ref: (a) JAG Manual
(b) CINCPACFLT OPLAN 99-69

1. In accordance with section 0402 of reference (a), a Court of Inquiry is hereby appointed to inquire into the circumstances relating to the seizure of the USS PUEBLO (AGER 2) by North Korean Naval Forces, which occurred in the Sea of Japan on 23 January 1968, and the subsequent detention of the vessel and its officers and crew. The Court will convene at the U. S. Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California as soon as practicable after the completion of Phase II, Stage II of reference (b).

2. The Court shall consist of you as President, RADM Marshall W. WHITE, USN, 073343/1310, RADM Edward E. GRIMM, USN, 072469/1100, RADM Richard R. PRATT, USN, 077114/1100, and RADM Allen A. BERGNER, USN, 085205/1100 as members. Captain William R. NEWSOME, JAGC, USN, 361843/2500, a lawyer qualified in the sense of Article 27(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is hereby designated counsel for the Court. Commander William E. CLEMONS, JAGC, USNR, 438729/2505, a lawyer qualified in the sense of Article 27(b) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is hereby designated as Assistant Counsel for the Court.

3. The Court is directed to inquire into all the facts and circumstances relating to the subject incident including whether PUEBLO did, at any time during the period 10 January 1968 to the time of her seizure, proceed within twelve miles of North Korea, and, if so, whether such action was in accordance with or in violation of any order issued to the
Commanding Officer by competent authority. The Court will also inquire into the circumstances surrounding the actual boarding, the details of that boarding and the events immediately subsequent to the boarding; and will also inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding the subsequent detention of the ship and its officers and crew. The Court is further directed to inquire into the deaths of and injuries to naval personnel, and, as appropriate, to perform the duties of an inquest. After deliberation the Court shall submit its findings of fact, opinions and recommendations. The Court will express its opinion as to the line of duty and misconduct status of any injured personnel and will recommend administrative or disciplinary action as appropriate.

4. The Court is directed to notify Commander Lloyd Mark BUCHER, USN, 582154/1100, of the time and place of the meeting of the Court and that he is a party to the inquiry and to accord him the rights of a party pursuant to the provisions of section 0304 of reference (a). The Court is authorized to designate additional parties to the inquiry during the proceedings as may be appropriate. As to the duty of the Court to designate parties, attention is particularly invited to section 0302d(2) of reference (a).

5. The Court is directed to take the testimony of witnesses under oath and to submit a verbatim record of the proceedings.

6. The proceedings of the Court will be held in open session except as the interests of national security may require.

7. The Court will expressly inform any parties and each witness appearing before it that the Court is aware that they may have been asked questions and may have disclosed information during the intelligence debriefing process conducted during Phase I of Stage II of reference (b) but that the Court has received no information whatsoever concerning any of the matters or facts disclosed at the intelligence debriefing and that the Court has no interest in what may have been discussed or related during any intelligence debriefing session and desires to avoid any further reference thereto.

8. The Court will further insure that, as appropriate, all witnesses are advised not to testify as to matters they believe to be classified without first advising the Court that they are about to so testify.
9. By signed copy of this appointing order, Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet is directed to furnish the necessary reporters and other clerical assistance and logistic support to the Court for the purpose of recording the proceedings and preparing the record of this Court of Inquiry.

Copy to:
CNO
CINCPAC
JAG
COMNAVAIRPAC
RADM Marshall W. WHITE, USN
RADM Edward E. GRIMM, USN
RADM Richard R. PRATT, USN
RADM Allen A. BERGNER, USN

CAPT William R. NEWSOME, JAGC, USN
CDR William E. CLEMONS, JAGC, USNR
From: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
To: Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Jr., USN, 072395/1100

Subj: Designation of additional assistant counsel to Court of Inquiry

1. Captain Richard W. Bates, USN, 512925/1630, is hereby designated as an additional assistant counsel to the court of inquiry of which you are president convened by my appointing order serial 13/9157H of 24 December 1968.

John J. Hyland

Copy to:
CNO
CINCPAC
JAG
COMFIRSTFLT
Members
Counsel
Party
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

(U) The Court of Inquiry was convened at the U.S. Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California, on 20 January 1969 and met thereafter in both open and closed sessions until 13 March 1969. Testimony was taken for 36 days, normally in both morning and afternoon sessions. Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter it was frequently necessary to limit the testimony taken in open session. A substantial part of the testimony taken in closed session was, however, unclassified but summaries of the unclassified testimony were provided to the press. To fulfill the mandate of the appointing order, with respect to conducting the proceedings in open sessions, several witnesses testified in both closed and open session to essentially the same facts, omitting the classified portions of their testimony in open session.

(U) Commander Lloyd M. BUCHER, USN, having been designated a party to the proceedings, was apprised of his rights in accordance with Section 030h of the JAG Manual. During the course of the proceedings he was also advised that he was suspected of having violated Article 0730 of U.S. Navy Regulations.

(II) Because of the magnitude of this Inquiry, it soon became apparent that the number of parties designated should be minimized. This course of action was considered desirable for several reasons. The Court was tasked primarily to investigate the circumstances of an incident that held both national and international interest. Although the facts were not complex, voluminous evidence and testimony were required in order to inquire into those areas which were essential to the Inquiry. The designation of additional parties would have obscured the Court's principal function as a fact-finding body, by requiring lengthy consideration of evidence presented on behalf of those parties. Although the Court inquired into the conduct of many individuals who appeared before it, this was never considered to be its primary task. The Court, therefore, relied upon Section 0302e of JAG Manual, which states in part: "Inasmuch, however, as the majority of investigations, although inquiring to some degree into the conduct of performance of duty of persons, result in relatively few instances in which adverse action is taken without further administrative or judicial action, separate hearings in such cases are much more efficient and frequently are more fair to the person involved. Accordingly, as provided in 0205b, it is generally undesirable to designate parties to investigations unless the subject matter of the Inquiry is so extremely complex or involves such disputed issues of fact that a grave risk of substantial injustice to the person would exist if he were not afforded the rights of a party during the investigation."

(U) It was considered at all times that those individuals into whose conduct the Court inquired and who were not designated parties, could best be provided ancillary proceedings directed specifically toward their individual conduct. The facts developed by this Court provide a solid foundation for such proceedings, which were considered to be inevitable prior to any administrative or judicial action.

(U) Finally, because of the atmosphere which surrounded the Court and the public misunderstanding of the purpose of designating parties and warning them of suspected offenses, any such warning would have been publicly interpreted as an accusation of guilt. It was therefore considered that separate hearings would be fairer to the individuals concerned.
(U) The task of the Court was made more difficult by the extreme emotional reaction of the people of the United States to the initial testimony of Commander BUCHER, and particularly to the warning by the Court that he was considered suspect of a violation of U.S. Navy Regulations. This reaction was clearly evidenced by the volume of mail received by the Court immediately subsequent to those proceedings and by the general press reaction. Demands upon court members, counsel and witnesses, by the press for interviews and answers to sensitive questions were burdensome and time-consuming. Despite these difficulties, relations with the press always remained cordial and the reporting of the proceedings was generally fair and accurate. It became apparent as the proceedings progressed that the press recognized the Court was fulfilling its mission in a businesslike, fair and impartial manner.

(4) Due to the length of detention and severity of maltreatment, many of the crew were unable to testify accurately or to place their actions in the proper perspective. Three Filipino crew members elected to testify in closed session with respect to the circumstances surrounding their period of detention because they feared reprisals against their relatives still living in the Philippine Islands if their testimony were publicized.

(4) Retaining the crew of PUEBLO as a unit after repatriation presented the Court with certain intangible problems which became apparent in the conformity of their testimony in many areas. The proximity of all members of the situs of the Inquiry, in addition to the extensive coverage by the news media, made it difficult for witnesses to appear without having learned of the details of previous testimony. In addition, at the time of the Inquiry, Commander BUCHER was still Commanding Officer and it would have been most difficult for any member of the crew to have criticized his conduct. It was still his responsibility to complete official fitness reports and enlisted evaluations for the crew prior to detachment.

(U) In view of the fact that all members of the crew excluding Chief Petty Officers and First Class Petty Officers were advanced in rating subsequent to their repatriation, it is considered that there has been unique administrative recognition of the hardships suffered by a great many.

(U) The emotional public response to the repatriation of the crew subjected the Court to unprecedented pressures, not only from higher military echelons, but from the seats of Government and Congress. While these pressures were to be expected, certain remarks by high-ranking Navy and Government officials could have been interpreted as providing authoritative direction to the Court. These pressures were resisted and the Court proceeded at all times free from improper influences.

(U) The requirement on the part of officials in Washington for continuing, minutely detailed, and instantaneous information concerning the hearings, both open and closed, caused the Court additional logistics problems as well as setting certain legal precedents which in the future may redound to the disfavor of the Navy's legal processes.

(U) The Court determined that the mandate of the appointing order could be fulfilled without extending the Inquiry outside of the Department of the Navy. In addition, it was considered that objectivity and fairness would obtain without the testimony of any person senior to the convening authority.
(U) Available to the Court for examination and consideration were copies of North Korean propaganda vehicles, such as letters written by members of the crew to persons in the United States, filmed interviews, texts of radio speeches, and filmed press conferences. In was considered, however, that the source of this information made it inappropriate for the Court's consideration, unless it was absolutely essential to an orderly development of the Inquiry. After considerable deliberation the Court determined that it could perform its assigned mission without viewing these materials and without dignifying communist-produced propaganda as evidence before the Court to the possible detriment of U.S. Navy personnel.

(U) In accordance with Section 0406 of the JAG Manual, the court members, together with counsel for the Court (except Commander Richard W. BATES) and counsel for the party, visited USS PALM BEACH (AGER 3) at U.S. Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, on 15 February 1968. The purpose of the visit was familiarization with an AGER. The party elected not to visit the scene. While it was recognized that FUELSO and PALM BEACH were not identical, there were sufficient similarities to provide the members of the Court with a better appreciation for the size and location of the various spaces which were frequently referred to throughout the Inquiry.

(U) Several technical advisors were made available to the Court to provide expert assistance in the various areas which were material. These advisors were:

1. Intelligence Officer: Commander Richard W. BATES, USN
2. Naval Security Group Officer: Captain Robert W. BARR, USN
3. Medical Officer: Captain Ransom J. ARTHUR, MC, USN
4. Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape Officer: Lieutenant James L. BAILEY, USN

(U) The intelligence advisor attended all sessions of the court and continuously monitored the evidence presented.

(U) The Naval Security Group advisor attended and assisted during those phases concerning Security Group matters.

(U) When it became obvious that the party would testify at length, the medical advisor remained in constant attendance during the Court sessions in order to observe the party's physical and mental condition. The medical advisor frequently consulted with, and examined, the party to assure that he was not subjecting himself to hazardous strain.

(U) The Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape advisor attended and assisted only during the period wherein the Court examined matters pertaining to the detention of the crew.

(U) All advisors were frequently consulted by the Court with respect to those technical matters in their field of expertise which the Court was required to consider.
Considerable logistical problems were experienced with regard to daily production of the voluminous record. A rough double-spaced transcript was completed and proofread by the end of each day on which testimony was taken, and was made available to the members of the Court and counsel the following morning. After a delay of two days to permit correction, the rough transcript was typed in smooth form on multilith mats. The mats were again proofread, corrected, and then sent to the printer. Portions of the record, particularly in the early phases of the proceedings, exhibit a greater number of typographical errors than desired. Among the contributing factors were the pressure of time; the quantity and nature of some testimony; the large numbers of relatively inexperienced personnel involved; and the lack of continuity in proofreading. It is believed, however, that such errors are clearly within acceptable limits.

A daily card index was maintained of the salient facts developed. These cards were keyed to an outline which was frequently changed to accommodate the facts as they developed. These cards proved to be of immeasurable value in compiling the final report.

The record of proceedings is paginated as follows:

1. All pages of the open session record are numbered consecutively and no hyphens appear in any of the numbers assigned.

2. All pages of the closed session record are numbered with hyphens; the number preceding the hyphen indicating the page of the open session where the Court retired into closed session and the number following the hyphen reflecting the consecutively numbered pages as they were recorded in that particular closed session.

3. All pages of the closed, special intelligence record have been paginated with two hyphens, such as, 198-7-1. This indicates that at page 198 of the open record the court moved to closed session and at page 7 of the record of that closed session the court began to receive special intelligence information.

The findings of fact have been keyed correspondingly. The letter "R" refers to the open record; the letters "CR" to the closed record; and the letters "SIR" to the special intelligence record.

Exhibits have similarly been numbered; unclassified exhibits consecutively in the order presented; classified, hyphenated to indicate introduction in closed sessions.
Findings of Fact
10. (U) In the Pacific, AGERs were under the administrative command of CONSERVPAC through CONSERVGROUP ONE in the Eastern Pacific and CONSERVGROUP THREE in the Western Pacific. In WESTPAC, operational control, was exercised by CONSEVENTHFLT, except when the AGER was on a mission in the NAVFORJAPAN area, at which time the unit would CHOP to CTF 96 (COMNAVFORJAPAN's operational title) on departing port for the mission, and CHOP back to CONSEVENTHFLT upon return to port. AGER operations carried out under the operational control of COMNAVFORJAPAN are governed by CTF 96 Operational Order 301-yr. (CR. pp. 198-115 to 198-116, 198-163 to 198-164; Exh. 18-2 p. 5)

11. (U) Each specific AGER mission is the subject of a proposal originated by COMNAVFORJAPAN in accordance with a CINCPACFLT directive. This proposal is forwarded to JCS via CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC each of whom must review and approve it prior to its being forwarded. Upon the recommendation of the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC), a JCS agency staffed by military personnel, JCS either approves or disapproves the mission. The JRC recommendation is based upon the submission of the proposal to a combined State Department and Defense Department group for decision. The approval or disapproval is forwarded to CINCPAC, who informs CINCPACFLT, who then directs COMNAVFORJAPAN to take appropriate action. Any level on the chain of command could modify the patrol proposal or impose additional restraints. This was necessary since the risk assessment of the proposal was based on dynamic, not static, considerations. (CR. p. 198-84) If the mission is approved, COMNAVFORJAPAN then executes it with a sailing order (SAILORD) to the ship. (CR. pp. 198-63 to 198-64, 198-84, 198-165; Exh. 18-3)

12. (U) The original submission by COMNAVFORJAPAN follows a prescribed format which requires: justification, including the manner in which the proposed mission will satisfy intelligence collection requirements; risk assessment; rules of engagement; direct liaison accomplished and required; and operational information including name of ship, ports of call, routes, CPA to sensitive areas, and ship information. (Exh. 18-3)

13. (U) At COMNAVFORJAPAN headquarters, AGER Project Officers are assigned in the Plans and Operations Division and in the Intelligence Division. They had a close relationship. The Intelligence Division project officer would brief Commander, Naval Forces Japan, weekly and during these briefs inform him of the status of planning for AGER operations. Controversial subjects would be brought to the Commander's attention in these briefings and his counsel sought. Both the Plans and Operations Officer and the Intelligence Officer had direct access to the Commander, but each would keep the Chief of Staff fully informed of any major decisions respecting the AGER missions. (CR. pp. 198-131, 198-139, 198-164)
Findings of Fact

10.

\[ B1 \]
Findings of Fact
22. (U) Surface support arrangements vary for each mission but may consist of alert destroyers several hours away from the area of operations, casual support provided by transiting units, or a committed destroyer located just over the horizon near the AGER. Surface support arrangements were made between COMNAVFORJAPAN and COMSEVENTHFLT. (CR. pp. 198-86, 198-129, 198-169)

23. (U) Air support from naval sources would be available from transiting CVAs or CVS's on an "as available" basis. When these units were in range such support would be available within 1 to 4 hours. This support is arranged for between COMNAVFORJAPAN and COMSEVENTHFLT. (CR. pp. 198-85, 198-117)

24. (U) Air support from U.S. Air Force resources is arranged by direct liaison between COMNAVFORJAPAN and the CG, FIFTH Air Force, subject to final approval by CINCPACAF and CINCPAC. (CR. pp. 198-85, 198-117, 198-127)

25. (U) COMNAVFORJAPAN was directed by CINCPACFLT to keep certain commands informed about the movements of AGERS, a practice which would facilitate the use of "on call" reaction forces. These information addresses included CG, FIFTH Air Force, COMSEVENTHFLT and COMAIRWING SIX. (CR. pp. 198-85, 198-168, Exh. 18-21)

Mission Support

27. (U) Although CTF 96 was charged with supporting AGERS operating in the NAVFORJAPAN area, these units did not CHOP to COMNAVFORJAPAN (CTF 96) until they departed port on a mission. Therefore, pre-deployment support was conducted in an informal basis. The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan stated that this arrangement did not degrade his ability to provide proper pre-deployment support. (CR. pp. 198-164, 198-180; R. pp. 200, 217)

28. (U) Intelligence support to AGERS falls in two separate categories: that which aided the ship in preparation for a mission, and the support provided during a mission. (CR. pp. 198-222 to 198-223)
Findings of Fact
course or showing any interest in BANNER. BANNER moved to a point about ten miles north, roughly where PUEBLO was seized, and conducted man-overboard drills in the vicinity of two fishing boats. BANNER then lay at that point overnight and part of the next day, without reaction. (CR. pp. 198-49, 198-70; R. p. 230)

36. During the 16 CLICKBEETLE missions, BANNER experienced ten incidents of actual harassment, and six other incidents of lesser importance. There was one minor collision; one instance when she was told "I'm going to or I will fire", three instances when she was closed by units with guns trained on her. On two occasions she was surrounded by trawlers; twice harassing ships closed to short range and maneuvered dangerously; was shouldered once; was accused of being in territorial waters four times, and was told twice she was standing into danger and requested to depart the area. (CR. pp. 198-51 to 198-52, 198-69 to 198-70; R. pp. 236 to 239, 244 to 246; Exh. 18-16)

37. (U) The Commanding Officer of BANNER believed that the greatest risk to an AGER on patrol was the possibility of loss through ramming, either accidental or intentional. He did not consider the possibility of attack on the high seas likely with regard to the Soviet Union because of the large number of similar units the Soviets operate on the high seas. He did not, however, feel as secure while operating off Communist China or North Korea. (R. pp. 226 to 227)

38. Fifty caliber machine guns were not installed on BANNER until mid December 1967. Consequently, she never exposed any guns while being harassed. (CR. p. 198-71)

41. (U) Prior to the seizure of PUEBLO, there had been no CPX's between CONNAVFORJAPAN and CG, FIFTH Air Force to verify adequacy of command and control arrangements to call up support. (CR. p. 198-135)

42. CTF 96 OPORD 301-YR provides general operating instructions for AGER operations under CONNAVFORJAPAN. The Communications plan of that OPORD provided emergency instructions for ship to ship communications in the event a surface unit was dispatched to the assistance of an AGER. However, there were no instructions for communications between the AGER and any air units which might be dispatched. (Exh. 18-2, annex G) The SAILORD would contain additional special instructions relating to communications plans for contact with surface/air support if alert air were laid on. (CR. p. 198-86; Exh. 18-2, annex C)
43. (U) Equipment in the Research spaces in BANNER and PUEBLO was similar; 10 to 15 percent of 12 cubic feet being classified. (R. pp. 2h9 to 250) The Commanding Officer, USS BANNER, felt that the means available to him for the emergency destruction of classified material inside the 100 fathom curve with respect to equipment were adequate but with respect to documents were inadequate. Outside the 100 fathom curve destruction would have consisted of smashing equipment and jettisoning it, placing publications in weighted bags, and jettisoning them. Equipment for destruction in BANNER was identical to that contained in PUEBLO. BANNER had drilled at emergency destruction and the Commanding Officer believed that all documents would have been placed in weighted bags and thrown over the side in ten to twenty minutes. (R. pp. 2h4, 2h9)

(U) Many alterations and changes have been effected in the areas of destruction devices, scuttling devices, armament, etc. in BANNER since PUEBLO seizure. In addition BANNER had conducted three missions subsequent to PUEBLO incident with CPA to land of approximately 70 nautical miles. (R. pp. 2h2, 2h9)

**PUEBLO MISSION**

**PUEBLO Mission Planning**

45. (U) USN PUEBLO (AGER 2) is the second of three Navy ships of that class to join the Fleet and to operate under the integrated naval surveillance and intelligence ship program. Her first patrol, after her conversion as an AGER was scheduled for January 1968. It was also the first mission of Phase II. (CR. pp. 198-85, 198-163; Exh. 18-3)

60a. Original plans for Phase II of the AGER program were made in March 1967 with the objective of establishing continuous coverage of Soviet naval operations for a specific period of time utilizing two AGERS. Upon ascertaining PUEBLO's availability date of 1 January 1968, COMNAVFORJAPAN originated a six-month plan for operations from January through June and forwarded it to CINCPACFLT on 13 December 1967. On 16 December 1967 the mission proposal for PUEBLO's initial mission was originated by COMNAVFORJAPAN. (CR. p. 198-49; Exhs. 7, 19-4)

47. (U) LT Edward A. Brookes, fleet support officer for the Intelligence Division at COMNAVFORJAPAN, was the project officer for AGER operations. (CR. pp. 256-1 to 256-2)

68. COMNAVFORJAPAN's mission proposal adhered to the format established in CINCPACFLTINST 003120.24a of 28 February 1966. His 161105Z DEC 67 to CINCPACFLT, with information copies to COMSEVENTHFLT, USS PUEBLO, and others. It was re-addressed information to FIFTH Air Force; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Korea; and others on 18 December 1967. The proposal contained a risk assessment stated as follows: "...Estimate of Risk: Minimal, since PUEBLO will be operating in international waters for entire deployment." (CR. pp. 198-8h, 198-87 to 198-89; Exhs. 7, 18-3)

49. (U) Captain Thomas L. Dwyer was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at COMNAVFORJAPAN from 1 July 1965 through 21 May 1968. As such he approved the intelligence input to all CLICKBEETLE missions and IGNITIC I. He did not recommend alert air support for PUEBLO's patrol, since he did not consider the risk sufficient to warrant such action. (CR. pp. 198-48 to 198-49, 198-50)
50. (C) Captain William H. EVERETT was Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at COMNAVFORJAPAN from September 1965 until November 1968. As such he approved the inputs of the Operations and Plans Divisions to most CLICKBEEF patrols and IDONTHIC I. In his opinion the fact that PUEBLO was to operate in international waters carried no more weight than other factors which were considered in the assessment of risk. (CR. pp. 198-82, 198-101)

51. (C) Having evaluated the risk to PUEBLO as minimal, it was expected within the COMNAVFORJAPAN Staff that if the FIFTH Air Force were requested to provide air support, aircraft would be furnished "...when available, as feasible". Although the Commanding General FIFTH Air Force and his operations officer were not personally aware of the PUEBLO mission until after the seizure, personnel within his staff were. CG, FIFTH Air Force had received CTP 96 OPERORDER 501-56 and was an information addressee on the mission proposal message. The FIFTH Air Force project officer had contacted the COMNAVFORJAPAN project officer with respect to special air support for PUEBLO's patrol, and was told that such support was not requested. (CR. pp. 198-95, 198-107, 198-191; R. pp. 419, 436, 521; Exxns. 18-33, 18-51)

52. (C) Captain Forrest A. PEASE has been Chief of Staff, COMNAVFORJAPAN since 19 July 1967, and did not participate in the policy formulation for the AGER program since the program was well underway when he assumed his duties. He also stated he was not always briefed on AGER operations and specifically that he did not CHOP or release either the PUEBLO's mission proposal or the SAILORD. Captain EVERETT stated that Captain PEASE was kept informed of all major decisions, including those in the AGER program. (CR. pp. 198-115 to 198-116, 198-131, 198-139)

53. (U) Rear Admiral Frank L. JOHNSON, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan from July 1965 to June 1968, was present during all CLICKBEEF missions and the first IDONTHIC mission. (CR. p. 198-163) He stated there was no plan in existence for protecting PUEBLO in the event the ship was seized on the high seas. (CR. p. 198-188) The only two ships under his operational control at the time were BANIER and PUEBLO. He had no air forces under his operational control. Hence, he had no forces which could react or protect PUEBLO. (CR. p. 198-179; R. p. 221) The program was of necessity on a calculated risk basis since even had cover forces been available, their employment would have been prohibitively costly and would have nullified the value of the AGER collection program. (CR. p. 198-188) Based on experience prior to 23 January 1968, that risk was acceptable in his opinion, since then it has not been. (CR. p. 198-116) He had received no information in December 1967 and January 1968 which indicated a North Korean change of attitude with regard to border sensitivity. (CR. p. 198-167)

54. (C) No special procedures were established by COMNAVFORJAPAN to assist PUEBLO (or any AGER) in the event of fatal collision. COMNAVFORJAPAN anticipated that in such an instance, normal sea-air rescue (SAR) procedures would be adequate. While CG, FIFTH Air Force was the SAR coordinator for the area, COMNAVFORJAPAN, under the ASW operational title of CTF 36, shared in SAR responsibilities. (CR. pp. 198-114, 198-149, 198-194)

55. (C) After his separate and complete evaluation of the proposed mission, CINC PACFLT opined that the North Koreans would not risk an encounter with the U.S. in international waters. He retransmitted the mission proposal to CINC PAC by his 172151Z DEC 67 with no substantive change of the COMNAVFORJAPAN proposal. (CR. pp. 198-217, 198-260, 714-73; Exh. 18-25)
56. (U) CINCPAC forwarded the proposal to the JCS by his 230320Z DEC 67 with no substantive change, recommending approval. (Exh. 18-26)

57. (U) On 29 December 1967, the Director, National Security Agency, (DINSA) sent a message (DTG 292228Z DEC 67 BCM) to the JCS and the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) outlining certain intelligence which DINSA considered might possibly reflect on the minimal risk assessment assigned the PUEBLO mission. This message was re-addressed to CINCPAC by JCS on 2 January 1968, and to DIRMASECGRUPAC on 3 January 1968 by the Assistant Director, Naval Security Group. At CINCPAC it was considered that the information had been evaluated by CINCPAC Staff prior to their recommendation that the mission be approved. DIRMASECGRUPAC did not pass the message to anyone else at CINCPACFLT Headquarters prior to the seizure. In addition, the message was not re-addressed to COMNAVFORJAPAN nor were the contents specifically relayed thereto. (Cr. pp. 198-181 to 198-182, 198-197 to 198-199; Exhs. 18-20, 18-21, 18-22) Captain (now RADM) George L. Caswell, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations; Captain John L. Marchetti, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and Commander Bobby R. Newman, Head of the Current Intelligence Branch, who were on CINCPACFLT Staff at the time, all indicated upon seeing the message after the seizure of PUEBLO, that while it would have triggered another look at the assessment, all the information referred to therein had been known and evaluated and that it is unlikely that it would have changed the risk assessment. Captain Daytor expressed essentially the same opinion from the NAVFORJAPAN point of view. (Cr. pp. 198-75 to 198-76, 198-157, 198-158 to 198-182, 198-251, 198-256, 198-260, 714-13; R. pp. 215, 263; Exh. 18-20)

58. (U) At the time of the PUEBLO mission and during its approval cycle, Captain Everett P. Gladding was Director, Naval Security Group, Pacific (DIRMASECGRUPAC). (Cr. p. 198-197)

59. (U) On 2 January 1968, JCS approved the PUEBLO mission without change by message to CINCPAC. CINCPAC in turn notified CINCPACFLT of the approval by message which directed COMNAVFORJAPAN to execute the mission. (Exhs. 18-27, 18-28, 18-29) On 5 January 1968, COMNAVFORJAPAN, as CTF 96, issued the IDENTIFY I SAILORD. (Exh. 5) On 4 January CTF 96 ordered PUEBLO to proceed to SASEBO in anticipation of receipt of approval of the mission. (Exh. 18-7) On 11 January the SAILORD was modified by COMNAVFORJAPAN to change the sailing date from SASEBO from 8 to 10 January due to completion of required repairs. (Cr. p. 198-90; Exh. 5)

60. (U) On 8 January 1968 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reported that Radio Pyongyang accused the U.S. forces of committing provocative acts along the East coast of Korea and threatened retaliation. On 11 January FBIS reported a similar broadcast. These FBIS reports have since been labeled "The PUEBLO Warning", by a New York Times editorial of 27 January 1968, which alleged these broadcasts warned the U.S. that USS PUEBLO would be seized. The particular FBIS reports were not seen at CINCPACFLT Headquarters, nor at COMNAVFORJAPAN Headquarters prior to the seizure. On being shown these reports, however after the fact, the consensus was that they were similar to numerous other reports received from FBIS and were not a direct threat to PUEBLO. (Cr. pp. 198-250, 198-260; R. p. 253; Exhs. 18-17, 18-18, 18-19)

61. (U) PUEBLO received CTF 96 Operation Order 301-68 on 4 January 1968. (R. pp. 50 to 51)
PUERLO Ship's Characteristics

62. (U) USS PUEBLO (AGER 2), formerly AKL 4I, was converted at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in 1966-67. The ship had the following characteristics:

a. Overall length: 176' 6"
   Displacement: 850 tons light
   950 tons loaded
b. Draft: 10.5' light
   11.5' loaded
   Propulsion: 2 GM 278 8-cylinder diesel engines, twin screw
c. Hull: 3/8" steel
   Speed: Full - 12 to 12½ knots
   Flank - 13 knots
d. Beam: 32' 8 5/8"

Armament (including small arms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Maximum Range (yards)</th>
<th>Maximum Effective Range (yards)</th>
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<tr>
<td>.50 caliber machine guns</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>2200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thompson sub-machine guns</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>.55 caliber pistols</td>
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<tr>
<td>.30 caliber rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(R. pp. 12 to 15, 555, 595; Ench. 1, 18-1; also U.S. Army Technical Manual (TM) 9215, U.S. Army Field Manuals (FM) 23-65 and 23-5, NAVFERS 10185 Potty Officer's Training Manual for GM3 and 2 (F.O. 3rd and 2nd)

63. (U) PUEBLO required five minutes to go from stop to full speed and an additional five minutes to flank speed. (R. p. 17)

64. (U) PUEBLO carried one Mark 10, 26' motor whale boat, and enough life rafts to accommodate 90 men. (R. p. 104; Ench. 18-1)

Conversion in BREMERTON

65. (U) USS PUEBLO (AGER 2) was built in 1944 as a general purpose supply vessel for the U.S. Army. She saw service in the Philippines and later in KOREA, retiring from service in 1954 as Army Vessel FS-344. She remained inactivated until she was transferred to the Navy on 12 April 1966. At that time she was renamed PUEBLO and classified as an auxiliary light cargo ship (AKL 41). During the period June 1966 to September 1967 she underwent conversion at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, BREMERTON, WASHINGTON. She was commissioned an AGER on 13 May 1967. (R. pp. 7, 10)

66. (U) On 30 January 1967 Commander Lloyd Mark BUCHER, 58215L/1100, USN reported to Commandant, THIRTEENTH Naval District, as prospective Commanding Officer of PUEBLO.

67. (U) When Commander BUCHER reported aboard PUEBLO, the ship's assigned allowance was 64 personnel (35 in ship's company and 29 in the Naval Security Group Detachment), of whom approximately 50% or about 30, were already aboard. As a result of conversations with the Commanding Officer, USS PALM BEACH (AGER 3), Commander BUCHER requested additional personnel to fill billets considered by him to be necessary in view of PUEBLO's conversion from an AKL to an AGER. After the additional allowance (to a total of 83) was made, he was satisfied that PUEBLO was adequately manned for the mission. There being no standard AGER ship's organization in existence, USS BANNER's was obtained as a preliminary guide. Commander BUCHER asserts that before leaving BREMERTON he wrote, and had printed, a PUEBLO Ship's Organization Book. All copies were sent to PUEBLO and none are available. (R. p.p. 5 to 7, 635)
During the outfitting and conversion of PUEBLO in BREMERTON, numerous material improvements were made in the ship with regard to habitability, and the usage of the SECGRUDET and navigation spaces. (R. pp. 7 to 8, 13 to 14)

Money for the conversion was reduced from $5.5 million to 4.5 million. (R. pp. 7, 13)

While PUEBLO was in BREMERTON, seven crew members attended Boat Coxswain's School, and others attended Damage Control School. (R. pp. 516 to 517)

The Navy designation as an AKL, caused some confusion during the conversion. Some items necessary for an AGER were not included in the original plans, such as no provision for stowage of registered publications, a suitable incinerator, etc. Items were also received at the yard for an AKL which were not intended for an AGER and had to be returned to the supply system. (R. p. 56)

When he first reported to BREMERTON, Commander BUCHER understood the ship would complete her conversion in May 1967. The conversion was finally completed and the ship left BREMERTON in September 1967. Extensions occurred on a month-to-month basis. As a result, certain projects which Commander BUCHER wished to accomplish which would have taken more than a month to complete, were never approved because the projected time remaining was never considered adequate. If the planners had realistically provided for the eventual delay in the shipyard, Commander BUCHER believes many of his requests would have been approved and implemented. (R. p. 7)

While PUEBLO was undergoing outfitting and conversion in BREMERTON, two fifty caliber machine guns were received from CONSERVGRU ONE for installation. Such guns were authorized for PUEBLO's former AKL configuration, but not for her present status as an AGER. Commander BUCHER discussed the matter with CONSERVGRU ONE Staff and it was agreed that the guns were sent erroneously, whereupon they were returned. (R. p. 61)

Commanding Officer PUEBLO letter serial 002-67 of 9 June 1967 requested Commander, Naval Ships Systems Command for modifications and additions to PUEBLO's damage control facilities, including additional sound-powered telephone systems, additional alarm systems, and an explosive emergency destruction system. Commander, Naval Ships Systems Command letter serial PMS83-0098/53 of 18 July 1967 to CNO, copy to PUEBLO, reviewed the requests and commented that the additional telephone circuits should be installed by ship's force, if desired, and suggested that the IHCS system should be sufficient to alert all hands of any emergencies. Relative to the requested explosive destruct system, it recognized that such a system was highly desirable and advised that destruct charges added to existing equipment normally provide doubtful effectiveness, accomplishing only partial destruction. It advised that the Army had developed an acceptable incendiary system and recommended that Mr. McCluskey (OP 940), be contacted for details and guidance. (GR. pp. 198-4 to 198-5; Exh. 18-8)

Intra-ship communications systems consisted of a 1JV sound-powered circuit with outlets in most compartments of the ship, a special secure sound-powered system with outlets in the SECGRUDET spaces, the Captain's cabin, and the pilot house, and a general announcing system (IHCS) with a general alarm system an integral part thereto. Commander BUCHER had indicated his displeasure with these systems and had requested additional sound-powered systems. He was authorized to install additional circuits deemed necessary, using the ship's force. Cable and terminals were ordered and were onboard prior to seizure; however, the additional circuits were not completed due to the lack of ship's force. (GR. pp. 198-6; R. pp. 11, 17 to 20, 350 to 361)
76. (U) While in BREMERTON, the watch, quarter and station bill was drafted and posted, and drills were held. (R. pp. 361 to 362) The emergency destruction bill for the SEGROUDEN was also drafted in the rough while at BREMERTON. (CR. pp. 18L6-22 to 18L6-23)

77. (U) Prior to departing BREMERTON, PUEBLO received an INSERV inspection and the SEGROUDEN spaces were inspected by a representative of DNI NAVSEGROU and accredited as COMM secure areas. (CR. pp. 256-49 to 256-50; R. p. 11; Exh. 18)

PUEBLO, Enroute to and Import SAN DIEGO

78. (U) PUEBLO departed Puget Sound on 11-13 September 1967 and arrived in SAN DIEGO on 21-22 September 1967 after stopping briefly in SAN FRANCISCO. (R. pp. 24 to 25)

79. (U) PUEBLO conducted shakedown training from 25 September, 1967 to 20 October 1967. (Exh. 3)

80. (U) While PUEBLO was in SAN DIEGO, most of the SEGROUDEN personnel attended fire-fighting and damage control schools. (R. pp. 329, 361) Officers attended OEB school and Communications school. (R. p. 361) There was, however, no Pre-commissioning school for the crew as a unit. (R. pp. 361, 365) Drills were held at emergency destruction. (R. pp. 331 to 332)

81. (U) On 26 October 1967, CONSERVGRU ONE conducted PUEBLO's pre-deployment readiness inspection. One of the discrepancies noted was, "...promulgate emergency destruction bill, post in all spaces, provide weighted bags where needed". (R. p. 23; Exh. 2) In Commanding Officer PUEBLO's reply to this inspection, Commander BUCHER noted that a destruction bill had been promulgated. (R. p. 24; Exh. 3)

82. (U) By the time PUEBLO deployed from SAN DIEGO enroute WESTPAC, Commander BUCHER was satisfied with the training and capabilities of his crew. (R. pp. 24 to 25)

PUEBLO, Enroute to and Import PEARL HARBOR

83. (U) PUEBLO departed SAN DIEGO on 6 November 1967 and proceeded to PEARL HARBOR, arriving 14 November. The time enroute was utilized for routine training evolutions and emergency drills. THE SEGROUDEN was given a Communications Security (COMSEC) task by DNI NAVSEGROU which included the routine interception of U.S. Navy communications for security checks, and other non-communications electromagnetic radiations. (CR. pp. 256-52; R. pp. 20, 33 to 34)

84. (U) After arriving in PEARL HARBOR on 14 November 1967, PUEBLO received the normal briefings given a deploying ship by CINCPEACFLT's Staff. This included briefings in intelligence, communications, and standard operational matters. (R. pp. 34 to 35, 262) In addition, Commander BUCHER spent about two or three days with the Intelligence Division's AGER project officer, and about one hour with the Operations Division's AGER action officer and had briefings from SERVPAC. (R. pp. 33 to 34, 260, 262) Captain (now Rear) CASSELL, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations at CINCPEACFLT, visited PUEBLO and arranged for shipyard work to be done on PUEBLO's steering gear. (R. pp. 259 to 260, 262) It was during these
four days of briefings that Commander BUCHER learned that his first mission
would probably be off North Korea, and that in the event he were attacked,
U.S. forces were prepared to react but that such assistance would probably
come too late to save the ship. LT Stephen R. HARRIS, 638681/1615, USNR,
OIC embarked SECGRUDEMT, USS PUEBLO, and other personnel of the detachment also
received briefings from, and were visited by, DIRECTIONAC and his staff.
(R. pp. 34 to 35, 59)

85.4 A While PUEBLO was in PEARL, several of the SECGRUDEMT personnel re-
ceived training in their specialties from CINCPACFLT Staff personnel, and
from the Technical Guidance Unit (TGU) at PEARL. CINCPACFLT Staff provided
assistance to PUEBLO in the area of material maintenance. Additional publica-
tions were also received aboard ship. (R. p. 335; CR. p. 258-59) Several
intelligence personnel from CINCPACFLT Staff informally toured PUEBLO’s
SECGRUDEMT spaces. (CR. p. 198-255; R. pp. 334 to 335)

86.4 A On 17 November 1967 a copy of DIRECTIONAC SIGHT letter of in-
struction 1-67 which was soon to be replaced by LOI 1-68, was given to
PUEBLO’s SECGRUDEMT in order to familiarize them with the overall require-
ments that would be contained in their tasking. LOI 1-67 and LOI 1-68
were the same in most essentials. (CR. pp. 198-200 to 198-201)

PUEBLO Enroute and in Port YOKOSUKA

87. (U) PUEBLO departed PEARL on 18 November 1967 and proceeded by rhumb
line to 29°W, 150°E, thence by rhumb line direct to YOKOSUKA. Time en-
route to YOKOSUKA was devoted to training similar to that conducted between
SAN DIEGO and PEARL HARBOR. (R. p. 35)

88. (U) While enroute YOKOSUKA from PEARL, Commander BUCHER discussed with
the officers of the wardroom, including LT HARRIS the fact that the first
mission would be off North Korea. He did not however, discuss with his
officers the information concerning the inability of U.S. forces to protect
PUEBLO should she be attacked. (R. pp. 34 to 35, 59)

89. (U) Upon arriving in YOKOSUKA on 1 December 1967, Commanding Officer
PUEBLO reported to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, who at that time
was RADM Frank L. JOHNSON. (R. p. 36)

90. (U) While PUEBLO was in YOKOSUKA, COMSTAFFJAPAN’s Staff assisted in
preparing the ship for her mission. (CR. pp. 198-53, 198-130, 198-161)
At the direction of COMSTAFFJAPAN, extensive conferences were held be-
tween all levels of personnel aboard PUEBLO and BANNER, which was also in
YOKOSUKA at that time. (CR. p. 198-172; R. pp. 52 to 53, 208, 236) The
Commanding Officers of BANNER and PUEBLO coordinated their efforts to
reduce the amount of classified material aboard AGERS. They were success-
ful in reducing the amount of cryptographic material, but were unsuccessful in
reducing the tactical publications carried aboard AGERS. (R. pp. 232
to 231)

91. (U) The Commanding Officer, USS BANNER, believed that his ship had
certain deficiencies. He was satisfied, however, that it fit the concept of
a small unarmored ship operating in international waters. BANNER and
PUEBLO had virtually identical hull configurations and basically the same
information gathering capabilities, although their interior arrangements
were different. (R. p. 228)