

29. Q. After the HOBSON had listed?

A. Yes, sir.

30. Q. And who picked you up?

A. The RODMAN.

31. Q. Or a boat from the RODMAN?

A. A boat from the RODMAN.

32. Q. How long after you went into the water were you picked up?

A. About 20 or 30 minutes.

33. Q. Do you know how long it took the ship to sink?

A. No, sir, I don't.

34. Q. You don't know that?

A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, party:

35. Q. You say you didn't make any reports to the bridge while you were on watch?

A. No, sir.

36. Q. Did the other lookout who had the phones make reports for you, the things you reported to him?

A. About the planes he did.

37. Q. Instead of your giving your reports directly to the bridge, they went through the other lookout?

A. Yes, sir.

38. Q. You did make reports, but not directly from yourself?

A. Just of the planes.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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B-6, yeoman second class, U. S. Navy, entered
as reporter.

B-6, seaman apprentice, U. S. Navy, was recalled as
a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the
oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Were you in a duty status aboard the HOBSON on the
night that she was in a collision with the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. What were those duties?

A. I was the lookout on the bridge.

3. Q. Which lookout?

A. Port.

4. Q. Port lookout?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. And at what time had you assumed those duties?

A. 8 o'clock.

6. Q. 2000?

A. 2000, yes, sir.

7. Q. Had you been observing the WASP shortly prior to the
collision?

A. No, sir.

8. Q. You didn't look at the WASP?

A. Yes, sir. I looked at the WASP. The last time I seen
the WASP was off the starboard quarter.

9. Q. It was off the starboard quarter?

A. The starboard quarter.

10. Q. Your starboard quarter?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. How long was that before the collision?

A. I really don't know.

12. Q. I don't mean to confuse you, *B-6* but you are sure
that shortly before the collision the WASP was on your starboard
quarter?

A. No, sir, it was quite a while before the collision, but I
really don't know what time it was.

13. Q. Was that when the WASP was launching her night planes?

A. Yes, sir, she was launching them.

14. Q. And your testimony is to the effect that you hadn't
seen the WASP since that night launch?

A. No, sir.

15. Q. Up to the time of collision?

A. No, sir, that's the last time I seen it.

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16. Q. What had you been doing in the meantime, 136
A. Well, I was lookout out the front of us there.
17. Q. In front?
A. Yes, sir, up to 270 degrees, around it from dead ahead.
18. Q. Were you wearing sound powered telephones?
A. Yes, sir.
19. Q. What stations on the ship were those phones connected
A. The bridge and combat.
20. Q. The bridge and combat?
A. And the life buoy watch.
21. Q. Did you hear any conversation between combat and the bridge during the ten minutes immediately preceding the collision?
A. The only thing I heard was that we were too close to get reading on the WASP.
22. Q. You heard combat say that to the bridge?
A. Yes, sir.
23. Q. Previous to that, had you heard combat sending up range to the bridge?
A. I heard them sending, but I don't remember what the ranges were.
24. Q. Do you recall how frequently they were coming up?
A. (No response)
25. Q. Every 100 yards or every 200 yards?
A. I believe.
26. Q. Did you answer every 200 yards, approximately?
A. I don't rightly know.
27. Q. Would you say that ranges were frequently being transmitted by combat to the bridge, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
28. Q. Were you in a position to overhear any conversation that was taking place on the bridge?
A. No, sir.
29. Q. Were you directing your attention shortly before the collision to the aircraft or to the other surface ships?
A. To the aircraft.
30. Q. Were you making any reports to the bridge?
A. Yes, sir. I reported when I could see a plane and what degree and bearing.

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31. Q. And its bearing?
A. Yes, sir.
32. Q. Were you giving any reports of the bearing of the other ships in company at all?
A. I couldn't see any of the other ships.
33. Q. Did you see the WASP at any time prior to the collision?
A. I seen just - - I don't know. It seems like I seen it and then she hit.
34. Q. And do you know at what angle she struck the HOBSON?
A. About 90 degrees.
35. Q. Did you see how far she penetrated the HOBSON - - whether she came all the way through, or, rather, whether her bow came all the way through?
A. No, I couldn't see that, sir.
36. Q. Do you know whether the HOBSON had been broken in two?
A. No, sir.
37. Q. How did you enter the water?
A. Washed me over.
38. Q. That was after the HOBSON began to list?
A. Yes, sir.
39. Q. Have you got any idea how long it took the portion of the ship that you were on to sink?
A. No, sir.
40. Q. And by whom were you picked up?
A. RODMAN.
41. Q. A boat from the RODMAN?
A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B. G., a party:

42. Q. Did you have binoculars, B. G.?
A. Yes, sir.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

43. Q. Were you using your binoculars?
A. Yes, sir.
44. Q. On what objects?
A. Mostly on aircraft.

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Examined by the court:

45. Q. Were you stationed as a lookout solely for aircraft or aircraft and surface vessels both?

A. Aircraft and I don't really know. I believe it was - - it must have been aircraft and surface, but I didn't see any ships or anything like that.

46. Q. You testified that you heard over the sound circuit the statement that the WASP was too close for ranges. You didn't even see it at that time?

A. No, sir, as I walked over she hit.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

^{B-6}, seaman, U.S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, ^{B-6} ?

A. Three years.

2. Q. And how much of that has been spent at sea?

A. I guess about 24 to 26 months.

3. Q. And when did you report to the HOBSON?

A. Oh, I believe it was January the 16th.

4. Q. 1952?

A. 1952.

5. Q. Were you in a duty status on the night of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. And what did that duty consist of?

A. I was on the annunciators on the engine order telegraph.

7. Q. You were on the engine order telegraph?

A. Yes, sir.

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8. Q. Was your designation "lee helmsman?"

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. At what time did you assume those duties?

A. Well, I had the 8 to 12 watch.

10. Q. You had the 20 to 2400 watch?

A. Yes, sir.

11. Q. Now, starting at the point of time approximately 15 minutes before collision, state to the court everything you heard, saw or did up to the time of collision?

A. The 15 minutes before the collision, I was on the helm. At that time we were rotating duties. I was just learning those watches, and as far as I can remember, we were on a steady course up until the time that I was relieved to go to the annunciators and after I went on the annunciators it was just about the time of the collision. Then Captain Tierney gave "ALL AHEAD FULL EMERGENCY" and to the helm he gave "LEFT FULL RUDDER," and then the next thing I remember he said, "Standby for collision." Someone on the bridge said, "Abandon ship." So I got out. That's all I remember.

12. Q. But the words, "Standby for collision" came after the last order to the helm?

A. Yes, sir.

13. Q. From your best recollection?

A. Yes, sir.

14. Q. Did you hear any other orders to the helm given by the commanding officer of the HOBSON after you were on course 102?

A. Not that I know of, sir.

15. Q. Were any other orders given to the engine room or given to you to ring up on the engine order telegraph other than "ALL AHEAD EMERGENCY FULL?"

A. No, sir.

16. Q. Did you hear any conversation during this time between the commanding officer and any other person on the bridge?

A. No, sir.

17. Q. Did you hear any discussion about who had the conn?

A. Yes, sir. The Captain had the conn at the time I took over the annunciators - - Captain Tierney had the conn.

18. Q. Had you heard him take over the conn?

A. Yes, sir.

19. Q. What did he say on that occasion?

A. Mister B-C asked him if he had the conn, and he said, "Yes," he had it.

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20. Q. And shortly before this happened, did you hear any discussion or conversation between Lieutenant ^{B6} and the Captain of the HOBSON regarding the courses he was going to steer and the maneuver that he was going to use to reach his new position?

A. No, sir.

21. Q. Did you see the WASP at any time before collision?

A. No, sir, I never did see it until we hit.

22. Q. You didn't see it until the - after the collision?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. Do you know whether the general alarm sounded throughout the ship before collision?

A. I never did hear it, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant ^{B6}, a party:

24. Q. After the Captain took over the conn, did he give you any orders before you were relieved on the helm?

A. On the helm, no, sir. Not that I remember.

25. Q. Well, when were you relieved at the helm in relation to the time the Captain said he had the conn?

A. It was just shortly before the collision. I don't know what time it was.

26. Q. When you heard the Captain tell Mister ^{T56} that he had the conn, were you still on the helm then?

A. No, sir, I was on the annunciators.

27. Q. You had already been relieved?

A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

29. Q. Did you ever hear the Captain give the steersman any course to steer?

A. I didn't see or hear the course. He gave rudders, but I don't know just what they were.

30. Q. Were you in a position where you could see the compass repeater?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

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The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Ensign ^{B-6}, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. You are the same Ensign ^{B-6} who previously testified?
A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. Will you describe your naval and marine service?
A. September 1945 I entered the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy and was sent to basic training in California. I spent nine months there, and left in May and was assigned to a ship in June of 1946 for one year of sea training. I served on three different type ships in the Atlantic and Pacific. I was detached from sea duty June 1947 and entered the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point. I stayed there until June of 1949 at which time I went to work for the U. S. Lines as third mate. I worked for them until June 1950 and I had no more connection with the maritime service until this January when I came on active duty with the Navy.

3. Q. You first came on active duty with the Navy in January 1952?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. And how long have you been aboard the HOBSON?

A. Since January 11th, 1952.

5. Q. What were your duties aboard the HOBSON?

A. I was main propulsion assistant and electronics officer.

6. Q. Did you have a watch on the night of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. And what was that watch?

A. CIC Officer.

8. Q. At what time did you undertake the duty as CIC Officer?

A. Approximately 1945. I relieved Ensign ^{B-6}.

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9. Q. Now, without revealing any matter that's in any confidential publication, will you describe or state what transmissions you heard between the WASP and the HOBSON during the 20 minutes immediately preceding the collision?

A. I would say that I heard nothing during the 20 minutes preceding the collision until the first signal came through. I believe that was read in here once and is not security matter and that was the signal to turn to recover aircraft and "FOX CORPEN 265" - - -

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and the spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

10. Q. All right, sir, proceed. You heard the signal "FOX CORPEN" - - -

A. "265 SLANT LINE FOX SPEED 27" and I wrote that down on the corner of the DRT on the tracking sheet in combat.

11. Q. And what did that signal convey to you?

A. That we were to come around about on course 265, speed 27, for recovery of aircraft.

12. Q. Was that a "SLANTLINE" or a "TACKLINE" in that signal?

A. I would say it's "TACKLINE." I don't remember that well.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

13. Q. Now, after hearing the signal you just mentioned, what further messages or signals did you hear passed between the HOBSON and the WASP?

A. I would say in 4 minutes - - the exact time, I don't know - - the signal came over "SIGNALS FOLLOW. EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN 260 TACKLINE SPEED 27." Then "STANDBY" - - I mean there was a pause in between the signal and then "STANDBY EXECUTE" After that I heard our ship call the WASP and ask, "Should we take plane guard station" - - the number I can't reveal, and the answer came back affirmative. After that I heard no more signals. If there were any more, I did not record them on the sheet where I kept notes on them.

14. Q. And the inquiry you heard regarding plane guard station, was that an inquiry of whether the HOBSON should take her station for recovery of aircraft - - night station for the recovery of aircraft?

A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. And you heard that answered in the affirmative by the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

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16. Q. Now, do you recall the courses and speeds taken by the HOBSON during the period of some 15 or 20 minutes prior to the collision?

A. Prior to the signals, the pit log -- I don't know the engineering speed. I know the pit log speed was about 26, and about a minute after the signal of execution it read 28 and one-third. I say one-third, the arrow was slightly above the one-quarter mark on the pit log. The only course I saw was the 102 we were on originally, and when I looked at the pit log it was 28 and one-third knots, compass reading I had it 130. Whether it was steady or not, I don't know.

17. Q. Do you recall any others?

A. No, sir.

18. Q. Courses?

A. No, sir. I never looked at the compass repeater after that.

19. Q. Were you observing your radar?

A. Yes, sir. I was on the surface search radar.

20. Q. And were you reporting ranges and bearings of the WASP to the bridge?

A. Story, radarman, third, on watch, was reporting the ranges from the VF repeater which is connected to the surface search radar. And bearings, I understand, were being taken from the bridge because we were not told to take bearings that I knew of. I could hear him reading off the ranges in back of me, but I never did hear - - -

21. Q. And how frequently was he sending ranges?

A. As far as I know, it was every 100 yards, although due to the rapid change rate, it got so on every sweep of the radar we would read up a range.

22. Q. And how fast was the range closing per sweep of the radar?

A. Well, approximately a minute or slightly less before the collision, it was almost 500 yards per sweep of radar, and I have checked the sweep of the radar on the RODMAN and it was from 13 to 14 seconds per sweep. Their radar was on the same sweep speed we were on.

23. Q. Did you feel any concern about your closing rate?

A. Yes, sir. I was first informed of the rapid closing of range at 1760 yards. At this time Story yelled for me to look at the VF with him, and the next reading we got was 1240. I yelled up the voice tube to the bridge at that time, and Mr. B, JOOD, answered it, and I asked him in rather strong language what they were doing up there, and told him the range was 1240, closing fast; and asked him if they had missed the signal, he said, "No, they were making the turn." They never said which way they were making the turn -- they were making 'the' turn now. x

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24. Q. They were making the turn now?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. Was there any other conversation between you and the bridge?

A. I just -- I went back to the VF repeater and stood there watching with Story.

26. Q. Did you still feel any concern?

A. Well, I realized you can come close to a ship. I did not think we were going to collide. I figured we were going to come pretty close, but there didn't seem to be any apparent danger, so I figured everything was under control. I never even thought about it.

27. Q. Did you feel it incumbent upon you as CIC Officer -- watch officer -- to find out what the intentions of the commanding officer were or to make any recommendations to him as to the safe course?

A. We were tracking this on the DRT so that -- what direction the WASP was going and what direction we were moving, I don't know. At the time I was just concerned with the ranges.

28. Q. And you didn't feel it incumbent upon you to know the course and speed or had you computed it?

A. The one we were supposed to take to get a station or which course and speed?

29. Q. The WASP was traveling -- did you know that course and speed?

A. Well, I knew she was coming to 260.

30. Q. And you knew the course and speed that the commanding officer of the HOBSON intended to take to come on station?

A. No, sir.

31. Q. Did you feel it incumbent upon you when you received notice of the WASP's intentions to recommend a course and speed to the commanding officer of the HOBSON to arrive on station?

A. No, sir.

32. Q. Did --?

A. In the past it has always been the practice that CIC figure a maneuvering solution when requested to do so by the bridge. The rest of the time we never touch it unless we were in screens. We did it quite often -- both of us would be working out solutions because we would feed the ranges and bearings up to the bridge and when requested we would get solutions, but when we were on plane guard or on plane guard station 2 we never worked the maneuvering solution unless requested to do so.

33. Q. And you made no recommendations. It wasn't the custom or the practice to make recommendations --?

A. No, sir.

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34. Q. (continuing) to the bridge as to a safe course and speed?
A. No, sir, we always waited on the bridge. In other words, if we were requested we would do it. We had at different times in the past -- but in the last operation we were on we didn't. We had taken the conn a couple of times down in combat at the request of the Captain, but we did that when we would get in line with the screen. I think he did that mostly for training purposes. But we never made any maneuvering board solutions unless the OD or the Captain requested a solution.

35. Q. Were there orders given by the commanding officer to the helm passed down over the sound powered phones or in --?

A. No, sir.

36. Q. (continuing) in any way to CIC?

A. No, sir.

37. Q. Was his order to the helm -- or, was an order to the helm that resulted in a course of 130 conveyed to combat?

A. No, sir.

38. Q. Do you remember any heading of the ship after the 130 course?

A. No, sir.

39. Q. Did you have any communication with the bridge other than the strong language you have referred to when you queried the bridge on what was happening up on the bridge?

A. We had the talker giving steady ranges up on the bridge.

40. Q. But you had no conversation with the bridge yourself?

A. No, sir, only the voice tube conversation with *B/Gs*, the JOOD.

41. Q. And what were your exact words that you say you yelled up over the voice tube?

A. Well, I asked "what the hell" they were doing. When the ranges started closing that fast I didn't -- I mean, I just was wondering what was going on, and so I asked him what they were doing and told them the range of 1240, and had they missed the signal, and they said, "No," that they were making "the" turn now.

42. Q. And what impression did that information convey to you?

A. Well, I imagined they were going to come about on a course parallel with the carrier. I realized that they weren't going the same -- I didn't know what the angle between the courses was due to the closing of the range rate, but I imagined they were going to swing around and come -- --

43. Q. Did you think that your ship was going to swing to the left or right?

A. I didn't know which way they were going to swing, sir.

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All redactions
are B-6.

44. Q. Was it your thought that it was the duty of, or that it was incumbent on, the HOBSON to execute the WASP's signal to turn right on a course 260?

A. Well, it seemed the only natural thing since we were on the starboard side and coming around we would be -- it was almost a 180 course change -- actually a 150 degree course change. It seemed like the easiest thing to do -- I never even thought about it. It was to me that the signal meant turn 260 -- all ships turn right and come on course 260.

45. Q. And you thought it was incumbent on the ship HOBSON to obey that signal by making that turn at that signal?

A. Well, I imagine they should turn right if they were going to come on the port side. They wouldn't have been actually on station. They would have been ahead, but it's easier to drop back than it is to catch up at 27 knots.

46. Q. Who, other than yourself, was on duty in CIC during this period?

A. , radarman, second. , radarman, third, and , seaman apprentice.

47. Q.

A. , seaman apprentice.

48. Q. And what were their various duties down in CIC?

A. Well, we rotated duties between all four of us during a watch. In other words, we would shift the man on the DRT to the SUGAR CHARLIE air search, and then shift to the SUGAR GEORGE the surface search. At the time, I was on the surface search, was talker on the VF repeater, was on the DRT and was on the air search.

49. Q. And you yourself at times had on the head set assigned to the talker duty?

A. Yes, sir.

50. Q. And do you recall where was during say the 15 minutes immediately prior to the collision?

A. He was on the air search radar.

51. Q. And ?

A. He was on the VF repeater and phones.

52. Q. He was the talker with the bridge?

A. Yes, sir.

53. Q. And ?

A. He was on the DRT. We weren't plotting with it but he was standing by.

54. Q. Do you recall ever telling the bridge that the bearing of the WASP was constant, that it was remaining constant?

A. No, sir.

55. Q. Do you recall anybody in CIC passing that information to the bridge?

A. No, sir.

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56. Q. Do you recall any information going to the bridge to the effect that the range was too close to get further ranges?
A. Yes, sir.

57. Q. I mean too close for further ranges going to the bridge
A. At approximately 750 yards, I heard *B-6* yell over the phone that the range was 750, closing fast, and too close for further ranges. He said - - he actually said, "I have lost it," and he didn't direct that at me. He directed it to the talker on the bridge, but he said it loud enough so everybody heard it.

58. Q. Did you in CIC ever hear any emergency signal such as "Collision Quarters" or the "General Alarm"?
A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by Captain *B-6*, a party:

59. Q. What occurred after what you have related, that is, how did you manage to get out of the ship and what rescue efforts were being made by the other ships in the area that you know of?

A. I went back aft with Mister *B-6*, who just happened to be in combat. At the time he was tuning the air search radar with *B-6*, our leading ET. We went aft and undogged an eight-dog hatch - eight-dog watertight door. He went out first and while I was getting out - - We had a port list and were rolling slowly on our side and which way he went I don't know. I thought he went port. I went out and went to port and swam out under the overhanging bridge and swam up forward past the bow and I kept swimming. I never did look back to see, and finally got to a floating net and was picked up by the gig from the RODMAN.

60. Q. Did you have a watch on at that time?
A. Yes, sir.

61. Q. Did anything happen to that watch that you know of?
A. It stopped.

62. Q. Did you happen to observe what time it stopped?
A. Yes, sir, it stopped at 1026 and a half - - thirty-five, actually.

63. Q. And prior to the collision, had you occasion to observe your watch to notice whether it was running at that time?
A. Yes, sir, it was running - - well, I don't remember actually looking at it. I set it at noon every day, and that was the last time I remember actually looking at it. I did look at it, but I can't remember any particular occasion.

64. Q. How much was it off at noon when you set it?
A. I set it by the watch up on the bridge. I went up on the bridge when they were checking up and comparing chronometers, and I checked it with the quartermaster.

65. Q. Did it require any particular adjustments?
A. No, sir, I would say it was maybe 10 seconds slow, but otherwise I never set it unless it was more than 2 minutes off.

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66. Q. Do you have any estimate as to how long a period of time it was between the collision and the moment you went into the water?

A. I would say probably a minute or slightly less than a minute.

67. Q. Was the watch broken in any way?

A. No, sir. It is a steel-cased watch with an unbreakable crystal on it.

68. Q. And you say you found a floater net?

A. Yes, sir.

69. Q. And then subsequently picked up by a boat?

A. Yes, sir, the gig.

70. Q. You were taken to the RODMAN?

A. Yes, sir.

71. Q. Did you observe any other -- any of the other rescue efforts that they were making -- floating gear and so forth?

A. I went down on the starboard side of the carrier and I would say probably in a minute there were life buoys all over and nets falling like rain because I could see them hitting the water all over the place.

72. Q. Was it lighted up at the time?

A. Yes, sir, all around the side of the carrier up on the conning tower.

73. Q. Did you see or happen to have a chance to observe lines being dropped off the side?

A. No, sir, I didn't notice, sir.

74. Q. How long was it that you were on the net then before you were picked up by the boat?

A. I would say probably thirty to thirty-five minutes.

75. Q. Looking back on it now in the light of what you saw do you feel that the rescue efforts were of such a nature as to have saved every possible person under the circumstances?

A. Yes, sir. I would say they saved everybody that was clear after the HOBSON went down. I never did see her take her final dive, but I would say probably everybody that was clear was picked up.

Cross-examined by the counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

76. Q. When your attention was called to the fact that the range was 760 yards, did you thereafter devote your attention to the radar?

A. No, sir. I turned to the voice tube again and the collision was before -- I don't even remember whether I said anything up the voice tube. I started to because I was standing right under the air search radar and the voice tube came right down over the top of it and I was standing there. I don't remember saying anything but I was all set to.

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77. Q. Now, if a signal had come about that time, was there a possibility that you might have missed it because your conversation - - -?

A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

78. Q. Then you didn't hear any signal after the execute?

A. I heard no signal after the execute.

79. Q. Did you hear anyone use the voice tube other than yourself?

A. No, sir. That was after the execute?

80. Q. Yes, that's what I meant - - I mean, during the last few minutes?

A. No, sir.

81. Q. Do you have any idea how long it was from the time that you heard *B-6* pass up the word that the range was 750 yards until the collision occurred?

A. I would estimate about 2 sweeps of the radar which would be about 26 seconds. Whether it was or not I couldn't say - - I mean, I don't exactly have much recollection as to what happened after that 750 range.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B-6*, a party:

82. Q. Between the time that *B-6* called up the 750 yards and the time of impact, which you estimate maybe around 26 seconds, just what were you doing in CIC?

A. I don't know.

83. Q. Well, you seemed to indicate in answer to another question that you were standing by the voice tube preparing to say something?

A. Yes, sir.

84. Q. What were you preparing to say?

A. I don't know. I mean, that's - - -

85. Q. You don't remember?

A. I was facing the voice tube, and I was going to say something, but I never did get anything out, that I remember.

86. Q. You don't remember what you intended to say?

A. I don't remember what I intended to say. I don't know whether I intended to have anything concrete to say.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated *B-6* had nothing further to say.

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The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

^{B-6}, radarman, second class, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. You are the same ~~man~~^{B-6} that previously testified in this matter?

A. I am, sir.

2. Q. How long have you been in the Navy Myers?

A. Approximately 10 years and a half, sir.

3. Q. And how much of that has been spent at sea?

A. All of it but 28 months, sir.

4. Q. And how long have you been attached to the HOBSON?

A. About three weeks.

5. Q. What were your duties on the night of April the 26th, 1952, aboard the HOBSON?

A. I was senior radarman on watch, sir.

6. Q. And at what time did you assume that watch?

A. At 1945, sir.

7. Q. Now, just answer this question yes or no. Did you hear any voice transmissions between the HOBSON and the WASP during an interval of 20 minutes prior to collision?

A. No, sir.

8. Q. Starting at that point of time approximately 20 minutes before collision, state to the court everything you saw, heard or did from that time up to the time of collision?

A. I was on the SC radar assisting the electronics officer and the technician in tuning it. A few minutes before the collision I heard ^{B-6}, radarman, third class, who was on the VF giving ranges and bearings. He yelled, "750 yards, closing fast." Immediately after that he gave, "Lost guide due to short range."

9. Q. "Lost guide due to short range?"

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. And how did he transmit that to the bridge?

A. In that way, sir.

11. Q. Over what system?

A. Over the 1-JC circuit.

12. Q. And do you recall any other conversation between the bridge and combat during the interval that I have referred to just shortly prior to collision?

A. No, sir.

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13. Q. Then the only thing you remember during that period of time is that ~~SC~~ B6, the talker, sent up the word "750 yards, closing fast. Lost guide due to short range?"

A. Yes, sir, he was giving those in a real loud tone of voice

14. Q. And you recall nothing further happening down in combat?

A. No, sir.

Cross-examined by Captain B6, a party:

15. Q. Just to make sure I heard right, did you say that you were working on tuning a piece of equipment at the time just prior to the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. You were not during - - or, at any time during the 10 minutes prior to the collision watching the radar yourself?

A. Well, SC was inoperative and they were tuning it.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B6 r, a party:

17. Q. I believe that Lieutenant B6 was the electrical officer, on the HOBSON, is that correct?

A. That's right.

18. Q. What was the condition of the electronic equipment on board?

A. The SC was in - - it was very good with ranges. The bearings ~~were~~ on the VF were approximately 4 degrees off. That was one reason we gave the ranges and bridge took visual bearing and on these operations the SC was inoperative for about 2 days, sir.

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B-6, yeoman, third class, U.S. Naval Reserve entered reporter.

19. Q. What had happened to it?

A. They were having trouble tuning it. I don't recall just what it was.

20. Q. What was the other equipment you had on board?

A. That was the only two pieces of equipment we had. We had repeaters.

21. Q. Did you hear anyone in combat call up to the bridge over the voice tube?

A. I couldn't answer that, sir, for sure.

22. Q. What was the condition of the radar equipment when the HOBSON sailed from Charleston on her last voyage?

A. All radar equipment was operative, sir. The SC wasn't too good but it was operative.

23. Q. And these discrepancies that you mentioned occurred after sailing, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir, we had transferred a technician from the HODMAN. He was on there at the time repairing it.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

B-6 c., interior communicationman, fireman, U.S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Are you the same B-6 that testified previously in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, B-6?

A. Nineteen months, I believe.

3. Q. And how much of that has been spent at sea?

A. About eleven months.

4. Q. When did you report aboard the HOBSON?

A. In May.

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5. Q. What year?

A. Of last year.

6. Q. May of 1951?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. And what were your duties aboard the HOBSON on the night of the collision?

A. I was checking my IC interior communication gear before turning in to my rack.

8. Q. Where were you?

A. I was in CIC.

9. Q. Were you in a duty status in CIC or just checking your gear?

A. I was checking my gear.

10. Q. Answer this question just yes or no. Do you recall when you were down there checking your gear hearing any voice communication between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. No.

11. Q. Do you recall any conversation or any information that you heard passed up from CIC to the bridge?

A. I heard the radar man send the ranges up.

12. Q. He was sending them rather frequently?

A. Yes.

13. Q. Did you hear anything else?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make a further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

^{B-6} L, fireman apprentice, U.S. Navy, was recalled a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Are you the same ^{B-6} that previously testified in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

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2. Q. How long have you been in the Navy ^{B-6} ?
A. April of '50.

3. Q. How much of that service has been spent at sea?
A. Since February 16, 1952.

4. Q. Is that the date you reported to the HOBSON?
A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Where were you at the time of the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. In between the two deck houses ^{on} and the main deck.

6. Q. Did you see the WASP before she struck the HOBSON?
A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Did you see her as she struck?
A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. At what angle did she strike the HOBSON?
A. Like that, whatever you call it.

9. Q. At a right angle, at an angle of 90°?
A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. At what point did the WASP strike the HOBSON, aft of the pilot house or deck house?

A. Straight in between them.

11. Q. Straight in between the deck houses?
A. Yes, sir.

12. Q. And at a right angle?
A. Yes, sir.

Cross-examined by Captain ^{B-6} , a party:

13. Q. Is that just about number two engine room where you were struck?

A. There is a hole there for number two engine room. It is right there.

14. Q. How long did you see the WASP before it struck? For how long a period?

A. I seen it for about 30 seconds.

15. Q. How far away from the HOBSON was it when you first saw it?

A. I am not very sure about that. When I first seen it, all I could see was the red light a hundred yards or better.

16. Q. Were you looking out to starboard on your ship when you first saw it, the WASP's light?

A. Yes, sir.

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17. Q. In other words, it was toward the end of the HOBSON's left turn that you first saw the WASP, is that correct?

This question was objected to by the counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney on the ground that the witness had testified concerning the HOBSON's turn.

The question was withdrawn.

18. Q. Where with reference to the bow of the HOBSON did you first see the WASP?

A. Off the starboard bow. It was up ahead.

19. Q. You mentioned you saw a light. What light are you referring to on the WASP that you saw?

A. It was up in the mast. I guess it was the running light. I ain't sure.

20. Q. What color was it?

A. Red.

21. Q. Would it be the masthead light?

A. I think so. It was pretty high up.

Cross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

22. Q. You say you first observed the WASP up on the starboard bow?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. And the WASP actually struck the HOBSON as you observed it, I think, at an angle of 90° on the starboard side, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Between the two deck houses?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. What did you do then?

A. When it had put the port side under water and all that water came up I think that water got me and took me over the starboard side. I don't know how I got past it but that is what happened, I think.

26. Q. How close was the bow of the WASP to you?

A. You mean from where I was standing?

27. Q. From where you were standing.

A. About six feet, seven.

28. Q. Did the bow of the WASP stop its motion through the HOBSON, do you know, before you were thrown off into the water? Do you have any recollection of that at all?

A. I don't know. It was too much. There was a whole lot of fire and sparks. That is the only thing I seen after it hit. I wasn't there very long.

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Examined by the court:

29. Q. In an endeavor to fix more exactly the point that the WASP struck the HOBSON, could you locate it more accurately? You said between the two deck houses. Between the stacks?

A. It is aft of the second stack. There is a five-inch drilling machine on the main deck. That is right where it hit.

30. Q. Do you know whether the WASP cut the HOBSON in two entirely?

A. No, I don't.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

B-6, seaman apprentice, U.S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Are you the same *B-6* that previously testified in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. How long have you been in the Navy, *B-6*?

A. Almost seven months.

3. Q. Almost seven months?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. And how much of that has been spent at sea?

A. Since the 28th of January.

5. Q. And was it on that date you reported to the HOBSON?

A. I believe so, sir.

6. Q. The 28th of January 1952, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Now where were you on the HOBSON at the time of the collision with the WASP?

A. I was in the loran shack.

8. Q. And where was that with reference to the bridge?

A. The pilot house is forward, then there is the chart house and in one corner of the chart house is the loran shack.

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9. Q. In the chart house?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. And after the collision where did you go?

A. I went out onto the starboard wing.

11. Q. And did you reach the starboard wing of the bridge?

A. Yes, sir, I climbed on the outboard side of the splash rail.

12. Q. Did you see the commanding officer of the HOBSON there?

A. Yes, sir.

13. Q. And where was he?

A. He was sitting down.

14. Q. Sitting down?

A. He was sitting on the splash rail.

15. Q. On the splash --

A. The spray shield.

16. Q. Did you have any conversation with the Captain?

A. Soon as I sat down I noticed it was the Captain. I said, "What happened, Captain," and he turned and looked at me and said "Somebody didn't change course," and I turned to the stern of our ship and the next thing I knew I was under water.

17. Q. And did you see the commanding officer again?

A. No, sir, I didn't.

Cross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

18. Q. How was the commanding officer dressed, do you recall?

A. He had his hat on and a foul weather jacket.

19. Q. Did you have occasion to look aft at the WASP?

A. In relation to the WASP he was -- the aft of the WASP was -- the fantail of the WASP was this way (indicating) and he was on the left-hand side.

20. Q. Did you look at the WASP after she hit?

A. When I came out the bottom of our ship was rubbing the side of the ship.

21. Q. The bottom of your ship was rubbing the side of the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

22. Q. She had capsized?

A. She was laying almost completely at a 90° angle.

23. Q. Was this alongside the starboard bow of the WASP?

A. I couldn't say, sir.

24. Q. When the commanding officer said, "Somebody didn't change course," did he say it with any anger in his voice or just as a matter of fact?

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A. He didn't say it with anger in his voice, no, sir.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *36* a party:

25. Q. Did you think you were seeing the entire hull of the HOBSON or just part of it when it was scraping alongside the WASP?

A. We were right next to it, and I looked up and saw the WASP. That is why I sat down. I never thought the bow would sink. I thought we would just sit there like that and climb aboard. We were right next to it.

26. Q. Do you know whether or not the ship broke into two pieces?

A. No, sir, I don't.

27. Q. How long had you been there in the chart house?

A. I had been -- I went to the movies and then, let us see, it must have been about 9:30 or quarter to ten when I got up to the chart house.

28. Q. You had been there at least thirty minutes, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

29. Q. You hadn't been out on the bridge?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, and present duty station.

A. *36*, Lieutenant, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy. My duty station is the WASP.

2. Q. Serial number?

A. *016*

3. Q. And state your naval experience.

A. I have had four months duty at the Naval Hospital, Portsmouth Virginia, six months on the MIDWAY, and eight months on the WASP.

4. Q. And when did you report to the WASP?

A. On September 10, 1951.

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5. Q. What are your duties aboard the WASP?

A. Assistant medical officer.

6. Q. You are a graduate of an accredited medical school?

A. I am.

7. Q. Are you a licensed physician?

A. I am.

8. Q. In what state are you licensed?

A. New York State.

9. Q. Will you state your medical experience.

A. I am a graduate of the New York Medical College in New York, had a year's internship at St. Agnes Hospital in White Plains, a year in Grasslands Hospital in Valhalla, New York, and a year's surgical residency at the same hospital, and then I went to Portsmouth, Virginia.

10. Q. How long have you been a licensed physician?

A. Since 1948.

11. Q. Were you aboard the WASP on April 26, 1952?

A. I was.

12. Q. And what were your duties then?

A. As assistant medical officer.

13. Q. Did you treat any of the survivors of the crew of the HOBSON?

A. I did.

14. Q. Since April 26?

A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. Do you know of any other medical officers who treated others of the survivors?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. Have you filled out a report of the nature and extent of the injuries and of the place and extent of hospitalization of the various survivors?

A. I have, sir.

17. Q. Do you have it with you?

A. Yes, sir.

At this point the report was marked Exhibit 62 for identification.

18. Q. And on what information or how did you obtain the information which is contained in that report?

A. This report was prepared from the health records of the men who were treated on board the WASP.

19. Q. Treated by yourself and by others?

A. By the medical department of the WASP.

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20. Q. And those health records, of course, were prepared subsequent to the sinking of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, they had no records. All their records were lost.

21. Q. And is this report signed, sir?

A. Yes, sir; it is.

22. Q. By whom?

A. By me.

The report was submitted to the parties and to the court, and the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 62.

23. Q. Does Exhibit 62 contain a list of all the injuries that were sustained by HOBSON personnel in this collision?

A. It includes all of the survivors. All of the survivors were admitted to the sick list which was used for record purposes in order to determine whether there was any exposure or other injury.

24. Q. And this report is accurate?

A. Yes, sir.

25. Q. Did you have occasion to examine a body that was recovered from the water after this collision?

A. I saw the man's body. I personally didn't examine him carefully.

26. Q. Did you take his fingerprints?

A. Not personally; no, sir.

27. Q. Do you know if his fingerprints were taken?

A. His fingerprints were taken, yes, sir.

28. Q. And who took these fingerprints, Doctor?

A. I really couldn't answer that, sir.

29. Q. Do you know whether those fingerprints have been sent to Washington?

A. Yes, sir, they were sent to the Bureau of Personnel.

30. Q. Bureau of Personnel or Bureau of Medicine?

A. Bureau of Personnel, I believe.

31. Q. For comparison with the prints of Chief Boatswain's Mate

^{b-6}
A. Yes, sir.

32. Q. And I believe you say that this man thought to be ^{b-6} was dead when you saw him.

A. Yes, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

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The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant ^{B-6} , U.S. Naval Reserve, a party was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and was again reminded of his rights as a party, as a witness and against self incrimination.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. You are the same Lieutenant ^{B-6} that has been previously on the stand in this case?

A. I am.

2. Q. I hand you Exhibit 62 and ask you to examine it and state whether the men whose names appear on that list were assigned to duty aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON on 26 April 1952 in a duty status.

A. Yes, sir, they were.

3. Q. And were they in that duty status at the time of the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Do you know whether, or do you have any reason to believe that, the injuries of any of the men mentioned in that exhibit were received through their own misconduct?

A. No, sir.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The witness resumed his seat as a party.

The court then, at 1652, adjourned until 0830 the next day, 13 May 1952.

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FOURTH DAY

U.S. Naval Supply Depot,
Bayonne Annex,
U.S. Naval Base,
New York, New York.

Tuesday, May 13, 1952.

The court met at 0830.

Present:

Rear Admiral , U. S. Navy,
Rear Admiral . S. Navy, and
Rear Admiral . S. Navy, members.

Lieutenant Commander , III, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel for the court.

Lieutenant , U. S. Naval Reserve, assistant to counsel for the court.

Commander , Jr., U. S. Navy, advisor to the counsel for the court.

Captain , U. S. Navy, party to the inquiry and his counsel.

Commander , U. S. Navy, counsel representing Lieutenant Commander William J. Tierney, U. S. Navy.

Lieutenant , U. S. Naval Reserve, party to the inquiry and his counsel.

Lieutenant , U. S. Naval Reserve, party to the inquiry and his counsel.

Yeoman, first class, U. S. Navy, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry:

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, serial number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. , junior, commander, serial number , USN, present duty station: Commander Mine Division 62.

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2. Q. What was your duty station on April 26, 1952, sir?
A. I was Commander Mine Division 62 in the RODMAN and flying my pennant in that ship.

3. Q. Directing your attention to the evening of April 26, at about 2200, what other ships were in company with the RODMAN?
A. The USS WASP and USS HOBSON.

4. Q. And who was the officer in tactical command of that unit?
A. The Commanding Officer of the WASP.

5. Q. Under whose operational control was the HOBSON operating, sir?
A. Under the operational control of Commander Task Group 88.1.

6. Q. And that Task Group was at that time a part of what fleet, sir?
A. The Second Fleet.

7. Q. Now, will you state under whose administrative control the HOBSON was operating?
A. Under my administrative control.

8. Q. And under whose administrative control were you operating, sir?
A. I was operating under the administrative control of Commander Mine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

9. Q. Now, on this occasion you were operating under an operation order and plan?
A. Yes, sir.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The spectators and press withdrew from the courtroom.

10. Q. Did you -- rather do you have the operation plan under which you, the HOBSON, and the WASP were operating at the time of collision?
A. Do I have it?

11. Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

12. Q. Would you produce it?
A. Yes. It was Commander Cruiser Division FOUR Op order number 1-52, which was derived from Commander Second Fleet's Op order 2-52, and which stated that CTF 88 Op plan 1-51 was effective excepting annex Baker to that latter plan.

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13. Q. I hand you a folder marked Exhibit 63 for identification and ask you if that is Operation Plan 1-52 of ComTaskForce 88 (Commander Cruiser Division FOUR) that you have referred to, sir?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 63.

14. Q. I hand you a paper marked Exhibit 64 for identification and ask you, is that the operation order of Commander Second Fleet 2-52 that you have previously referred to?

A. It is.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 64.

15. Q. I hand you another paper, Commander, marked Exhibit 65 for identification and ask you if that is Commander Cruiser Division FOUR Op order number 1-52 that you previously referred to, sir?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and ^{IS APPENDED} marked Exhibit 65. was

16. Q. Now, on the evening, sir, of April 26, for your Task Unit of which you have said the Commanding Officer of the WASP was OTC, were the publications known as ATP1 and ACPL75 in effect?

A. ACPL75 was used for signal purposes and ATP1 - well, is not directly involved, I considered it to be effective.

17. Q. Had any message or any other order been received making ATP1 effective as of noon that day, Commander?

A. No, only a signal of intention to place it in effect at noon had been received prior to our detachment from the main body; however, when the Task Unit Commander used ACPL75 for the signal in the afternoon, I assumed that it was - both were effective for the unit.

18. Q. You were part of the Task Unit, under the commanding officer of the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

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19. Q. You did consider ATP1 in effect rather than the USF⁹? Were the signals used from ACP175 and did they call for maneuvers which were under ATP rather than the USF series?

A. In most respects.

20. Q. As I understand your testimony you had earlier in the day and some time prior to noon on April 26, 1952, received a signal from Commander Task Group 88.1, that it was his intention to put ATP1 and ACP175 in effect as of noon?

A. That is correct.

21. Q. But you had received no other message or signal?

A. No.

22. Q. (continuing) Directly putting those publications or the maneuvers described in those publications in effect?

A. No, sir.

23. Q. At what time was the task unit in which you were operating at the time of collision detached from the main force?

A. About 0700 on the 26th.

24. Q. Immediately - - Where were you, sir, in your ship from about 2200 that night up to the time of collision?

A. On the bridge of the RODMAN.

25. Q. Did you hear any signals exchanged between the WASP and the HOBSON during that period, sir? - Or do you recall them now?

A. Do you mean signals - signals received by both ships?

26. Q. Yes.

A. Yes, sir, I did.

27. Q. Now, will you tell the court what those signals were and the approximate time they were sent and received and whether you heard the HOBSON receipt for them, sir?

A. I don't remember specifically which ones I heard personally and which ones were relayed to me.

28. Q. You mean relayed to you by personnel in your ship?

A. Yes.

29. Q. Will you tell the court what signals were - all the signals that were either relayed by personnel or which you heard personally?

A. About 2212, signal "FOX CORPEN" - "265 SPEED 27" was received.

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50. Q. From the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

31. Q. Just a minute, sir, do you know or do you recall if that was receipted for by the HOBSON?

A. I am not sure.

32. Q. All right, sir.

A. About 2223 the signal "turn 265 speed 27" was made and executed.

33. Q. From the WASP?

A. Yes.

34. Q. Do you recall whether that signal was receipted for or acknowledged by the HOBSON?

A. I do not recall. I believe that signal course 265 was corrected to 260, either before or during the turn.

35. Q. In other words, it is your recollection that the turn signal was originally put in the air as 265 and later corrected

A. Perhaps I should say rather, the course we were coming to was 265.

36. Q. And do you recall whether that signal was receipted for or acknowledged by the HOBSON?

A. I do not.

37. Q. Now, sir, did you hear any other signals prior to collision from the WASP - any exchange of information between the WASP and the HOBSON during that period?

A. I heard no signals, but at one point after the turn had been commenced I heard the HOBSON ask a question of the WASP. I did not understand the question, but thought it was something about his station. I heard the WASP answer "Affirmative".

38. Q. You mean the signal from the HOBSON was garbled, that you couldn't understand or you don't recall what it was, sir?

A. No, I think I couldn't hear it in the wind and noise.

39. Q. Do you recall either hearing or having relayed to yourself a "MIKE CORPEN" signal from the WASP?

A. I don't recall definitely although that may have been the method by which we received this course 260.

40. Q. Do you know whether, sir, there is a radio log kept in the RODMAN that would reveal these voice transmissions and exactly what they were?

A. There is a radio log, ^{for} the completeness of which I think you will have to examine it.

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41. Q. Had the HOBSON earlier in the day been assigned a plane guard position for that particular operation?

A. Yes.

42. Q. And what was that position, sir?

A. The Task Unit Commander directed me to assign plane guard stations for afternoon and night operations. I originated a dispatch to the HOBSON and the RODMAN, info to the WASP, that the RODMAN was assigned plane guard station number one, HOBSON plane guard station number two for night operations - day and night, today and tonight. I think the wording in the dispatch was day and night.

Examined by the court:

43. Q. Did you assign the RODMAN number one and the HOBSON number two day and night?

A. Yes, sir.

Examination by counsel for the court continued:

44. Q. Commander, will you give a narrative of the sequence of events leading up to this collision between the WASP and the HOBSON, what you saw, what you could see from your ship?

A. At what point do you want me to start?

45. Q. From say 2200 on up to collision.

A. About 2200, I'm not sure of the time, I was on the bridge of the RODMAN and some time after 2200 I believe it was, I was on the after starboard end of the bridge, near the starboard flag bag and looked for the red truck lights of the HOBSON and couldn't see them at that time. Possibly because the ships were close to being in line and a little variation in station keeping on the part of either ship might have placed the WASP in between us. In any event, I asked the HOBSON if she had her truck lights on and received a reply in the "Affirmative". I returned to the vicinity of the starboard flag bag and this time through my binoculars, was able to make out the red truck lights of the HOBSON. When the turn signal was executed about 2223 I was on the starboard wing of the RODMAN's bridge. For the first part of the turn I saw that the ship was turning with the WASP and maintaining approximate bearing and distance. I then crossed to the port wing of the bridge and attempted to spot the HOBSON's truck lights, as we came around near the end of the turn, I think it was, I saw his lights dimly and very close to ahead from the RODMAN. I then went into the pilot house and looked in the repeater and saw that the HOBSON's distance from the WASP was approximately the same, 25 hundred or three thousand yards and about that time I heard this conversation or rather question from the HOBSON which I believed concerned her station and the WASP answering "Affirmative". Not having heard the conversation exactly, I asked the HOBSON if she understood her station to be night recovery station number two, and she replied in the "Affirmative". I then stepped out on the starboard end of the bridge again and remained there, and about that time I think the planes were beginning to approach the landing circle.

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A. (continued) I don't know how long I was there when the word came up from combat something about a collision - first planes, then something about collision on the flight deck and finally collision with the HOBSON. I looked to the port and saw smoke forward of the WASP's island and the WASP's searchlights were shining. About that time the signal "EMERGENCY" was reported from the WASP. I then asked the WASP if there were personnel in the water and they answered "Affirmative" - "Come alongside to starboard." I then directed the RODMAN to close the WASP, which we had already commenced to accomplish, and the ship close at the best speed they could having regard for possible people in the water and we soon heard people in the water. With the searchlights we saw them. The ship dropped liferafts, life-jackets, stopped all engines and backed - we were clear and put our motor whaleboat in the water and continued to search through the area the best we could, investigating the debris and looking for survivors. The RODMAN returned to the - RODMAN's boat returned to the ship, disembarked their survivors and the WASP's boat came alongside and disembarked some survivors, and then the WASP told us it would be necessary for her to get underway and recover planes at midnight, but the RODMAN had some injured personnel which we thought might - would be best off in the WASP under medical care. We had one man who was most seriously injured asked the WASP to delay until that man had been taken aboard. We asked the WASP if she wanted the RODMAN to act as plane guard her in recovery and she said "Affirmative". We then hoisted in boat - the motor whaleboat about 0020. And about 0030, I believe the WASP got underway. The RODMAN was some distance from its plane guard station and maneuvered in that direction to take that station as soon as possible, and acted as plane guard for the WASP while planes were recovered. And about 0100, ComDesFlotFOUR in the STRIBLING, with the CORRY and O'HARA were sighted. Previous to that the CORRY, I believe, had been assigned as plane guard number two. And upon completion of the recovery operations the WASP released the RODMAN and directed us to report to ComDesFlotFOUR at the scene of the collision, which we did, and upon reporting, ComDesFlotFOUR directed the RODMAN to search the scene of the collision - estimated scene of the collision - and return from the eastward, which we did and the search continued. Searched the area until daybreak, at which time ComDesFlotFOUR formed up the ships in a line first at five hundred yards then at a thousand yards distance and we searched through the area under his directions until about noon. From that time on we operated under ComDesFlotFOUR. There were numerous rafts, life-jackets, and rescue gear in the water. During the morning one injured man was taken by helicopter to the WASP. The intention was to take the others, but the weather had been worsening continually throughout the morning and the transfer of any other than that one man was finally cancelled by ComDesFlotFOUR.

46. Q. As I understand it, the following ships participated in search and rescue operations: The WASP, RODMAN, STRIBLING, O'HARA, and CORRY?

A. Yes, sir.

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47. Q. And at what time about did ComDesFlotFOUR assume charge of the search and rescue operation?

A. It must have been between approximately 0030 and 0100, while the WASP was recovering planes and the RODMAN was acting as plane-guard.

48. Q. And up until that time the WASP - the Commanding Officer of the WASP was in charge of search and rescue operations, is that correct, sir?

A. Yes.

49. Q. When was the search abandoned, Commander?-at what time?

A. I think about noon the following day. Although while we were waiting for the WASP ships were in the vicinity while the WASP effected repairs and before reporting ready to proceed. I am not sure of the time on that. The weather in the meantime had deteriorated and visibility was as little as three thousand yards, the wind had picked up, the seas had built up until it was really - you couldn't see much of the surface at that time.

50. Q. Do you recall the force and the direction of the wind at the time of collision?

A. I would estimate it to be about from 250 and about ten knots.

51. Q. And visibility was good?

A. Visibility was good - dark, but clear.

52. Q. But - just what ships took survivors aboard, sir?

A. The WASP and the RODMAN. The WASP had several boats in the water. The RODMAN had her only boat over as we approached the area of the scene of the collision. The water was literally covered with rafts, lifejackets and rescue gear of all types.

53. Q. And were all the survivors later transferred to the WASP?

A. Yes, oh, I think it was the Tuesday following - Tuesday - they were transferred by helicopter to the WASP.

54. Q. In your opinion, were the search and rescue operation efforts in all respects adequate?

A. Yes, sir.

55. Q. Are you aware of any outstanding meritorious service, or heroic acts, rendered by anyone?

A. No.

56. Q. Are you aware of any dereliction in the performance of duty by anyone?

A. No, sir.

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57. Q. A few minutes ago you spoke of observing, I think I'm quoting you, "The ship was turning with the WASP", were you referring to the RODMAN turning with the WASP?

A. Yes.

58. Q. Did you consider it incumbent on the HOBSON upon the execution of the turn signal you referred to to make the directed turn simultaneously with the WASP?

A. No. Plane guards should take steps to get into the proper plane guard station.

59. Q. And in your mind should arrive at that station in the most expeditious manner possible?

A. Yes.

60. Q. You speak of times, Commander, was there any time check conducted between the ships that evening?

A. Not that I recall.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

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All redactions are B-6.

, yeoman, second class, U.S. Navy, entered as reporter.

Captain [redacted], U. S. Navy, a party to the inquiry, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was duly sworn. He was reminded of his rights as a party. He was advised of his rights as a witness and under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and was also advised that any statement made or testimony given by him might be used as evidence against him in any subsequent trial by court-martial.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, serial number, branch of service and present duty station.

A. [redacted], captain, [redacted], U.S. Navy, Commanding, USS WASP.

2. Q. You are a party to this inquiry?

A. I am.

3. Q. Captain, will you describe your naval and marine experience?

A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1926. I went to the battleship TEXAS; spent a year there, and went to the battleship WEST VIRGINIA and spent a year there. The next two years I was on the USS NOKOMIS, survey vessel operating in Cuban waters. From there I went to Pensacola for flight training, graduating in 1931. I went to a fighter squadron on the LEXINGTON and remained there until 1934. From '34, to '37, I was an instructor in fighter and later torpedo planes at Pensacola. From '37 to '39, I was attached to Bombing Squadron FIVE on the USS YORKTOWN. I then put VO-5 in commission. That was an observation squadron attached to the forces of the Atlantic Fleet. From there I went to Panama as executive officer of a patrol plane squadron and worked up to command when the war started. Following that, in 1942 I was operations officer of the new Fleet Air Wing 12, Station at Key West. I remained there until 1943, then I went to the Staff of the Commander in Chief. In 1944, I left there and took command of the USS GUADACANAL, a CVE. From 1944 to 1945, I had command of a hunter-killer Task Group in the Atlantic, which consisted of five and sometimes six destroyer escorts. In 1945, I went to an air support control unit in connection with the building up of the Pacific campaign. When the war was over I went to Guam for a couple of months. I was the Naval Liaison Officer of a B-29 Group. I then moved to Commander Marianas Staff on Guam where I was operations officer and logistics officer. In 1947 I returned to the United States to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations where I was in the aviation detail section. In 1950, I went to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and then placed the WASP in commission on the 10th of September 1951.

4. Q. And you have been in command of the WASP since September 1951?

A. Yes, sir.

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5. Q. Directing your attention to the 26th of April 1952, was the WASP in collision with another vessel?

A. Yes.

6. Q. What vessel?

A. The USS HOBSON (DMS26).

7. Q. What was the time of the collision?

A. 2225, as nearly as I can determine.

8. Q. PETER zone time?

A. Yes.

9. Q. What was the state of the sea at that time, Captain?

A. If I may refer to my statement: The state of sea, smooth waves, three feet; wave period, six seconds; direction, 270.

10. Q. Will you state to the court the sequence of events leading up to the collision, sir?

A. I believe I can best do that by reading my statement: "On 26 April 1952, I was the Task Unit Commander and Officer in Tactical Command of the WASP, RODMAN, and HOBSON, and since we operated as a unit only on that day I am giving a resume of all our operations. Upon completion of the WASP's refueling from the tanker about noon, I directed a course to take position away from the main body from which we could launch night attack. I also directed that the DMS's be ordered to take screening positions. About 1300, I sent a message to Commander Mine Division 62, in the RODMAN, to designate the ships for plane guard stations number ONE and number TWO for flight operations that afternoon and night. He designated the RODMAN to take number ONE position and the HOBSON to take number TWO position.

"All the following signals were made and executed by flag hois. At 1345 the WASP directed the DMS's to take plane guard station which they did. At 1350, the tactical signal for all ships to turn left simultaneously to launching course was executed and the signal was hoisted, meaning aircraft operations within 10 minutes. At 1357, the WASP steadied into the wind on launching course 285 and signalled this course to the DMS's. At 1358, the start of flight operations was signalled and at 1400 the first of nine planes was launched. At 1416, with the last plane off the deck I signalled a new course, and turned right to course 060 True. At 1438, while the planes were circling overhead, I signalled the DMS's that it was our intention to recover aircraft on course 290 at speed 20.

"This was followed at 1440 by a turn left into the wind to recover the aircraft. The first plane landed at 1456 and the last at 1527. During the landings both plane guards maintained positions satisfactorily. Following the recovery of the last plane at 1529, the end of flight operations was signalled and the formation turned to the new course of 065 degrees True.

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"The above exercise conducted in broad daylight served two purposes: First, to familiarize the pilots with catapult launches before the night operations; and second, to 'walk through' the Carrier Task Unit procedure using the Tactical Publications prescribed for these operations. The operation was normal in all respects. At 1548, all ships were placed in a normal cruising formation, and we steamed on course 065 degrees to reach a position well away from the main body from which we could conduct the night operations and still rejoin them at 0800 the next morning.

"In accordance with orders to the entire Task Group, all ships were darkened at sunset which occurred at 1854. From my information, all ships were most meticulous in carefully dogging hatches and doors and turning off any bright lights in much traveled passageways and ladders. At no time before the collision did I see any naked lights, except the red trucks, on either of the DMS's. The weather conditions were favorable for night flying operations. The night was clear, extremely dark, high overcast at 25,000 feet, middle broken at 8,000 feet, low broken at 2,500 feet, visibility ten miles, wind west southwest about 240 degrees, 10 knots; temperature 58.5 degrees; sea water temperature 64 degrees; sea state smooth, wave height 3 feet, wave period 6 seconds, direction 270 degrees. There was no visible horizon and from our high point of observation on the bridge of the WASP the hulls of the DMS's merged with the dark water.

"However, the same Task Group orders directed the Carrier Task Unit to use Lighting Measure GREEN during night flight operations. As Officer in Tactical Command, I directed that this lighting measure be set. This night lighting measure consisted of red truck lights on the surface ships but no running lights.

"Flight Quarters were sounded at 1900 and lighting measure GREEN was set. Due to darkness all orders issued subsequently were by voice radio. At 1940 we again sent an intention signal that we would be operating aircraft in ten minutes on course 265 degrees, speed 20. Both ships receipted for the message. At 1945 Lieutenant, junior grade, ^{B-6}, relieved Lieutenant, junior grade, ^{B-6}, (sic) and the Junior Officer of the Watch was relieved by Ensign ^{B-6}. At 1948, we turned to course 265 degrees in order to get proper wind for launching aircraft. Commencing at 2001 we launched ten aircraft by catapulting. At 2034, we signalled the completion of flight operations, and at 2035, by signal, we turned the ships simultaneously to the left to course 102 degrees True.

"The night exercises consisted of a simulated attack on the main body some fifty miles away to the south. The aircraft attack was completed about 2150 and the aircraft so reported to us. During this attack period our Task Unit remained steady on course 102 and conducted inter-ship blinker drills. At 2209 a radio check was held with the HOBSON and RODMAN on the voice tactical

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(continued.) circuit and communications were satisfactory. The GUPPY aircraft returned to the Task Unit at 2220, by which time the attack divisions had returned to a point 30 miles south of the WASP. In accordance with my instructions, preparations for night recovery had been commenced at 2210. This consisted of a voice radio course and speed intention signal to the RODMAN and HOBSON. Both ships receipted for these signals. At 2221, we commenced a simultaneous turn to the right to course 260 degrees True and increased speed to 27 knots. At this time the HOBSON was on our starboard quarter, True bearing 245 degrees, distance 3,000 yards. His new position for night recovery was to be 1,000 yards on our port beam. The WASP's OOD ordered RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER at 2221. Shortly after the start of the turn the HOBSON requested confirmation that she was to assume plane guard position for night recovery of aircraft. This was confirmed. About two degrees before the WASP reached course 260 degrees True, I observed, through my binoculars, that the HOBSON's red truck light had reached a position about twenty degrees to the left of our projected recovery course of 260, and that the relative bearing was changing to the left. I noticed that the actual wind was slightly to port of the anticipated wind, hence at this time I directed a signal be sent informing the HOBSON and RODMAN of a change in course to 250 degrees True. As I continued to observe the red truck lights of the HOBSON on the port side, they suddenly grew distinctly brighter. I immediately gave the order ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY. This order was telegraphed immediately to the engine room. The HOBSON's lights closed rapidly and the ship passed across the bow so close that it disappeared from my sight under the forward end of the flight deck. The bow, with the large number 26 and the forward stack appeared on our starboard side and I thought he had possibly cleared. However, almost immediately the WASP, which had only reached a heading of 258 degrees, struck the HOBSON amidships on her starboard side and swung her bow aft on our starboard side. As the bow was swung around, I asked if we had stopped and was informed that we were still making headway. I stopped all engines as soon as I thought we were dead in the water. At this time it appeared that the HOBSON had broken in two. The geographic location was Latitude 42-21 N and Longitude 44-15 W. The depth of the water was 2695 fathoms.

" Practically simultaneous with the collision, I gave the order LIGHT SHIP. COLLISION QUARTERS were sounded, then MAN OVERBOARD Fire and rescue parties were called away and "LIFE BOAT CREWS, MAN YOUR BOATS." Line, liferafts, life preservers, and nets were immediately ordered dropped over the side. All flight deck fire stations were manned. The HOBSON and surrounding area was immediately illuminated by search lights and the RODMAN was directed to assist in the rescue. Approximately four minutes after the collision the HOBSON up-ended and sank.

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"The WASP lay dead in the water, continuing rescue operations until about 0015, at which time we got underway and recovered ten aircraft, leaving our boats in the water to continue the rescue. As we were steady on course to recover aircraft, Admiral B. C. in the STRIBLING, with O'HARE and CORRY arrived and he took charge at the scene of the collision."

11. Q. Now, will you continue your narrative and describe the search and rescue operations?

A. If I may, I have one other thing I would like to put in at this time. In summary, I have here a chart on which I have had reconstructed the track of the WASP from the point at which the turn from course 102 degrees True was commenced to the point where the collision with the HOBSON occurred. It includes the most likely track of the HOBSON as adduced from the evidence from her position at the start of the maneuver to the point of collision. It also includes the plane guard position to which the HOBSON had been assigned. I would like to emphasize that this chart is merely a chart which has been worked up by me ~~with~~ with the assistance of the people who have assisted me in this court of inquiry.

12. Q. Is this the chart to which you have referred?

A. It is.

The counsel for the court requested that the reporter mark the chart Exhibit 66 for identification. It was so marked.

13. Q. And this merely represents your best judgment of the respective tracks taken by the WASP and the HOBSON from 2221 on 26 April 1952 up to the point of collision?

A. That is correct.

The chart representing the witness' judgment of the respective tracks of the WASP and the HOBSON was submitted to the parties and to the court and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 66.

A. (continued.) The WASP was here (indicating) at 2221. The HOBSON was here (indicating) at 2221. When the execution of the turn signal was made the WASP made a turn to come to 260, although we had 25 knots here. (Indicating) Through the motions, a certain amount of speed in a turn,--we dropped to 21.8 and on down. At 2223--this point (indicating)--the surface search radar on which the HOBSON was being plotted failed. There was an approximate range of 3100 yards on the HOBSON at that time. At this time here (indicating) the bearing was, at the start, 065 or 245, 3,000 yards. This is where the collision occurred. This is where the HOBSON's position would have been, and if the operation had continued normally, the WASP would have been here at that time. The bearings at 1240 yards were given to the

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(continued.) HOBSON at that time, and the WASP was approximately here (indicating). We have assumed that that was the time when the HOBSON was here (indicating). The WASP was approximately there (indicating) and the HOBSON approximately here at 740 yards (indicating). This change was that the HOBSON went to course 130 and then took an average course of 090 until the first turn here (indicating). Gentlemen, that is how, I believe it happened.

14. Q. Captain, when you gave the turn signal, did you expect the HOBSON to turn simultaneously with the WASP?

A. Yes.

15. Q. Did you feel that it was incumbent on the HOBSON in obedience to that signal to turn simultaneously with the WASP?

A. Initially, yes.

16. Q. If the HOBSON had turned simultaneously with the WASP to course 260, did the bearing--rather, would the bearings have been approximately the same as they were on the actual course she took?

A. That is very difficult to answer because it entails a supposition of where she was going to end up. If he made a complete 90 degree turn, she would have ended up far ahead of my port bow.

17. Q. What I am trying to get at Captain, is, could you or your Officer of the Deck, by bearings, tell that the HOBSON had not executed the turn to course 260?

A. No.

18. Q. And at what point were you apprised or could you have been apprised that she had not obeyed that signal and turned to course 260?

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney objected to this question on the ground that the question assumed facts not in evidence.

The counsel for the court replied.

Captain 7-6, party, replied.

Counsel for the court withdrew the question.

19. Q. At what point, Captain, could you have been apprised that the HOBSON had not turned simultaneously with the WASP, come right to 260?

A. In order to answer that I am going to have to bring in the doctrine.

Counsel for the court withdrew the question.

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20. Q. Captain, would you continue on with your narrative and describe somewhat more in detail the search and rescue operations that were conducted after the collision? To what extent and what was the duration?

A. My statement gave the things we did. I enumerated them and they may give the appearance that it was one after another when that is not true. The minute that we saw the HOBSON so close aboard the "light ship"--the "collision" orders were practically simultaneous. The minute that it was struck the word was passed to throw over life lines when we could see the men at the bow in the water. To throw over life jackets and so forth, all the people started and it just rained things. For instance, there were fifty-nine inflatable life boats dropped over. There were fifty-eight life floats. There were 1250 life jackets, and there were eleven life buoys that went over at that time.

21. Q. Went over from your ship?

A. Went over from my ship into the water.

22. Q. Continue.

A. There was only one boat ready. That was the 26-foot motor whale boat. It was in the water, I believe, within 4½ minutes. And although all the others were hemmed in in the hangar bay number THREE, by airplanes stowed for sea, within fifteen minutes all eight boats were in the water searching. The signal searchlights were turned on. We were all on the edges of the bridge. We had a sound-powered telephone right there on the bridge from which I and the Officer of the Deck could give orders to train the search lights to where they were picking up people in the water. There were so many people in the water, and we got the boats into the water in such a hurry, there was no attempt for organized search other than to pick up everyone you could. The deck edge elevator was lowered and the lines were thrown down from it and men were hoisted up.--Those that could, tied them around themselves. One man was standing on the edge. Here is the picture which was published. (Handing counsel for the court a photograph.) There is a man standing on the edge of the bridge and as this man came up that man hooked his arms right around the ladder--rather, around the radar antenna which wasn't strong enough and it bent with him down even with the hangar deck, and our boys just gathered him in. The boats brought survivors back; they were taken aboard ship, and then they went back again but I had ten planes up there who had to be recovered. After the first forty-five minutes, about ten minutes after 11:00, I do not believe there were any more people in the water. I don't think there were any people who were rescued after that time, but we stayed and continued the search until midnight when the airplanes reported that their gasoline was getting so low that they might not be able to come aboard so we left our small boats the way they got underway, and I had just established a speed of 10 knots because you had to have some wind over the deck, and we had all the planes parked up forward so as to provide space.

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23. Q. Did you have any difficulty recovering the aircraft?

A. No. The RODMAN took her plane guard position. Admiral came in with his three destroyers and asked me if I wanted another one in number TWO, and I said, "Indeed I did." So he sent the CORRY. We recovered them--ten airplanes. Then we returned to the scene of the collision.

24. Q. And continued your search?

A. We did not. Our boats did, but our boats were by then so low that they had only about an hour's amount of gasoline left, and we had to lift them and bring them back onboard.

25. Q. Was the search for survivors continued throughout the following day?

A. Admiral -I was about two miles away from the scene of the collision when his group was closing. He took charge of the search and continued the search. I had finished recovering the planes, and I directed the RODMAN and the CORRY to go back and report to him and we came on back, but we laid to at about the scene of the collision and started recovering our boats. The search continued the next day. We did not participate except to send the helicopter out to fly between the destroyers on the search line but the weather was so gusty, and with rain squalls, that sometimes you couldn't even see the destroyers and they couldn't see each other, so we recalled the helicopter and continued with our damage control and shoring on the forward part of the ship. I think the search was continued until about noon, but frankly, I don't know. They were waiting for me to report to them that I could get underway. And when I did, I backed. I didn't know what damage was forward so I just backed into the sea.

26. Q. What is your estimate of the elapsed time between your backing order to the engines and the collision?

A. I will have to look at that. Approximately, a minute. I have tried to reconstruct it.

27. Q. That is your best judgment?

A. Yes, it is.

28. Q. And the time that you gave the order for all engines to back emergency, you knew the HOBSON, of course, was in dangerous proximity. Did it occur to you, Captain, to give any whistle signals?

A. Yes. However, I think I will have to answer that by saying this: That my backing signal was given on the increasing of the intensity of the HOBSON's truck lights. I did not see the hull of his ship and since he belonged on the port bow--on the port side of the ship, and was so close, he might be passing down the port side. I did not know that the HOBSON was heading directly for us and by the time that I could--this was a flash decision--by the time we could get out a signal--if I got one signal out, one blast, I was turning right. If I only got two blasts out, I was turning left. My chances of getting three blasts to indicate that I was backing full was practically negligible, and I felt that any whistle signal might be more confusing than remaining on the course which I said I would keep.

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29. Q. And could you tell from the position of the HOBSON's truck lights the heading of the HOBSON?

A. No.

30. Q. Would you, in general, describe the damage done the WASP and the damage control measures which you undertook, sir?

A. The damage consisted of a slit--If I may draw it on the board I can describe it better. (The witness drew a picture of the forward part of the ship.) That is the water line (indicating). It consisted in a slit about fifteen feet, as far as I could tell about fifteen feet, three feet above the water line to about twelve feet below the water line. The first bulkhead was frame 19. That is where we shored all the way aft. The keel and the forefoot remained, but it broke off apparently some time on our way back. The damage on the port side was not as great as on the starboard. Both chain lockers were open to the sea and the bulkhead which held the starboard chain locker to which the bitter end was attached had carried away, and the starboard chain was hanging down 108 fathoms and has an 8-foot piece on the end. The port anchor chain came ^{out} and came down in this fashion (indicating). That only went eighty fathoms. We were able to recover all of the chain, brought it up on deck on the forecastle, broke it into 15-fathom lengths and hauled them aft to the hangar deck. For further details on the extent of the damage, I am afraid the ship yard will have to give you that.

31. Q. Captain, will you describe your voyage back to port in the United States, and any difficulty you encountered during the voyage?

A. It may not be accurate, but I will try.

32. Q. Just your best recollection.

A. As soon as I felt, the morning of the 27th, that we had the watertight boundaries developed and knew as to where we stood, the weather was getting rough. The weather forecast was better to the southward, and Admiral ^{BC} sent me a message as to when we would be ready to get underway, and I said, "We are ready now." So, we started backing. The waves were about 25 to 30 feet from 240° and I was trying to make good a course of 180. The engines would only back 140 rpms except in an emergency, so I backed 140 revolutions on the starboard screws and about 19 degrees of left rudder on. Now, the reason I used 19 degrees of left rudder, we found that she would hold a general course by holding about 20 degrees from 050 to 010, and we backed. About 3:00 o'clock in the morning, something happened as that system didn't work any more so we backed around in a circle. Then I found that the port screws were winding--windmilling backward at about 40 revolutions and I had the engine room cut them down to 20 revolutions, and we were able to regain steering. About noon of the 28th, I was ready to come around and try to quarter or put the sea on the bow. Well, I did that. The turning was very very difficult, having to back full on two engines and go ahead full on the other two engines in order to swing it so we progressed back, tacking across the sea. Every time it got too rough, why

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(continued.) we would turn our tail and find an easier course. I guess that, as it always appears, we tried to find a comfortable course in the afternoon and the sea would change just when it was darkest at night, and we would have to do all the experimenting while it was dark. One night when the port anchor chain tumbled out, one of the youngsters who was a little bit nervous on the bridge reported that the bow was falling off. And about three days out, we got some calm weather, and we got down inside to see what the damage was; put the small boat in the water and then started bringing up the port anchor. And most unusual, we got quite good weather, so we were able to bring up the other anchor. Then we came in.

33. Q. Now, directing your attention to a point shortly before the collision; what was the interval, in your best judgment, that elapsed between your first intention signal for this maneuver and your signal to execute the turn?

A. Ten minutes.

34. Q. From your position on the bridge of the WASP, could you tell at what angle she struck the HOBSON?

A. Not except that it was at a right angle.

35. Q. From your observation of the HOBSON immediately after the collision, do you know at what point or where the HOBSON was struck?

A. No. I do know that it was about the after stack.

36. Q. And did the HOBSON break in two, sir?

A. I can't answer that. I believe it, but I don't know.

37. Q. Do you know how much way on the WASP had at the time of the collision?

A. No, I do not know.

38. Q. What was the last range to the HOBSON given you by combat before the radar failed, or do you recall?

A. It was 3100 yards, but I don't remember whether it was given to me or not.

39. Q. Did you have any method, other than by visual observation, after the failure of the radar, to determine whether the range between the WASP and the HOBSON was closing perilously?

A. No.

40. Q. You have said that aircraft warning lights were burning on the WASP. Were there any other lights burning on her?

A. Yes, but there were no others which were designed to be seen by other surface vessels.

41. Q. And do you know whether at the time of the collision these lights were properly screened so they could not be observed by other surface vessels?

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A. I think my word "designed" is misinterpreted. As the ship rolls you can see certain other lights that are designed to be horizontal with the plane of the horizon. They were, as far as I know, adjusted to that plane.

42. Q. Would you describe the location and arrangement of the aircraft warning lights on the WASP, approximately?

A. All around red lights.

43. Q. One light, sir?

A. Two lights, way up on the top of the mast.

44. Q. Are those situated fore and aft or across the ship?

A. Fore and aft.

45. Q. And what is the distance between them?

A. Three to six feet.

46. Q. The point I am getting at, Captain, if you know, are your aircraft warning lights on the WASP so positioned that the HOBSON could determine the WASP's heading?

A. I can't answer that.

47. Q. Were there any other officers other than those you have mentioned on the bridge of the WASP at the time of collision?

A. Yes. Commander *B-6*, our executive officer, was there.

48. Q. Was he participating in giving any orders to the helm or participating in the maneuvers in any manner?

A. No, sir.

49. Q. Who had the conn of the WASP at the time of collision?

A. I had it.

50. Q. And had you assumed the conn prior to the order to the engines, "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK"?

A. No.

51. Q. Who had the conn prior to that?

A. Lieutenant *B-6* the Officer of the Deck.

52. Q. And is Lieutenant *B-6*, in your opinion, in all respects a qualified officer of the deck?

A. Thoroughly qualified in all respects, including the fact that he has brought the ship to anchor and gotten it underway by himself.

53. Q. How long has he been so qualified?

A. Since 10 September when we put the WASP in commission.

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13-6, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

54. Q. Now, Captain, would you tell the court under what publications - - what maneuvering instructions and communications instructions you were operating at the time of collision?

A. ATP-1, ACP-175 and associated publications.

55. Q. When had those publications been put in effect, sir?

A. At 1200 local time that day, the 26th.

56. Q. By whom, sir?

A. The Commander Task Group 88.1.

57. Q. And he was what officer, sir?

A. ComCruDiv4, Admiral *13-6*.

58. Q. And had those publications been put into effect by direct order or had it been an intention?

A. He said that "it is my intention to do this," and his initial dispatch said at 1600 that day; then he came through and changed and said, "Change my so and so to 1200." We assumed that it was in effect. And during the afternoon exercises those were the publications we used.

59. Q. Then there was no direct order or statement from any person that those publications were actually in effect, is that correct?

A. I sent a dispatch to the Commander Cruiser Division FOUR two days ago asking just that question, and I have not received a reply.

60. Q. But you had conducted exercises and maneuvers yourself that afternoon in which you used the doctrine and tactics from ATP-1 and communication signals from ACP-175?

A. That's right.

61. Q. Now, would you relate to the court the exact verbage of the series of messages and signals that you have described in your testimony in open court?

A. This is a standard check-off list which is used by all of the officers of the deck on the ship. It has been in effect since we started fleet operations, I believe, oh, before Christmas. It starts out (witness reading) "0-20 minutes: Check true surface wind. Wind over deck desired. Start increasing speed to 'some' knots and 'such' time information. Inform main engineering control in advance if possible. 0-15 minutes: Determine signal for launching. Course and launching speed. Hoist in time to execute at 0-10 minutes. 0-10 minutes: Hoist FOX at the dip. Turn into the wind. Steady on course."

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A. (continued) 0-1 minute: Two-block FOX. Wind on the port bow. Be prepared for emergencies." - Now, all of these signals fit this pattern of time. At 1350 - - no, wait a minute. At 1345, I directed the DMS's to take their plane guard stations which they did. At 1350, the tactical signal to turn left was executed. The signal, I think it was - - oh, no, it was 285 turn, and we hoisted the FOX signal indicating aircraft operations will be commenced within 10 minutes. We hoisted it at the dip. At 1357, we steadied into the wind and hoisted the signal MIKE CORPEN 285. At 1358, the FOX flag was two-blocked. At 1416, when the last plane left the deck, I had the signal, "TURN 060" second repeater hoisted and when the ships had answered we executed it and we turned right to that course. At 1438, while the planes were circling overhead, the signal FOX CORPEN 290 TACKLINE FOX SPEED 20 was hoisted and executed, and then I followed that at 1440 by a flag hoist TURN FOX PORT which is one of the new ACP signals meaning we would turn left into the wind to recover aircraft. Following the recovery of the last airplane, the FOX flag was executed and the signal "TURN 065 TACKLINE SPEED 20" was hoisted and was executed as soon as it was two-blocked on the DMS. At 1900 - - at 1940, we sent an intention signal FOX CORPEN 265 TACKLINE FOX SPEED 20. That was by radio; both ships receipted for it. At 1948, we sent the tactical signal EXECUTE TO FOLLOW, TURN 265 FOX IS AT THE DIP. When both ships had receipted, we sent MY TURN 265 STANDBY EXECUTE EXECUTE. Both ships receipted and we turned simultaneously. At 2001, we two-blocked FOX. At 2034 FOX was executed, and at 2035 we turned the ships simultaneously using the tactical signal EXECUTE TO FOLLOW 102 TURN. Both ships receipted and we sent MY 102 TURN EXECUTE EXECUTE. At 2210 we sent a voice signal to the RODMAN and the HOBSON, FOX CORPEN 265 TACKLINE FOX SPEED 27. Both ships receipted for the message. At 2220 we sent the following signal: FOX IS AT THE DIP EXECUTE TO FOLLOW TURN 260 TACKLINE SPEED 27. As soon as this message was received, TURN 260 TACKLINE - - or, we sent MY TURN 260 ~~OR~~ TACKLINE SPEED 27 STANDBY EXECUTE EXECUTE. At 2224 or right in there (indicating), as soon as we came closer to the wind I noticed that the wind would be slightly too far on the port bow, and the best information that I can get - - I cannot remember this. I was standing by the primary tactical and I sent out MIKE CORPEN 250. Now, the RODMAN had a sick transmitter on that frequency and I did not get a reply to it, but I turned and told the Junior-Officer-of-the-Deck on the secondary tactical across the bridge from me to send that signal to them and delayed to give him a chance to send it, but, however, I did start to come around - - I told the Officer-of-the-Deck to come around gently to 250. We might have checked at 254 depending on how the direction of the wind would be given. The policy on the ship was that at any time we changed course 5 degrees or more we notified the escorts by the use of MIKE CORPEN. Those are the signals.

62. Q. In making your turn to the right, Captain, what tactical diameter did you use?

A. 1500. - 1500 yards.

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63. Q. And that is the tactical diameter prescribed in ATP-1?
A. It is.

64. Q. Do you know of any message or any order from the Task Group Commander or anyone in authority directing that a different tactical diameter be used in this operation?
A. Do you mean the operation which I was conducting?

65. Q. Yes, sir.
A. No. No such message had been received.

66. Q. During your exercises crossing the Atlantic, had a tactical diameter of 1200 yards been used at any time in the maneuver of the task force?

A. Yes, sir. On the previous Wednesday afternoon when the group was assembled, we were conducting drills under the ACP and ATP which were to be used. At that time the Task Group Commander signalled tactical diameter 1200 yards will be used. He also signalled station^{INC} speed will be 25 knots, and operational speed 27 knots. And I believe we made a few - - possibly two or three turns using those figures - - those directives, but those were cancelled at the conclusion of that. Let me say it this way: Those applied to that exercise and that exercise only.

67. Q. Your group was sailing to join the SIXTH Fleet, was it not, sir?
A. Yes.

68. Q. Do you know whether SIXTH Fleet instructions require a tactical diameter of 1200 yards rather than 1500 yards?
A. I do and they do.

69. Q. And was this exercise in which a 1200 yards tactical diameter was used a preparatory exercise for the maneuvers that you were to be engaged in when sailing under SIXTH Fleet instructions or do you know?
A. I don't know.

70. Q. And what time, sir, on the evening of April 26th had Lighting Measure Green been put in effect?
A. About 1900.

71. Q. And it remained in effect from that time up until the time of collision?
A. Yes.

72. Q. Did the operation order under which you were exercising require that a Lighting Measure Green stay in effect from the time of your original launching of aircraft up to the time of their recovery?
A. Yes. Because flight operations were being conducted, you might say, continuously.

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73. Q. In conducting your flight operations during the afternoon, Captain, when you were operating under ATP-1, and ACP-175, your turns into the wind were made by the execution of a turn signal under ACP-175, had either of your plane guards upon the execution of those signals failed to turn simultaneously with the WASP?

A. No.

74. Q. Captain, I call your attention to Section 567 of ATP-1, and quote "Navigation lights on darkened ships and any ship endangered by others. When ships are darkened, and any ship considers herself endangered by another, she is to switch on dimmed navigation lights. Other ships in the immediate vicinity sighting such lights are to switch on their dimmed navigation lights. b. When it is necessary to change formation, formation axis, or course of a screened unit, dimmed navigation lights may be switched on if it is not certain that ships will clear each other." Did it occur to you in the execution of the maneuver which brought the WASP and the HOBSON together, to order dimmed navigation lights on?

A. No.

75. Q. Well, do - - ?

A. May I change that? I did not consider it necessary since we were operating purely by tactical signals of execution and the formation was small and simple.

76. Q. Captain, did it occur to you at the point of where you ordered all your engines emergency back to switch on your navigation lights at that time or to lighten ship entirely?

A. I preferred to lighten ship. ref

77. Q. And did you order that immediately upon the execution or upon giving the orders to all engines emergency back?

A. No, it wasn't immediately. It followed along behind that.

78. Q. Does that "light ship" include running lights, Captain?

A. It includes everything that can be turned on on the topside.

79. Q. Well, in the execution of that order, were your running lights turned on?

A. I can't answer that. My order was "light ship." "Turn on all lights" so that it wasn't a navigational "light ship". It was "turn on all lights."

80. Q. As best you recall, sir, what was the wording of the message sent by the HOBSON to the WASP on voice radio regarding whether or not the HOBSON should take plane guard station 2 for the night recovery?

A. "Shall I take plane guard station for night recovery of aircraft?" My answer was "affirmative."

81. Q. Did you consider your answer to that question an order to take a different course from that you had previously ordered in your turn signal?

A. It was not an order. It was permission for her to adjust her maneuvers to get into the position.

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82. Q. Was there any reference to time either in the question asked or in your reply?

A. No.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

83. Q. Captain, what was your physical location on the bridge of the WASP during the maneuver which resulted in the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON - - where were you standing?

A. How far back do you want me to go back?

84. Q. Well, I would say from your turn signals - - from the execution of your turn signals?

A. I came out on the bridge before the turn started and stood over in the starboard after part and saw that the officer of the deck was carrying out the maneuver and that the other people were doing what was supposed to be done, and then as they stepped forward I walked behind the officer of the deck on the open bridge to the port side. The 'open bridge' is really a closed bridge. I was then actually in a position in front of my chair with the voice tactical circuit here (indicating) a compass here (indicating) the indicator in front of me (indicating).

85. Q. And at the time you took your position on the bridge at the beginning of the maneuver were your eyes fully night adapted?

A. I can't say that.

86. Q. And how long had you been on the bridge, Captain, or about the bridge or in the pilot house?

A. I would say 20 minutes. I can't answer that directly and no one can assist me. I don't remember the times I went out on the bridge while operations were impending.

87. Q. During how much of the maneuver commencing with the signal to execute the turn were you in a position to observe the HOBSON?

A. I would say that I was in my position on the port wing of the bridge about here (indicating on Exhibit 66) I saw the RODMAN, and then as we swung around here (indicating), as soon as we came around, I started watching the HOBSON off to the right and followed her around the - - from on the starboard bow across so that I was watching her from here (indicating) - -

88. Q. Could you see her heading through your binoculars?

A. No, sir.

89. Q. Were you or anyone else on the bridge taking bearings on the HOBSON?

A. I was not.

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90. Q. Do you know whether anyone else was taking bearings on it, sir?

A. I can't answer that. I think I might qualify that by saying that with the compass which I have with an illuminated dial and my binoculars, I can look right across the compass and take a seaman's eye bearing.

91. Q. But you don't know whether during that maneuver anybody was taking bearings on her through a pelorus?

A. I can't answer that.

92. Q. What was the position of Lieutenant B.G., the Officer of-the-Deck, on the bridge during that maneuver?

A. As far as I can remember, he was to my right.

93. Q. Over on the starboard wing?

A. He was on my side of the bridge on the port side of the bridge, but his exact position, I don't remember.

94. Q. Do you recall what he was doing during this period?

A. He was watching the HOBSON just the same as I was.

95. Q. Through the binoculars?

A. I can't answer that.

96. Q. Do you recall what other personnel were on the bridge and in the wheel house during this period?

A. I would have to get that from a piece of paper. I can read it. On the open bridge, I was there, Commander the Executive Officer; Lieutenant (junior grade) the OOD; and Lieutenant JOOD, and , seaman, on the JX telephone circuit.

97. Q. That's the inter-communication phones or sound powered - - - ?

A. Sound powered phones connected with the searchlight. In the pilot house were the Junior-Officer-of-the-Deck, Ensign ; the quartermaster of the watch . I have their names, but I haven't their initials. The steersman, . The boatswain's mate of the watch, The JS talker, . The messenger-talker, , the engine order telegraph and lee steersman, SN. One other steersman under instruction by the name of . Those were the bridge personnel.

98. Q. Are you the official custodian of the various official records of the WASP?

A. I am.

99. Q. Have you the Quartermaster's Notebook that was in use on the WASP at the time of collision?

A. I have.

100. Q. Would you produce it, sir?

A. Here it is.

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At this point the Quartermaster's Notebook was marked Exhibit 67 for identification.

The Quartermaster's Notebook from 1200 to 2400, 26 April 1952, was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 67.

101. Q. Are you the legal custodian of the Officer-of-the-Deck Rough Log?
A. I am.

102. Q. That was in use from 1200 to 2400, 26 April 1952?
A. Yes.

103. Q. Would you produce it?
A. Here it is.

At this point the Officer-of-the-Deck Rough Log was marked Exhibit 68 for identification.

104. Q. At this point, I want to, Captain, call your attention to the fact that Exhibit 68 for identification only covers a period from 1200 to 2400 on the 26th of April?
A. Yes.

105. Q. Do you have in your custody another log that continues from 2400, 26 April through the next day?
A. I think that you have the even numbers day. The odd days is another rough. We have the other one.

106. Q. Yes, sir, and would you bring it to court at some later time, sir?
A. Yes, sir.

The Rough Deck Log from 1200 to 2400 on the 26th of April was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 68.

107. Q. Do you have in your possession the Officer-of-the-Deck Smooth Log covering the period from 1200 to 2400, 26 April 1952?
A. I have.

108. Q. Would you produce it, sir?
A. Here it is.

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At this point the Smooth Deck Log was marked Exhibit 69 for identification.

The Smooth Deck Log from 1200 to 2400, 26 April 1952, was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 69.

109. Q. Do you have in your possession, but not at this time, the Officer's-of-the-Deck Smooth Deck Log covering the period from 2400, 26 April 1952, through the next day?

A. I have.

110. Q. And would you bring it to court at some future time, sir?

A. Yes.

111. Q. Do you have in your possession the Engineering's Bell Book in use aboard the WASP at the time of collision?

A. I have.

112. Q. Would you produce it?

A. Here it is.

At this point the Engineering's Bell Book was marked Exhibit 70 for identification.

The Engineering's Bell Book for 26 April was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 70.

113. Q. Do you have in your possession, sir, the Engineering Log Book covering 26 April 1952?

A. I have.

114. Q. Would you produce it, sir?

A. Here it is.

At this point the Engineering Log Book was marked Exhibit 71 for identification.

The Engineering Log Book for 26 April 1952 was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

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There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 71.

115. Q. Do you have in your possession the Navigational Chart which was in use aboard the WASP at the time of collision?

A. I have.

116. Q. Would you produce it?

A. Here it is.

At this point the Navigational Chart in use on the WASP at the time of collision was marked Exhibit 72 for identification.

The Navigational Chart was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute a true copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such true copy is appended marked Exhibit 72.

117. Q. Do you have in your possession the Radio Voice Transmission Log in use during the afternoon and night of April 26th?

A. I have.

At this point the Radio Voice Transmission Log was marked Exhibit 73 for identification.

118. Q. Does this exhibit, this Radio Log to which you have referred and is marked Exhibit 73 for identification, contain only the transmission over the primary tactical maneuvering circuit?

A. To the best of my knowledge.

119. Q. Do you know whether there is any radio log containing the transmissions over the secondary tactical circuit?

A. I do not.

120. Q. Would you make inquiries and if one is found bring it at some future date?

A. Yes.

The Radio Voice Transmission Log for the Primary Tactical Maneuvering Circuit for the afternoon and night of 26 April was submitted to the parties and to the court and, by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 73.

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The court then, at 1210, took a recess until 1330, at which time it reconvened.

B-6 yeoman, third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, entered as reporter.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties and their counsel and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain B-6 U.S. Navy, a party, the witness on the stand when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by counsel for the court continued:

121. Q. Are you the same Captain B-6 that was on the witness stand when the court recessed before noon?

A. I am.

122. Q. Do you have in your possession the quartermaster's notebook for the 27th of April 1952 which was in use aboard the WASP?

A. I have.

At this point the quartermaster's notebook was marked Exhibit 74 for identification.

The quartermaster's notebook for the 27th of April 1952 was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 74.

Examination by the counsel for the court continued:

123. Q. Do you have in your possession the officer of the deck's rough log of April 27, 1952 which was in use aboard the WASP on that date?

A. I have.

124. Q. Would you produce it.

A. Here it is.

At this point the officer of the deck's rough log for 27 April 1952 was marked Exhibit 75 for identification.

The officer of the deck's rough log for 27 April 1952 was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

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There being no objection, it was so received, and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the hearing. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 75.

Examination by counsel for the court continued:

125. Q. Do you have in your possession the officer of the deck's smooth log used on board the WASP on 27 April 1952?
A. I have.

At this point the officer of the deck's smooth log for 27 April 1952 was marked Exhibit 76 for identification.

The officer of the deck's smooth log for 27 April 1952 was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received, and permission was granted to substitute therefor a photostatic copy at the conclusion of the inquiry. Such photostatic copy is appended marked Exhibit 76.

Examination by the counsel for the court continued:

126. Q. Captain, you have testified that you sent an information signal to the HOBSON and the RODMAN which indicated that your recovery course would be 250. I am not clear on your testimony and therefore ask you whether that signal was received for or acknowledged by either the RODMAN or the HOBSON.

A. I did not receive a receipt or acknowledgment for that message.

127. Q. Had you gone to the execution of that signal by the time of collision?

A. When I did not receive an acknowledgment to my signal I directed the officer of the deck to have the signal transmitted over another voice circuit. I had commenced coming to the left. As soon as I had an opportunity to repeat that message to the junior officer of the deck and put it out I had commenced to come left to 250. However, if I may say so, I might not have come that way far. I was trying to get the wind on the port bow and I might have checked the turn at 255 wherever I could get the wind.

128. Q. Do you know how far the head of your ship had swung in the direction of 250 by the time of collision?

A. About 2°, to 258.

129. Q. And it had not come appreciably further than that?

A. No, it had not come any further.

130. Q. Do you know whether the junior officer of the deck put that signal out over the voice circuit that he was using?

A. I don't know.

131. Q. In this formation that you were in at the time of collision, what ship was the guide?

A. The WASP.

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132. Q. Had it by a previous transmission or a signal been designated the guide?

A. The guide is always the carrier. The guide is in the carrier in all aircraft recovery and in all aircraft operations within a unit of this type.

133. Q. She is the guide with respect to the ships that are doing plane guard duties, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

134. Q. Always?

A. Always.

Cross-examined by Captain *B-6*, a party:

135. Q. Captain, at one point you mentioned the fact that the radar on the WASP had gone out very shortly before the accident had occurred, and I would like to know, however, if at that time you were able to clearly see the lights, that is, the truck light of the HOBSON visually.

A. I was.

136. Q. Were you able, in observing the HOBSON to visually see its course as it pursued the path outlined on the chart?

A. No, I could not determine its course.

137. Q. Could you determine the ranges as you observed the light proceeding along that course?

A. No, I could not determine its ranges.

138. Q. You could, however, see the relative movement of the bearings in order to determine whether it was passing across the projected course of the WASP.

A. Yes.

139. Q. Considering the short period of time involved from the moment the HOBSON left its approximate 090 course and made this left turn, do you feel that the radar if it had been in operation at the moment would have been an aid in actually avoiding the collision?

A. No, I do not feel it would have been of any help.

140. Q. It is a case that the radar in reporting the various positions that it does report sweeps around and there is an interval between each sweep, is that correct?

A. Yes.

141. Q. When such short periods of time as are involved in this case are in question if you are able to observe the movement visually do you consider that more reliable to determine that movement than one or two pips on the radar?

A. I consider that visually is the only answer.

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142. Q. So that you feel that the fact that the radar did go out a short time previous to the accident did not affect your ability to avoid the accident at all, considering the short period involved in this turn?

A. Yes, I do.

143. Q. Was the WASP's bridge darkened in accordance with Lighting Measure Green during these maneuvers?

A. Yes.

144. Q. Had a similar operations practice exercise been conducted in the afternoon in company with the HOBSON and the RODMAN, these plane launching and recovery operations?

A. Yes.

145. Q. In observing the actions of the plane guards at that time did you consider that the HOBSON maneuvered in accordance with the usual procedures?

A. Yes. If I may add a clarification, the afternoon maneuvers and the initial launching maneuvers in the evening only entailed the HOBSON taking a position which wasn't the same position as the night recovery. The day recovery was up ahead on a different bearing whereas the night recovery position was on the beam, so there is a dissimilarity in the operations.

146. Q. On the night in question after the WASP had proceeded through most of its turn and was about ready to steady down on its projected course, did you observe the truck light of the HOBSON at that time?

A. I did.

147. Q. And in relation to the WASP's projected course where was it?

A. About 20° on the port bow.

148. Q. Which way was the bearing of that light moving at that time?

A. To the left and apparently away from the ship.

149. Q. So up to the point that the HOBSON actually started its last left turn was there anything about the position and bearing of the HOBSON light that caused you any alarm?

A. I can't say when I saw the -- where he was when I saw his red light beginning to get much brighter. He might have been paralleling me and going to turn out.

150. Q. It was when you saw that red light brightening that you took action immediately.

A. That is correct.

151. Q. Up to that point was there anything about that light that would cause you any alarm?

A. No.

152. Q. I understand then it was about 20° off your port bow as you started to steady down the course.

A. And still moving to the left and away.

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153. Q. Until the last moment and it suddenly got bright and it was at that point you took the action you have already described?

A. That is correct.

154. Q. Would you answer again, Captain, what lights were showing on the WASP at this time, that is, in accordance with the lighting condition?

A. The aircraft recognition lights with those which would normally show outside, the two red lights all around at the top of the mast.

155. Q. Those are 360° lights?

A. 360° lights.

156. Q. As nearly as you can estimate, Captain, how far forward did the WASP actually move after the collision, geographically? In other words, had it passed the HOBSON or was it stopped in the immediate vicinity?

A. No, the HOBSON was impaled on the bow, and I continued backing until the bow of the HOBSON--the HOBSON was in our bow this way and as her bow folded up like this and I could see men jumping over from her, and looking over the side as she came up here and then fell away and appeared to sink, I believe I was dead in the water and that is when I stopped backing my engine. ^{me}

157. Q. And in relation to the bow of the WASP approximately what position was the HOBSON in when she finally sank?

A. I would say just to that part which I could see, just to the starboard of our bow.

158. Q. I have here a photograph. I would like to ask you to look at it. Do you recognize it?

A. I do.

CAPTAIN ^{B6}, A PARTY: I ask that it be marked for identification.

At this point the photograph was marked Exhibit 77 for identification.

159. Q. Captain, I ask you to glance at that picture again. Do you recognize that picture?

A. I saw it.

160. Q. Where was that taken?

A. From the starboard edge of the flight deck towards the island

161. Q. On the WASP?

A. On the WASP.

162. Q. Is there any indication of what it was that was taken?

A. It was the bow of the HOBSON sinking.

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CAPTAIN ³⁻⁶, A PARTY: I would like to, if there is no objection, offer this into evidence as Exhibit 77.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 77.

163. Q. So that the fact the WASP was able to stop at the immediate scene of the accident was one of the factors which made it possible for rescue operations to get underway so quickly.

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

164. Q. Captain, you stated in your statement that shortly after you had observed the HOBSON bearing about 20° to the left of the projected recovery course of 260 that you directed the signal be sent informing the HOBSON and RODMAN of a change in course to 250°? ~~elsewhere?~~

A. Yes, sir.

165. Q. At this time, Captain, had you steadied down on course 260?

A. No, I believe we were probably on about 258, just steadying on 260. We did actually swing and steady on 260 but I believe it was just before.

166. Q. So you had completed the turn then - - had substantially completed your turn when you decided to send that message?

A. That is correct.

167. Q. Now, when you sent the message you first endeavored to transmit it over the primary circuit?

A. Yes.

168. Q. And then did you endeavor to send it - - direct it to be sent over the secondary combat circuit?

A. Yes.

169. Q. Approximately how long do you think that took?

A. It is hard to estimate, but I would say no less than 20 seconds. I say no less than that.

170. Q. Then, as I understand it, sir, you turned around, maybe then you looked over at the HOBSON again?

A. I was watching the HOBSON all the time. The primary tactical is right here and I didn't have to take my eyes from the HOBSON in order to send the message.

171. Q. Then was it about how long after that message that you observed the red truck light of the HOBSON on the port side grow distinctly brighter?

A. I am sorry. I do not believe I can even answer it. I don't think I can estimate the time. I base my estimate on the transmission of the "I am changing course to 250" to the other one through turning my head and looking over there and turning back.

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172. Q. The interval, however, was very brief, very short?
A. Yes.

173. Q. Would you say it was almost at the same time or was there an appreciable but brief interval?
A. Between what?

174. Q. Between the order to transmit the course change to secondary radio and the first time you noticed the lights growing brighter on the HOBSON.

A. Well, it seemed appreciable. If you think of seconds as one thousand one, one thousand two and so on. It wasn't immediately.

175. Q. Not immediately?
A. No.

176. Q. Then you immediately ordered ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY?
A. I did.

177. Q. And you testified that they backed for approximately a minute before the collision, is that correct, sir?

A. There again that is -- I can't testify to that. That is in the bell sheet.

178. Q. Was it less than half a minute? Could you testify as to that, it was either more or less than half a minute?

A. I believe it was more than a half a minute.

179. Q. Now, if that was half a minute -- if you backed for a half a minute before your collision with the HOBSON and if it was 20 seconds between your first transmission of your course change -- 20 seconds from the first transmission of your course change to the second, then there is a very brief interval between the second transmission and the time you saw the lights growing brighter and ordered ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY?

A. Yes, sir.

180. Q. Would you say that the minimum possible interval between the first transmission of the change of your signal was one minute and the time of collision?

A. Let me look at my chart. I would say approximately perhaps slightly less.

181. Q. Slightly less. Would you care to mark on the chart, sir, where you think you transmitted the course change to 250?

A. I am of the belief that right in there is probably where - -

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: (interrupting) Will the witness mark that point with the letter "A".

182. Q. Now, sir, could it have been later than that? Could it have been down here, sir (indicating)?

A. No.

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183. Q. Could it have been earlier?

A. Very slightly because I had to get near to the wind in order to use my wind gauge. It could have been perhaps back in there.

184. Q. Now, sir, from looking at this, could you tell me approximately what is the period of time between this 2224 position and this point you have marked on the diagram as "A", approximately how many seconds that is?

A. 20 seconds.

185. Q. 20 seconds. And this point 2224--we realize that these are all approximations on here, sir. 2224 is one minute before collision, is it not, as we have plotted it?

A. No, we have the collision at 2225:22, a minute and 22 seconds.

186. Q. And you estimate that could have been a little earlier. By indicating, will you mark that point "B", sir? Captain, I draw a ship simulating the carrier WASP at point BAKER. This is just a rough approximation. Is that a fair representation of approximately the heading of the WASP at point BAKER?

A. Yes.

187. Q. When the WASP is at predicted point BAKER what is the approximate range and bearing of the HOBSON?

A. From that sketch 1740 yards.

188. Q. And bearing?

A. About 060 or 240.

189. Q. At that time, according to this sketch, is the heading of the HOBSON 090, approximately?

A. Yes.

190. Q. Captain, in your experience as a navigating officer of a ship, if you were on the HOBSON and a carrier was on your port bow, showing you this approximate target angle, and at that time you received a signal MIKE CORPEN --

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Should not the court be closed?

191. Q. --you received a signal that your course was from the carrier--that the carrier's course was a certain--the carrier was on a definite course --

Captain B-6, a party, objected to the question on the grounds that it assumed facts not in evidence.

Counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney withdrew the question.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The spectators and press withdrew from the courtroom.

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36, yeoman, first class, U.S. Navy, entered as reporter.

Cross-examination by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney continued:

192. Q. You have testified that the signal MIKE CORPEN 250 might have been transmitted at point Baker according to the diagram which you have submitted in evidence. When the WASP was at point Baker the HOBSON was bearing 240° True, range 1740 yards, on course 090°, speed 27. The WASP was heading approximately 225, speed 27. Under these circumstances, if you were the commanding officer of the HOBSON and received a signal "MIKE CORPEN 250" from the WASP what would be your action?

A. May I point out certain things in the first place? The picture of the WASP as drawn here (indicating Exhibit 66) is incorrect in that it is made to conform to this track. The turning point of the WASP is forward about even with part of the island so that the heading of WASP as shown would not be correct for that position in the turn. It would be somewhere over here. The second thing is the course - the signal "MIKE CORPEN" does not mean "my course is" it means, "I am coming to" or "my course will be." So it is not a statement of fact that I am steady on that course at that time; therefore, I do not feel that in this question the WASP's heading of approximately 225 is correct - is a correct assumption, may I say. If I were commanding officer of the HOBSON and were in a tactical formation in which my position was definitely ordered in which I clearly understood where the guide was and which I clearly understood that all the tactical doctrine, say that all ships within a carrier task group shall remain clear of the carrier, that they also say that they shall not pass close aboard or in anywise embarrass the carrier when she is engaging in flight operations, I would have turned right and have given sea-room in accordance with the paragraph on good sea manners.

193. Q. Your answer to my question is that you would have turned right?

A. Yes, sir.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *36*, a party:

194. Q. Captain, I believe you testified that on the Wednesday prior to this collision certain drills had been conducted during which the tactical diameter of 1200 yards was used and that later the directive to use that diameter was cancelled; do you have available a copy of the message cancelling that?

A. That signal was made by flag hoist in connection with a drill conducted at that time.

195. Q. Was that signal made upon the completion of drills that afternoon, is that your recollection?

A. The signals used at that time were for a particular purpose for just that period of time.

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196. Q. Well, when you say that the signal was cancelled, then you mean that you assumed upon completion of the drills it was no longer effective, that's the purpose of the signal used?

A. That is correct.

197. Q. Captain, what are the - what color are the lights on the flight deck itself, not the aircraft warning lights, but other lights that were burning?

A. Well, they are white. I think I had better refresh my memory if you don't mind. I have a chart here which shows them. This will involve location, arc of visibility, matters of that nature -- classified --.

LIEUTENANT *h.c*, A PARTY: I'm not interested in that.

COURT: Possibly the witness can answer in general terms.

A. Principally white.

198. Q. Captain, as I understand it, when you made the decision to back down that was based upon the increased intensity of the light of the HOBSON, not in change of bearing?

A. That is right.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *h.c*, a party:

199. Q. Captain, do you have any criticism of Lieutenant *B.t* performance of duties during the watch in which this collision occurred?

A. None whatsoever. I considered that he did as fine a job as I could have expected.

200. Q. Did he remain up there after you assumed the conn?

A. Yes.

201. Q. Did he assist you after the collision in the rescue operations?

A. In all of the things which an officer of the deck should have done.

202. Q. And through the rescue operation - the rest of the watch - he continued to do the normal things that an officer of the deck would do with the captain being on the conn?

A. That is correct.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

203. Q. Captain, from what port had the WASP sailed on the voyage during which she collided with the HOBSON?

A. Norfolk, Virginia.

204. Q. En route to where, sir?

A. To Gibraltar.

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205. Q. What was the material condition of the WASP when she sailed from Norfolk?

A. Excellent.

206. Q. Were there any material deficiencies or discrepancies that hadn't been remedied prior to leaving the continental United States?

A. Not affecting her wartime rating.

207. Q. Was she in all respects ready for sea?

A. She was.

208. Q. After the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON was there any effort made to determine the error, if any, in the various clocks aboard the WASP?--In other words, to determine whether her clock on her bridge was synchronized with the clock in the engine room and also synchronized with the clock in the radio shack--in CIC?

A. I can't answer that of my own knowledge.

209. Q. Have you any information that would indicate whether that was done or not?

A. I believe it was.

210. Q. Do you know what officer would have conducted that check?

A. The navigator and his department.

211. Q. Captain, do you know of any--during the time and immediately after collision, do you know of any outstanding meritorious service or heroic act performed by any of the naval personnel involved?

A. They all rated a well-done.

212. Q. Do you know of any dereliction in the performance of duty on the part of any person in the naval service on this occasion?

A. No.

Examined by the court:

213. Q. For ranges and bearings were any other means used after the failure of the search radar that you testified became inoperative during the turn?

A. No ranges were taken. I do not know of my own knowledge about the bearings. I took rough bearings standing behind my compass which was at my right hand.

214. Q. In your earlier testimony the court believes you used the expression told the officer of the deck to "come around gentle to 250". Did that affect the rudder?

A. The amount of rudder which is used when searching for the wind, we try to carry a certain amount on the bow and sometimes we get a little bit further off than we consider well for the landings. We come over a couple of degrees and steady there and see if that brings the wind down the deck to the best advantage for the landing of aircraft.

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215. Q. What time did you use that term "gently"; when starting your final turn?

A. That was in coming to the new course of 250. We had steady on 260, and I wanted to come left gently to 250. If I may further explain.

216. Q. Explain it if you wish but the court understands now. It did not understand precisely where you gave those instructions. Were there any electronic or mechanical failures which contributed to the collision to your knowledge?

A. No, sir.

217. Q. Were all the survivors of the HOBSON transferred to the WASP?

A. Prior to our arrival in port, yes, sir.

218. Q. How do you know this? Did you receive any message or communication saying so?

A. Yes, sir, ComDesFlotFOUR, the OTC at the scene, advised me where the other survivors were, other than those on the WASP.

219. Q. And they were transferred to the WASP?

A. The only ones were on the RODMAN and I transferred those by helicopter as soon as the weather permitted.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and spectators withdrew from the court room.

Examination by the court continued:

220. Q. Do you have any recommendations for changes or modification in tactical instructions or doctrine as a result of this collision?

A. I recommend that there be a provision for more than one platoon guard inserted in ATP-1.

Recross-examined by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

221. Q. Captain, you have testified that "MIKE CORPEN" signal means my intention is to come to a certain course? - Are you still of that mind, sir?

A. I said it does not mean "my course is."

222. Q. I show you, sir, a copy of ACPI75, sir, and refer you to page 7-8. Does "Mike Corpen" signal appear there, sir?

A. Yes, it does.

223. Q. Will you read what the meaning of that signal is?

A. "My course is." Here is the reason for the confusion, if at all. "Under minor - -"

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Excuse me. For the purpose of the record would you refer to the paragraph number of the publication from which you are reading.

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A. (continued.) Paragraph 1522 of ATP-1,--paragraph 1522(c), it says, "When carriers designated the guide find it necessary to adjust course or speed, they should signal "my course or my speed".

224. Q. Yes, sir. In other words, that means if you are on course and wish to adjust it to a new course you send a "MIKE CORPEN" signal, sir?

A. Yes.

225. Q. According to what you have just testified, the signal means, that you were on a course and you are going to adjust to a new course?

A. This is correct.

226. Q. What course had you signalled that you were coming to at the beginning of the turn?

A. 260.

227. Q. Now, sir, would it be a reasonable interpretation of a person receiving the signal "MIKE CORPEN 250", that you were steady on 260, and were going to come left to 250 --?

A. Yes.

228. Q. And this signal might have been sent at point BAKER, (indicating on Exhibit 66), quite possibly at point --.

A. Quite possibly a little later.

229. Q. I refer again to ATP-1. You testified, sir, that carriers have the right of way?

A. (The witness indicated in the affirmative.)

230. Q. I don't recall your exact words, sir, but for the purpose of keeping the record straight, I wonder if you would re: paragraph 1506 from this publication--1506a, from ATP-1?

A. 1506, "Carriers, right of way. Carriers have the right of way in launching and recovering aircraft. Other ships are to keep clear. If a ship must pass a carrier conducting flight operations she should pass to starboard of the carrier when the carrier is headed into the wind, to leeward when the carrier is out of the wind." Is that the one you have in mind, sir?

231. Q. Yes, sir, exactly.

A. I also refer to paragraph 532 called "Special rules of the road."--"In addition to the International Regulations for Prevention of Collision at Sea, the following rules are applicable: a. Carriers. A carrier has the right of way when showing a signal to indicate that she is launching or recovering aircraft. This right of way is effective whether or not the carrier is heading into the wind."

232. Q. Yes, Captain. Had any signal been executed to the effect that the WASP was launching and recovering aircraft at the time of the collision?

A. The FOX flag was not "two-blocked". The FOX flag was at the dip.

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233. Q. Is it doctrine that theoretically she was not yet engaged in the recovery of aircraft?

A. Doctrine - When the aircraft carrier starts turning into the wind she is in all respects launching or recovering aircraft, as the case may be. I don't know, I would have to have someone find it for me. The reason I say that, frequently in a scramble we do not come into the wind, we launch when we are out of the wind. We do that by "two-blocking" FOX.

234. Q. This wasn't a scramble operation though?

A. No.

235. Q. Now, sir, you also read in ATP-1 - - -

A. Excuse me. I have here a paragraph, 478 USF2, "Smaller more maneuverable ships shall avoid hampering the movements of large ships within formation. Particularly, they should not attempt to cross the bow of a large ship unless ample sea room is available, the maneuver is required and is obviously safe for all concerned. If any doubt exists, it is incumbent upon the smaller vessel to cross astern. A small ship should not stubbornly maintain the right of way over the large ship, particularly in restricted water where current or other navigational effects make it more difficult for the large ship to slow or change course. In taking the above courteous action, the smaller ship should take it soon enough to be helpful and appreciative."

236. Q. Yes, sir, I think that is sound doctrine, sir.

A. May I read, "A clear situation should not be changed to an awkward one by any ship either through lack of timely indication to others of her intent, or from an impatient haste in accomplishing the movement."

237. Q. Yes, sir. You read from ATP-1, sir, the fact that if a carrier was heading into the wind and a smaller ship was going to embarrass the carrier she should swing to starboard; does the diagram show, sir, that it might have been the intention of the commanding officer of the HOBSON to swing to starboard to pass you to starboard, sir, when you were heading into the wind?

A. Pass me?

238. Q. Yes, sir. By this course change?

A. I cannot answer that.

239. Q. Captain, the operation order for this voyage, was there a paragraph in the order which authorized carriers to change course five degrees without signal?

A. I don't - while conducting flight operations?

240. Q. Yes, sir, while conducting flight operations?

A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

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241. Q. All right, sir. Captain, did you hear the testimony of the helmsman on board the U.S.S. HOBSON? He testified that his rudder was right full prior to being put full left, so bringing the HOBSON in collision with the WASP; from your knowledge of events on board the WASP, is there any fact which might have caused the commanding officer to make that fatal decision?

A. You had better ask that one over again.

The reporter repeated the question.
A. I have no knowledge.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

242. Q. Captain, was the WASP at the time of this collision sailing from the continental limits of the United States to the Mediterranean from the operational control of Commander SECOND Fleet to the operational control of Commander SIXTH Fleet, under Commander Cruiser Division FOUR as Commander Task Force 88.8, under the operation plans offered as, or in evidence, as Exhibit 63, and operation order Commander SECOND Fleet Number 2-52, which has been offered in evidence as Exhibit 64, and operation order Commander Cruiser Division FOUR Number 1-52, which has been offered in evidence as Exhibit 65?

A. May I see them? (The witness viewed the exhibits) Yes.

243. Q. And under whose administrative control was she, sir?
A. Commander Carrier Division SIX.

244. Q. And he was aboard what ship at this time?
A. The CORAL SEA which had preceded us.

245. Q. Commander Carrier Division SIX was not in company with the Task Group that you were crossing with, is that correct?
A. That is correct.

246. Q. Was there any operation order of Commander Carrier Division SIX that was in effect during this crossing?
A. No.

The court then, at 1520, took a recess until 1540, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties and their counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Captain ~~WASP~~ ^{WASP}, U.S. Navy, a party, the witness on the stand when the recess was taken, resumed the stand as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding and continued his testimony.

Re-examined by the court:

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247. Q. You mentioned a "sick" radio receiver in one of the plane guards; what do you mean by that and which plane guard was it?
A. It was inoperative -- a radio transmitter in the RODMAN which was set up on the primary tactical circuit, sir.

248. Q. Were there any injuries or deaths incident to this collision on the WASP?
A. No, sir.

249. Q. When and where did the WASP arrive in port? - approximately?
A. Gravesend Bay on Tuesday morning at 7:45, the 6th of May.

250. Q. You testified, I believe, that you gave the signal for EMERGENCY BACKING approximately one minute prior to collision. Do you believe that a whistle danger signal could have been used in one minute?
A. No, sir, not without possible confusion.

251. Q. You were not actually launching or recovering aircraft at the time you directed sending the signal "MIKE CORPEN 250". I would like to invite your attention to paragraph 1522c of ATP-1?
A. Yes, sir.

252. Q. Then do you consider that that was an appropriate signal at the time?
A. Yes, sir.

253. Q. Will you read the paragraph?
A. "When they are into the wind, individual carriers have discretion to make minor adjustments of course and speed, but they must remain within 500 yards of correct station. When a carrier designated the Guide finds it necessary to adjust course or speed she is to signal 'My course --' or 'My speed--'."

254. Q. Do you consider you were in the wind when you made that signal?
A. If I may, I was into the wind as I had indicated to my formation.

255. Q. You have testified that doctrine in carriers, as you understand it, is to the effect that CV's are considered to commence the launching or recovery when FOX is at the dip and when CV's are turning into the wind, is that correct?
A. It doesn't quite --. Would you read it again, Admiral?

256. Q. The court believes you have testified that doctrine in carriers, as you understand it, provides that carriers are considered to commence launching or recovery operations when FOX is at the dip and the CV starts turning? This is in connection with right of way over other vessels in the fleet - in the formation. Before you answer that would you like your statement read from the record?

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A. No, sir, I realize - I'm trying to rephrase it, Admiral, in such a way - . When a carrier hoists FOX at the dip indicating that she is coming into or coming to a recovery or launching course, common usage is that all other ships will consider her in practically the same state as though she were recovering and will give her leeway in order that she may complete the turn and steady into the wind. The ideal, of course, is to have a plane at the ramp at the time you steady on your course.

257. Q. The court would like to have you read Article 923, USF-4, and have your comment with respect to that?

A. "Ships shall observe the Rules of the Road, particularly the General Prudential Rule, in all maneuvers. Carriers operating aircraft with FOX two-blocked, have the right of way over all other U. S. Naval ships. At other times, carriers have no unique privileges when maneuvering within the Formation." I would like to look up the rule on Guide, Admiral.

258. Q. Yes, you refresh your memory, whatever you wish to do?

A. I am looking at Article 224, Admiral.

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B-6, yeoman, second class, U.S. Navy, entered
as reporter.

(answer continued) I first refer to ATP-1, paragraph 525(a):
"OTC ship is guide. The ship in which the OTC is embarked is the
guide unless otherwise ordered." I was the guide. USF-2, para-
graph 221b(6): "Guide.-A designated ship on which other evolution
units take and maintain their station." USF-2, paragraph 323(a),
"Miscellaneous Instructions. A steady course, uniform speed, and
when changing course, an accurate turn by the guide, are prerequi-
sites to accurate station keeping by other ships." And USF-4, pa-
graph 924: "Performing Evolutions.-Station units required to per-
form an evolution within the formation, or when changing from one
formation to another in obedience to a maneuvering signal, will
do so on the basis of a maneuvering board solution to the problem.
Courses which cross close ahead of other ships should be avoided.
Turns should be made away from rather than toward other ships."

259. Q. Then, do you believe that aircraft carriers, when not
obtaining such right of way by virtue of being guide, still have
the right of way over other ships when FOX is not two-blocked?

A. Not in violation of the prudential rule, sir.

Cross-examined by Captain B-6, a party:

260. Q. We won't get too far away from what you feel is the
principal point, but I would like to ask you this: After the
HOBSON had actually made his last left turn - had started on the
last left turn, could you have avoided the collision?

A. I didn't know that he had started a left turn. All I knew
was that his light was getting brighter. He might have been
passing right down close aboard to port.

261. Q. I am sorry, sir. I think my question might have been
misleading. Knowing now what has been adduced from the evidence
knowing now that he did make a left turn at that time, and
knowing the relative speeds, do you now feel that there was any
way that you could have avoided the collision other than the
attempts you did make?

A. No.

Re-cross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

262. Q. When you attempted to transmit the last signal to the
HOBSON and the RODMAN, could you indicate on that diagram your
approximate heading?

A. Well, it was very close to 260.

263. Q. Will you please put that up there, sir, for me on the
diagram? (Indicating Exhibit 66.)

A. All right. I would again like to invite the attention to the
fact that the turning point of this carrier is about 1/3 of the
distance aft on the flight deck, so that this black mark here does
not show the true heading of the ship. The ship is cocked this
(indicating on Exhibit 66) about the turning point. Since the
message did not go out and since I have no indication that the
message "MIKE CORPEN 250" was ever transmitted from the ship -
if that is true the time at which it might have been sent, it is
most difficult question to answer. I would believe that if it were
it would be right in there. (Indicating on Exhibit 66 and marking
with the letter "C")

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264. Q. At that time, sir, the heading of the WASP was approximately 260?

A. Yes.

265. Q. On this chart (indicating Exhibit 66), let the record show that the approximate time - diagram time - of the attempted transmission of the signal was 2224:30. Now, from looking at the approximate track of the HOBSON, sir, where was she at that time, sir?

A. In her turn to the left.

266. Q. In your capacity as officer in command of the unit, sir, did you ever consider, in planning the course change and the change of station of the plane guard, that she would have to maneuver very precisely with the limited amount of power available in order to arrive at and maintain station?

A. Yes, I considered that and there was no precision required in one way, nor was there any excess boiler power required.

267. Q. What was that, sir?

A. To turn completely right, slow and fall back into position.

268. Q. Now, this morning you testified that you were going to keep a rendezvous at 8 o'clock the following morning. Was that knowledge generally known to the other vessels of your force?

A. I don't know. It might have been. It came from the Task Group Commander to rejoin at 0800. I don't know whether it was addressed to the unit or not.

269. Q. What speed had you been making in the afternoon and as you proceeded in the general easterly direction?

A. 20 knots.

270. Q. What speed were you making, sir, when you began this maneuver?

A. 25.

271. Q. Is that greater than normal cruising speed, sir?

A. I am afraid I don't ---

272. Q. Isn't 25 knots a comparably high cruising speed, sir?

A. The reason was that with the light winds and the delay in getting the planes off for the afternoon launching, we had to work further down wind and away from the Task Force than we had initially intended, and with the light winds - every time we turned to recover I opened out on the Task Group.

273. Q. Were you trying to launch planes and recover planes as rapidly as possible?

A. That is the aim of every carrier.

274. Q. But you think that the destroyers that were there, that they should assist as part of the team?

A. I can't answer that.

275. Q. Didn't you say in your testimony this morning, sir, that if the HOBSON had made a complete - I believe you said 90 degree turn - "She would have ended up far ahead of my port." Now, as the Task Unit Commander in charge of carrier operations, endeavoring to make a rendezvous, would that particular maneuver have met with your approval?

A. Yes, indeed.

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276. Q. Because it was safer?

A. Yes.

277. Q. In other words, Captain, you feel that time is not always most important in your consideration?

A. That is correct.

278. Q. Sir, would it have been safer to make the turn to port rather than to starboard?

A. Who?

279. Q. You, sir, make your initial turn to port rather than to starboard?

A. No, no!! That little black dot up there (indicating Exhibit 66) is the HODMAN who was only 1000 yards from me on my port bow.

280. Q. Yes, sir. Then your opinion is that the turn to port would have been more hazardous?

A. Yes.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

281. Q. I don't recall, Captain, whether I have asked you if you knew the heading of the WASP at the time of the collision.

A. You have, and I gave 258.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness; he resumed his seat as a party.

Commander B-6, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Are you the same Commander B-6 who previously testified in this case?

A. I am.

2. Q. Commander, in the maneuver which resulted in the collision of the WASP and the HOBSON, what was the tactical diameter in use at that time?

A. I understood that 1500 yards was in use.

3. Q. As I understand your testimony, Lieutenant Commander Tierney, at the time of the collision was serving under your command, is that correct?

A. Yes.

4. Q. Would you state to the court what you know of his naval and marine experience, training and background.

A. I talked with Lieutenant Commander Tierney after he took command of the HOBSON. From that and from a biographical sketch which I have in my files and which was forwarded through me to CINCPAC in accordance with standard instructions, Lieutenant Commander Tierney, as I remember, had entered the Navy during World War II and served in an AF, I believe auxiliary type, duty as executive officer, and I believe that at or near the end of the war he commanded or brought back an AK or an AKA from the Far East as commanding officer. And also after that, he had commanded an (continued on next page)

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APD, I believe, a DE type which he also brought back to the States before commissioning. I then believe that he went out of the Navy and served as second mate or first mate in a Sun Oil Company tank and then returned - and previous to his reporting to the HOBSON, he had served as executive officer of a destroyer in the Atlantic Fleet. That destroyer had made two cruises to Europe - to the Mediterranean, he was bound to have had considerable experience in plane guard duties.

5. Q. Who prepared, if you know, sir, the biographical sketch on Lieutenant Commander Tierney which you have in your possession or did you receive it from him?

A. That was forwarded as official correspondence from the ship. I presume that the information must have been from his own records.

6. Q. Do you still have that biographical sketch?

A. Yes, I do.

7. Q. Would you produce it in this court at some later time?

A. I will. I don't have it with me now.

8. Q. In your capacity as Division Commander for the HOBSON, had you received, prior to her sailing from Charleston, any reports as to her materiel condition and readiness for sea?

A. On the 2nd of April, the HOBSON was inspected by the Board of Inspection and Survey. All the deficiencies that were found at that time were corrected immediately following that during restricted availability at the Charleston Navy Shipyard, and I worked very closely with the commanding officer through that period. By a directive which ComMinLant has issued, that after having had a Board of Inspection and Survey, there must be a report in two weeks of the action that has been taken in the correction of the deficiencies, and I received that - the HOBSON's report on the correction of the deficiencies prior to the departure of the ship.

9. Q. And did that report indicate that all the deficiencies which would affect her readiness for sea and readiness for the maneuvers on which she was about to be engaged had been corrected?

A. Yes, I considered that it did.

10. Q. And in your opinion, the HOBSON was in all respects ready for sea when she left Charleston?

A. Yes.

11. Q. And in your opinion, from the conversations and observations with Lieutenant Commander Tierney, and the biographical sketch which you received under official correspondence, was he in all respects a qualified, efficient naval officer? Fully qualified for command of the HOBSON during these maneuvers?

A. I definitely considered him so.

12. Q. What was the RODMAN's bearings and distance to the WASP at about 2200 the night of the collision?

A. Bearing was 270 True and she was maintaining a distance of 1200 yards.

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13. Q. What was the distance between the RODMAN and HOBSON about 2200 the same night?

A. It would be approximately 4200 yards, both ships being on station.

14. Q. As Division Commander, what was your opinion as to the state of training and combat readiness for maneuvers of the HOBSON?

A. I considered them satisfactory. The HOBSON and the RODMAN had, and I believe most ships going to Europe had had a considerable personnel turnover and required the operations which we were then in the process of conducting to be efficient. She was ready and efficient.

15. Q. Had the commanding officer of the HOBSON informed you of any mechanical or electronic deficiencies or failure in his ship at any time after departure from Charleston?

A. After the second day out of Charleston, Tuesday, 22 April, the HOBSON was having some difficulties with her communications. I had my sailing instructions set up on the same frequency plan that we were going to use in joining up with Task Group 88.1, and required that the ships check out frequently. And about the second day out, the HOBSON was having trouble with some of the voice circuits and I asked if he would like the assistance of my electronic's technician. I had a second class assigned to the division, and he said he would appreciate him very much and I directed the RODMAN to lower a boat and we made a transfer at sea of that man. The next day the HOBSON's communications were in excellent condition and from my observations they were continued that way throughout the rest of the time.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

Examined by the court:

16. Q. As a result of this collision, do you have any recommendations for changes in tactical instructions or doctrine?

A. I don't have this very well thought out, at least from the carrier's point of view, but it appears perhaps in the tactical publications, there should be a recommended procedure that after a night launching when the carrier is satisfied and there will be no more launchings, that the commanding officer of the carrier, anticipating the wind to such a degree as he could, would station the number 2 plane guard on a bearing which would, when turned in the wind, be then approximately on station rather than requiring the maneuver at night. I don't know whether the wind and various factors could be well enough determined to do it, but he should then know whether they could. My only further statement is that in introducing the Op Orders under which we were operating, I did not mention CDF-4, Cruising and Screening Instructions, 7 April, which as far as destroyers, screening destroyers are concerned, I think applied in a general way.

17. Q. And thereby pertinent to this inquiry?

A. I think so.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

18. Q. Have you a copy of those instructions with you?

A. I have. Here they are.

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The document was marked Exhibit 78 for identification.

19. Q. Exhibit 78 for identification is a copy of ComDesFlot FOUR's Cruising and Screening Instructions, sir?

A. Yes.

The document containing ComDesFlot FOUR's Cruising and Screening Instructions was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 78.

20. Q. Commander, would you read from Exhibit 78 such divisions thereof as you consider pertinent to this inquiry?

A. Those articles which I consider pertinent to this inquiry might be Article 115: "Sea Manners - Comply fully with paragraph 472, USF-2. Your sea manners must be above reproach." 116: "Maneuver in a manner that will make your intentions clear to other ships in the vicinity. Announce your intentions to other ships involved if the situation warrants it." 117: "Plane Guards: (a) Leave screen station in time to arrive on plane guard station 15 minutes prior to scheduled launching or recovery. (b) Announce departure from screen station. (c) Use maximum available speed in reaching plane guard stations for unscheduled or emergency launching or recovery." Article 120 might be considered pertinent. "Maintain at all times on the bridge and in CIC a complete and currently corrected plot of the formation."

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, file number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. My name is B-6e, Lieutenant Commander, B-6
Present duty: Commanding Officer of the RODMAN DMS-21.

2. Q. U. S. Navy?

A. U. S. Navy.

3. Q. Will you state your naval and marine experience.

A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in December of 1941. I had a short course at MIT in radar and went to the U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY. I was on the SALT LAKE CITY until the latter part of 1943, and I went to a fleet radar center at Pearl Harbor as a CIC instructor for several months and returned to the continental limits and attended the Gunnery School in Washington; then put a new destroyer in commission and was on the destroyer until we were sunk at Okinawa. I returned to the States and reported to the Underway Training Unit, San Diego, for approximately twenty months, and then reported to a destroyer as executive officer for approximately 14 months. I attended the guided missiles school at Fort Bliss for nine months and then reported to the Air Force Guided Missiles center at Cocoa, Florida; was detached there in December and had three weeks Mine Warfare Training and four weeks at Sonar School.

4. Q. And when did you assume command of the RODMAN?

A. On the 22nd of March 1952.

5. Q. And you are the commanding officer of the RODMAN at this time?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Directing your attention, sir, to the night of 26 April at about 2200 and times subsequent thereto up to the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON, where were you in your ship?

A. I was on the bridge of the RODMAN.

7. Q. During that period?

A. During all that period.

8. Q. At that time, were you operating under the doctrine laid down in ATP-1 and ACP-175?

A. Yes, sir.

9. Q. Now, from the time 2200 on that night up to the time of collision between the two ships, will you state to the court exactly what signals you heard given by the WASP and received by the RODMAN and what you heard from the HOBSON -- receipts you heard from the HOBSON?

A. Some of this was relayed to me. I was on the wing of the bridge and in the wind. Some of it I heard and some of it I am not sure. Approximately 2200, as I recall, we were on course 102, making 25 knots. At approximately 2212 to 13, the preparato signal was relayed to me by one of my officers that the recovery course would be 265, speed would be 27 knots.

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10. Q. Did he paraphrase that information?

A. No, he gave it to me - -

11. Q. What was the signal?

A. FOX CORPEN 265 SPEED 27.

12. Q. All right, sir. And what other signals did you hear or were relayed to you?

A. The next signal that I received was a TURN to 260.

13. Q. Speed?

A. Speed 27. Approximately 20 - - it must have been 2223 somewhere around there.

14. Q. Did you hear the execution of that signal?

A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. Did you hear or did you have relayed to you any other signals from the WASP prior to the collision?

A. Oh, I had one that I thought I heard. Someone in the pilot house said that FOX was two-blocked. No others, sir.

16. Q. No other signals?

A. No.

17. Q. Did you hear the HOBSON receipt for any of these signals or acknowledge any?

A. I don't really recall.

18. Q. Did you hear any MIKE CORPEN signal?

A. No, sir.

19. Q. And Lighting Measure Green was in effect during this period?

A. Lighting Measure Green was in effect the entire night of operations.

Examined by the court:

20. Q. As a result of this collision, have you any recommended changes to tactical instructions and doctrine?

A. No, sir, I don't.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection, therewith which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly warned, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rank, file number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. Lieutenant *B-6* USS RODMAN DMS-21.

2. Q. U. S. Navy?

A. U. S. Naval Reserve.

3. Q. And on April 26, 1952, were you attached to the U. S. S. RODMAN?

A. I was.

4. Q. At the time of collision, did you have a watch?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. What was that watch?

A. I was officer of the deck.

6. Q. And what time did you assume those duties?

A. 2000, sir.

7. Q. During the period or interval from approximately 2200 that night up until the time of collision will you state what signals you heard transmitted by the WASP.

A. Between that particular time we received a signal "FOX CORPEN 265 SPEED 27."

8. Q. Did you hear that signal receipted for or acknowledged by the HOBSON?

A. I can't answer that, sir.

9. Q. What signal did you hear next?

A. We received an execute of the CORPEN - or the turn signal and we commenced making the turn.

10. Q. Did you turn simultaneously with the WASP?

A. Yes, sir, I was taking continuous bearings and attempting to maintain station during the turn.

11. Q. Did you hear any other signal from the WASP?

A. I heard no other signals until after I had seen a flash and there was a period of time in there when we were asking the WASP if there was an emergency existing.

12. Q. Did you hear any MIKE CORPEN signal?

A. I did not.

13. Q. Did you hear any transmission or exchange of information between the HOBSON and the WASP during the period you have just discussed?

A. No, I didn't. I was at the time watching bearings from the wing of the bridge and it is quite possible that I wouldn't get any transmissions unless they were directed to the RODMAN.

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14. Q. On what vessel or on what object were you taking bearings?

A. I was taking bearings on the truck light of the carrier.

15. Q. And did you observe the HOBSON during this period -- take any bearings on her?

A. I did not. I did not have the red truck lights of the HOBSON in view.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant B-6, a party:

16. Q. Mister B-6, I would like to refer your attention to Exhibit 66 which is posted on the blackboard where the heavy black line is the estimated track of the WASP and in their turn (indicating). This black figure here (indicating) is the RODMAN's relative position at the time the turn started. You say you executed a simultaneous turn movement when you received the execute. Did you maintain your same relative bearing on the port bow of the WASP?

A. We did.

17. Q. All the way around?

A. All the way around.

18. Q. Do you know whether you were relative to the WASP when the collision occurred?

A. We were on relative bearing of 165, 1250 yards about.

19. Q. Relative bearing of 165?

A. Relative to the WASP. That's right.

20. Q. You were bearing 165 from the WASP?

A. That's right.

21. Q. If this were (indicating) the point of collision here (indicating) would you have been down here (indicating)?

A. We would have been on the starboard quarter.

22. Q. You would have been on her starboard quarter?

A. That's right.

Re-examined by the counsel for the court:

23. Q. You testified that you turned with the WASP you maintained the same relative bearing?

A. I meant true bearing. The same true bearing -- we had but to come around and we would be on station for recovery of aircraft. Relative bearing was not the same.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. My name is _____, RDL, USN.
Present duty: RODMAN.

2. Q. And were you attached to the RODMAN on 26 April 1952?

A. I was.

3. Q. Directing your attention to approximately 2200 to 2300 on that night, were you in a duty status?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

4. Q. What were those duties?

A. I was supervisor of the CIC watch.

5. Q. And what time did you assume those duties?

A. At 2000.

6. Q. Directing your attention from approximately 2200 up until the time of collision between the WASP and the HOBSON, did you hear any transmission of signals from the WASP?

A. Only a plane report - - I heard her reporting to the plane over - -

7. Q. You heard no CORPEN signals or heard no turn signals?

A. No, sir.

8. Q. Were you observing the WASP on radar?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

9. Q. And were you taking bearings and ranges on the WASP and transmitting them to the Officer-of-the-Deck?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. And were you taking any ranges or bearings on the HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

11. Q. Do you know anything of the - - did you hear any transmissions from the HOBSON during this period?

A. No, sir, I did not.

12. Q. Do you know anything of the movements of the HOBSON during this period?

A. No, sir, I do not.

13. Q. Do you know of anything that would shed - - or, was there any information received in CIC in the RODMAN that would shed any light on the collision or the track taken by either the HOBSON - - taken by the HOBSON?

A. No, sir, I don't.

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Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing ^{Further} to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 1730, adjourned until 0830 the next day, 14 May 1952.

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FIFTH DAY

U. S. Naval Supply Depot,
Bayonne Annex,
U. S. Naval Base,
New York, New York

Wednesday, May 14, 1952.

The court met at 0830.

Present:

Rear Admiral
Rear Admiral
Rear Admiral

U.S. Navy,
U.S. Navy, and
U.S. Navy, members.

*Allegations
are B-6.*

Lieutenant Commander *[Name]*, U. S. Naval Reserve, counsel for the court.

Lieutenant *[Name]*, U.S. Naval Reserve, assistant to counsel for the court.

Commander *[Name]*, U.S. Navy, advisor to the counsel for the court.

Captain *[Name]*, U.S. Navy, party to the inquiry and his counsel.

Commander *[Name]*, U.S. Navy, counsel representing Lieutenant Commander William J. Tierney, U.S. Navy.

Lieutenant *[Name]*, U.S. Naval Reserve, party to the inquiry, and his counsel.

Lieutenant *[Name]*, U.S. Naval Reserve, party to the inquiry, and his counsel.

[Name], yeoman, second class, U.S. Navy, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

The court sat with open doors.

Lieutenant *[Name]*, U.S. Naval Reserve, a party to the inquiry, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was duly sworn. He was reminded of his rights as a party. He was advised of his rights as a witness and under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and was also advised that any statement made or testimony given by him might be used as evidence against him in any subsequent trial by court-martial.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

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1. Q. State your name, rank, file number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. ^{B-6} , Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve, ^{B-6} , present duty station: USS WASP.

2. Q. You are a party to this proceedings?

A. I am, sir.

3. Q. Will you state your naval and marine experience?

A. I was sworn into the Navy in May of 1943 as apprentice seaman, and in July 1943 reported to the Navy V-12 unit at Duke University. I remained there for a few months and was transferred to the Naval NROTC unit at Duke University and in October of 1945 I graduated from Duke University and was appointed Ensign, U. S. Naval Reserve, and shortly thereafter reported to the light cruise DENVER. I was on that ship for approximately eight months and in August of 1946 I was released from active duty. In June of 1951 I was recalled to active duty and in the intervening time I had been a member of the Organized Surface Division 6-22, Durham, North Carolina, since about September 1948, and I reported to the shipyard up here for duties in connection with recommissioning the WASP and I have served on the WASP since she was commissioned.

4. Q. And you were attached to the WASP on April 26, 1952, when she was in collision with the HOBSON?

A. I was, sir.

5. Q. Do you have any other marine experience other than in the Navy?

A. Well, yes, ever since I was about nine years old my father worked for a yacht broker and during the summer we made numerous trips from Norfolk to New York. In general, I have had considerable experience in small boats.

6. Q. Did you have a watch on the evening of April the 26th?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. 1952?

A. Yes.

8. Q. And what was that watch?

A. That watch was Officer-of-the-Deck of the WASP on the 2000 to 2400 watch.

9. Q. Were you a qualified Officer-of-the-Deck?

A. Yes, sir.

10. Q. And who qualified you, sir?

A. Well, the senior watch officer.

11. Q. Of the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

12. Q. Now, will you relate the sequence of events leading up to the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir. With your permission, I would like to read from this statement.

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All redactions are B-6

13. j. All right.

1. (witness reading) "I went up to the bridge at 1920 on 26 April 1952 to relieve LTJG [redacted] as Officer of the Deck. Mr. [redacted] informed me that we were on course 087° TRUE, speed 20 knots, and that Lighting Measure GREEN had been set. I checked and it appeared that all units of the TASK UNIT 88.1.1, consisting of the USS WASP (OV-18), USS HOBSON (DMS-26), and USS RODMAN (DMS-21), had set Lighting Measure GREEN. I was informed that a message had been sent to the RODMAN and HOBSON stating that it would only be necessary to have boiler power available for 27 knots. At the time WASP had eight (8) boilers on the line and on the advice of the Main Propulsion Assistant we secured two (2) boilers leaving sufficient power for us to make 27 knots. The wind was from approximately 265°, speed varying from seven (7) to ten (10) knots. Seas were moderate, visibility was unlimited, there was no moon up. One could barely make out the horizon.

"I was also informed of what Tactical Publications were in effect.

"Plane guard station #1 had been assigned to the RODMAN and plane guard station #2 had been assigned to the HOBSON. Before I relieved the watch the HOBSON and RODMAN took those stations. We were to conduct flight operations in accordance with the Night Air Operations Schedule promulgated by ship's Operation Officer. This schedule directed the launching of aircraft at 2000 and their recovery at 2230.

"I relieved the watch at approximately 1945 and organized the 2000 - 2400 watch as follows: LT [redacted], Junior Officer of the Deck, was instructed to take station on the starboard side of the open bridge to handle all voice communication on the secondary tactical circuit, and to keep his eye on whatever plane guard took station on our starboard hand. We were using the secondary tactical circuit, and not the primary circuit because the RODMAN appeared to be unable to transmit on the primary circuit. ENSIGN [redacted], Junior Officer of the Watch, was directed to handle all routine administrative matters of the watch and was assigned training duties in the pilot house.

"The regular underway steaming watch of the WASP was set as follows: steersman, lee steersman, quartermaster, boatswain's mate of the watch, and one JS talker all in the pilot house. Four lookouts were stationed on the O10 level to act as lookouts for the forward hemisphere and four lookouts were on the O7 level to act as lookouts for the after hemisphere. Sound powered phones were manned on the fantail, steering aft, and in Damage Control Central. The life boat watch was set and so reported to me.

"At 1950, I ordered Lieutenant [redacted] to send to the HOBSON and RODMAN a tactical signal ordering a simultaneous turn to the right to new course 265° and also to send an information signal indicating that we would conduct flight operations when wind conditions permitted. The turn signal was executed and all ships turned right to course 265° TRUE. At approximately 2001 an information signal was sent to the RODMAN and HOBSON indicating that we were conducting flight operations and we

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launched a strike group of ten (10) planes against the remainder of Task Group 88.1 which was located some fifty (50) miles to the South. At about 2030 the launch was completed and Task Unit 88.1.1 was turned left to course 102° and speed was increased to 25 knots. RODMAN and HOBSON were on station - RODMAN at 1000 yards 070° TRUE and HOBSON 3000 yards 245° TRUE. During the interval between 2030 and 2200 Nancy drill was conducted with the RODMAN and HOBSON. At 2209 a radio check was held with the RODMAN and HOBSON on the secondary tactical circuit Communications were satisfactory.

"At 2210, an information signal indicating that we would conduct flight operations on course 265° at a speed of 27 knots was transmitted and receipted for by the RODMAN and HOBSON. Shortly after this the Captain came up on the bridge. At approximately 2219 the Executive Officer said 'Are you going to turn on time?' I replied, 'Yes, sir.' At 2220 the tactical signals ordering a simultaneous turn to the right to course 260° and an increase in speed to 27 knots and an information signal indicating that we would conduct flight operations when wind conditions permitted were transmitted and were receipted for by the RODMAN and HOBSON. At 2221 the tactical signals were executed. Both the RODMAN and HOBSON receipted for the execution of the tactical signals. I gave the orders 'RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER' and 'ALL ENGINES AHEAD PLANK indicate 208 turns.' My orders were repeated and carried out by the steersman and lee steersman respectively, and I personally observed on the Rudder Angle Indicator on the open bridge that the rudder was right 10°. At this time I informed the steersman that his new course was 260°. While these orders were given I was standing behind and to the right of the Captain's chair. At the same time as the execution of the signal and my orders to the steersman and lee steersman, the RODMAN was observed by me to be on station and I directed LT B-6 to observe the movements of the HOBSON. Both the RODMAN and HOBSON were observed to be turning right at the same time that the bow of the WASP commenced to come right.

"Shortly after that, the HOBSON, by voice radio requested the Task Unit Commander to confirm the fact that the HOBSON was to take night recovery station #2 and an AFFIRMATIVE was sent back to the HOBSON.

44 "After we had completed about 60° of our turn, our heading was approximately 160° and the HOBSON bore approximately 250° from us. As we continued our turn and approached the heading 260°, I observed the HOBSON crossing our bow from starboard to port, and her bearing from us was changing rapidly to the left. As we swung past the heading 250° I ordered the steersman to shift the rudder. The order was repeated and carried out. At the same time I told him to steady on 260°.

47 "When the WASP had swung past 250°, and steadied on 260, it was observed that 250° would be a better recovery course than 260°. The Captain sent a signal to the RODMAN and HOBSON informing them that we were adjusting our course to 250°. I then ordered the steersman to come left to 250°. At the time we were steady on a course of 260° and had commenced no swing to the left. My

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observation of the HOBSON at that time showed her to be coming left and heading towards our port bow. The HOBSON bore about 350° relative at that time. This movement of the HOBSON in coming left at what appeared to be a range of less than 1000 yards was unexpected. I immediately said, "Captain we are in trouble." At almost the same time, the Captain was ordering, "ALL ENGINES BACK EMERGENCY," and thereby assumed the conn. I saw that this order was rung up. The HOBSON passed under our bow from port to starboard. It appeared that the WASP had commenced slowing and I thought for a moment that the HOBSON might clear us. Her number one stack passed just beyond the starboard edge of our flight deck and the two ships collided at approximately 2226. Our heading at the moment of the impact was 258°. I estimate that the HOBSON was on a heading not to the left of 350° and that her speed was not less than 25 knots. Immediately after the collision I ordered the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch to sound Collision Quarters which he did. When it appeared that our forward motion had stopped the Captain ordered "ALL ENGINES STOP." The smoking lamp was ordered out, Man Overboard was sounded and the Fire and Rescue Party was called away. All boats were lowered into the water by approximately 2235. The Captain was directing rescue operations. The RODMAN, who had been informed by me of the collision, was ordered to come up on the starboard side and assist. The area was illuminated with searchlights from the WASP and RODMAN. All lights were turned on.

"About four minutes after the collision I saw the bow of the HOBSON rise in the water and sink stern first on our starboard bow.

"Life preservers, rafts, nets and lines were dropped into the water immediately after the collision. Shortly afterwards I noticed men on life rafts to starboard.

"After rescue operations were well underway we made efforts to find out exactly how much damage had been sustained by the WASP. I ordered the Damage Control Assistant to furnish reports directly to the Captain which he did. The WASP still had planes in the air.

"Rescue operations continued. At about 0015, with the Captain's permission, I was relieved of the watch by LTJG D-6."

14. Q. Then you had six boilers on the line at the time of collision?

A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. Do you know what your speed was at the time of collision or whether or not the WASP had an opportunity to respond to ~~the~~ order "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK?"

A. Well, I feel that she did. When we back down at an emergency speed or even full speed, why, it's quite apparent to you on the bridge that we are. The ship shudders slightly and I am fairly well convinced that our order began to take effect before the collision occurred.

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16. Q. But you don't know what speed the WASP was moving at
at that time?

A. When we go through a turn of the magnitude in which we
went, why, the 25 knots -- when we entered the turn, we were
naturally losing speed swinging around the turn, even though
we had ordered up 27 knots.

17. Q. Now, you are positive that you had settled down and
steadied on course 260 after the turn signal?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. And the order was given -- transmitted by the command
ing officer to come left to 250?

A. That's not quite accurate. The order was transmitted to
that effect -- But the tactical signal which was used, was to the
effect that we were adjusting our course to the left to 250.

19. Q. Do you know what rudder angle was used in that adjust-
ment?

A. Well, normally, when we ordered the steersman to come left
and he's got a 10 degree swing, I would say that he wouldn't use
much over 5 degrees rudder to do it. I don't know precisely what
rudder angle he did use.

20. Q. Now, on this turn 260, you say that both the RODMAN
and HOBSON were observed to be turning right at the same time
that the bow of the WASP commenced to come right. Did you make
that observation that the HOBSON was turning right?

A. Well, I observed the RODMAN from my glasses and saw that
she was turning right and told Lieutenant ~~Bo~~ to watch the
HOBSON. Now, had the HOBSON been turning left it must have been
immediately obvious to him. I am sure, and he would have reported
it. I did not see the HOBSON.

21. Q. Did he make any report to you that the HOBSON was
turning right?

A. No, he did not.

22. Q. And you base that statement on the fact that you told
Lieutenant ~~B-6~~ to observe the HOBSON and you believed that
if he hadn't thought she was turning right he would have so
informed you?

A. I am quite sure he would have.

23. Q. Now, you say that about the time or at the time you
were steadied on a course of 260 and had commenced to swing to
the left, your observation of the HOBSON at that time showed
her to be coming left and heading towards your port bow, was
that your own observation?

A. It was, sir.

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24. Q. How were you able to observe that she was coming left, sir?

A. Well, I put my binoculars on her and I could see the outline of the ship and it was fairly obvious to me that she had started to swing to the left and ---

25. Q. That she was in a left turn?

A. Yes, sir.

26. Q. And that her range was less than a thousand yards?

A. Well, I wouldn't estimate it as being less than that. It wasn't 3000. It gave me the appearance of being close. I would estimate a thousand yards.

27. Q. But you definitely observed that the HOBSON was in a left turn.

A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. Did you inform the Captain that she was coming left?

A. Well, I stated the movement I saw and then I said, "Captain, we are in trouble," and almost the same time the Captain was ordering "ALL ENGINES EMERGENCY BACK", with which command I agreed one hundred percent, and there was nothing more on my part to be said

29. Q. But in no event did you feel that you had observed her on a heading not to the left of 350?

A. Well, now, that statement -- a statement which is taken from my statement of the collision angle. Now, I didn't -- when I observed, I don't believe he was on a course of 350.

30. Q. But you did definitely observe the HOBSON making a left turn?

A. Well, she appeared to be coming left.

31. Q. Did you see her wake?

A. No, I did not.

32. Q. For what period of time had you had the HOBSON under observation through your binoculars before you observed the left turn?

A. Well, I don't want to get a picture of her turning on a course and then turning, but I observed that she was in a turn and coming to the left.

33. Q. Had you had her under observation through your binoculars prior to that time, and after you gave the orders to turn right to 260?

A. After that? No, I don't remember precisely when she -- when I put my binoculars on -- for, by that time I could see her truck lights sweeping to the left and under that situation, since we were going to the right, her bearing was changing to the left, I didn't consider that to be a particularly alarming situation so I didn't take a closer glance at it.

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34. Q. When was the first time after you gave the order to come right to 260 did you observe the outline of the HOBSON through your binoculars?

A. Well, it was after I had ordered the steersman to come left to 250 from my heading of 260.

35. Q. Well, was she already in a left turn at the first time you observed her through your binoculars?

A. Well, I have stated that.

36. Q. That was the first time you had observed her through your binoculars?

A. Yes, sir.

37. Q. And you don't recall when she crossed your bow when you were in the turn - - you don't recall whether you looked at her through your binoculars at that time?

A. No, I do not.

38. Q. Did you have any information on her range at that time?

A. Well, as I observed her as I stated there when I -- our heading was about 160, I observed her on our starboard beam, as I recall, at that time. As I looked out over the edge of the open bridge, her truck light was about two-thirds of the way up the glass and it appeared that when she came around ahead of us she was a little bit closer, but she wasn't unduly close.

39. Q. You didn't observe - - Was your radar working at that time or was that after the SG went out?

A. Well, I couldn't say.

40. Q. You had no information on her range or heading?

A. At what time?

41. Q. At the time she swung across your bow?

A. You mean the instant that she turned left?

42. Q. No, prior to that, while you were in your turn?

A. I see. No. No, sir.

43. Q. Did you - - you are positive at the time of your impact your heading was 258?

A. I am very reasonably certain of that, yes, sir.

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yeoman, third class, U. S. Naval Reserve, entered as reporter.

44. Q. Will you state to the court why you are so certain.

A. I think one of the first things I did after I announced COLLISION QUARTERS was look at the compass.

45. Q. That was 258 at that time?

A. It was approximately 258 at that time, yes, sir.

46. Q. Did you personally observe the angle of impact?

A. My angle of impact is partially from an observation and partially from a deduction made after the collision. It was observed by me (1) that her number one stack cleared, (2) that the right barrel on our three-inch mount forward was hit, and about the only thing I know that could have hit was the second stack which to me would indicate the ship was coming so. If it had been any other way we would have hit her well forward. I believe if she was coming in like this (indicating) we would have hit her further forward.

47. Q. And where did the WASP strike the HOBSON?

A. I would estimate, it is fairly accurate, we hit her just aft of the number two stack.

48. Q. Do you know whether the bow of the WASP passed completely through the HOBSON or whether - -

A. I could not say yes or no to that. It appeared that the ship, the HOBSON, broke into two, but to say the bow passed through I could not say because the way I was standing I never did see the stern of the HOBSON.

49. Q. Do you know whether she broke in two?

A. I couldn't say from my own knowledge.

50. Q. You didn't observe the two parts of the ship after the collision?

A. No, sir.

51. Q. Was she somewhat obscured by the forward edge of the flight deck?

A. I think one would say that for anyone standing on the bridge his vision is somewhat obscured by the forward edge of the flight deck.

52. Q. In your statement you say that the movement of the HOBSON coming left, at what appeared to be a range less than 1000 yards, was unexpected. What movement did you expect of the HOBSON?

A. I rather expected her to get on our port side and stay there since some time she had to maneuver back into plane recovery station 2, but under no circumstances did I expect her to turn left when she was on our port side.

53. Q. When was the first time you were aware the HOBSON had not turned right simultaneously with the WASP?

A. Well, I think it is - - what do you mean "had not turned"?

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54. Q. Made the full turn to 260°T simultaneously with the WASP.

A. That would be one place where I was reasonably certain of when I observed her coming towards us, yet I estimated her bearing when we were around to course 260, was 250 which means she had dropped back in station a little bit but apparently had not closed range, which gave me the impression perhaps she had followed the maneuver by simply slowing and turning.

55. Q. That was your impression from the observation you had taken?

A. At that particular instant, yes, sir, so that she went across our bow rather fast. I would say, to be absolutely certain, that she had not completed the turn to the right. When I first observed her heading for us I would say definitely that was the first time I would know for sure.

56. Q. Did you have any reason prior to that time to suspect she hadn't?

A. No, sir. If she had slowed down and turned with us and slow down immediately upon the execution of the signal she would have naturally appeared to close us as she passed our bow as we swung around. That didn't appear to be unusual to me.

57. Q. If she had turned to the right the whole turn to 260 simultaneously with the WASP and had slowed down would her bearing have been substantially the same as you observed on the bridge of the WASP?

A. I would say that would be so. It had been slowing and she would have time to drop back on station and close a little bit in range.

58. Q. But it would close more slowly than she did, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

59. Q. Do you recall where you were in your turn when your radar repeater on the bridge failed?

A. No, sir, I don't.

60. Q. Were you observing the HOBSON when that radar repeater failed?

A. No, sir, I wasn't.

61. Q. During the turn to 260 did you take bearings on either the RODMAN or the HOBSON through a pelorus?

A. No, sir, I did not.

62. Q. I call your attention to Exhibit 66. Do you concur in all respects with that estimate of the track of the HOBSON and the WASP?

A. I can certainly testify to the fact that the WASP made her turn that way and from the description that has been given of the HOBSON's movement I would say that was a fairly accurate representation of her maneuver.

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