

4. Q. You have heard the narrative read in this courtroom as to the sinking of the USS HOBSON by the senior surviving officer of the HOBSON and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court.

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Have you any objection to make in regard to either narrative or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man regard to the loss of the USS HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

6. Q. Do you have with you now a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the USS HOBSON?

A. That's right.

7. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man on that list with whom you are personally acquainted and who you know, of your own knowledge, was aboard the USS HOBSON during the voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, and up to the time of the HOBSON sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the USS HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or whose name is not on that list?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 45.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court then, at 1759, adjourned until 0840 the next day, 10 May 1952.

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SECOND DAY

U. S. Naval Supply Depot,  
Bayonne Annex,  
U. S. Naval Base,  
New York, New York

Saturday, 10 May 1952.

The court met at 0840.

Present:

Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy,  
Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, and  
Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, members.

Lieutenant Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve  
counsel for the court.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve, assistant to  
counsel for the court.

Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, advisor to the  
counsel for the court.

Captain \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, party to the  
inquiry and his counsel.

Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, counsel representing  
Lieutenant Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve, party  
to the inquiry and his counsel.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve, party to the  
inquiry and his counsel.

\_\_\_\_\_, yeoman, first class, U. S. Navy, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were  
present.

\_\_\_\_\_, seaman apprentice, U. S. Navy, who was sworn  
with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON, was  
called as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned  
that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and service number, branch of  
service, and present duty station.

A. \_\_\_\_\_, seaman apprentice, \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy,  
and U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. And to what vessel were you attached on 26 April 1954?  
A. HOBSON (DMS-26)

3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U. S. S. HOBSON; have you any objection to either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

4. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who, of your own knowledge, know was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or whose name is not on the list you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 46.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

B/B  
r, junior, seaman apprentice, U.S. Naval Reserve, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

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1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service and present duty station.

A. *T2b*, SA, *T2b*, I'm attached to the U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. U. S. Navy or U. S. Naval Reserve?

A. Reserve, temporary duty on the WASP.

3. Q. And what vessel were you attached to on the 26th of April 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON.

4. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior surgeon and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court concerning the details of her sinking; have you any objection to make regarding the narratives or either of the narratives, anything to lay to charge any officer or man with regard to the loss of United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you are personally acquainted and who you of your own knowledge, know was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or not on the list you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 47.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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*Ryb*, seaman apprentice, U.S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service and present duty station.

A. *Ryb*, SA, *Ryb*, attached to the WASP.

2. Q. U. S. Navy or U. S. Naval Reserve?

A. U. S. Navy.

3. Q. To what vessel were you attached on the 26th of April, 1952?

A. U. S. S. HOBSON.

4. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor officer, U.S.S. HOBSON, and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON; have you any objection with regard either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who you know, of your own personal knowledge, was aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, up to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage whose name is not on the list which you hold or who is not among the survivors?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 48.

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Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

<sup>B-6</sup> e, seaman apprentice, U. S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court. He was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service and present duty station.

A. <sup>B-6</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, seaman apprentice, <sup>B-6</sup> \_\_\_\_\_, presently attached to the WASP.

2. Q. To what vessel were you attached on the 26th of April 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON (DMS-26).

3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior surgeon and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON; have you any objection relative to either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir, I haven't.

4. Q. Do you have a list of the men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were acquainted and who you, of your own knowledge, know was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Do you know of any other man aboard the HOBSON during that voyage who is not among the survivors and who is not on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir, I don't.

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The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 49.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

<sup>B36</sup> seaman apprentice, U.S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. <sup>B36</sup>, <sup>B36</sup>, SA, USN and I'm on the U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. <sup>to</sup> What vessel were you attached to on April 26, 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON, sir.

3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U. S. S. HOBSON; have you any objection with regard to either of those narratives or have you anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

4. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have been in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you are personally acquainted and who you know of your own knowledge was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

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6. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 50. W-9

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

, seaman apprentice, U. S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officer's and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding. W

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. , seaman apprentice, , U. S. Navy.

2. Q. You're presently attached?

A. U.S.S. WASP.

3. Q. What vessel were you attached to on the 26th of April, 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON.

4. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U. S. S. HOBSON; have you any objection with regard to either of those narratives or have you anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

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5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who you know of your own knowledge was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, up to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or on the list which you hold? 108

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 51.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

*B6* seaman apprentice, U.S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officer's and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. *B6* SA, *B6* USN, U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. To what vessel were you attached on 26 April 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON (DMS-26).

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3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor of the U.S.S. HOBSON and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the HOBSON; have you any objection in regard to either of those narratives?

A. No, sir.

4. Q. Do you have anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you are personally acquainted and who you know, of your own knowledge, was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, up to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know any other man who was aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors and whose name is not on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 52.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

A witness called by the counsel for the court entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.

The counsel for the court read the one narrative, unclassified previously read to the surviving members of the crew by Lieutenant *Bo*, junior, U. S. Naval Reserve.

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Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, and service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. <sup>7-6</sup> IC3, attached to the U.S.S. WADP right now.

2. Q. Branch of service?

A. Regular Navy - USN.

3. Q. To what vessel were you attached on 26 April 1952?

A. The U.S.S. HOBSON (DMS-26).

4. Q. Do you have any objection with regard to the narrative just read or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the sinking of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark ~~ed~~ to the left of every name of every man with whom you are personally acquainted and who you know, of your own personal knowledge was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors whose name is not on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was marked Exhibit 53 for identification.

COURT: The court will temporarily sit with closed doors.

The spectators and press withdrew from the courtroom.

The counsel for the court read the confidential dispatch containing a narrative concerning the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON to the witness.

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8. Q. Do you have any objection to the narrative just read?  
A. No, sir.

9. Q. Or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?  
A. No, sir.

Exhibit 53 for identification was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 53.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The court was opened and sat with opened doors.

B-6, seaman apprentice, U.S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of the service, and present duty station.

A. My name is B-6 - B-6, SA, presently attached to the U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. Branch of the service?

A. U. S. Navy.

3. Q. To what vessel were you attached on the 26th of April 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON (DMS-26)

4. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor of the U.S.S. HOBSON and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court; have you any objection to either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the sinking of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

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5. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who you know of your own personal knowledge was aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage and who is not among the survivors or not on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 54.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

, radioman seaman apprentice, U. S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.

A. , RMSA, U.S. Navy, U.S.S. WASH (CV-18).

2. Q. To what vessel were you attached on the 26th of April, 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON (DMS-26).

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3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior sur of the U.S.S. HOBSON and the narrative contained in the dispat read by counsel for the court concerning the details of the si of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Have you any objection to either of those narrative

A. No, sir.

5. Q. Or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or in regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

6. Q. Do you have a list of <sup>NAMES</sup> ~~names~~ of men believed to have in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every n of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who know of your own personal knowledge was aboard the U.S.S. HOBS during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

8. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard during voyage and who is not among the survivors or on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appende marked Exhibit 55.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties t the inquiry desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to ma any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully broug out by the previous questioning.

The witness <sup>STATED</sup> ~~said~~ that he had nothing further to say. W

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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B-6, fireman apprentice, U.S. Navy, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of service, and present duty station.  
A. B-6, FA, B-6, USN, U.S.S. WASP.
2. Q. To what vessel were you attached on 26 April 1952?  
A. U.S.S. HOBSON.
3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor of the U.S.S. HOBSON and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON; have you any objection to either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man with regard to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?  
A. No, sir.
4. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?  
A. Yes, sir.
5. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who you know of your own knowledge was aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, up to the point of her sinking?  
A. Yes, sir.
6. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or on the list which you hold?  
A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 56.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine the witness.

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The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness <sup>STATED</sup> ~~said~~ that he had nothing further to say. WPR

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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seaman apprentice, U. S. Naval Reserve, who was sworn with the surviving officers and crew of the U.S.S. HOBSON, was called as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your name, rate, service number, branch of the service, and present duty station.

A. 56, SA, 36, USNR, duty station: U.S.S. HOBSON, presently the U.S.S. WASP.

2. Q. What vessel were you attached to on 26 April 1952?

A. U.S.S. HOBSON.

3. Q. You have heard the narrative read by the senior survivor and the narrative contained in the dispatch read by the counsel for the court concerning the details of the sinking of the U. S. S. HOBSON; have you any objection with regard to either of those narratives or anything to lay to the charge of any officer or man relative to the loss of the United States Ship HOBSON?

A. No, sir.

4. Q. Do you have a list of names of men believed to have died in the sinking of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. Have you placed a check mark to the left of every name of every man with whom you were personally acquainted and who you know of your own knowledge was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, South Carolina, up to the point of her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

6. Q. Do you know of any other man who was aboard the U.S.S. HOBSON during that voyage and who is not among the survivors or on the list which you hold?

A. No, sir.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

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All redactions  
are TS-6

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 57.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the party to the inquiry desired further to examine the witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding, and was advised of his rights as a party, ~~as~~ a witness and against self-incrimination.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. You are the same Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_ that testified in this matter yesterday afternoon?

A. I am, sir.

2. Q. You are the senior survivor from the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. I am, sir.

3. Q. Do you know of any survivors of the collision who are presently hospitalized?

A. I do, sir.

4. Q. What are their names and rates?

A. \_\_\_\_\_, I believe he was CSSN, and \_\_\_\_\_ - I'm not sure of his rate, RM striker, I believe.

5. Q. Do you know of any man who sailed from Charleston on the HOBSON on her last voyage who was not living at the time of the sinking of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir.

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6. Q. What is his name?

A. John Joseph O'Leary, sir.

7. Q. Under what circumstances did he die or was he killed and when?

A. He was killed the previous morning, sir, while fueling at sea. While hauling in the messenger from the U.S.S. PAWCATUCK (AO-108), the lines from the PAWCATUCK dropped in the water, took a good size bite or loop in the water. The line or the messenger from the HOBSON started feeding - to the best of my knowledge it wrapped around this man's left leg and he was carried over the side. He was brought aboard about an hour later, brought aboard the tanker about an hour later. He was dead when he came aboard, sir.

8. Q. I believe you testified yesterday afternoon that after the sinking of the HOBSON there was another body?

A. There was, sir.

9. Q. Recovered?

A. Right, sir.

10. Q. Were any bodies recovered other than the one you have reference to?

A. No, sir.

11. Q. Has this body been identified?

A. The body has been identified by Chief Electrician's Mate . . . identified the body by face, tattoo marks, jewelry that he had, and so forth. To the best of my knowledge the body has not been identified by fingerprints, or any other means, sir. However, Chief . . . and Chief . . . were shipmates on the HOBSON for 30 months. The body was not mutilated or marred in any way. I am quite sure it is Chief Hopkins.

12. Q. Have you prepared a list of names of men of the crew of the HOBSON who were rescued after the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

13. Q. Do you have it with you?

A. I do, sir.

The counsel for the court requested that the document be marked Exhibit 58 for identification.

14. Q. The names of those men who were rescued appear on the list that is marked Exhibit 58 for identification under the word "survivors?"

A. Under the word "survivors."

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15. Q. Does that Exhibit 58 for identification contain to the best of your knowledge, the names of the men who were aboard the U. S. S. HOBSON during her last voyage, including the survivors?

A. This particular exhibit does not have four names on it, which was brought out prior to this time.

16. Q. Will you add those names?

A. I added the names, sir.

17. Q. Exhibit 58 for identification now contains what is to the best of your knowledge a list of the names of all the personnel who were aboard the HOBSON during her last voyage from Charleston, to the point of her sinking?

A. It does, sir. The name O'Leary does appear on this list. At the time of the sinking he was dead and his body was not on board. He was on board at the time of sailing.

18. Q. Would you strike his name, please?

A. I have struck his name, sir.

19. Q. Under the heading of survivors are there the names all the men who were originally aboard the HOBSON during her last voyage and who you have seen since her sinking?

A. Yes, sir.

20. Q. Did you muster those men yourself?

A. I have, sir.

21. Q. What vessels were engaged in the rescue work in taking these survivors out of the water?

A. The U.S.S. WASP, (CV-18), U.S.S. MODMAN (DMS-21), some other ships from the screen which I do not know the name of, the STRIBLING and O'HARA were two of them. I am not sure of the names of the other ships in the screen, sir.

22. Q. Well were the survivors that you have referred to picked up by the various ships?

A. Yes, sir.

23. Q. And later what was done with them?

A. Later we were all assembled aboard the U.S.S. WASP.

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24. Q. Now, were all the men whose names appear on Exhibit for identification attached to the U.S.S. HOBSON at the time of her sinking?

A. No, sir, two of them on this list were on ComMinDiv 62 staff. They were on board the HOBSON at the time of the sinking.

25. Q. What are their names?

A. Lieutenant *76*, Medical Corps, USNR, and ET second *76*.

26. Q. And were they aboard the HOBSON in a duty status?

A. They were on board the HOBSON in a duty status.

27. Q. Were they in that status at the time of collision?

A. Yes, sir.

28. Q. Were all the other men on that list attached to the U.S.S. HOBSON at the time of collision and in a duty status?

A. They were, sir.

29. Q. Do you know or have any reason to believe that the injuries to or death of any man whose name appears on Exhibit for identification were sustained or was suffered as a result of his own misconduct?

A. I do not, sir.

30. Q. How did you arrive, Mr. *36*, at the list of names which appear on Exhibit 58 for identification?

A. Well, we started off with a list that was about two weeks old, a roster that was two weeks in arrears. ComMinDiv 62 staff furnished it. From that list we drew about 80 to 85 percent of the names. *76*, BM3, the mustering petty officer in the gunnery department, Lieutenant (jg) *36*, Supply Office worked on his division; Lieutenant (jg) *36*, operations department personnel, arrived at their list; *36* and myself arrived at the engineering list. I think every department head of every department knew how many men they had in their department. We did come up with some additional names which had to be straightened out. We had to come to ComMinLant or BuPers to make the final decision whether they had been transferred off the ship or not in about two or three cases.

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The document marked Exhibit 58 for identification was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, Exhibit 58 for identification was received as Exhibit 58.

Neither the counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired further to examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as a party.

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The court then, at 0945, took a recess until 1005, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties and their counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

*B-6*, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

*B-6*, chief electrician's mate, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. Do you recall after the sinking of the HOBSON whether a body was recovered?

A. No, sir; I didn't see the body recovered. The body was taken aboard another ship and brought to the WASP at a later time.

2. Q. And you observed that body?

A. Yes, sir.

3. Q. On board the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

4. Q. Did you identify that body?

A. Yes, sir.

5. Q. As who?

A. As Hopkins, Hubert, chief boatswain's mate.

6. Q. Hubert D. Hopkins?

A. Yes, sir.

7. Q. How long have you known Chief Hopkins?

A. For twenty-six months.

8. Q. How long had he been aboard the HOBSON?

A. Well, he told me that he had been aboard it since the commissioning, sometime in 1942.

9. Q. How long have you been aboard?

A. I have been aboard since December 1949, sir.

10. Q. And what was the condition of the body when you observed it?

A. Well, it didn't look like it had been mangled or hurt in any way. It looked like, according to the pharmacist's mate, he had drowned.

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11. Q. His features were unmarred?

A. Yes, sir.

12. Q. And did he have any other identifying marks on him?

A. He had some tattoos that I recognized on the arms.

13. Q. Will you describe those tattoos?

A. Well, the one that I definitely remember--the only one that I definitely remember was the tattoo of a girl on his arm, sir.

14. Q. On his forearm?

A. Yes, sir; I believe it was on his forearm.

15. Q. Then you positively identified the body you observed?

A. Yes, sir.

16. Q. As being that of Hubert D. Hopkins, chief boatswain's mate?

A. Yes, sir.

17. Q. Formerly who was attached to the USS HOBSON at the time of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. Were you shown any personal effects of the deceased?

A. No, sir; I didn't see any.

19. Q. And that body was aboard the WASP in sick bay when you saw it?

A. Yes, sir; it was in the quiet room in the sick bay on the WASP.

20. Q. And it was Hubert D. Hopkins, chief boatswain's mate?

A. Yes, sir.

Neither counsel for the court, the court nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Lieutenant *B C*, U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding and was again reminded of his rights as a party, as a witness and against self incrimination.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

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1. Q. You are the same Lieutenant <sup>B-6</sup>, the senior surviving officer of the HOBSON, who previously testified in this case, who gave a narrative of the events leading up to the collision between the HOBSON and the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

2. Q. Were any of the records such as the Deck Log, Quartermaster's Notebook, Engineering Bell Book--were any of the records of the HOBSON saved after the collision?

A. No, sir.

3. Q. Were any of the pay accounts or service records of the men saved?

A. No, sir.

4. Q. You know of no documents whatsoever that were saved from the HOBSON?

A. No, sir; I know of none.

5. Q. To what command was the HOBSON attached at the time of her loss?

A. Attached to ComMinDiv 62, MinRon 6, and ComMinLant, sir.

6. Q. To what port was she enroute?

A. Oran, Algeria.

7. Q. What other ships were in company with the HOBSON on this occasion?

A. At the time of the collision, sir?

8. Q. No, sailing from Charleston and rendezvousing at sea?

A. The USS WASP, USS WORCESTER, USS BALTIMORE: ~~THE~~ USS STRIBLING. I do not recall the names of all the screen ships, sir. The O'HARA.

9. Q. And of that force of ships who had tactical command?

A. Admiral <sup>B-6</sup>, I believe, sir.

10. Q. As what?

A. Commander Task Group 88.1, sir.

11. Q. At the time of collision, what ships were in ~~the~~ company with the HOBSON?

A. The USS WASP and USS RODMAN.

12. Q. And of that group, who had tactical command?

A. Captain <sup>B-6</sup>, USS WASP.

13. Q. How long had you known the commanding officer of the HOBSON?

A. Since about 14 March 1952, sir.

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14. Q. And when did he assume command of the HOBSON?  
A. I think on 17 March, sir; 1952.

15. Q. How long had you served aboard the HOBSON?  
A. Eleven months.

16. Q. Were you a qualified Officer-of-the-Deck?  
A. I was sir.

17. Q. How long had you been so qualified and who qualified you?  
A. Standing top watch about six weeks, sir, and qualified by Lieutenant Commander *BB* USN.

18. Q. What was the condition of the sea on the night of the collision?  
A. The seas were moderate, sir.

19. Q. What was the direction and force of the wind?  
A. The wind was coming out of the West, sir.

20. Q. Do you remember the force?  
A. The force I do not know, sir.

21. Q. You can't be certain as to the direction of the wind other than it was from the West?  
A. We were coming and going into the wind, sir, across 260.

22. Q. Was ~~there~~<sup>there</sup> any current--ocean current--at that point?  
A. There seemed, from my experience after the HOBSON went down that night--there seemed to be some current, yes, sir.

23. Q. Do you know in what direction, or its rate?  
A. The direction was North, Northeast, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: At this point, I would like to ask this witness some detailed questions and the answers will refer to the doctrine and tactical maneuvers contained in confidential publications.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

24. Q. Now, Mister *BB* I will ask you to elaborate on your narrative that you gave yesterday stating in detail the position of the two ships, the maneuver in which they were engaged, and an entire sequence of events leading up to the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON.

A. Would it help any if I--more or less--draw it out, sir, on the blackboard?

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COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I think you can draw it on the blackboard and reproduce your drawing, if it meets with the approval of the court and the parties, on a piece of paper that we can offer in evidence, if that procedure is satisfactory to the court and parties.

WITNESS: Well, I can put it on a maneuvering board sheet later, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Let the record show that the witness is drawing on the blackboard.

WITNESS: (indicating on the blackboard.) We were steaming on course 102 degrees, speed 25 knots. The WASP was in the center (indicating). The WASP was bearing 065 degrees True from us; range of 3,000 yards. The signal which was executed, turn 260, speed 27, should have brought the WASP back in on this course (indicating) and HOBSON on her port beam a thousand yards relative bearing 270 to 280. The maneuver which was planned by Captain H/6 was for the HOBSON to come right to 130, steer 1 until the WASP was bearing 010 True course somewhere along this line (indicating). The solution to the problem that was figured on the maneuvering board was for the HOBSON to come right to 130 steam at a speed of 27 knots until the WASP was bearing about 010; to come left with Hard Rudder and that would throw us on her port beam approximately a thousand yards. She would have completed her turn at the time--almost her turn, and we would have to make almost a 270 degree turn the other way.

Actually, the WASP would have been bearing about 350 when we were on station, course 260. We were to start a little early and get us a positional bearing to complete our turn back to the left; however, we came right to 130; held that course approximately a minute and forty-five seconds to two minutes, came left to new course 090 and swung past it to 082 and steadied up on 090. We came up (indicating) at this point (indicating) when I came in and checked off how far the WASP transferred and checked to see the bearing that I had, which at the time, I had taken 048--045 to 048; came in and plotted to see how far off we would pass the WASP which plotted that we would miss her about 800--pass the WASP about 800 yards from each other - -

COURT: (Interposing.) That is on that course of 090?

WITNESS: That's right, sir. We held this course for another two minutes or so, and up in here some place (indicating) for some reason we came left across the bow of the WASP.

25. Q. Now, you spoke of the maneuver having been figured on a maneuvering board. Who did that?

A. Captain H/6 did, sir. It was first figured for a recovery course of 265. They had launched on 265 and we assumed that we would recover on 265 within a very few degrees of that with adjustments.

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26. Q. And the man<sup>eu</sup>ver as it had been planned then called for W an original course of 130?

A. Yes, sir.

27. Q. To maintain that course until the WASP was bearing 010?

A. That's right, sir. 010, or in that immediate vicinity of bearing.

28. Q. And then a left turn which would put you on the port beam of the WASP after she had completed her turn?

A. Yes, sir.

29. Q. What position were you originally in--was that a launch position?

A. Well, we were originally 340 relative, 3,000 yards and launched on 265. At the completion of launching, the turn was executed to the right, new course 102, sir, which brought us around on their starboard quarter--from their port bow to their starboard quarter.

30. Q. And you had been assigned plane guard station 2, is that correct?

A. That's right, sir.

31. Q. And what is that station--for the recovery of aircraft?

A. Station 2 for the recovery of aircraft is at a relative bearing from the carrier of 270 to 280, range 1,000 yards.

32. Q. Had you discussed your intended man<sup>eu</sup>ver with the commanding officer of the HOBSON? W4

A. I had, sir.

33. Q. Will you relate that conversation to the court?

A. Well, we started out--it first started that the captain said he wished that he could go down below and get a cup of coffee. I asked him why he didn't go down and get the cup of coffee, and then he said, "Well, about the time I get to the wardroom to get it they will put a signal in the air to standby to recover aircraft." I told him I would call him in the wardroom when they put the signal in the air. I told him if they did execute that I thought I could get it. I hadn't had any trouble doing so before. At this point, he asked me what I would do if they turned right? I told him that I would come around--and he said, "Suppose you get a signal to turn 265, what would you do?" I told him I would come right with 10 degree rudder which would give us a turning circle of 1200 yards and slow to 15 knots and let the WASP catch up with me. Earlier in the crossing we had received a message from the screen commander stating that when ships were not on station they were serving no useful purpose; that there would be no--or, that there had been a lot of sluggishness, apparent indecision, there would be no more of it. Ships would get on station in the most expeditious

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(continued) manner possible even at the expense of an occasional mistake. When I said to come right 10 degrees rudder, slow to 15 knots, and let the WASP come right and catch up with me, WASP to get up on our starboard beam or for me to be back on their port beam, and it probably would have been slow stationing. The captain said as much - - that we had to expedite getting on station.

34. Q. Who was the screen commander that sent the message that you referred to?

A. I do not know the name, sir. The admiral who was on the STRIBLING. I do not know his name, sir. I have the original of the dispatch which we received.

35. Q. Do you know what command he held?

A. 88.1.1, I believe, sir.

36. Q. What administrative command - - was he commander of a destroyer flotilla?

A. He was screen commander. I don't know what other command, sir.

37. Q. He was the screen commander for the operation on the way to Oran?

A. That's right, sir. I know it was on the board - - we had it on the board in the wheel house of the HOBSON, but I do not remember now what it was, sir.

38. Q. And who had assigned you to plane guard station 2?

A. I believe ComMinDiv 62 had assigned us.

39. Q. And what publications or maneuvering instructions were you operating under at the time of collision?

A. ATP-1 was fully effective as of 1200 that day, however, ATP-1 does not give but one plane guard station so my assumption that night was that we were operating from USF-4 as far as the stationing of plane guards was concerned. ATP-1 does not give a plane guard station 2.

40. Q. And what exercise was your unit or the unit to which you were attached engaged in prior to the collision?

A. We had left the main body of the task force, sir, going out of radar range and were engaged in an air strike on the main body, sir.

41. Q. And the WASP, the HOBSON and the RODMAN were acting as a unit or element?

A. Yes, sir.

42. Q. Which?

A. Unit.

43. Q. And the commanding officer of the WASP was the officer in tactical command of that unit?

A. As reported to me, yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge he was, sir. We had been detached from the main body of the task force.

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44. Q. And you had received a signal from the WASP, "Turn 260?"

A. Yes, sir.

45. Q. You receipted for that signal?

A. Yes, sir; I ROGERED for the message myself.

46. Q. You understood that signal?

A. Yes, sir.

47. Q. And did you consider it the duty of the HOBSON when that signal was executed to follow that signal--to obey that signal by making a turn 260?

A. Well, sir; the captain called the WASP and asked if they desired us to take night recovery station 2. To the best of my knowledge, the answer to that was affirmative, and I think that was the reason for us maneuvering to get on their port beam instead of coming right to a new course 260 and maintain the same true bearing.

48. Q. That question was asked subsequent to the execution of the signal turn 260?

A. Yes, sir; it was asked afterwards.

49. Q. Who had the conn in the interval after the command "260" was given on the HOBSON?

A. When the signal "Turn 260" was executed, the captain gave the order to the steersman. I stepped to the starboard wing and asked if he had the conn. He told me he had the conn. I had the conn up until the time that he gave the order to the steersman, and I stepped out to find out just who had the conn.

50. Q. And who had the conn at the time of collision?

A. The captain had the conn, sir.

51. Q. You had recommended to the commanding officer of the HOBSON that you perform that maneuver by turning right to 260 and slowing down and letting the WASP catch up with you?

A. Yes, sir; I did. In fact, we had some pretty heated words over it.

52. Q. What were those words?

A. Well, just exactly what they were I can't say. I know words came out--or, on the point that I was trying to bring up was turn 260 meant to turn right to that course, also that the captain's solution would be bringing us within a thousand yards which would be cutting it pretty close at that speed as far as was concerned, and there was a matter of putting two ships bow to bow in there some place. It's just not a good policy as far as I'm concerned.

53. Q. Did you so inform the commanding officer of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir; that's when the part came up that we had to expedite getting on station.

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54. Q. Now, was this conversation before or after the signal was given or was it at the execution of an anticipated signal?

A. This was before the "FOX CORPEN" signal was given, sir.

55. Q. When was the "FOX CORPEN" signal given?

A. Approximately, the time was about 2215 PETER, sir.

56. Q. And how long was that before the turn signal was given?

A. I think about six minutes, I am not sure, sir. There is no way of verifying that now.

57. Q. The "FOX CORPEN" signal is an intention signal or an information signal, is that correct?

A. As well as I remember, yes, sir.

58. Q. In other words, the "FOX CORPEN 260" signal put in the air--by it, you understood it to mean the WASP intended to turn right to 260, is that correct?

A. Well, the signal was "FOX CORPEN 265, TACKLINE FOX SPEED 27," sir.

59. Q. And you --?

A. I think that's so, but ACP-175 --

60. Q. But was it your impression and your belief at the time that that signal meant that that was the course and speed on which the WASP would recover her aircraft.

A. Yes, sir.

61. Q. Is it your thought that that was the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON's understanding also?

A. Yes, sir; because he had already figured the maneuvering board solution at 265 before the signal was ever put in the air.

62. Q. Did he figure that after the "FOX CORPEN" signal?

A. No, sir; before. They launched on 265 and we assumed that we would recover at 265 or within a very few degrees of that course.

63. Q. When the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON departed from his preconceived plan of maintaining course 130 after giving it to the helm and came left to 090, did you raise any objection to that order?

A. No, sir; not verbally. I stepped into the wheel house and turned on the light and took the parallel rule and maneuvering board and checked to see how far down approximately--how far down we would pass or how far away we would pass her.

64. Q. Did you make any further recommendation to the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON after your original recommendation that the maneuver be accomplished by a right turn?

A. No, sir.

65. Q. Were you certain in your own mind and do you know whether the commanding officer was certain that ATP-1 and ACP-175 were in effect at the time of this maneuver?

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A. Well, I knew ATP-1 and ACP-175 were supposed to be in effect. The only question in my mind was the HOBSON being assigned to plane guard station 2, sir.

66. Q. And what --?

A. Which had to come from USF-4.

67. Q. There was one but not a second plane guard station provided for in ATP-1?

A. That's right. There is only one station assigned; however, the "FOX CORPEN" signal came from ACP-175.

68. Q. And did you understand that signal as you previously testified?

A. Yes, sir.

69. Q. As I understand your testimony, the sequence of sign and events is as follows: OTC in the WASP put out "FOX CORPEN 265, TACK SPEED 27?"

A. That's right, sir.

70. Q. And then what was the next signal?

A. The next signal that came over and the way it came over was: "Signals Follow. FOX at the dip. Execute to follow. Turn 260, TACK SPEED 27. Standby. Execute. Execute. Turn 260, TACK SPEED 27."

71. Q. What does "FOX at the dip" mean?

A. I believe, sir, it means that I am maneuvering to commen aircraft operations. I will have to check ACP-175 again to be sure, sir.

72. Q. And then after the turn signal, what was the next communication between the HOBSON and the WASP?

A. The HOBSON called the WASP to find out if they desired us to take night plane guard station 2, for recovery of aircr

73. Q. And that was answered?

A. To the best of my knowledge it was answered in the affirmative, yes, sir.

74. Q. What was the next signal put out by--or, what was the next communication between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. There was one more signal that I understood came from another ship beside the WASP. I understand from the RODMAN an that it was ROGERED for by the HOBSON. I do not recall hearin signal at all, sir.

75. Q. And then the last signal that you remember--or, the last communication that you remember between the HOBSON and th WASP was the inquiry from the HOBSON, "Shall I Take Plane Guar Recovery Station 2?"

A. I think so, yes, sir.

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76. Q. What lighting measure was in effect in the task unit?  
A. Lighting Measure Green.

77. Q. And what lights does Lighting Measure Green provide for in navigational lights?  
A. On all ships, sir?

78. Q. On all ships?  
A. On a destroyer, the red foretruck light. I know on the carrier--the red foretruck light. I do not know what other lights, sir.

79. Q. Did you observe on the WASP any other lights other than the truck light?  
A. I have the impression, sir, of seeing two green lights some place when I stepped out to the starboard wing of the bridge. That was about the time that the range was 750. I am almost sure I saw these lights, but things were happening so darn fast that I couldn't tell you where I saw them.

80. Q. How long before the collision was it that you saw those green lights?  
A. Maybe twenty seconds.

81. Q. And you don't know on what part of the WASP they were?  
A. They seemed to be on the forward end of the flight deck, outboard, sir. I cannot be sure.

82. Q. Now, you spoke of ranges between the HOBSON and the WASP. Were you getting those ranges by visual observation or by --?  
A. Radar, sir.

83. Q. Radar?  
A. Radar ranges. The radar ranges were coming up from combat on each sweep of the scope, sir.

84. Q. When had you been assigned plane guard station 2--had that been your station throughout the day--throughout that exercise?  
A. When I relieved the watch, sir, I was informed that we had been assigned plane guard station 2.

85. Q. You don't know when that order came?  
A. No, sir; I do not. I imagine that it had just recently come to us because we were not on station and I relieved the watch off station--relieved the watch enroute to the plane guard station 2.

86. Q. Do you know whether that came over the TBS; did it come by voice?  
A. I should say it probably came over the secondary tactical circuit.

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87. Q. Had you been having any difficulty that day with your voice communication?

A. To my knowledge, no, sir. We had not.

88. Q. When you assumed the watch, did you conduct any radio check?

A. I don't recall now, sir, if I checked the radio or if I was informed by the off-going OOD that he had just checked it. I do not know. It has been the policy on the HOBSON to relieve. Normally, the off-going OOD would check the radios before he went off. In the event he did not, the oncoming OOD would check the radios.

89. Q. And both your primary and secondary tactical circuits were in working order?

A. Yes, sir; we were sending and receiving on both primary and secondary circuits. I believe we were transmitting on CI nets. I know we were receiving on them.

90. Q. On your diagram there on the board, what was the position of the RODMAN relative to the WASP at the time the turn signal was given?

A. Without a board I will have a little trouble with this. I think that they would be bearing--the WASP would be 250.

91. Q. Are you trying to figure what should have been their position? Do you recall that position?

A. No, sir; I am not sure exactly where it was because they were just on the opposite side of the WASP from us and, of course, the WASP was cutting out the pip of the RODMAN on the scope.

92. Q. You couldn't see the RODMAN on your radar?

A. No, sir; on just--on very infrequent sweeps she would show up on our scope.

93. Q. Was she on the port quarter of the WASP?

A. She was on the port bow of the WASP when we were on course 102.

94. Q. And you are positive that the maneuver the commanding officer had in mind to take his assigned station was by a left turn rather than a right turn?

A. Yes, sir.

95. Q. And that was his intention before the execution of the turn signal that was given?

A. Yes, sir; if we had steamed 130 and come right, we would have been 3,000 yards off their bow at least. The solution to the problem was to steam 130 and come left to the new course.

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96. Q. Can you offer any explanation of why the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON departed from his preconceived plan and came left to 090?

A. No, sir; unless he thought the range was opening too much.

97. Q. Did you give him the information as to the range to the WASP?

A. No, sir; the phone talker--bridge phone talker was relaying that information to him from combat.

98. Q. Did you hear any such information relayed by the phone talker on the bridge?

A. I heard some ranges. I do not know what all the ranges were.

99. Q. What ranges do you recall hearing?

A. Only the last three.

100. Q. And what were they?

A. 1700, 1240, and 750.

101. Q. You heard the information relayed to the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON that the range to the WASP was 750?

A. Yes, sir; that came up.

102. Q. 750 yards?

A. 750 yards. That came up to the bridge talker who told the captain. That was also screamed up the voice tube from combat to the bridge that the range was 750. Combat had lost contact; the range was too close.

103. Q. Was this range of 750 yards given to the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON before or after his order "LEFT FULL RUDDER?"

A. I would say about the same time plus or minus three or four seconds.

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, yeoman, second class, U.S. Navy, entered as reporter.

104. Q. You are not certain whether that information was conveyed to him before or after his order, LEFT FULL RUDDER?

A. No, sir, I was not paying too much attention then. I went to the starboard wing of the bridge to look out and see where the WASP was, and I heard his order to the helm, and also heard the range come up.

105. Q. Was a bearing given to him?

A. No sir, we had been using visual bearings all night.

106. Q. Were you keeping the commanding officer of the HOBSON informed of the bearing? Were you taking those bearings yourself?

A. There was only one bearing taken by me on the port alidade which I previously stated was fogged up. The commanding officer was on the starboard alidade.

107. Q. Was he taking bearings?

A. Yes, sir.

108. Q. Throughout this maneuver?

A. He was, sir. What they were, I don't know.

109. Q. Can you locate on that diagram the ranges as they came up with relation to the orders of change of course to 090 and 130? Do you know where in that turn - - -

A. The only one I know right in this vicinity (indicating) was 750.

110. Q. And you have indicated a place on that diagram immediately at the time LEFT FULL - - -

A. Just at the turn, yes, sir.

111. Q. And you can't give us the course when the range 1200 was given?

A. No, sir, because first of all I don't know how far (indicating) we steamed on that before we steamed on this one.

112. Q. Had any maneuvering board plot been worked out, which included a course of 090 for the HOBSON on this maneuver prior to the giving of the - - -

A. No, sir, it was not worked out. The Captain might have checked it. He might have taken parallel rulers and worked and checked it, but it was never mentioned to me.

113. Q. But after you were on course 090, you took a bearing and on parallel rulers computed your closest point of approach on the course?

A. Came back in and checked it. As well as I remember, it checked somewhere about 800 yards.

114. Q. And that takes into consideration the turn the WASP was making?

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A. Yes, sir. One other thing I might bring up here: It to into consideration the speed the WASP was making using 1200 yard tactical diameter.

115. Q. This was also a signal that had been given earlier the movement?

A. Let me get back to when all the ships were together before being detached from the Task Group. The station<sup>in</sup> speed was given as 25 knots; operational speed as 27, and all ships to use run angle to give a 1200 yard tactical diameter which was what we still assumed to be the case. Now, ATP-1, USF-2 and USF-4 give a tactical diameter of 1500 yards, which would cut 800 or in neighborhood of 800 down to 500. We were still using the 1200 yards as previously signalled.

116. Q. Who gave the order that the ships would use the 1200 yard tactical diameter?

A. When the group was together as a whole, it came from Commander Task Group 88.1.

117. Q. It was put out by the Task Group Commander?

A. Yes, sir.

118. Q. Do you know whether that message came by voice or otherwise?

A. No, sir, I do not recall. I do know that we had a sheet of paper with that written out on it stuck up on the bulkhead over the chart table with masking tape. I don't recall seeing the dispatch on it or whether it was by voice or what.

119. Q. Was there any signature on that memo?

A. No signature on it. I knew the handwriting.

120. Q. Whose handwriting was that?

A. Captain Tierney's. I do know that the message came out.

121. Q. You know that the message came out. Do you mean that you heard it yourself on voice?

A. No, sir.

122. Q. Did you see it in any dispatch?

A. No, sir. There again, maybe I said something I shouldn't have. I was informed of it when I was relieving the watch.

123. Q. The officer of the deck you relieved informed you that the message had come in to use 1200 yards tactical diameter?

A. Yes, sir, along with the station<sup>in</sup> and operational speed.

124. Q. Who was the officer you relieved?

A. Lieutenant *D-6*.

125. Q. Is Lieutenant Smith among the survivors?

A. No, he relieved Ensign *B-6*, who is among the survivors.

126. Q. Was the HOBSON showing her navigational lights or her running lights?

A. No, sir.

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All redactions  
are B.6

127. Q. The WASP was not either?

A. No, sir, none of the three ships had on their running lights.

128. Q. When had you darkened ship?

A. I don't know the exact time. It was some time after sunset.

129. Q. Lighting Measure Green was in effect when you assumed the watch?

A. I think it was about the time of the relief of the watch that the signal came on.

130. Q. Could you plainly see the red truck lights of the WASP and the RODMAN?

A. Yes, sir, at all times.

131. Q. Would you give the names and the identity of the various officers and men on the bridge of the HOBSON at the time of the collision?

A. At the time of collision?

132. Q. Or from the turn signal - turn 260 signal.

A. Just the men on watch?

133. Q. On watch on the bridge or anybody else that was on the bridge, whether on watch or not?

A. You want that for combat also, sir? Or just the bridge?

134. Q. If you know for combat, we will get that.

A. The survivors from combat were Ensign B.6 and D.6 s, RD.6 B.6, ICFN was in combat, but not on watch. To the best of my knowledge he was up there checking the DRT.

135. Q. What officers and men were on the bridge?

A. On the bridge: Captain Tierney; myself; Lieutenant, junior grade, JOOD; quartermaster of the watch and I, both SA's, were lookouts. was bridge talker; Desrosiers was boatswain's mate of the watch. was steersman and Painter was lee helmsman. Two other on the bridge, one on watch and one not on watch, neither are among the survivors.

136. Q. Who?

A. Craver, QM1, and Swan, MN3.

137. Q. Did you see the commanding officer after the collision or after he went into the water?

A. I just saw him as he went into the water. That is about right after he went into the water. The ship was going down fast, Mr. and I went into the water together. I would say 3 seconds after he left the ship I never saw him again. 4 seconds later the seas were taking us off the same as they taken and the captain.

138. Q. Do you recall seeing a on the bridge at any during that crucial period of time on the starboard wing of the bridge?

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A. No, sir, I don't. There had been several men on the starboard wing of the bridge back on the after corner when the WASP was launching aircraft. I don't know who was down there at the time. I do know that this one man, , I mentioned, was still on the bridge. I do not know who else, sir. Ones not on watch, sir.

139. Q. Would you give the location, the physical location, on the bridge of the various surviving officers and men at the time of collision, if you recall?

A. The Captain was on the starboard pelorus, at the time of collision, I was right in the door going out to the starboard wing from the wheel house. Mr. , I believe, was over by the chart table, port side of the wheel house. The boatswain's mate of the watch was on the forward side of the wheel house right in front of the steersman. The steersman was on the wheel and the lee helmsman just at his right on the telegraph. The phone talker had been about the center of the wheel house. I believe he had come over to the starboard wing on the last one or two ranges that came up. , I believe, was plotting the position in the chart house. I am not sure about that, but I believe he was. Raps, quartermaster of the watch, was on the starboard side of the wheel house at the quartermaster's log desk. To the best of my knowledge, he was, sir. and were lookouts on the O4 level right above the house. was the bridge talker. He was in the center of the wheel house and on the last range or two he went over to the starboard side of the wheel house, which is only 12 by 15 feet across. To the best of my knowledge, that's it. WOL

140. Q. Did the bow of the WASP strike fore or aft of the bridge?

A. It struck aft of the bridge, sir.

141. Q. And cut the HOBSON in two?

A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir. The WASP hit us on one side. I went to the other side of the bridge. When I got over there the WASP had already come through the ship. I never saw the after end of the ship. From people I have talked to, they said the after end was listing to starboard, and I do know that the forward end of the ship was listing to port.

142. Q. And you were on the forward end of the ship?

A. Yes, sir.

143. Q. Did you observe any of the search and rescue operations?

A. Yes, sir.

144. Q. Would you describe those, please? As to what was done, and your opinion as to the adequacy of it?

A. Well, I know that there were quite a few boats in the water, sir. I saw quite a few boats myself. From what I can understand from the survivors, and so forth, the place was literally covered with life-saving gear, life jackets, life rafts and floats and anything else that would float. I don't know why or how or anything else except that I managed to get away from all that. I do know that from reports from practically everyone among the survivors, there was an amount of life-saving gear floating.

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145. Q. Have you any complaint or criticism to make of the search and rescue operations after the collision?

A. No, sir. I think everybody did a wonderful job to get everybody in in such a short time.

146. Q. Do you recall whether there were any emergency signals given before or at the time of the collision in the HOBSON?

A. Well, we had LEFT STANDARD RUDDER on. You might say the order to the helm to increase of LEFT FULL and increase to HARD LEFT was an emergency signal. And one order which was given to ring up, and we never had time to get the answer, "ALL AHEAD EMERGENCY FLANK" to both engines.

147. Q. And that signal was not answered?

A. No, sir. I don't think it was ever rung up, and even if it had been it would have taken us 10 minutes to get up to it.

148. Q. Were any emergency orders given throughout the ship, such as collision quarters, abandon ship or the like?

A. I know that I, myself, screamed out, "Standby for collision on the LMC. The general alarm was sounded at the time of the collision. The general alarm switch was thrown and the word was passed to abandon ship. It was after the collision. The general alarm never did ring in either the forward or after section of the ship. The word went out to abandon ship in the forward section. I don't think it ever went out in the after section.

149. Q. That was passed by word of mouth?

A. Over the LMC, yes, sir.

150. Q. Over the LMC?

A. Over the LMC, and I imagine it was pretty well passed by word of mouth too. I don't guess anybody had to tell anybody to abandon ship.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

Examination continued:

151. Q. You have referred to a dispatch that was received by the HOBSON directing plane guard ships and vessels to expedite getting on station?

A. Yes, sir.

The counsel for the court requested the reporter to mark a dispatch Exhibit 59 for identification. It was so marked.

152. Q. I hand you a dispatch marked Exhibit 59 for identification and ask you if that is the dispatch you referred to?

A. Yes, sir, it is. This particular dispatch does not refer to plane guard ships, sir. I think that is made quite plain in the first part of it, but this dispatch is still behind the whole thing.

153. Q. Would you elaborate on your remark that it is behind the whole thing?

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A. Well, I think that the statement or remark that was passed to me, that we have got to expedite getting on station, came right from this.

154. Q. You think that dispatch motivated the remark made to you by the commanding officer of the U.S.S. HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir, I do.

The dispatch, marked Exhibit 59 for identification was submitted to the parties and to the court, and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 59.

155. Q. Will you read that dispatch?

A. "From: CTU 88.1.4 - Action: TU 88.1.4 - Info: CTG 88.1; Classification, PLAIN - Precedence, DEFERRED - PARA ONE X GENERAL- LY SPEAKING AND EXCEPT WHEN PLANE GUARDING CMA VESSELS OF SCREEN WHEN NOT ACTUALLY ON STATION PERFORM NO USEFUL PURPOSE X SUCH TIME MUST BE KEPT AT MINIMUM X PARA TWO X THEREFORE SUCH EVOLUTIONS AS FORMING UP CMA CHANGING SCREEN CMA AND CHANGING STATION ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MANNER X PARA THREE X I HAVE OBSERVED THAT SOME SHIPS DO SO IN ADMIRABLE FASHION X OTHERS PERFORM WITH APPARENT INDECISION CMA SLUGGISHNESS AND AT UNDULY SLOW SPEED X THE NET RESULT IS AN INDIFFERENT PERFORMANCE IN THIS RESPECT BY THE OUTFIT AS A WHOLE X PARA FOUR X PROMPT AND RESOLUTE ACTION PAREN EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF AN OCCASIONAL MISTAKE PAREN IS A HALLMARK OF GOOD DESTROYER OUTFITS X LET US HAVE MORE OF IT BT."

156. Q. Did you hear the commanding officer of the HOBSON discuss that dispatch?

A. This dispatch had been discussed. I don't recall if it was when we were plane guarding or when we were still in the screen. This dispatch, as I remember, was marked action to all OOD's.

157. Q. Was it routed through the ship by the commanding officer marked action to OOD's?

A. Yes, all OOD's.

158. Q. Have you any reason to think that the dispatch affected the attitude of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. HOBSON or affected his decision as to the course and speed he would take to assume his assigned station in the particular maneuver we have been discussing?

A. From his statement that we had to expedite getting on station I think this dispatch would cause him to use a maneuver, which he did, in order to effect a faster stationing maneuver. Turning to the right at a slow speed would have been easier to accomplish, but it would have taken longer to do.

159. Q. In your opinion, would it have been safer?

A. Yes, sir. I think any time you can keep your bow in the same direction as anyone else's, it is safer.

160. Q. Could you explain why, feeling as you do, that you didn't object more strenuously to the proposed maneuver that the commanding officer had in mind?

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A. Well, sir, on paper it worked all right. It would have put us on station. It would have brought us into our required range and distance. As I said before, this particular dispatch said to get on the ball and I think that was on his mind, and he inferred that we had to get on station in an expeditious manner. I made a suggestion I thought it good. It wasn't agreeable so I saw no sense in keeping arguing about it. I had already been informed that he would take the conn when the maneuver started.

161. Q. Did you think it incumbent upon you to object to his change of course to 090, thereby departing from the maneuver as it had been worked out on the maneuvering board and bringing you closer to the WASP?

A. When I went back in and checked to see how close we would pass - what our closest point of approach to the WASP would be, and saw that we still had 800 yards left or in the neighborhood of 800 yards, I didn't say anything more about it then, sir. I will say this, I couldn't figure why it had been done.

162. Q. Would you state, or can you state, what you thought the commanding officer's next order to the helm would be to bring you on station from that course of 090?

A. RIGHT FULL RUDDER. HARD RIGHT RUDDER.

163. Q. And it was your impression that that was the maneuver that he intended to execute to get on station?

A. That is about the only thing you could execute. We had too large a turning circle to go left and clear the range we would have on the CPA.

164. Q. And did you have any warning or any advanced knowledge that the commanding officer of the HOBSON was going to give an order to the helm which would put the rudder left?

A. No, sir.

165. Q. How soon after he gave that order did you make the exclamation, "Standby for collision."?

A. About 15 seconds. As I recall, I had gone to the radar scope just stopped and looked in at that and as soon as he called LEFT STANDARD RUDDER, I went and looked at the radar scope and turned to the starboard wing to see just where the carrier was. Just where she could be. The first thing that was in my mind was that I had made a miscalculation in this 800 yards. It wasn't an accurate measurement - a rough calculation.

166. Q. Was it your immediate thought that the order, LEFT RUDDER was a dangerous maneuver if your calculations had been correct?

A. Yes, sir, it didn't sound right.

167. Q. And for that reason, you thought you had made a miscalculation in the CPA that you had computed?

A. I didn't know what had happened. All this time the ranges were coming up and the Captain was taking visual bearings on the carrier. I should have figured that he had a better idea of what the carrier was doing, what the bearing was doing than I did. At some place along the line the word came up from combat to ask if we were taking visual bearings. We were asking combat for bearings but word came from combat that the bearing was holding steady.

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168. Q. The bearings were holding steady?

A. Yes, sir, that was sometime before the collision.

169. Q. Was that while you were on course 090?

A. No, I don't think so. I think it was after we started our left turn.

170. Q. How many seconds after you started that left turn would you estimate it was until the collision?

A. About 20 seconds.

171. Q. During that 20 seconds did combat - - -

A. It could only have had two bearings - two sweeps.

172. Q. You think in that interval that combat could have made their computation that the bearings were constant?

A. Not accurately, no, sir. Because it was jumping so much. The pip was jumping so much it was almost a guess as to whether we were centered on it or not, but I do recall that word once from combat. I don't know how accurate it is or anything else. Maybe someone else can throw more light on it.

173. Q. And you are positive that no maneuver or that the maneuver which entailed a course of 090 had never been figured on paper prior to the commanding officer of the HOBSON's order to take that course?

A. Not that I ever saw. If it was figured it was thrown away. There was one maneuvering board there and there was only one solution that had been figured to the problem that I saw. There were no other solutions laying around anywhere.

174. Q. That was figured sometime in advance of the order "TURN 260"?

A. Yes, sir. In fact, it was figured in advance of the first signal, even.

175. Q. And it envisaged a right turn by the carrier?

A. Yes, sir.

176. Q. After the commanding officer gave his order LEFT RUDDER that sent you into that left turn, did it occur to you to warn him that that maneuver might take you perilously close to the WASP?

A. I made the statement to the Captain that the ranges were closing, too ~~fast~~ fast.

177. Q. What was his answer?

A. I don't think he made an answer. I don't think he said anything about it. It was just before he called for EMERGENCY FLANK.

178. Q. You warned him that the ranges were closing too fast. Did he say anything about the bearings?

A. No, sir.

179. Q. Do you think that formation came up from combat?

A. Yes, sir. The Captain had been taking visual bearings all along. I assumed that was what the bearings were.

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Numerical sequence of questions and answers interrupted through error. No questions or answers are omitted from the record.

182. Q. Do you know of any particular acts of heroism or outstanding performance of duty on the part of any personnel that you would care to mention to the court or for the record?

A. I heard of one man in particular, sir.

183. Q. Who was this particular man?

A. He was on the HOBSON. I have not been able to substantiate the story, but I understood from one or two people that he helped 12 or 15 men get out of the forward compartment and went down with the ship when she went down. He was helping them get up the ladder. I am not sure of that, and until such time as I am able to inquire around some more about it, I would like some time to try to find out more about it, sir.

184. Q. Do you know of any instance of dereliction in the performance of duty on the part of any person?

A. No, sir, I do not.

185. Q. Can you form any opinion, or have you formed any opinion of how long it took for the HOBSON to sink?

A. From my own observation, or from what I have heard from talking to other men off the HOBSON?

186. Q. You can't give any estimate of your own?

A. Well, I have talked to some men off the HOBSON who say they know it was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  minutes after the collision before they got out. In my mind, I thought she went down in less than a minute time because I know I was off it when the O3 level was under water. The bow was not up in the air when I left. It apparently happened after I left the ship and my back was to it and I didn't see it.

187. Q. You say it was a dark night, that there was no moon?

A. I can't remember a moon, sir. If there was, it was very faint. I know the visibility was good.

188. Q. The visibility was good?

A. The visibility was good. I rather doubt if there was a moon because the aircraft - I couldn't see the outline of the aircraft. I could see their lights, but I couldn't see their outline.

189. Q. What was the time of sunset that night?

A. I don't recall that, sir.

190. Q. If you know, what was the materiel condition of the HOBSON and its readiness for sea when she left Charleston, South Carolina on this voyage?

A. The ship, to the best of my knowledge, was ready for sea in all conditions. On 2 April 1952, we were inspected by the Board of Inspection and Survey, Washington Group. The Board of Inspection and Survey's recommendations were broken down, as well as, remember, into A, B and C items. Group A items, which, in their estimation, should be accomplished before we sailed from Charleston and which were of major importance. Group B items, which items required attention but were not necessary to the operation of the ship right at that time. The ship was in a good condition, and could steam very satisfactory without these B items being taken care of right then.

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Other items which were, I believe, recommended alterations to be accomplished on the ship. Class C items amounted to engineering and mechanical tools. One item was to procure a boring bar. Another item was to procure a set of 2-inch micrometers. So that left 6 engineering items to be accomplished. Of the 6, one was to clean out the feed and condenser lines, which was a long range job. The others were accomplished. To the best of my knowledge, we did not leave the Charleston Navy Yard without accomplishing all Class A items. I won't say 100%, no, sir, because we had some grounds in the IC circuits. In the intercommunication's circuits there was some grounds in there; however, as far as the condition of the hull of the ship is concerned, the ship had been drydocked for sonar work, and our forward peak tank which was forward of the forward bulkhead, had had a leak in the bottom of it that had been fixed. Bottom tanks, feed water, fresh water, lower sound, forward ~~beam~~ tank, paint locker, magazines, and so forth were tested in the Yard at the time because we did not want to go to Europe and wind up with a leaking tank. So as a safety precaution, all tanks were tested before we were even out of drydock in Charleston. As I said a minute ago, I don't think there was any item which was required to be completed 100% before we sailed that was not done.

191. Q. In your opinion, did any mechanical failure or material deficiency in the U.S.S. HOBSON contribute in any manner to this collision and the consequent loss of life?

A. No, sir.

192. Q. Are you able to accurately state the time of the collision?

A. No, sir. Do you want that down to fractions of a minute?

193. Q. No. If you can come to within a minute.

A. 2225 Peter Zone time.

194. Q. Did you arrive at that by looking at the clock, or did you look at a clock?

A. I can't feature myself stopping and looking at a clock as it happened, but I saw that someplace. I saw it on a clock. I don't know whether it was my watch or not. I think I did look at my watch just before I went off the ship, sir.

195. Q. What speed and how much way did the HOBSON have on at the time of the collision, if you know?

A. Well, we started at 25 knots. We had rung up 27 knots. The course we were making two or three turns - two minor turns and one pretty hard turn. I don't think we were making anything over 25 knots. However, the pit log, which was fairly accurate, read about 28½ knots at the time of the collision. I think that was due to the side motion of the bow through the water in the turn.

196. Q. I believe you have previously stated that the bow of the WASP cut clear through the HOBSON?

A. It did, sir.

The court then, at 1202, took a recess until 1318, at which time it reconvened.

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B-6 yeoman, third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, entered as reporter.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties and their counsel and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant B-6 U.S. Naval Reserve, a party to the witness on the stand when the recess was taken, resumed his seat as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.

Examination by counsel for the court continued:

197. Q. I hand you a maneuvering board plot which has been marked Exhibit 60 for identification and ask you in your best judgment is that the track of the two ships, the WASP and the HOBSON, taken by those ships immediately prior to collision from their original course of 102 up until the time they would up in collision?

A. With one exception. I think this is probably a mistake in writing. (The witness corrected the mistake)

198. Q. Then in your best judgment that plot correctly sets forth the track of the two ships immediately prior to collision?

A. Yes, sir. It is stated on here the length of legs "A" and "B" is not known. However, it is the course steered.

199. Q. And it is a reproduction on a maneuvering board drawn to scale, each circle representing 2000 yards, of the plot you drew on the blackboard this morning, is that correct?

A. Each circle represents 500 yards.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I offer this exhibit 60, for identification to the parties, for their inspection and possible objection.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: May I address an inquiry as to how this diagram was made up?

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Yes, sir. Counsel for Lieutenant Commander Tierney would like to examine this witness on voir dire.

Examination on voir dire by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

200. Q. I think the initial position of the ships is substantially in accordance with the testimony. Is there any place on this diagram where the ranges that you have testified to have been calculated? Does it show on here? Is that information worked into this diagram?

A. I don't know if the ranges have been checked on that or not.

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201. Q. Do the ranges check in here all right, the ranges as given by Lieutenant on his direct examination, the 1700 yard range, the 1260 yard range, the 1240, and 760, I believe it was? They have been plotted in here, and I see that you have two courses here, one is the estimated track of the WASP and one is the actual track of the WASP. Were you on board the WASP at the time of the HOBSON collision?

A. No, sir.

202. Q. Were you observing the WASP in any way so as to be able to predict or to relate now what her movements were from the time she executed her signal to the time she collided with the HOBSON?

A. I don't know what turning circle she turned on. The estimated is 1200 yards.

203. Q. What is her advance before she begins to turn?

A. I don't know that, sir.

204. Q. What is the advance of the HOBSON before she begins to turn?

A. I don't know at that speed.

205. Q. What is the rudder angle that was used on that turn to 130, which we have, from 102 to 130?

A. RIGHT STANDARD, which is  $16\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  rudder, to 130.

206. Q. LEFT STANDARD to 090, which is again  $16\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  rudder, and LEFT STANDARD, next  $16\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ , LEFT FULL  $25^{\circ}$  rudder which would leave  $30^{\circ}$ , and these are the angles -- I think those rudder angles give you the turning circles that have been used in the construction of this diagram, is that right?

A. That gives approximately -- I don't think the advance has been figured into that.

207. Q. Is your advance appreciable at 27 to 30 knots at which these vessels were traveling at the time?

A. The advance is appreciable, yes. I want to stipulate I don't know the length of legs "A" and "B".

208. Q. If you don't know the length of legs "A" and "B", Lieutenant, the only thing you do know about this is the point at which the HOBSON collided with the WASP, and that prior to that time the HOBSON had steered course 102 for some length of time and 130 for some length of time and setting the initial position you have just adjusted those legs to bring those ships into collision. I think we have more information available on this problem.

A. The only thing I am sure of on there is the range and bearing at the commencement of the maneuver, that there was a collision the approximate collision angle, and the course steered.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: I offer in substitution this track of the U.S.S. HOBSON. I ask you to consider it at this time or I shall introduce it later.

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COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: May I interpose? Exhibit 60 for identification represents the witness' opinion, his reconstruction of the track of the two ships. The counsel for the court does not present it as an accurate track of the two ships. It is an attempt to summarize the testimony the witness gave this morning and is a plot, a duplicate plot, drawn to scale, of the plot he actually drew before the court this morning on the blackboard.

COURT: The court understood the actual track of the WASP was on there.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I think I can clear that up. On this plot, Exhibit 60 for identification, the word "actual track" he assumed a tactical diameter of 1500 yards for the turn made by the WASP.

COUNSEL FOR LIEUTENANT *B-6*, party: If it please the court at this time I would like the record to affirmatively show Lieutenant *B-6* did not prepare this plot. This was prepared by the technical advisor to the counsel of the court and he is merely identifying his testimony on that. That drawing is not purported to be an accurate representation.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I thought counsel for the court made that clear.

COURT: The court understands that. But the document as the court sees it is an attempt to reconstruct what was drawn on the blackboard that he used to illustrate his point this morning. There is anything else on there then the document would appear to be something of which the court is not aware.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I am attempting to clear up this word "actual." I will ask the witness if that word does not refer to the estimated track of the WASP if a tactical diameter in this turn had been 1500 yards.

WITNESS: It would, yes, sir. The assumed tactical diameter was 1200 yards which was the assumed diameter that we plotted.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: And the words on here "estimated track" refers to a tactical diameter of 1200 yards that you assumed when you arrived at the CPA of 800 yards, an estimated CPA of 800 yards.

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COURT: The words "actual" and "estimated" - - should be further explained. The court is not clear. Is the court to understand that this represents what the witness thinks the two ships did as you illustrated this morning on the blackboard.

WITNESS: This is not a stepped-off plot. I know I did not check it and I don't think anybody has stepped-off the track in hundreds of yards to see how far each ship went on this maneuver.

COURT: Let's make sure when this is presented on that basis so you all understand it very well what it is.

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COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I have substituted words on this exhibit. For the word "estimated track" I have substituted the word "tactical diameter 1200 yards" and for the word "actual track" I have substituted the word "tactical diameter 1500 yards" and counsel for the court merely offers it not as an actual track of the two ships but as a summarization of this witness' testimony this morning and a plot drawn to scale on a maneuvering board, which he had drawn previously this morning on the blackboard without using any accurate scale, and I am merely asking him if in his opinion this is a correct summarization of the testimony he has given and if in his best judgment this is the track of the two ships.

WITNESS: It is with one exception. When the HOBSON came left from 130 she swung past to 082 and then back to 090, which will set this track in a little bit to the north.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: The witness indicates leg B on the plot marked Exhibit 60 for identification, which is drawn on the plot on course 090 and said his testimony indicates that the heading at one time was 082 and that leg should be moved a little north.

Examination by counsel for the court continued;

209. Q. Is the plot as now drawn on Exhibit 60 for identification in your opinion the track taken by the two ships immediately prior to collision?

A. In my opinion, yes, sir.

210. Q. And is it a reproduction of the rough drawing you made on the blackboard this morning?

A. It is that. Yes, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: I offer exhibit 60 for identification in evidence as Exhibit 60.

The document was submitted to the parties and to the court and by the counsel for the court offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 60.

211. Q. I hand you a dispatch that has been previously admitted in evidence as Exhibit 59. Have you refreshed your recollection and can you tell me now by whom that dispatch was sent?

A. Commander Task Unit 88.1.4 was ComDesFlot FOUR. My belief is that his name is Rear Admiral

212. Q. That dispatch was sent by ComDesFlot FOUR, Rear Admiral, is that correct?

A. That is correct, sir, sent by ComDesFlot FOUR whom I believe to be Rear Admiral

Cross Examined by Captain \_\_\_\_\_, party:

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213. Q. I believe you testified previously that prior to beginning the maneuver to take night recovery plane guard station 2 the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON had worked out a solution for that course on a maneuvering board.

A. That's right, sir.

214. Q. And would you repeat what his solution called for?

A. The solution called for a change from course 102 to a new course of 130 True and holding that course as it was figured at that time until the WASP was bearing about 010, which bearing doesn't hold good. It would put us too far out. To hold that course until the WASP was bearing 010 as it was figured at that time and then come left with FULL or HARD RUDDER, bringing us in on the port beam of the WASP.

215. Q. In proper station?

A. That's right, sir.

216. Q. As I recall, you said he actually started to follow that solution and that his first order was a turn to course 130?

A. That is correct.

217. Q. He proceeded on that course for a short period of time 1-3/4 minutes to 2 minutes, I believe you said?

A. That is right.

218. Q. Then he departed at that point from his maneuvering board solution by making a left turn to course 090?

A. We came to a new course 090 and to the best of my knowledge there was never a 090 on the solution. If there was, it was on a sheet which I did not see and which was no longer on the chart.

219. Q. And you also stated at that point you went in to check whether the new course 090 would give you clearance from the WASP?

A. I did, sir.

220. Q. Just what was it you used to check that point?

A. The thing that I used to check that point was this bearing of 045 or 048 which is apparently out some in bearing too. I took the bearing from the WASP 048 on my track 130 and ran that parallel to 090 course and then took the distance between the track the WASP was estimated to be on, and the track that we would --

221. Q. Were you using the same maneuvering board that the captain had figured his solution on?

A. I did, sir. I didn't have any lines drawn on it any place.

222. Q. Did you see the captain work out another maneuvering board problem before executing that turn to 090?

A. No, I did not see him come in off the starboard wing. After he came in at first and told me he had the conn, when steady on 130 he went back to the starboard wing. I don't think he came back in the wheelhouse after that.

223. Q. Was he taking visual bearings on the wing of the bridge during the course of this maneuver?

A. Yes, from the starboard pelorus across our bow to the WASP. As I previously said, the port alidade was fogged some.

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224. Q. After turning on to the course 090, had the HOBSON proceeded on that course making no turn whatsoever, would it, in your opinion, have cleared the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

225. Q. If the HOBSON, at the time it actually made the last left turn, had made a right turn would it have resulted in the HOBSON arriving approximately on its proper station?

A. Yes, sir, possibly a little out in range, probably a little out in range.

226. Q. Now if, at the time the HOBSON actually made its last left turn, you had been able to anticipate it was going to make that turn to the left instead of to the right, what would you have thought the result would be?

A. I am afraid I can't say anything more to that than probably closer. It would have to be calculated. The ship at that speed and that short distance would have to be calculated mighty close to avoid collision.

227. Q. Perhaps I didn't make my question exactly clear. The point is: If you had the conn at that point would you have ordered a left turn at the time the HOBSON turned left and it had been in the same position?

A. No, sir.

228. Q. And had you known somebody was going to order that turn what would you have expected to happen? Would you have considered it dangerous?

A. Yes, sir. I wouldn't say that I would have expected a collision. I would have expected the two ships to get mighty close to each other.

~~Cross-Examination~~<sup>ed</sup> by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney:

229. Q. The line of inquiry which the interested party was pursuing is rather interesting. If I remember correctly, they were discussing whether or not you would have turned right when the commanding officer of the HOBSON actually turned left. In making that decision, Lieutenant, would the relative position and the relative heading of the two ships have any bearing on your decision?

A. Yes, sir.

230. Q. Do you know what the heading and the bearing of the WASP was when the HOBSON turned left?

A. No, sir, I don't know.

231. Q. Then how can you tell what you would have done if you did not know what the heading and the bearing of the WASP was when you were asked to give your opinions to a particular situation?

A. He asked me first, I believe, if I had been at the conn, if I would have made a left turn.

232. Q. Yes, that's right.

A. To have a collision, bearings had to be drawing left when we were on course.

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233. Q. Rapidly left or slowly left?

A. Depends how long it takes if the two ships got closer together.

234. Q. What would you call a rapid bearing rate?

A. How many degrees and how many seconds I can't say.

235. Q. What would you define as a rapid bearing rate, Lieutenant?

A. In answer to that question, I cannot say how many degree and how many seconds. It would all depend on the circumstance at the time. A ship that was out at 50,000 yards might have a slow bearing rate.

236. Q. If two ships remained on diametrically opposite course at the same speeds, the range would decrease, and the bearing rate would be very rapid.

A. That's right.

237. Q. On the other hand, if two ships were heading on a collision course the bearing rate would be constant regardless of the range, would it not?

A. Yes, sir.

238. Q. Then would you conclude that in making an estimate of any given navigational situation you must first postulate what conditions are at the time to predict what the bearing rate will be, what the range rate will be? You have to assume certain conditions, do you not?

A. That's right, sir.

239. Q. What conditions were you assuming when you were estimating your maneuvers for the interested party of the WASP?

A. Is this getting back to the question whether I would or would not turn left at that point?

240. Q. What is your idea, Lieutenant, of what the relative position, the range, the bearing, the course, and the speeds of the ships were when the commanding officer of the USS HOBSON said "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER to 090"? Will you put that up on the board?

COUNSEL FOR LIEUTENANT Tierney: If it please the court I would like to interrupt counsel's questioning. Aren't we going over the same ground we covered when we identified this maneuvering board track. The board is an estimate of the location of ship's relative position, his conclusion that it was some 800 yards off the track.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: Counsel for the court will advise the court that counsel for Lieutenant Commander Tierney should be given full latitude in cross-examination. If he covers matter that was brought out on direct questioning he certainly has the privilege to go back over it to test the witness' <sup>CREDIBILITY</sup> ~~ability~~ and his recollection.

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COURT: The court feels that counsel for Lieutenant Commander Tierney should be allowed to continue.

WITNESS: I would like to bring out in this I wasn't watching the WASP at every moment of this maneuver and this one particular location is about the only one I can give, (indicating on blackboard) which was with the WASP about 20 degrees on our port bow

241. Q. Do you know what her heading was at that time, Lieutenant? Is that the heading you observed?

A. No, I don't know what her heading was.

242. Q. 20 degrees on the port bow?

A. Yes, sir.

243. Q. The approximate relative bearing of the WASP at some time while you were on course 090 was 20 degrees port?

A. Right, sir. The only way that I can imagine that you could get a heading of this ship without asking them what their heading was with voice communications would be to know you were on 090, that 270 was right dead behind, your new course 260 lies just off your starboard quarter.

244. Q. That's right.

A. The only way I know that you can do that is to see how much of the side of the aircraft carrier or ship is open to your vision. If you can see the whole side of the ship it must be going that way.

245. Q. Is it easy to tell, Lieutenant, when you see the whole side of an aircraft carrier?

A. I won't say when you are dead 90 degrees on their beam, sir.

246. Q. If you are 45 degrees, have a target angle of 45 degrees, is it easy to tell whether it is 45 or 30 or maybe 60?

A. At a thousand yards it should not be too hard, sir, I don't think.

247. Q. No, that is probably right. At a thousand yards you might get a good idea.

A. If it was a destroyer or something of that nature I imagine it would be pretty hard.

248. Q. Lieutenant, we have another way, I think, of getting the target angle of the aircraft carrier and that is if we consider when the aircraft carrier started her turn and how long had been in the turn. We would be able to calculate what the target angle was at that point, would we not?

A. That's right. I would also like to say if there had been an accurate plot at all times.

249. Q. I was going to ask you if there is any way you could connect that 20 degree bearing which you have just put on the blackboard with any other fact which you have already stated in your testimony. You are on course 090, to refresh your memory you look up and you see that carrier bearing 20 degrees relative to the port bow.

A. I don't know, sir. I don't think I checked it on a maneuvering board. This 20 degrees is, I think, an approximation.

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250. Q. That is understood. I think it is all understood that unless you otherwise specify these are approximations. Have you spoken to me about this case previously?

A. Yes, some, but not in too much detail.

251. Q. I am just trying to refresh your memory. I have some notes which I jotted down at that time. Did you say something to this effect in the course of our interview the day before yesterday: "We swung to 090 from 130, past to 082, and back to 092" Words to that effect?

A. Yes, sir.

252. Q. Did I not then ask you the question at that time, when you swung past to 082 and went back to 090 did you by any chance look up and see the carrier?

A. At that time?

253. Q. Did I ask you that question?

A. I don't recall, sir.

254. Q. All right.

A. You might well have. I don't recall.

255. Q. How long were you on course 090 would you estimate?

A. I estimate that at about two minutes.

256. Q. Two minutes on 090?

A. That's right. There again it is an approximation.

257. Q. From the time you steadied down or until the time you first started to swing to 090?

A. I am sorry. I can't answer that.

258. Q. How long were you on course 130?

A. Two minutes or a little less.

259. Q. If you add two minutes or a little less that you were on course 130 to the two minutes on course 090, how many minutes does that make altogether?

A. 3 minutes, 30 or 40 seconds to 4 minutes.

260. Q. At the end then of 3 minutes 30 or 40 seconds to 4 minutes, according to your estimate, the commanding officer of the HOBSON said "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER," is that correct?

A. The order was given for LEFT STANDARD RUDDER. No, it was four minutes after the change of course to 130. It was somewhat less than four minutes.

261. Q. It was something less. Can you tell me how much less?

A. It must be about 20 seconds less.

262. Q. <sup>20</sup> seconds less? waf

A. Yes, sir.

263. Q. So then, at the end of 3 minutes and 30 or 40 seconds from the time of the execute the commanding officer of the U.S.S. HOBSON for some reason said "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER"?

A. That's right, sir.

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264. Q. At the time he gave that command he was on course 090?  
A. That's right, sir.

265. Q. Now, approximately how long does it take the HOBSON to make a 90 degree turn at 27 knots at full rudder?  
A. There again I don't know, sir. I have never timed it.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

Examination by counsel representing Lieutenant Commander Tierney continued:

266. Q. I have a copy of Tactical Operational Instructions, Mine Forces, 1948. Will you refer to this publication and find in it the turning circles for DMS type vessels and speed of 27 knots with full rudder, 30 degrees rudder.

A. The turning circle for DMS class 1630 ton cans at 25 knots using 30 degrees rudder with no gear streamed.

267. Q. What is the tactical diameter of that circle?

A. 700 yards, sir.

268. Q. Knowing the diameter to be 700 yards, could you tell me what the circumference is?

A. Yes, sir.. 2200 yards is the circumference. 500 yards is the traverse.

269. Q. Then you conclude that a 90 degree turn would involve a traverse of approximately 550 yards?

A. At 25 knots.

270. Q. At 25 knots, yes, sir. Now, if the U.S.S. HOBSON was traveling at 27 knots more or less, the rudder was put over hard 30 degrees left, how long would it take the HOBSON to traverse an arc of a circle-550 yards - or 90 degrees of a turn?

A. It would take approximately 36 seconds. That is hard rudder. If from 090 the rudder was put hard left immediately, which it wasn't. There were three different rudder angles used.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

271. Q. Will you repeat the answer to the last question?

A. I said it would take approximately 36 seconds to cover that provided the rudder had been put over hard left from 090 at 25 knots, but we used three different rudder angles.

272. Q. How long would it take the rudder to travel from 0 to 30 degrees hard left at 27 knots?

A. I don't know that, sir.

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273. Q. Could you estimate the time very roughly?

A. No, sir.

274. Q. The purpose of my asking the question, Lieutenant, was to see if it made any difference whether or not the commanding officer said LEFT STANDARD and then FULL, but of course you can't answer that question.

A. If I estimated it, sir, it would be grabbing a figure out of the sky.

275. Q. From your general recollection of the sequence of rudder angles given at this time, do you believe the rudder ever paused in its swing left?

A. From 090 to the time of collision, yes, sir. I do, because the steersman reported back rudder answers LEFT STANDARD. Just about that time was the order to increase to LEFT FULL and HARD RUDDER. There would have been a pause.

276. Q. Would the pause then be a very short pause?

A. Yes, sir. Actually it was almost like a lazy steersman coming to HARD LEFT RUDDER.

277. Q. Speaking of laziness, Lieutenant, was there any confusion on the bridge at this time?

A. No, sir, I don't think so. It happened almost too quick for anybody to realize what happened.

278. Q. Did the Captain shout more than usual?

A. No, sir.

279. Q. Did he appear excited?

A. Just when he called for the last two orders to LEFT FULL and HARD LEFT and ALL AHEAD EMERGENCY FLANK. I wouldn't call that shouting. It was singing the orders out loud to make sure they would be heard.

280. Q. From your general observation on human behavior would you say that the Captain throughout this evolution acted with deliberation?

A. Yes, sir.

281. Q. May I summarize the scope of our testimony so far for time sequences? On the execute, 0 time, the HOBSON came right to course 130 and increased speed to 27 knots. At approximately 1 minute and 45 seconds the order was given come left to course 090. Approximately 1 minute 45 seconds later the order was given LEFT STANDARD RUDDER. This was approximately 3 minutes 30 seconds after the execute. 36 seconds later the ship had arrived at the approximate heading of 000 and that would be time 4:06.

A. That's right, sir.

282. Q. That is approximately what we have covered?

A. That's right, sir.

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282. Q. You mentioned several ranges, Lieutenant. If I remember correctly they were 1700 yards, 1240 yards and 760 yards. Now the last range of 760 yards occurred approximately how long before the collision, do you think?

A. I estimate at the time, sir, it was just about the time we put our rudder over left. As I said, at that time it may have been plus or minus a few seconds.

yeoman, first class, U. S. Navy, entered as reporter.

283. Q. You are quite sure, Lieutenant, that range was not quite a bit later, a few seconds before collision.

A. What do you call a few seconds in this case, sir?

284. Q. 20 seconds?

A. 20 seconds would be about right.

285. Q. 20 seconds would be about right?

A. Wait just a moment, sir.

286. Q. Take your time by all means, this is important.

A. Figuring from the range, sir, between the two ships we covered a little over half the range and the WASP covered a little less than half of the range coming together. - Figures about 30 seconds.

287. Q. 30 seconds. All right. Now, you said that you took - you had two other ranges, one preceding range being, if I am correct, 1240 yards?

A. That's right, sir, I don't know where along the course that came from.

288. Q. At what interval of time do you think those ranges - the 760 range and the 1240 yard range were received on succeeding sweeps of the antenna?

A. After the collision we checked the Sugar George on the RODMAN, which I believe to be identical gear, in the same position and timed the rate of sweep. It was on 13 second sweeps, sir, that is, of course, trying to stop a stop watch coming around you might miss two seconds. It might be 12, it might be 15 seconds - it is in that neighborhood.

289. Q. Now, the last range was received, we have estimated, 30 seconds before collision?

A. That's right, sir.

290. Q. We have estimated that the next preceding range was received 43 seconds - 30, plus 13?

A. All right, sir.

291. Q. 43 seconds - in the last 43 seconds the two ships closed 1240 yards, all times being approximate?

A. That is about right, sir.

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292. Q. Was the third preceding range taken on a sweep - succeeding sweep of the radar?

A. I think so - I do not know. From 1200 to 1700 is approximately the same as 750 to 1240, which was taken on one sweep. I would assume it was on the next sweep of the previous sweep.

293. Q. On that assumption and only on that assumption, the range between the WASP and HOBSON 56 seconds before collision was 15 to 17 hundred yards.

A. That would be right, sir. Taking into consideration here too, sir, that pip was jumping pretty fast and the float was coming too great, on the gear to try to center in his pip. You have to estimate where the center is - the pip was fading by then. You can be out a few yards.

294. Q. Speaking of that -

A. Of course I was not in combat; I don't know how accurate it was, I am merely quoting ranges that came to me from combat.

295. Q. Could you give me the approximate length of the WASP approximately?

A. What I judge it to be? Nine hundred feet, sir.

296. Q. I think that is reasonable - approximately three hundred yards is the length of the WASP?

A. That's right, sir.

297. Q. Now, if you took a radar bearing of a ship three hundred yards, approximately, broadside at a range of 12 hundred yards roughly, could you approximate the possible bearing error of a radar bearing?

A. Closing at that rate?

298. Q. A bearing - You're at 1200 yards, let's say, there is no closing, the ships are stationary, but there is a ship like the WASP at 1200 yards broadside to you at that radar range; no from the length of that ship what is the probable variation between the varying on the left - port, left bearing and the bearing on the right - roughly?

A. I do not know, sir, I never operated this radar gear - I never took radar bearing on the gear. The only thing I used was the repeater for navigation, sir.

299. Q. I see. In the course of your testimony this morning which was very complete, you mentioned that the commanding officer of the HOBSON requested the WASP for instructions as to whether or not he should take recovery station 2, is that the right phraseology?

A. I don't know if I put it quite that way, sir. I rather think I said, he inquired of the WASP if they desired the HOBSON to take night plane station 2 for recovery of aircraft.

300. Q. Did you hear the response of the WASP to that?

A. I cannot say definitely that I did - I am not sure what the WASP said. I assumed it from what we did - there was a reply, yes, sir.

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301. Q. Then, if I remember correctly, the counsel for the court then asked you whether or not there was any other signal from the WASP after that communication and your answer was to the effect "There was none so far as you heard"?

A. As well as I remember, sir, I said I do not know myself of a signal--I do not remember hearing a signal, but as I just stated it was told me by some people on the RODMAN there was a signal and both of the plane guard ships ROGERED for the signal I do not remember the signal myself--I do not remember ROGERING for it--I don't remember hearing it. I cannot definitely say there was a signal--I do not remember anything about it.

302. Q. You cannot remember definitely the WASP replying to HOBSON's request as to whether or not they should take plane guard?

A. The answer to the question is I do not remember. That was the answer. I never did know what the answer was. I never did hear the answer.

303. Q. Did you move about the bridge?

A. Yes, sir.

304. Q. Would your movements about the bridge account for the fact that you distinctly heard the signal "Commence the Manueve" but indistinctly heard the communication--subsequent communication from the WASP?

A. May I try to explain why I heard the first two signals clearly and not the last two?

305. Q. Surely.

A. On the first signal Mr. <sup>76</sup> was the Junior Officer of the Deck. He had the conn. I was the Officer of the Deck. As such I assumed that I was fully responsible for the ship although the Captain was on the bridge at the time--he did not have the conn, and as long as my JOOD had it, I would assume complete responsibility for the ship. I was fully alert for signals. When the first signal was put in the air I took the conn of the ship and being the OOD and having the conn I was especially alert for signals, and the execute, which was executing the second signal, when the Captain took the conn. The next communication between the two ships was a question from the HOBSON to the WASP which was not asked by me as I was not conning the ship. I did not particularly listen for the answer.

306. Q. You do not wish to imply--to be construed to mean that you are less alert when the Commanding Officer has the conn as when you had the conn?

A. No, sir. If he had told me, "Mr. <sup>56</sup>, will you please find out if the WASP wants us to take the night plane position for recovery," I would have sent the message and inquired if the WASP wanted us to do that. I would have been listening for the signal. I would have kept a lookout--so forth. I wasn't talking to the WASP--I was not paying any attention to the communication between the two.

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307. Q. In the early afternoon--excuse me, in the early evening was there any communication between the WASP and the HOBSON and the RODMAN--was there any communication concerning truck lights?

A. There had been.

308. Q. Could you summarize for the court the gist of those messages?

A. I do not recall which ship called us--which ship, whether it was the WASP or--the RODMAN did not call us--ComMinDiv 62, I believe called us. Both, ComMinDiv 62 and the WASP called the HOBSON and inquired of--one inquired if we had our aircraft warning lights burning--the other directed us to turn them on.

I answered both of those messages. Told them--the one directed that they were burning--and the other one inquired if they were burning and I gave them an affirmative on it. One of the two ships asked me if the lights were shielded and I gave them negative to that, sir. I do not remember which ship sent which message.

309. Q. Was the WASP at any time at a range much greater than 3,000 yards?

A. Yes, sir.

310. Q. Was this at the time they made this inquiry--concerning running lights--truck lights?

A. It was in the same general time, yes, sir. The range opened one time to almost 4,000 yards.

311. Q. 4,000 yards; do you know that of your own personal knowledge?

A. No--wait a minute; no, sir, it was not, as I recall the inquiry was before the WASP launched aircraft that night and the range opened to almost 4,000 yards when we came at the new course 102°.

312. Q. Was it dark when this inquiry was made?

A. Yes, sir. I don't know whether this would be of any value but the HOBSON, to the best of my knowledge, was the only ship with aircraft warning lights fore and aft instead of athwartship. You could pick the HOBSON out regardless of where she was.

313. Q. Because of the fore and aft position of the lights on the HOBSON it is quite possible that the relative positions of the WASP and the HOBSON would have caused the HOBSON's lights to be blocked off?

A. To the RODMAN do you mean?

314. Q. No, to the WASP?

A. No, sir. I don't think so. I have come back to the HOBSON at night from just about every angle, tied up at the dock, moored and anchored, and we looked for fore and aft aircraft warning lights; I never had any trouble seeing the lights burning on the ship.

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315. Q. How do you explain this dimness of the HOBSON's lights on this evening?

A. I cannot explain it, sir. I stepped out on the wing of the bridge and they were burning.

316. Q. Could they have gotten dirty when you were in the navy yard?

A. Could have, sir. That's a hard thing to answer. The lights were burning brightly - - well visible from where I stood. I was not 3,000 or 4,000 yards away.

317. Q. All right. Do you know--did you know if the signal to recover aircraft was ever "two-blocked?"

A. I would have to check a publication to say that.

318. Q. Did Captain Tierney advise you that he had used a 1500 yard turning circle for solution of the maneuvering board problem?

A. Which ship, sir?

319. Q. For the HOBSON?

A. 1500 yards was not used for either ship, sir.

320. Q. Do you know if the maneuvering board solution used 1200 yards?

A. For the HOBSON?

321. Q. For both ships?

A. No, sir; it did not.

322. Q. What was used?

A. 1200 for the WASP and a Hard Left for the HOBSON. I said the 1200 yards was my solution to the problem, the WASP was supposed to turn in 1200 yards. I was turning the other way.

323. Q. If the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON had used the wrong turning circle for the WASP what would be the error in his solution?

A. It would have closed if everything came out exactly as was shown on the solution to the problem --closed an additional 300 yards. The estimated turning circle was 1200 and the turning circle which the WASP planned to use and which was directed by the publication at the time was 1500.

324. Q. Would you have crossed the bow further ahead of the WASP or would you have been closer to the WASP because of this error?

A. I don't follow you, sir.

325. Q. I refer to Exhibit 60. Would it take a vessel longer to follow the dotted track marked "tactical diameter 1200 yards" or the solid "tactical diameter 1500 yards?"

A. I don't follow you. In the first part--"take a vessel longer to follow?"

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326. Q. To go from (indicating) this point to that point or would it take longer to go from this point to the further point?

A. It would take longer from 1500 yards, sir.

327. Q. Then referring to this diagram. If the commanding officer had calculated the distance which passed ahead of the WA on the basis of a 1200 yard turning circle, would the distance be greater or less if the turning circle of the WASP had been in fact, 1500 yards?

A. At what time was this calculation made?--just before he ordered Left Standard Rudder here, sir?--thirty seconds before the collision. Before the signal was put in the air?

328. Q. On this diagram--on Exhibit 60, this is the track of the time of execution, does the HOBSON ever cross the bow of the WASP?

A. Actually, or in the solution to the problem as it was figured?

329. Q. Either way?

A. Yes, sir; at one time.

330. Q. I asked if the track of the HOBSON ever crossed the bow or the extended track of the WASP?

A. Certainly, sir, the WASP cut us in half, it had to cross their bow to have the collision.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: I withdraw the question.

331. Q. What do you mean "mooring board solution"---"man<sup>EU</sup>euveri board solution"?

A. Solution to figure what course to use at a certain speed or what speed to use at a certain course, man<sup>EU</sup>euvering a ship to a certain position.

332. Q. Is that the relative movement or the geographical movement?

A. Relative movement. Well, now, it is done actually by picking a ship up in one spot and sitting it down in another spot--guiding every movement--your speed and so forth.

333. Q. I refer to Exhibit Number 59, and read in part therefrom as follows: "THEREFORE SUCH EVOLUTIONS AS FORMING UP CMA CHANGING SCREEN CMA AND CHANGING STATION ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MANNER X \* \* \* PROMPT AND RESOLUTE ACTION PAREN EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF AN OCCASIONAL MISTAKE PAREN IS A HALLMARK OF GOOD DESTROYER OUTFITS X LET US HAVE MORE OF THEM". Now, in view of that message, do you persist in your testimony this morning, in your opinion, that is, under the circumstances you would have taken comparatively slow action, is that correct?

A. If I had the conn?

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334. Q. If you had the conn?

A. Yes, sir; I think so--I know so.

335. Q. Why?

A. To keep things like this collision from happening, sir.

336. Q. Do you think there is an extra element of hazard in this particular situation?

A. Yes, sir.

337. Q. Why?

A. The bow of the two ships came together, sir.

338. Q. Will you draw the relative positions up on the board of the two ships at the start of the maneuver?

The court then, at 1505 recessed until 1515, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties to the inquiry, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant <sup>3-b</sup> , U. S. Naval Reserve, a party, the witness on the stand when the recess was taken resumed the seat as a witness, and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

(Cross-examination by counsel representing Lieutenant Command Tierney, continued:)

339. Q. Now, Lieutenant, if you reversed the course of the aircraft carrier to the right, does its path approach that of the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir; if the HOBSON continued on its course, sir. Is that the way you mean it, sir?

340. Q. Yes.

A. Yes, sir.

341. Q. Is that the reason you said it was hazardous?

A. The maneuver as signalled was not hazardous.

342. Q. It was not?

A. No, sir. The signal was, as given, the Turn signal. By range we were out from the ship--there was no hazard there at a

343. Q. Doctrine is, on a turn--on a turn signal the ships turn together?

A. Right, sir.

344. Q. According to your interpretation of the signal, it is incumbent on both the HOBSON and the WASP to change course simultaneously--to course 260°?

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A. That is what the signal said, sir. The signal was given the execute for the signal was given which means as far as I know, all ships under a tactical command do this. Of course, this changing station came into the picture too.

345. Q. How did it come into the picture?

A. The captain requested of the carrier if they desired us to take our recovery station.

346. Q. If the Commanding Officer of the HOBSON had not done that he would have maintained his position?

A. We would have maintained our range and True bearing, sir.

347. Q. If you had had the conn you would have executed the turn and awaited further instructions?

A. No, sir; I wouldn't say that either. I think that I would follow right along with the reasoning in asking if it is desirable that we take our recovery station--night recovery station. I do not disagree with that at all. That, as far as I can see, is a logical thing to do. I think the only disagreement in this matter is the manner in which the station was to be taken.

348. Q. Well, I asked you why you disagreed in the manner of taking the station and you said because the manner in taking it was hazardous, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. It was in direct contrast to doctrine.

349. Q. It was?

A. Yes, sir. I think the doctrine states that when ships are maneuvering that you should all keep the bow of your ship at least five degrees outside of the bow of the next ship.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LIEUTENANT COMMANDER TIERNEY: I request that the court be closed.

At this point the court sat with closed doors.

The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

350. Q. I read into the record from USF-4, Section 924, "Station units required to perform an evolution within the formation, or when changing from one formation to another in obedience to a maneuvering signal, will do so on the basis of a maneuver board solution to the problem. Courses which cross close ahead of other ships should be avoided. Turns should be made away from rather than toward other ships. Slow speeds should be avoided when submarine danger exists or when the maneuver will be delayed by the slow speed of the evolution unit." I ask if in your opinion, the signal to take station was a maneuvering signal?

A. I do not think the WASP was directing us to take station right then, no, sir. We asked a question if they desired us to take that station. I think that there was an answer, was affirmative. However, I do not know that they said to take station at that time or desired we complete the maneuver; but that it be left up to the commanding officer of the ship, I do believe or the Officer of the Deck.

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351. Q. I continue with the quotation and ask you this question: In view of the message of ComTask Element 88.1.4, do you believe that the clause "Courses which cross close ahead of other ships should be avoided" was in any way affected?

A. Going back a little bit on the maneuvering board solution

352. Q. Will you please answer the question? The question was: In view of ComTask Element 88.1.4's message, do you believe that this phrase "Courses which cross close ahead of other ships should be avoided" was in any way affected--was in any way rendered null--any way nullified?

A. No, sir; there was never a course laid to cross ahead of another ship. There was never a course plotted to cross the bow of another ship.

353. Q. The commanding officer's solution of the problem --

A. Never crossed the bow of the WASP. Not in the solution of the problem, sir.

354. Q. You would hardly concur in the solution to the commanding officer's problem?

A. Yes, sir; I wholeheartedly disagree with it. I didn't agree with the thing before the first signal was put in the air that night. I stated that, I think.

355. Q. Why did you not concur in it?

A. Simply as I have stated, sir, the WASP turned to the right--we turned to the left, they came here (indicating), we came here on the solution with a thousand yards between us. If it would have worked it would have put the two ships, the two bows at 25 knots. You have a good chance of opening or closing when you get two bows that close, you find yourself in a dangerous situation. At 25 knots it is a little late to do anything about

356. Q. Is that situation at all pertinent to this?

A. I think so.

357. Q. That course was never followed?

A. I know.

358. Q. Your observation has no relevancy. The commanding officer didn't do that?

A. That's right, sir.

359. Q. Do you know why?

A. No, sir; I don't.

360. Q. Why, at that time did he not execute the maneuver he had originally planned?

A. To the left?

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361. Q. Yes.

A. I don't know, sir. If the closest point was 800 yards --if he turned left he would be at best 100 yards off their port beam. I never thought that left turn or left rudder would be given--it would never enter my mind.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

362. Q. Did you relieve Lieutenant (jg) <sup>B-6</sup> of the watch on the evening in question?

A. Yes, sir. He had the 1800 to 2000--I relieved him.

363. Q. Did he tell you that the turning circle was 1200 yards?

A. No, sir--no, sir; he did not. That notice had been on the bulkhead for two or three days.

364. Q. Two or three days?

A. Yes, sir. That came from the Commander of Task Group 88.1

Next question is numbered 368 in error. No questions or answers are omitted from the record.

The court then, at 1535, adjourned until 0837, Monday, 12 May 1952.

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THIRD DAY

U. S. Naval Supply Depot,  
Bayonne Annex,  
U. S. Naval Base,  
New York, New York,  
Monday, 12 May 1952.

The court met at 0837.

Present:

Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy,  
Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, and  
Rear Admiral \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, members.

Lieutenant Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve  
counsel for the court.

Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, advisor to counsel for  
the court.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve, assistant to  
counsel for the court.

Captain \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, party to the  
inquiry and his counsel.

Commander \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Navy, counsel representing  
Lieutenant Commander William J. Tierney, U. S. Navy.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, Jr., U. S. Naval Reserve, party to  
the inquiry and his counsel.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U. S. Naval Reserve, party to the  
inquiry and his counsel.

\_\_\_\_\_, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_, U.S. Naval Reserve, the witness  
on the stand when the court adjourned resumed his seat as a witness  
and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still  
binding.

Cross-examination continued by counsel representing LCDR Tierney.

368. Q. Lieutenant, as I understood your testimony on Saturday  
the HOBSON had been conducting screening operations during that time?  
A. That's right.

369. Q. And the previous night, had the HOBSON conducted aircraft  
operations? Plane guard duty?  
A. Not that I recall, sir.

370. Q. Would you briefly summarize the general employment of  
HOBSON during the preceding 48 hour period?  
A. I am afraid I can't go through it in a chronological order.  
Some of the duties we were performing, we were working in the screening  
at one time we left the screening and went out to conduct tracking  
exercises and then returned to the force after tracking exercises.

*All redactions  
are B56*

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371. Q. Was this on the day prior to the collision or on the day of the collision?

A. I don't know, sir.

372. Q. You conducted tracking exercises on the day of the collision?

A. I don't recall, sir. We left the group about 9 o'clock in the evening, went out about 30,000 yards and came back in. I do not recall if that was the night before that we went out and we came back in Saturday morning or not.

373. Q. In other words, your recollection of the events of 1 day prior to and the time of the collision is quite hazy?

A. Yes, sir, it is.

374. Q. But your recollection of the events at the time of the collision is extraordinarily good, is it not?

A. Not in all respects, no, sir. I may be able to remember quite well what was taking place at the time - the course steered. Of course, this is a matter of some 4 minutes to collision and not 48 hours.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant *B6*, a party:

375. Q. Mr. *B6*, when the HOBSON came to course 090, you went into the wheel house at that time to check the captain's solution, is that correct?

A. Well, I didn't exactly go in to check his solution. I went in and took the maneuvering sheet that he had his solution on and checked to see where 090 would put us in relation to the WASP - how close we would pass. 090 was not on the solution.

376. Q. And your conclusion at that time was that you would pass within 800 yards of the WASP?

A. Approximately 800 yards.

377. Q. Was that a port to port ~~crossing~~ <sup>passing</sup> situation?

A. Port to port.

378. Q. Is that another reason why you did not anticipate a left turn on the part of the HOBSON?

A. Certainly.

379. Q. Now, on that 090 course, could you see the bow waves of the WASP at any time?

A. I am afraid I didn't look for it. I don't know if it could have been possible or not, but I did not pay that much attention to it.

380. Q. Could you see the outline of the WASP?

A. I could see the general outline of the ship, yes, sir.

381. Q. And you saw its truck lights?

A. That's right.

382. Q. On that course, did you get any reports on the bridge of the HOBSON from your lookouts?

A. Not that I recall, no.

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All redactions are B6-

383. Q. Did you get any reports from your lookouts prior to the collision?

A. No, sir, not that I can remember. I think the lookouts were busy watching aircraft.

384. Q. How many lookouts did you have?

A. Two.

Cross-examined by Lieutenant , a party:

385. Q. Mr. you testified previously that Lieutenant Commander Tierney relieved command of the HOBSON on 17 March 1952. This collision occurred the 26th of April. Do you remember generally the employment of the ship during that period? What operations you had had at sea after he assumed command?

A. Captain Tierney relieved Captain in Norfolk. The ship came back out with two destroyer escorts, two DE's. We did submarine, or ASW work, for, I believe, one day. At that time we were directed to sail to Charleston and we operated in extremely heavy seas and our sonar gear was damaged. We were ordered proceed to Charleston to have this work taken care of. The ship went to Charleston; was in Charleston about two days, and from there we went back to Norfolk; rather into degaussing range, then right back to Charleston. In Charleston we were drydocked and the sonar work was taken care of. The bottom compartments, and so forth, adjacent to the skin of the ship, were air tested, and so forth, while we were in drydock. The Board of Inspection and Survey conducted their inspection of the HOBSON. Just general yard work until, I believe, the 16th of April. On the 16th or 17th of April - on the 17th of April we loaded ammunition and went to Pier Able, Mine Craft, Charleston, and stayed there until we sailed for the Mediterranean the morning of the 21st.

386. Q. Had you known Captain Tierney prior to the time he reported aboard the HOBSON?

A. No, I did not.

The Roster of Officers List of the U.S.S. HOBSON was submitted to the other parties, the counsel for the court, and to the court and by Lieutenant , a party, offered in evidence.

There being no objection, it was so received and is appended marked Exhibit 61.

387. Q. I show you a document which has been marked Exhibit 6 and ask you if you can identify that document? What does it purport to be?

A. A Roster of Officers, U.S.S. HOBSON.

388. Q. Does that Roster indicate the duties of each officer aboard?

A. Yes, it does.

389. Q. Is the Roster correct, so far as the names of the officers are concerned and their duties?

A. As far as I know, it is, sir. The last week, in fact, after we got underway, there were some changes in duties.

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390. Q. What were those duties - or those changes?

A. Well, Mr. Smith was taken out of the engineering department and put in the operations department where he took the electronic gear along with him, so to speak, and assumed some extra duties in the operations department. Mr. [redacted] was made a communications officer, to the best of my knowledge. About that time Mr. [redacted] who was communicator, was released from active duty, and Mr. [redacted] assumed some of those duties too.

391. Q. Have those changes been indicated on that roster?

A. The communicator is added. Mr. [redacted] assumed those duties. Mr. Smith as electronics while he was still in the engineering department. As it stands it is correct.

392. Q. As it stands it is correct as of the time of the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

393. Q. Does the roster indicate the months aboard for each officer?

A. It does, sir.

394. Q. Are those periods of time correct as of the date of the collision?

A. I think with the exception of Mr. [redacted] having been aboard 5 months instead of 4.

395. Q. Will you make that correction on the paper?

A. (Witness did as requested)

396. Q. I notice that the name of one officer has been added in longhand to the sheet.

A. Lieutenant McCord, Medical Officer.

397. Q. What was his status aboard?

A. Dr. McCord was the division doctor, attached to Mine Division and in view of the fact that the RODMAN was rather crowded in their wardroom, Dr. McCord was in the HOBSON.

398. Q. Did he have any shipboard duties on the HOBSON?

A. Well, none other than sick call and such as that.

399. Q. He was not considered as a regular ship's officer. He was attached to the Staff?

A. Yes, he was attached to the Staff.

400. Q. Mr. [redacted], you were the engineering officer?

A. That's right.

401. Q. Mr. Wolfe was the executive officer, is that correct?

A. At the time of the collision Mr. Wolfe was the executive officer.

402. Q. I am speaking of the period from the time you sailed from Charleston until the collision?

A. Yes, sir.

403. Q. Who was the communicator?

A. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. [redacted] was.

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404. Q. Was he also the custodian of the registered publications?

A. No, Mr. [redacted] was custodian of the registered publications.

405. Q. Who was operations officer?

A. Lieutenant, [redacted].

406. Q. Mr. [redacted], at the time of the collision, you had the 2000-2400 watch. Was the Captain on the bridge during that entire watch?

A. Yes, he was close. He stepped back into his sea cabin. If he was in his sea cabin at all it wasn't over 2 or 3 minutes.

407. Q. Was he on the bridge at the time you relieved the watch?

A. Yes, sir, he was.

408. Q. When he first informed you that when you executed the turn to go into the wind that he would take the conn?

A. Before the first signal ever went into the air? Well, he had completed his solution on the maneuvering board and at the time he made the remark that he would like to go below and get a cup of coffee and I suggested that he go on down and get some coffee.

409. Q. Was that after you made your objection to the solution he had worked up?

A. No, I was coming up to that then. I suggested that he go below and have some coffee and after the signal was put in the air I would notify him, and if I was unable to contact him I would execute the signal, of course. And the discussion came up about if the WASP turned right what would I do? I told him what I would do on the turn. The discussion went on further then about getting on station and so forth, and that is when the solution was brought up. He turned on the light and showed me the solution to it. After it was evident that there was a disagreement in the solution of the problem, he informed me then that he would take the conn when the signal came about.

410. Q. That is after you told him what you would do in that situation?

A. That's right, sir.

411. Q. And there was some discussion concerning the proper course, and he told you that he would take the conn?

A. That is correct.

412. Q. And he remained on the bridge from that time until the time of the collision?

A. That's right.

413. Q. If you had been looking in the direction of the WASP, <sup>was</sup> could you have seen the WASP at all times?

A. I will say yes to that, because from the time the signal was executed we were within 3000 yards, and at one time we were out about 3800 yards, and the WASP was clearly visible then. Not clearly visible but you could see the outline of the ship and see her red truck lights.

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414. Q. Did the visibility or weather change from the time you were 3800 yards until the collision occurred?

A. No, sir.

415. Q. Was the executive officer on the bridge during this time?

A. No, sir, he was not.

416. Q. Was he ever on the bridge during your watch?

A. No, sir, he wasn't. Not at all.

417. Q. Do you remember what was the last word the bridge received from combat?

A. The last thing that came up from combat was "RANGE 750 yards." Combat had lost radar contact as it was too close. That was the last thing that came up.

418. Q. Do you remember what your last comment to the captain was prior to the collision?

A. I think the last thing I said to the captain direct was that the ranges were closing too fast; approximately 500 yards on every sweep and you could tell it was every sweep because the range was changing too fast. I made the remark to him that the ranges were closing too fast.

419. Q. Mr. <sup>B-6</sup>, I believe you have testified that you were aboard the HOBSON for approximately 11 months prior to the collision?

A. 11 months to the day.

420. Q. Your naval experience prior to that in the United States Navy consisted of attendance at a damage control school?

A. That is correct.

421. Q. Is that the sum total of your United States Naval experience?

A. Of my Navy experience.

422. Q. How long a school was the damage control school?

A. 8 weeks. The entire school was 8 weeks, 5 of which was devoted to damage control.

423. Q. Were you damage control officer aboard the HOBSON?

A. Yes, sir. I had been damage control assistant the first 6 months on board, and as the engineering officer is the damage control officer, at the time of the collision I was engineering officer and damage control officer.

424. Q. And had been for some 5 months?

A. Yes, sir.

425. Q. In your opinion, was there anything that could have been done by the officers or men aboard the HOBSON to have protected her? Watertight integrity, say, to prevent the sinking of the ship, under the circumstances?

A. No, I don't think so. I know that material condition Baker was set to condition the ship.

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426. Will you explain that, please? What does condition BAKER mean?

A. All X and Y fittings are secured. The only fittings open were Z fittings which are topside openings. Not all topside openings either. Half of the topside fittings are X and Y, and below decks, only such fittings as quick-acting doors and scuttles. Quick-acting fittings were Z and they were open. Fittings X and Y, were all closed. I think that probably if the ship had remained in contact at the time of the collision--I don't mean in one piece, but if the skin of the ship, bulkheads and so forth, hadn't torn loose and given way, the proper watertight integrity would have been lost anyhow. At the time of the collision, I imagine the foremost thing in everybody's mind was to get out of there and they were opening doors to do it.

427. Q. That is an assumption. You don't have any personal knowledge?

A. I do know that the skin of the ship gave way. One of my men told me he was in the engineer's living compartment in his bunk, and the next thing he knew he was out of the ship in the water and there is no ladder out of that compartment. You had to go forward through the first compartment and aft to the third or fourth compartment to get out.

428. Q. And the only way to get out, as he described it, was through the side of the ship?

A. Yes.

429. Q. And in summarizing, in view of your two months' course of study in damage control, six months' duty as assistant damage control officer aboard the ship, and five months' as damage control officer of the HOBSON, the condition of the ship, so far as doors and hatches and fittings, could not have had any effect in the sinking of the ship under the circumstances after being struck by the WASP, and actually broken into two parts?

A. I don't hardly think so. I don't think the condition of it would have helped or hurt it at that time. I will state that the knife edges on all the doors and hatches of the HOBSON were kept clean and shined at all times, and I think that probably the inspection reports of the HOBSON will show that she had as clean knife edges as any ship in the Mine Force or any ship in the Navy. We were always having a big argument about buying rubber and gaskets. I think they were on all the doors and hatches and everything all the way through, and all had new rubber.

430. Q. How long were you in the water?

A. I think about forty minutes.

431. Q. You have previously testified, I believe, that you were picked up by small boat from the RODMAN?

A. That's right.

432. Q. How big a boat was that? What type?

A. Twenty-six foot whale boat.

433. Q. Open whale boat?

A. That's right.

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434. Q. How big a crew did they have in that boat?

A. Coxswain, engineer, boat officer and quartermaster, I believe, were all that was in it then. I am not sure about the bow hook.

435. Q. Do you know how many people were picked up by that boat?

A. I think around 20 or 22 people were in the boat. I know the boat was overloaded.

436. Q. Was that the total number of people counting the 4-man crew?

A. No, counting the 4-man crew, I would say there were 26 people. I know the RODMAN kept calling the boat back alongside.

437. Q. How long did that boat stay in the water? Do you know?

A. No, I don't know.

438. Q. Did it go back to the RODMAN immediately after you were picked up?

A. No, - well, as soon as they were through picking up men, all the men they could get in, - they picked up probably a half a dozen after they took myself in, and went back to the RODMAN then.

439. Q. Mr. , you were the senior officer from the HOBSON who was picked up since the time of the collision. Have you had any duties or responsibilities in connection with the men from the HOBSON?

A. Trying to keep them all in a little group.

440. Q. Did that require much in the way of your time?

A. No, not necessarily, in keeping them together.

441. Q. I don't mean that particular part, but any duties you may have had in connection with those men?

A. Well, every minute of my time, so to speak, since the collision had been utilized in conjunction either with mail, letters to next of kin or something along that nature.

442. Q. What do you mean by letters to next of kin; have you written letters to them?

A. Yes, to, I think, virtually all the next of kin of the men who were lost on the HOBSON.

Reexamined by the counsel for the court:

443. Q. Mr. , would you describe the physical location of the aircraft warning lights on the HOBSON that were burning on the night of the collision?

A. The aircraft warning lights were on the fore truck. They were located fore and aft.

444. Q. What was the distance between them?

A. I am afraid I don't know either what it should be or what it was.

445. Q. Approximately what was the distance between them?

A. I imagine 4 to 6 feet. I don't know exactly.

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446. Q. They were located fore and aft?

A. That's right, sir.

447. Q. However, I believe you testified that the HOBSON was the only ship of that type in this group of ships that had her aircraft warning lights so situated?

A. I think that is the only one I have ever seen with aircraft warning lights like that.

448. Q. Had the HOBSON participated in any exercise since Lieutenant Commander Tierney assumed command which would have required her to be plane guard for an aircraft carrier prior to this collision?

A. No, I think this night or this day and night was the first time that we had plane guarded since Captain Tierney came aboard. I don't recall having plane guarded any prior to that from the time we left Charleston.

449. Q. Had the maneuver in which the HOBSON and the WASP were engaged at the time of the collision been rehearsed that afternoon?

A. As I understand, it had been. However, the maneuver, so to say, was merely a turning movement which I think as we all know, is done time after time after time after time. It is a most common maneuver in the Navy.

450. Q. But you understand that the maneuver in which the HOBSON was to take her plane guard and recovery station was rehearsed that afternoon?

A. That's right.

451. Q. Do you know who had the deck during that?

A. No, I do not. Either Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_ or Ensign \_\_\_\_\_ would have had the deck. Ensign \_\_\_\_\_ is among the survivors. He may know.

452. Q. You have testified that when the WASP gave her intention signal indicating the course she intended to recover aircraft on, you relieved the conn?

A. That's right, I took the conn from Mr. \_\_\_\_\_.

453. Q. From Lieutenant, junior grade, \_\_\_\_\_?

A. That's right, sir. He had been maintaining station.

454. Q. You have testified that you were asked some question by one of the other two ships in company regarding whether your aircraft warning lights were burning. Were the RODMAN's or WASP's aircraft warning lights visible to you?

A. Yes, sir, they were. Of course, I had seen the RODMAN. The RODMAN was on the other side of the carrier from us, and as I recall, I could see her only once in a while. When she was in a position when we could see her, her lights were visible.

455. Q. You don't know from what ship though the query came regarding your aircraft warning lights and the order to turn on the aircraft warning lights?

A. Both ships called the HOBSON about the aircraft warning lights. I think the RODMAN asked if our lights were on and the WASP directed us to turn them on. However, they were on. Both ships called us in relation to our aircraft warning lights.

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456. Q. You don't know whether at that time it was twilight or dark, do you?

A. No, I don't recall.

457. Q. Would your aircraft warning lights have been obscured from the RODMAN by the hulk of the WASP?

A. I think so. Particularly, in view of the fact that they were so much closer to the WASP than we were.

458. Q. You have spoken of a piece of paper attached to the bulkhead which indicated a tactical diameter 1200 yards should be used, and you have stated that there was an order or that your impression was that there was an order from the Task Group Commander to use a tactical diameter of 1200 yards. Would it be possible for you to confuse an exercise in which the Task Group was engaged some day or two before this accident and which called for a tactical diameter of 1200 yards?

A. It could be possible because I did not read the dispatch or hear the communication myself. But I do know that there was a piece of paper stuck on the bulkhead over the chart table with masking tape stating that operational speed would be 27 knots, stationing speed would be 25 knots, using a rudder angle of a tactical diameter of 1200 yards, which had written on it "14 degrees" and that was scratched out and had "12 degrees" which was scratched out and "10 degrees" written on it.

459. Q. Had the 1200 yard figure been scratched out?

A. No, just the rudder angle to use to get to 1200 yards had been scratched out.

460. Q. Had there originally been a figure on that to indicate a tactical diameter of 1000 yards and that scratched out and 1200 written on it?

A. No.

461. Q. You have been asked on cross-examination how you knew the heading of the WASP at various times during these maneuvers. Did you know that originally the WASP was on a heading of 102 degrees?

A. Affirmative.

462. Q. And that a signal had been executed, which would have required the WASP to turn right to heading to 260 degrees?

A. Yes.

463. Q. And in assuming her heading at a given time on the night in question, you assumed that the tactical diameter was 1200 yards and that the WASP executed her right turn upon the execution of her turn signal, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

464. Q. Can you reproduce from memory the maneuvering board problem and solution that Lieutenant Commander Tierney worked out to which you referred in your testimony?

A. Yes, sir, I think quite easily.

465. Q. Would you do so so that we might have it at some future time?

A. Yes, sir.

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466. Q. Do you know what Lieutenant, junior grade, *B.C.* did, or what position he took on the bridge after you relieved him of the conn on that intention signal?

A. No, I don't know exactly what he did. He stayed out on wing as I went in the wheel house, as I came in. He either went into the radar or else he went back on the after corner of the wheel house. The bridge can get awfully cluttered up, and he was standing to the back. He had been on the ship only a short time and he was trying to see what was taking place more than anything else.

467. Q. He was under instruction?

A. Yes, sir.

468. Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant *B.C.* had had any previous sea duty?

A. Not that I know of. I don't think he had. I might be mistaken, but I don't think he had had previous sea duty.

469. Q. How long had Lieutenant *B.C.* been assigned to the HOBSON?

A. He had been assigned to the ship about 3 weeks. One week of that he was on leave. He got there and found out we were going to the Med and he didn't have any gear so he took a week's leave to get gear.

470. Q. Of the two weeks he was aboard the HOBSON, how many days were you at sea?

A. 6 days, sir.

471. Q. Do you know how many JOOD watches Mr. *B.C.* had stood aboard the HOBSON?

A. Probably 14, sir. JO's were standing a watch in three and they dogged the watch, so every third day they caught 12 hours on the bridge.

472. Q. Had Mr. *B.C.* been officially assigned that watch as junior officer of the deck? That is, on an official list or merely there under instructions aboard?

A. Yes, sir, he was assigned on a watch list, a rotating watch list as a JOOD on the bridge.

473. Q. And that watch list had been approved by the commanding <sup>OFFICER</sup> of the HOBSON?

A. Well, it had been submitted by myself and approved by the executive officer, I think, with the commanding officer's approval. I do know he saw it because the commanding officer stipulated that one man would be under a ~~an~~ instruction watch.

474. Q. Did you hear any conversation between the commanding officer of the HOBSON and Lieutenant, junior grade, *B.C.*, during your watch and shortly before this maneuver, that related to the maneuver in which the WASP and HOBSON were engaged at the time of the collision?

A. Not that I recall, no, sir.

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Examined by the court:

475. Q. Lieutenant , do you know what experience in plane guarding the HOBSON had had during the time you were on board her? The court does not expect to get it in minute detail, but generally.

A. No, sir. I boarded the HOBSON in Guantanamo Bay last May and we were guarding for the Kula Gulf and the Midway at that time. From last May until this April, I do not recall any other plane guarding duties. However, there seems prior to the time I came aboard the HOBSON, she had had a lot of plane guarding. All officers that had been there then were gone prior to my time on her.

476. Q. Have you yourself, other than during the current cruise, concerning which this investigation is being held, have you had any plane guarding experience?

A. No, sir.

477. Q. You testified that there ~~was~~ <sup>WERE</sup> some exercises during the daylight hours which preceded the collision we are investigating. Will you describe generally what they were? The extent?

A. Well, sir, we changed formation some, from closed concentric to closed eccentric. At one time I know the signal was given to commence fueling, and the ships came around and went alongside the tanker for fuel, and others came back in and took the life guard station.

478. Q. The question was to determine what aircraft operations were conducted or simulated aircraft operations.

A. Oh, I don't recall of any, sir.

479. Q. No aircraft were launched prior to this operation during the cruise from Charleston?

A. There may have been, sir. There were none on my watch, sir. I had the deck, sir, and we were plane guarding.

480. Q. What is your opinion of the general state of training of the crew of the HOBSON? Training to perform the duties normally expected in plane guarding and other functions?

A. I think the state of training was pretty good on there, sir. Of course, that is a little bit hard to say because half of our crew were new men aboard. A great percentage of them right out of boot camp. However, the rated men on board, they proved to be good men. However, they had not been aboard long enough for myself or any other officer to know too much about them.

481. Q. More particularly, did the helmsmen and other personnel concerned appear to respond promptly to orders and commands?

A. Yes, sir.

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482. Q. Commencing with the signal which indicated the intention of the carrier to recover aircraft on 265, speed 27, could you give the court the sequence of signals thereafter? In particular, the court would like to know the chronological order of the execution and of the thoughts of the Captain on the plane guarding?

A. First, the intention signal came over, which was the "FOX COR EN" signal. Next, was turn 260, tack speed 27, with a signal put in the air, there "EXECUTE, EXECUTE". The signal was repeated again. Right after that, as best I can remember, as soon as the execute was given the Captain came right in, stepped in the wheel house and told the steersman that he had the conn, what course to steer and turned right around and told - called the WABP and asked if they desired us to take recovery station 2.

483. Q. You testified that you do not know what the reply was to that?

A. No, sir.

484. Q. But was there any other signal you acknowledged prior to the collision?

A. Not that I recall right now. Seems like there was, but I can't think of it right now.

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as reporter. <sup>B/C</sup>, yeoman, second class, U. S. Navy, entered

485. Q. The period the court refers to is after the executive order was made and between that point and the collision you testified that the captain asked about taking plane guard station 2. Was there any other signal that you know of beside that or any exchange of communications?

A. Not that I recall right now, sir.

486. Q. Did you actually hear the captain give his orders for LEFT STANDARD RUDDER, LEFT FULL and HARD LEFT?

A. Yes, sir.

487. Q. You testified that the port alidade was fogged up. What do you mean by that -- that it was a temporary condition or that it was permanently fogged?

A. I don't know if there was moisture on the outside or condensation on the inside. I think that it was probably moisture on the outside, sir. The alidade had been fogged on the ship before that time, and when we were in Charleston last time they were taken over and cleared up. I do know that when we sailed from Charleston that the alidades were clear.

488. Q. What reserve speed of 27 knots did the HOBSON have with two boilers in use?

A. A knot and a half. Maybe a little over a knot and a half. Not much.

489. Q. Did the HOBSON or the WASP use any whistle or sound signals during these maneuvers?

A. I don't think so. No, sir.

490. Q. On approaching a hazardous position or just prior to the collision, did the HOBSON or the WASP turn on any navigational lights -- by that, the court refers particularly to side light or running lights?

A. The HOBSON did not, sir. I don't recall seeing them on the WASP. If they did, I didn't see them. The HOBSON did not, sir.

491. Q. Lieutenant <sup>B/C</sup> I refer you to Exhibit number 59 which is a signal from Task Force Commander 38.1.4. Is it correct that this signal exempted the plane guarding vessels?

A. Yes, sir, the message says, "Except when on station or serving as plane guard." It does exempt plane guards, sir. That was sent out to the screen. Actually, it was meant as a message to the screen.

492. Q. In other words, Admiral <sup>B/C</sup> message to be prompt in taking station did not apply to the plane guards?

A. I don't think it did, no, sir.

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493. Q. Refresh your memory, if you wish.

A. He says in here that - - -.

494. Q. Let's get the answer read the message.

A. All right, sir. No, sir, he says, "and except when plane guarding."

COURT: The reporter will repeat the question.

The reporter read as directed.

WITNESS: No, sir, this message applied to screen ships in the screen.

COURT: The court has no further questions.

Reexamined by the counsel for the court:

495. Q. You spoke of this piece of paper that was stuck up on the bulkhead referring to a rudder angle of 14, 12 and 10 degrees. What would be the tactical diameter if a 14 degree rudder angle was used on the HOBSON? Just a rough estimate?

A. A thousand yards.

496. Q. And if a 12 degree rudder angle was used?

A. About 1100.

497. Q. And a 10 degree rudder angle?

A. 10 degrees was giving us just about 1200 yards, sir. On turn movements we were remaining on station using 10 degrees.

Re-cross-examination by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

498. Q. You testified, Mr. *Bo*, that you did not look for bow waves on the carrier?

A. That's right, sir.

499. Q. You have also testified that you saw the hull outline at 3800 yards?

A. That's right, sir. I could see the flight deck and so forth.

500. Q. Was this with or without binoculars?

A. It was without, sir.

501. Q. Without binoculars?

A. Yes, sir.

502. Q. Were you wearing them at the time you were officer-of-the-deck?

A. Yes, sir, I was.

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503. Q. During your watch?

A. I don't recall if I had them around my neck or not, but I know at the time of the collision I had them.

504. Q. During this maneuver, did you observe the WASP with your binoculars?

A. I don't recall that I did.

505. Q. As Officer-of-the-Deck, was it your duty to supervise the lookouts?

A. As Officer-of-the-Deck, I was responsible for the lookouts, yes, sir.

506. Q. Did you receive any reports from the lookouts pertaining to aircraft during the - - shall we say, fifteen minutes preceding the collision?

A. I don't remember, sir.

507. Q. Had you specifically assigned the lookouts the duty of observing aircraft?

A. Well, that was one of their duties. That was not the only thing - - just to look out for aircraft. They were watching for aircraft.

508. Q. Had you given the lookouts any instructions or orders?

A. The only thing that I told them at the beginning was to keep track of the number of aircraft in the air. At the time they were launching aircraft, I told them to keep track of the number of aircraft in the air.

509. Q. Had you received any reports from lookouts during your watch?

A. Yes, as to the number of aircraft in the air and so forth, and when the planes were overhead, and so forth. We were getting reports - - aircraft bearing such and such, position angle such and such.

510. Q. Now, you testified that the electronics officer took his electronics gear with him. Did he take a set of tools, or what do you mean?

A. I mean when he was transferred from the engineering department to the operations department, the responsibility for radar, radios and all the electronics gear fell on the operations officer and Mister Smith is assistant operations officer.

511. Q. And before that it had been the engineering officer's responsibility?

A. That's right, sir.

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512. Q. Did you approve of this change?

A. Not particularly, sir, because it threw a lot of that work back in the department. He did other work besides the electronics gear, and, of course, that was cutting me down one officer, and it meant that I had a little more work.

513. Q. Did you approve of the commanding officer's solution to the problem as to the proper course - - the change of station problem?

A. No, sir, I think I have testified to it. - - or, to the contrary that I didn't.

514. Q. Did you approve of the commanding officer's change to 090 after the maneuver had commenced?

LT <sup>W</sup>, A PARTY: If it please the court, I object to the line of testimony in that it is not cross-examination on any new material that has been brought out since the last direct examination. We are just rehashing the same old questions.

Counsel representing LCDR Tierney did not reply.

The court was cleared. The court was opened. All parties to the inquiry entered, and the court announced that the objection was not sustained. The witness was directed to answer the question.

A. As I said before, the 090 was not in the solution on the maneuvering board. I would not say that I approved or disapproved. At the time I went in and checked on the maneuvering board to see approximately how close that would put us to the WASP is when I saw that we should clear her about 800 yards. I would not say that I disapproved of it, no, sir, because 800 yards was not a close range.

515. Q. Then if the WASP had followed the predicted track shown on the maneuvering board when the HOBSON turned to 090, according to your calculations, she had crossed the predicted track of the WASP when the WASP had settled on course 260?

A. We were crossed?

516. Q. You had crossed the new change course to - - -?

A. I would have to get a maneuvering board and plot it. We had already (witness observing the maneuvering board sheet) crossed it, that's right. The answer to that is affirmative.

517. Q. When that course change to 090 was made, did you believe or did the thought occur to you that the commanding officer had changed his mind about turning toward the WASP to parallel her and instead had decided to turn away. In other words, instead of turning left as originally planned, he had decided to turn right?

A. Yes, sir, he would have to turn right from where we would

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518. Q. Were you surprised when the commanding officer said "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER" shortly before collision?

A. Yes, sir, I assumed right away that I had made a miscalculation some place, and he had something figured that I didn't.

519. Q. So then, Lieutenant, to summarize, as the solution to the maneuver actually evolved you had no objection to the commanding officer's course?

A. Of 130.

520. Q. As the maneuver actually evolved until the commanding officer order LEFT STANDARD RUDDER shortly before collision you felt that he had properly coned the ship?

A. To go back quite a ways, sir, I objected to the maneuver in its entirety from the very beginning. I suggested and wanted to come right with 10 degrees rudder and 15 knots, however, the commanding officer of the ship told me that I would steer 130, and I think it's his prerogative to steer any course and any speed he desires.

521. Q. I refer to exhibit 59. You have testified that the message exempted vessels of the screen from its context?

A. It exempted plane guards, sir.

522. Q. Plane guards, excuse me.

A. It was directed to screening ships that when in the screen - -

523. Q. Is it not the exception which regards plane guarding occur in this sentence: "Generally speaking, and except when plane guarding, vessels of the screen when not actually on station, perform no useful purpose?"

A. That does exempt vessels which are plane guarding.

524. Q. For the purposes of the record in order to clarify the meaning of sentence one of subject message, would you rephrase that message so as to begin with the word 'vessels' - that's the first sentence, and then attach the clause "beginning generally" to the end of the sentence?

THE PROSECUTOR: If it please the court, I object to that last question. This message has been introduced in evidence. It's the best evidence of what it contains. I object to changing the wording of the message and the position of the phrases in the message in that it confuses it as to what it means. This witness has testified as to what he thought it meant, and the message is already in evidence.

The counsel representing LCDR Tierney replied.

The court announced that the objection was sustained.

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525. Q. You testified that the maneuver - the turn had been done - - was done time after time. It's one of the most common maneuvers in the Navy. You did not mean that this particular problem of going from one station to another station in the course of a turning movement had been worked out time and time again?

A. No, I meant turn signals.

526. Q. Had the actual maneuver, including a change of station and the turn, been rehearsed by the HOBSON during daylight?

A. I understand it had. I was not on the bridge. I did not do it. I did not see it.

527. Q. Was Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_ the Officer-of-the-Deck at that time?

A. I do not know. Mister \_\_\_\_\_ had the 'short dog.' He had the 1800 to 2000 watch. \_\_\_\_\_ had the watch before that.

Recross-examined by LT \_\_\_\_\_ a party:

528. Q. Mister \_\_\_\_\_, you don't think Admiral \_\_\_\_\_' message that recommended prompt and resolute action condones dangerous action, do you?

A. Not hardly.

529. Q. And you don't assume that that message would condone violations of the rules of the road, would it?

A. No, I don't see how any one would give a message to that effect.

530. Q. And that message wouldn't condone violations of rules for tactical maneuvers, would it?

A. It would not.

Reexamined by the counsel for the court:

531. Q. Do you know whether immediately prior to the collision that Lieutenant Commander Tierney had the WASP under observation through the binoculars?

A. I don't know. I don't think he did. I am not sure. He had been taking bearings from the starboard pelorus.

Reexamined by the court:

532. Q. Do you know any change in tactical instructions which you would recommend as a result of this collision?

A. I would highly recommend using running lights at all times, sir.

533. Q. Do you have anything else?

A. No, sir.

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Recross-examined by counsel representing LCDR Tierney:

534. Q. Does the pelorus have any optical instrument on it to assist it in taking bearings?

A. The starboard pelorus had a bearing circle on it, and the port pelorus had an alidade.

535. Q. The starboard pelorus did not have - - -

A. Did not have an alidade. It had a bearing circle.

536. Q. But no optical instrument which would magnify it?

A. The reading of the bearing?

537. Q. The bearing?

A. No, it did not.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: No further questions.

Neither counsel for the court, the court, nor the parties desired to further examine this witness.

The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything related to the subject matter of the inquiry that he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness resumed his seat as a party.

The court then, at 1010, took a recess until 1020, at which time it reconvened.

Present: All the members, counsel for the court, all the parties and their counsel, and the reporter.

No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.

Lieutenant (junior grade) <sup>TS 6</sup> U. S. Naval Reserve, was recalled as a witness by the counsel for the court and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Examined by the counsel for the court:

1. Q. State your naval and marine experience?

A. The 22nd of May, 1943, I was sworn into the naval service as apprentice seaman, and reported for active duty in the V-1 program 1 July 1943. I served at Drew and Colgate University, University of Georgia, Holy Cross, and Yale University in the

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A. (continued) V-12 and V-5 and NROTC programs. I was released from active duty on the 25th of January, 1946. I went back under the GI program and finished and also in the NROTC program and was graduated and commissioned 31 January 1947. On 11 August 1950, I was advanced to the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade) while on inactive duty. I reported for active duty 1 April 1952 to ComFOUR, Philadelphia. I was assigned to the USS HOBSON 9 April 1952. That's the extent of my naval career.

2. Q. How much of your naval service has been at sea?

A. Just the period on the HOBSON from 21 April 1952 to 26 April 1952. I might say, I was in the organized reserve program and had three two-week cruises which were at sea.

3. Q. Were you assigned a watch on the evening of 26 April 1952?

A. I was Junior-Officer-of-the-Deck on the HOBSON.

4. Q. What hours?

A. From 20 to 2400 the 26 of April.

5. Q. And were you the Junior-Officer-of-the-Deck when the WASP and the HOBSON collided?

A. I was, sir.

6. Q. Now, will you, without going into any confidential matter or revealing any security information, give a sequence of events leading up to the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON?

A. I had the conn while we were on course 102. We were in plane guard station number 2 for launching aircraft. The WASP bore from us 065 true, 3,000 yards. I was keeping station with them at that time, speed 25.

7. Q. And during that time, were you taking ranges and bearings on the WASP?

A. I was taking bearings, sir, with the alidade and the ranges were coming from combat - - radar ranges. At approximately 2205 or thereabouts an intention signal was received I don't know whether that - - -.

8. Q. From the WASP?

A. Yes, sir. At that time, Mister *B-t* relieved me of the conn, and I was on the port wing of the bridge at the time and I retired to the pilot house to be out of the way for further conning by Mister *B-t*. Mister *B-t* had the conn for a period of about 15 minutes, and when we got the execute signal the captain gave an order to the wheel --. At that time, Mister *B-t* asked the captain if he had the conn and the captain said he did. That order to the wheel was "RIGHT STANDARD RUDDER" turns for 27 knots. The new course was 130. I don't know how long we stayed on that course and then a command to the wheel was given "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER" and steadied up on a new course. I don't know what the new course was. I don't know how long we were on the new course.

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9. Q. You mean you don't recall what that course was?  
A. No, sir.

10. Q. All right, proceed.  
A. Some time after that - - a matter of minutes, we were given another "LEFT STANDARD RUDDER." As I recall, I was standing near the helm at the time and no new course was given.

11. Q. Who gave that order LEFT STANDARD RUDDER?  
A. Captain Tierney. After giving LEFT STANDARD RUDDER and no new course and in a short time he gave - - maybe a matter of a minute and a half, he gave "LEFT FULL RUDDER," and then, following very shortly, "LEFT HARD AND ALL ENGINES AHEAD EMERGENCY FLANK," as near as I can recall, and the collision occurred very shortly after that.

12. Q. During the maneuver which you have just described, did you take any bearings on the WASP?  
A. No, sir.

13. Q. Were any ranges taken or did any ranges between the WASP and the HOBSON come up from combat?  
A. Yes, sir, continuous ranges. The captain asked for continuous ranges from combat using the phone talker.

14. Q. And were those ranges relayed by the telephone talker to the commanding officer?  
A. Yes, sir.

15. Q. Do you recall what those ranges were - - do you recall any of the ranges that were communicated to the commanding officer?  
A. No, sir. The telephone talker was standing out on the port wing where the captain was conning, and giving them directly to the captain.

16. Q. And then you know of no ranges of your own knowledge between the WASP and the HOBSON after the HOBSON turned from the course 102 to 130 up to the point of collision?  
A. At one point during the maneuver after the turn, the CIC officer called over the voice tube to the bridge and I was at the voice tube, and asked if we got the execute signal because the ranges were closing rapidly and he mentioned a range at that time of 1240 yards, and I said - - I answered the question that we had the execute signal and we were maneuvering. The captain was giving orders to the wheel and we were maneuvering to take our new station at that time.

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17. Q. 1240 yards?

A. Yes, sir.

18. Q. Do you recall or do you know on what course you were at that time?

A. No, sir.

19. Q. Do you know what the bearing to the WASP was at that time?

A. No, sir.

20. Q. Did you take any bearings at all after departing from course 102?

A. No, sir, I didn't take any after relinquishing the conn to Mister .

21. Q. Did you take or make any visual observations of the WASP during that time through your binoculars or in any other way?

A. Just one, sir, right at the time we started from 102 to 130 I observed the WASP.

22. Q. Could you see her hulk?

A. No, sir, the only thing I recall is the aircraft warning lights.

23. Q. And they were visible on the WASP?

A. Yes, sir.

24. Q. Were any other lights on the WASP visible?

A. I don't recall any, sir.

25. Q. Do you recall any conversation other than that you referred to when you say Mister asked if he had the conn - - do you recall any other conversation between Lieutenant and the commanding officer during this maneuver?

A. No, sir, I don't recall any conversation. They were together during the maneuver.

26. Q. Did you hear any warning given the commanding officer by Lieutenant at any time during that period?

A. No, sir.

27. Q. Did you overhear a discussion between Lieutenant and the commanding officer as to how this maneuver should be executed and the courses and speeds you should take to arrive on station?

A. No, sir.

28. Q. Do you know whether the commanding officer of the HOBSON had plotted the proposed maneuver on a maneuvering board?

A. Yes, there was a sheet of maneuvering board paper on the desk and all I recall seeing on it are two relative positions M-1 and M-2. I didn't see a course to steer to arrive on the new station, but the two points were on the paper and I think the speed vector of the 102 - 265 courses were laid out on the maneuvering board and the two points - the point we were keeping station on and the new point we wanted to arrive at. The rest of it I think was done by parallel ruler and making no marks on the paper. I didn't see any.

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29. Q. Did you hear Lieutenant <sup>3.6</sup> suggest a course to the commanding officer to arrive at your new station?

A. No, I didn't, sir.

30. Q. Do you recall any additional signal to emergency flank speed - do you recall any other emergency signals or orders given in the HOBSON such as "Collision Quarters", "Standby for Collision" or any such thing?

A. The boatswain's mate of the watch shouted "Standby for Collision" using the ship's communication system at the time. I don't know whether the word got out, but he did say those words.

31. Q. Did you hear a signal from the WASP directing a right turn to 260?

A. No, sir.

32. Q. You speak of hearing an execute signal. What was that signal - - what course would that have required the WASP or the HOBSON to turn to?

A. That was the execute signal "260, TACKLINE SPEED 27."

33. Q. After hearing that signal, did you hear any other signals from the WASP?

A. No, sir.

34. Q. Did you hear any exchange of information between the WASP and the HOBSON on the TBS?

A. I recall Captain Tierney going over to the TBS. I don't know who he called or if he had a conversation, but he was in that area and I don't know what the conversation was, if any.

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yeoman, third class, U.S. Naval Reserve, entered as reporter.

35. Q. What was your understanding as to the position to be taken by the HOBSON on the completion of the manuever in which she was engaged?

A. I understood we were to take plane guard station 2 for recovery of aircraft 270 to 280 degrees relative 1000 yards from the carrier.

36. Q. Do you know when that information came to the HOBSON?

A. I recall early in my watch we were to take plane guard station 2 for recovery of aircraft. I don't know how the information came to the HOBSON.

37. Q. That was prior to the execute of signal turn 260?

A. Yes, sir, I think it was.

38. Q. Do you know how much prior?

A. No, I don't sir.

39. Q. When you took over the watch or assumed the JOOD watch at 2000 what information was given you as to your probable manuevers to your station?

A. Mr. Kreger, the officer who had the watch before me, showed me a piece of paper that had four plane guard stations. It had the launching and recovery station for daylight and nighttime recovery. It was copied from one of the various publications and it was at that time he told me we were to take plane guard station 2.

40. Q. When you assumed the watch?

A. When I assumed the watch he told me he thought that was what I was going to do. There would be an exercise involving launching of aircraft and recovery of same.

41. Q. Did you have the watch on the night launching of the aircraft?

A. Yes, that occurred on my watch.

42. Q. The answer was in the affirmative?

A. Yes, sir.

43. Q. Were the aircraft warning lights burning on the HOBSON when you assumed the watch and were they burning throughout the watch?

A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

44. Q. Were there any other lights showing on either the HOBSON or the WASP other than the red aircraft warning lights?

A. No, sir.

45. Q. I hand you a document marked Exhibit 59 and ask you whether you had seen that prior to the collision between the WASP and the HOBSON.

A. No, sir, I had never seen it prior to the collision.

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46. Q. Did you hear any discussion by the commanding officer of the HOBSON of that dispatch or the fact that such a dispatch had been received?

A. Not by the commanding officer, sir, no.

47. Q. Did you hear any discussion of that dispatch on the HOBSON at all?

A. Yes, sir, I was told --- I was informed such a dispatch was on board and informed in general as to its contents by the JOOD whom I was relieving, Mr. *B6*.

48. Q. Did you at any time while you had the junior officer of the deck watch hear Lieutenant *B6* make any objection to the commanding officer of the proposed manner in which this maneuver was to be executed?

A. No, sir, I heard no such comments by Mr. *B6* to the Captain. I might repeat I was in the pilot house and they were on the port wing of the bridge.

49. Q. And you were not in a position at all times to hear the conversation that went on between Lieutenant *B6* and the commanding officer of the HOBSON?

A. That's right, sir.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT: At this time I intend to ask the witness some questions that might reveal the contents of confidential publications and I will ask the court to be closed just temporarily.

At this point the court sat with closed doors. The press and spectators withdrew from the courtroom.

Examination by counsel for the court continued:

50. Q. Now will you restate exactly and in detail all the signals passed between the WASP and the HOBSON from the time you were both on course 102 and you began to turn to the right to course 130 up to the point of collision.

A. Would you repeat that please.

51. Q. Would you describe in exact detail what signals from the WASP and from the HOBSON came over the voice circuits from, say, 15 or 20 minutes before collision up to the time of collision?

A. I only remember two signals. One was this intention signal. As I recall it was "FOX CORPEN 265, TACKLINE FOX SPEED 27" and that was rogered for by, I think, Mr. Hoefer.

52. Q. What was the other signal you heard?

A. The second signal I remember is the command to EXECUTE which was "TURN 260, TACKLINE SPEED 27."

53. Q. Do you recall how that signal was given, whether there was any preparatory signal before the execute signal?

A. No, sir. I don't recall other than the message itself. It was probably BLOODSHOT to our call sign UNDERPASS, but I don't recall what it was.

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All redactions  
are B-6.

54. Q. You don't recall the verbiage of that signal, is that correct?

A. No, sir.

55. Q. But it was a turn signal to, do you recall, what course?

A. The turn was to 260, preparatory command was to 265, as I recall.

56. Q. Speaking of preparatory commands, what was your understanding of the FOX CORPEN 265, TACKLINE FOX SPEED 277?

A. I looked it up in the publication. I don't know which one but it was "my estimated course for recovery of aircraft will be numerals and my estimated speed for aircraft recovery will be" for FOX CORPEN and FOX SPEED respectively.

57. Q. The FOX signal is an intention signal rather than a preparatory signal, is it not?

A. Yes, inasmuch as I used the word "estimated" I guess it is logical to assume a more detailed and exact course would be given at the command EXECUTE.

58. Q. Directing your attention to the signal which required an execution of a right turn, do you recall whether there were any words in that signal such as EXECUTE TO FOLLOW and then STANDBY-EXECUTE or was it "SIGNAL FOLLOWS EXECUTE UPON RECEIPT"? Do you recall which way that signal came in?

A. No, sir. I don't remember. I don't remember the method of execution.

59. Q. Do you remember any signal such as MIKE CORPEN coming from the WASP, any MIKE CORPEN signal coming from the WASP?

A. No, sir.

60. Q. Do you recall any course that you were on after your changed course to 130?

A. No, sir, I don't know any of the courses after that.

At this point the court sat with open doors.

61. Q. Mr. [redacted], what personnel other than you, Lieutenant [redacted], and the commanding officer were on the bridge at the time of collision and what were their duties and their physical location on the bridge shortly before and up to the time of the collision? Will you describe the general picture of the bridge during that time.

A. I don't know their names, sir. I can give them by their duties.

62. Q. Do you know any of their names?

A. Yes. I do. [redacted] was the boatswain's mate of the watch and [redacted] was telephone talker.

63. Q. He was the one that was relaying information from combat to the commanding officer?

A. Yes, sir. The helmsman, I think his name is [redacted]. May I refresh my memory with this list of survivors? In fact, most of them were saved. The two lookouts above the pilot house were [redacted] and [redacted] was quartermaster.

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All redactions are B6.

64. Q. Quartermaster of the watch?  
A. Yes. We had a navigating quartermaster who was there plotting the evening position. He was back in the chart house. [redacted] was the other man. He and [redacted] and [redacted] rotated one job, I think, of telephone talker, engine order telegraph and helmsman. I don't know which of the three -- but I know [redacted] was on the phones at the time, but I don't know what [redacted] and [redacted] were doing.

65. Q. You do know those three men were rotating those three duties during that watch?  
A. Yes, sir.

66. Q. Now/was there anybody else on duty on the bridge that you recall?  
A. No, sir, I don't recall any more.

67. Q. Will you describe the physical location of the lookout with reference to the bridge.  
A. They were on the level above the pilot house, above the bridge level, actually standing on the overhead of the pilot house where we were. They had a telephone circuit down to the telephone talker.

68. Q. The telephone talker on the bridge?  
A. Yes, sir, one starboard and one port up there.

69. Q. Do you recall or did you see the commanding officer of the HOBSON at any time after he gave the order to turn right to course 130 looking at the WASP through his binoculars?  
A. No, sir, I don't recall him using binoculars at the time. I might say I wasn't in a position to observe his using the binoculars. I was in the pilot house.

70. Q. He could have used them and could have looked at the WASP without you seeing him?  
A. Yes, sir.

71. Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant [redacted] took any bearing or made any visual observation of the WASP during that period?  
A. Although the Captain had the conn. I recall both he and Mr. [redacted] around the alidade on the port wing of the bridge.

COUNSEL REPRESENTING LCDR TIERNEY: Repeat that, please.

WITNESS: Although the Captain had the conn. I remember both Mr. [redacted] and the Captain at the alidade on the port side of the bridge, and I do recall Mr. [redacted] using the alidade and sighting towards the WASP, presumably taking a bearing.

72. Q. Does that alidade have any optical instrument in it that magnifies?  
A. It is a pelorus with a -- I don't know if there is any magnification. As I understand it, it is a telescopic affair with a hairline.

73. Q. It is an optical instrument, is that correct?  
A. Yes, sir, it has glass in it. Whether they are lenses or not I don't know.

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74. Q. Can you reproduce from memory the maneuvering board problem and solution as you saw it which was worked out by the commanding officer of the HOBSON shortly before this maneuver? Would you be able to do that at some later time?

A. I could reproduce what I recall having seen on that maneuvering board.

75. Q. Would you do so and bring it to the court at some later time?

A. Yes, sir.

76. Q. Please describe the sequence of events as you observed them after collision.

A. The ship listed to starboard immediately after collision and then reversed itself and went violently to port and to the best of my knowledge never stopped rolling. I went out on the port wing of the bridge and was swept into the sea, and I imagine the list then was 80 or 85 degrees, and I think it kept going.

77. Q. How were you picked up?

A. I was picked up by a small boat from the RODMAN and taken aboard the RODMAN.

78. Q. How long after you entered the water?

A. I estimate it at about 45 minutes.

79. Q. Did you observe any floater nets or life preservers or life rafts or life-saving equipment in the water.

A. Yes, sir, there was a great deal of flotation gear of all kinds. I got a life jacket for myself from the amount of jackets that was floating.

80. Q. You did get a life jacket from the life-saving equipment that was floating in the water?

A. Yes, sir.

81. Q. Did you hear any other emergency orders other than the word given by the boatswain of the watch, "STANDBY FOR COLLISION"?

A. No, sir, I heard no other signals or alarms.

82. Can you estimate what length of time or how long prior to the executed turn signal you received from the WASP did the commanding officer of the HOBSON take the conn?

A. It was practically immediately as soon as the EXECUTE was received he gave the order. Very shortly after that he gave an order to the wheel and in that manner obtained the conn from Mr. Hoefler.

83. Q. Did you check the plot made by the commanding officer on the maneuvering board that detailed this particular maneuver?

A. I observed it. There were no courses on the maneuvering board itself. There were just these two positions.

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