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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
200 STOVALL STREET  
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22332-2400

IN REPLY REFER TO

5830  
21.3  
16 April 1987

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and (99)

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on RADM , USN, B(4)  
investigative report of 12 Mar 86

From: Judge Advocate General  
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED  
WITH THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS JASON (AR 8) AND USS WILLAMETTE  
(AO 180), WHICH OCCURRED AT ABOUT 2115W ON 10 FEB 86,  
APPROXIMATELY 60 NM SOUTHWEST OF OAHU, HI, AND THE DEATH OF  
HTC SUSANO R. VALDEZ, USN, B(4)

Encl: (108) SURFPAC ltr 5830 Ser 006/6150 3 Jun 86  
(109) SURFGRUMIDPAC ltr 5830 Ser 006/0910 of 11 Jul 86

1. Enclosures (108) and (109) are added to the report of  
investigation.

By direction

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station one nautical mile astern of WILLAMETTE imprudent. This decision caused JASON, a slow, cumbersome ship with limited formation maneuvering practice, to penetrate a screen from ahead while attempting to avoid a tail-chase scenario. These factors set the stage for the collision.

JASON failed to ascertain the correct course and speed of WILLAMETTE either through interrogatives or by plotting. JASON believed, on the basis of overhearing a prior communication, that WILLAMETTE's course was 320 degrees T at 12 knots. All of JASON's maneuvers were based upon this incorrect assumption. The Commanding Officer's intention was to penetrate the screen astern of JARVIS then turn port and make a starboard to starboard passage with WILLAMETTE. This intention was never communicated to WILLAMETTE. In accordance with ATP-1(c), JASON's responsibility was not to hamper JARVIS or WILLAMETTE and if possible to indicate her intentions by signal. In penetrating the screen, JASON passed 830 yards ahead of JARVIS causing JARVIS to maneuver to avoid collision. At CPA with JARVIS, JASON was approximately 6000 yards from WILLAMETTE and approximately eleven minutes away from the collision. JASON then turned to course 208 degrees T at 12 knots. The course taken by JASON created a crossing situation with WILLAMETTE. The Commanding Officer of JASON failed to recognize the risk of collision. CIC was manned by an unqualified officer and failed to provide any information or recommendations to the bridge. After hearing WILLAMETTE sound six short blasts the Commanding Officer ordered all engines stop, all engines back two-thirds, the sounding of six short blasts, all engines back full, all engines back emergency full and left hard rudder, at the time these orders were given JASON was within 800 yards of WILLAMETTE.

WILLAMETTE was aware of the stationing order given to JASON. WILLAMETTE expected JASON, after penetrating the screen to turn starboard to a parallel course and slow so as to slide into station or to turn port for a starboard to starboard passage to station. WILLAMETTE never informed JASON of her course and speed nor inquired as to JASON's intent. Commanding Officer WILLAMETTE believed incorrectly that as guideship he was constrained from maneuvering until extremis. The CO and bridge team on WILLAMETTE failed to recognize the risk of collision. The CIC in WILLAMETTE failed to provide any information or recommendations to the bridge. When JASON was approximately 800 yards from WILLAMETTE, the officer of the deck ordered all engines stop and the sounding of six short blasts and then engines back two-thirds, followed shortly by the orders engine back full and back emergency full. When JASON was 2-300 yards from WILLAMETTE, the Commanding Officer ordered the signal bridge to illuminate JASON and then ordered right full rudder. The ships collided at approximately 2115W.

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The collision resulted in the death of one individual, serious injury to another as well as numerous minor injuries. Cost to repair both ships is estimated at \$9,064,257.

The Commanding Officer of JASON must bear the heaviest burden of responsibility for this collision. His actions placed JASON and WILLAMETTE into a risk of collision situation. In addition he failed to recognize the risk of collision and take timely and proper maneuvering action.

The Commanding Officer of WILLAMETTE must also bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the collision. He failed to timely recognize risk of collision and take timely maneuvering action.

The Officer in Tactical Command must also bear some burden of responsibility. He failed to ensure JASON, a ship joining formation, had all the necessary tactical information. There were many options for stationing JASON, such as stationing JASON abeam of WILLAMETTE which, considering all the factors, would have been more prudent. Once having given the stationing order close monitoring of JASON was warranted, and might have alerted him to the impending disaster and allowed him to take positive action to prevent the collision.

3. Both ships failed to utilize CIC. The bridge watch teams neither received nor requested any information from CIC, this despite the presence of the Commanding Officers on the bridge. In short, there was a complete break down in the flow of information which should exist between bridge and CIC. The failure to properly utilize CIC capabilities is of significant concern. By copy of this endorsement COMNAVSURFPAC is requested to examine current training regimes in this area and take action to emphasize the necessity for proper utilization of CIC.

4. The following findings of fact are added:

208. The OTC is required to maneuver forces in accordance with ATP-1 procedures. Enclosure (106).

209. Appendix 16 to Annex C to COMTHIRDFLT OPLAN 301 states: "safety takes precedence over all other exercise objectives in the conduct of Surface Warfare Operations. Tactical maneuvers or other actions which may jeopardize the safety of ships are not authorized. Enclosure (107).

210. The Letter of Instruction for this exercise states stationing speed is to be 5 knots greater than ordered base speed. Enclosure (61).

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211. Base speed at the time of the collision was 15 knots. Stationing speed was 20 knots. Enclosures (61), (64).
212. JASON's maximum speed was 17 knots, allowing 2 knots vice the established 5 knots stationing speed. Encl (3) and (61)
213. ATP-1 Article 2206 states: "When ships are maneuvering, the signaled speed should be appreciably less than the operational speed, so as to leave a reserve of power for taking up and keeping station." Enclosure (105).
214. The OTC knew the base course and speed; knew JASON's maximum speed; knew the location of JASON relative to the task force and knew the stationing order given to JASON. Enclosures (6) and (7).
215. The OTC was in CIC on board WHIPPLE and monitored on radar JASON pass ahead of JARVIS. Enclosure (7).
216. In accordance with Rule 17 COLREGS JASON was the stand-on vessel. Enclosure (85)
217. In accordance with Rule 17 COLREGS JASON's responsibility was to keep course and speed. Encl (85)
218. ATP-1 Instructions are provided to facilitate maneuvering. Where one ship is directed not to hamper the other, the ship required to keep clear is to conduct her movements so that her heading and proximity to the other ship does not cause any doubts about her intentions. She should, if possible, indicate her intentions by signal. If doubt arises the COLREGS apply. Enclosure (105).
219. In accordance with ATP-1 Article 2243, JASON, as a ship not on station, should have maneuvered so as not to hamper WILLAMETTE, a ship on station. Enclosure (105).
220. In accordance with Rule 17 of COLREGS JASON should have taken action to avoid collision. Enclosure (85)
221. In accordance with Rule 7 of COLREGS and ATP-1 Article 2241, both JASON and WILLAMETTE were responsible to determine if risk of collision existed using all resources available and take any action necessary to avoid a collision. Enclosures (85) and (105).
222. In accordance with Rule 15 of COLREGS WILLAMETTE was the give-way vessel. Enclosure (104)

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10. The following actions regarding classification of the investigation are taken:

- a. The classified portion of fact 32 has been deleted.
- b. By authority granted in paragraph 8-2 of reference (d) enclosure (83) has been declassified by COMTHIRDFLT and appropriately marked. Fact 203 which was based on enclosure (83) has also been appropriately downgraded.
- c. Investigation is unclassified with removal of enclosures (60), (64) and (99), and is so marked.

11. By copy of this endorsement an advance copy of the basic correspondence is forwarded to the Judge Advocate General, Commander Naval Safety Center and Commander Training Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, pursuant to section 0211 of reference (a), and paragraph 2603.5(c) of reference (e).

12. Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer are approved; specifically including the opinion that the injuries suffered by GSCS R. G. Monroe were incurred in the line of duty and not due to his own misconduct.

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COMNAVSAFECEN Norfolk VA  
COMTRAPAC San Diego CA

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15. (U) JASON's bridge watch received and logged FLT TAC net communications throughout the day up to and including 1842W. The R/T log then reveals a gap from 1842-2008W, at which time logging resumes. At 1912W, JASON commenced man overboard drills in the vicinity of her MODLOC position.

Enclosures (67), (99)

16. (U) At 1849W, the screen commander (AN) promulgated by the delayed executive method a tactical signal on FLT TAC net to all screen ships which, when executed, would direct them to form a sector screen with WILLAMETTE as the guide. This signal was neither addressed to nor acknowledged by JASON.

Enclosure (64)

17. (U) At 1856W, the screen commander (AN) executed the sector screen with WILLAMETTE as guide. This signal was neither addressed to nor acknowledged by JASON.

Enclosure (64)

18. (U) At 1930W, FCC relieved OS1 as CICWO in WILLAMETTE.

Enclosure (17)

19. (U) At 1937W, the OTC (AB) promulgated by delayed executive method a tactical signal on FLT TAC to WILLAMETTE which, when executed, would direct WILLAMETTE, as guide, to steer course 335°T at 15 knots. This signal was directed to and acknowledged only by WILLAMETTE.

Enclosure (64)

20. (U) At 1942W, the OTC (AB) executed the signal for WILLAMETTE as guide to steer course 335°T at 15 knots. WILLAMETTE acknowledged this signal.

Enclosure (64)

21. (U) At 1945W, WILLAMETTE was steady on course 335°T at 15 knots and remained so until 2112W.

Enclosure (68)

22. (U) At 1944W, LTJG relieved LTJG as JOOD and assumed the conn in JASON.

Enclosure (67)

23. (U) At 1945W, LTJG relieved ENS Day as OOD in JASON.

Enclosure (67)

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24. (U) At 1947W, ENS " " relieved BMC " as JOOD and assumed the conn in WILLAMETTE.

Enclosure (68)

25. (U) At 1949W, ENS " r relieved LTJG " as CICWO in JASON.

Enclosure (16)

26. (U) At about 1950W, CIC in JASON was tracking eight radar contacts to the south of her position. One contact was identified as USS ROBERT E. PEARY and four other contacts were collectively designated as SKUNK KILO. The remaining three contacts were neither identified nor were they assigned individual skunk designations.

Enclosures (16), (21)

27. (U) At 1953W, JASON was on course 270°T at 5 knots.

Enclosure (67)

28. (U) At 2000W, JASON changed speed to 14 knots.

Enclosure (67)

29. (U) At 2002W, JASON came left to course 250°T.

Enclosure (67)

30. (U) At 2006W, the screen commander (AN) promulgated by the delayed executive method a tactical signal on FLT TAC to all screening ships which, when executed, would direct them to rotate assigned screening sectors 35° clockwise.

Enclosure (64)

31. (U) At 2009W, the OTC (AB) promulgated by delayed executive method a tactical signal on FLT TAC to JASON which, when executed, would direct JASON to take station one NM (2000 yards) astern of the formation guide (WILLAMETTE). This signal was acknowledged by JASON.

Enclosure (64)

32. (S) The signal in the above finding was as follows: "Station Bravo DESIG [REDACTED] (call sign WILLAMETTE) - 1."

Enclosure (64)

33. (U) The stationing signal to JASON did not include any information concerning the formation base course and speed, disposition or maneuvering intentions.

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Enclosure (64)

34. (U) ATP Vol. I (Table 1-11) requires the OTC to provide such information to a ship joining a formation. (See Table 1-11)

Enclosure (65)

35. (U) The OOD, JASON (LTJG \_\_\_\_\_), incorrectly interpreted the signal to mean that JASON was to take station astern of the guide, WILLAMETTE, at standard distance (1000 yards).

Enclosures (2), (3), (12), (13)

36. (U) The OOD, JASON (LTJG \_\_\_\_\_), reported her interpretation of the signal to take station 1000 yards astern of WILLAMETTE to CO, JASON (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_), who was on the bridge. In response to the OOD's interpretation of the signal, CO, JASON (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_), directed the OOD (LTJG \_\_\_\_\_), to work a maneuvering board solution to take station at 1500 yards astern of WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (3), (12)

37. (U) Standard distance for COMPTUEX 86-2A events was 1000 yards.

Enclosure (61)

38. (U) The CICWO (ENS \_\_\_\_\_) and CIC watch supervisor (OS2 \_\_\_\_\_) in JASON correctly interpreted the signal to mean that JASON was to take station astern of the guide, WILLAMETTE, at a distance of 1 NM (2000 yards).


Enclosures (16), (20), (66)

39. (U) The JOOD, JASON (LTJG \_\_\_\_\_), did not hear (and was not involved in breaking) the stationing signal to JASON. He was misinformed by the OOD as to what the station was, and directed to work a maneuvering board solution to take JASON 1500 yards astern of WILLAMETTE. He worked the maneuvering board correctly as directed. Throughout the episode, the JOOD passed all engine and helm orders from the CO and OOD.

Enclosure (14)

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40. (U) At 2010W, the disposition of the formation was as indicated below:



Enclosures (64), (70)

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41. (U) At 2010W, WILLAMETTE was located approximately 198°T, 34,700 yards from JASON.

Enclosures (70), (72)

42. (U) At 2015W, the screen commander (AN) executed the signal on FLT TAC to rotate assigned screening sectors 35° clockwise. This signal was neither addressed to nor acknowledged by WILLAMETTE or JASON.

Enclosure (64)

43. (U) At 2019W, JASON reduced speed to 12 knots.

Enclosure (67)

44. (U) At 2025W, WILLAMETTE and JASON exchanged call signs by flashing light. At this time, JASON was 10-12 miles away from WILLAMETTE and outside the formation screen.


Enclosures (4), (10), (22), (36)

45. (U) At 2040W, LCDR [redacted] relieved LCDR [redacted] as OOD in WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (10), (68)

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46. (U) At 2040W, the disposition of formation was as indicated below:



Enclosures (64), (70)

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47. (U) At approximately 2043W, WILLAMETTE's OOD (LCDR [redacted] and JOOD (ENS [redacted]) heard a signal on the FLT TAC net from the OTC (AB), to JASON: "Station Bravo DESIG [redacted] (call sign - WILLAMETTE)-1." Both officers looked up the signal in ATP-1 and interpreted it to mean JASON was to take station one mile astern of WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (10), (15)

48. (U) The signal heard at 2043W by LCDR [redacted] /ENS [redacted] was a retransmission of the 2009W signal but without execution language.

Enclosure (64)

49. (U) At approximately 2045W, CO WILLAMETTE (CDR [redacted]) was advised by the OOD (LCDR [redacted]) that JASON had been given a station 1 NM astern of WILLAMETTE and that JASON was now proceeding to station. CDR [redacted] then came to the bridge.

Enclosures (4), (10)

50. (U) At approximately 2049W, the OTC (AB) executed the signal directing JASON to take station 1 NM (2000 yards) astern of the guide WILLAMETTE. JASON acknowledged this signal.

Enclosure (64)

51. (U) The CO (CAPT [redacted]), OOD (LTJG [redacted]) and JOOD (LTJG [redacted]) of JASON believed formation base course and speed was 320°T at 12 knots.

Enclosures (2), (3), (12), (13), (14)

52. (U) The CO, JASON's (CAPT [redacted]), understanding of base course and speed was based on his overhearing of secure voice communications by WILLAMETTE to AB at 1831W, that she would come to course 320°T/speed 12 knots upon reaching station.

Enclosures (2), (3)

53. (U) The OOD, JASON (LTJG [redacted]), was informed of the supposed formation course and speed (320°T/12 knots) by CAPT [redacted] after she relieved the watch.

Enclosures (3), (12)

54. (U) The JOOD, JASON (LTJG [redacted]), was informed of the supposed formation course and speed (320°T/12 knots) by the OOD (LTJG [redacted]).

Enclosures (13), (14)

55. (U) The actual formation base course and speed was 335°T at 15 knots. This formation base course and speed commenced at 1942W and was in effect at time of collision.

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Enclosure (64)

56. (U) The CO (CAPT           ), OOD (LTJG           ) and JOOD (LTJG           ) of JASON based all maneuvering calculations on their understanding of base course and speed of 320°T at 12 knots.

Enclosures (3), (12), (14)

57. (U) The CO (CAPT           ) of JASON stated that his knowledge of the base course and speed (320°T/12 knots) had been confirmed by maneuvering board calculations by the OOD (LTJG S           ) and JOOD (LTJG           ) by tracking and plotting the movements of the guide (WILLAMETTE).

Enclosure (3)

58. (U) Neither the OOD (LTJG           ) nor JOOD (LTJG           ) of JASON worked maneuvering board calculations to determine or verify WILLAMETTE's course and speed.

Enclosures (12), (14)

59. (U) The CO, JASON (CAPT           ), stated that he wanted to penetrate the formation on a course that would avoid a "tail chase."

Enclosures (2), (3), (12), (13), (14)

60. (U) At 2048W, the USCGC JARVIS, maneuvering in her screen sector, held JASON bearing 354°T at a range of 10,800 yards with a slight left bearing drift.


Enclosure (24)

61. (U) At 2057W, JASON came left from 250°T to 245°T and reduced speed from 12 knots to 10 knots.

Enclosure (67)

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62. (U) At 2100W, the disposition of the formation was as follows:



Enclosures (64), (70)

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63. (U) At 2101W, JARVIS held JASON bearing 349°T at a range of 1500 yards. JARVIS then reduced speed from 15 knots to 10 knots.

Enclosure (24)

64. (U) JASON's maximum available speed was 17 knots.

Enclosure (3)

65. (U) The CO, JASON (CAPT - ), stated he intended to pass astern of JARVIS enroute to station.

Enclosures (2), (12), (14)

66. (U) While penetrating the formation screen to take station, JASON crossed ahead of JARVIS.

Enclosures (2), (24), (70), (72)

67. (U) At 2102W, JASON reduced speed from 10 knots to 8 knots.

Enclosure (67)

68. (U) At approximately 2102W, JARVIS put on right 30° rudder and changed course to 010°T in order to avoid collision with JASON.

Enclosures (3), (24)

69. (U) At 2103W, JASON increased speed from 8 to 12 knots.

Enclosure (67)

70. (U) At 2104W, JASON and JARVIS were at CPA, a distance of approximately 830 yards.

Enclosures (12), (24), (25), (26), (27), (70)

71. (U) CO, JASON (CAPT - ), stated he believed his CPA to JARVIS was about 2200 yards.

Enclosure (3)

72. (U) At CPA with JARVIS, JASON was approximately 6000 yards from WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (2), (10), (12), (70)

73. (U) At 2104W, the OOD, JASON (LTJG - ), recommended to CO, JASON (CAPT - ), to come left to 208°T at speed 14 knots to take station on WILLAMETTE.


Enclosures (2), (12), (14), (16)

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74. (U) At 2105W, the disposition of the formation was as indicated below:

USS  
A.E. PEARY

USS  
BADGER



Enclosures (64), (70)

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75. (U) Between 2104W and 2108W, the CO (CAPT ) and OOD (LTJG ) of JASON discussed the maneuvering situation/intentions for taking station on WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (2), (12), (67)

76. (U) At 2108W, JASON came left to course 208°T.

Enclosure (67)

77. (U) At 2112W, CO, JASON (CAPT ), directed the conning officer (LTJG ) to continue left.

Enclosures (2), (3), (13), (14)

78. (U) At 2112W, JOOD, JASON (LTJG ), ordered left standard rudder to 190°T.

Enclosures (31), (67)

79. (U) At about 2112W, the OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), attempted to call JASON on bridge-to-bridge radio, once on Channel 13 and once on Channel 16. There was no response by JASON.

Enclosures (5), (10), (15), (28)

80. (U) At approximately 2112W, the OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), ordered through the conning officer (ENS ) engine stop and the sounding of six short blasts of the ship's whistle.

Enclosures (10), (15), (68)

81. (U) At about 2112W, the OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), directed the EOOW (BTC ) on the 21MC to secure from boiler surface blow and to prepare to answer emergency backing bells.

Enclosures (10), (11), (18), (29)

82. (U) The OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), then ordered through the conning officer engine back two-thirds.

Enclosures (10), (15), (35), (68)

83. (U) When WILLAMETTE sounded six short blasts, the range to JASON was approximately 800 yards.

Enclosure (17)

84. (U) The six short blasts sounded by WILLAMETTE were heard on JASON.

Enclosures (2), (12), (13)

85. (U) Upon hearing WILLAMETTE's six short blasts at about 2113W, the CO, JASON (CAPT ), ordered through the conning

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officer (LTJG           ) in rapid succession all engines stop, all engines back two-thirds, the sounding of six short blasts, all engines back full, all engines back emergency full and left hard rudder.

Enclosures (2), (3), (13), (30), (31), (32), (67)

86. (U) The helm (SN           ) and lee helm (SN           ) of JASON heard and answered all of the above orders except the order for left hard rudder.

Enclosures (30), (31), (67)

87. (U) Moments after JASON sounded six short blasts, QMC            entered JASON's bridge from the chart house and immediately asked for the position of the rudder. The helmsman stated that JASON's rudder was amidships.

Enclosures (33), (34)

88. (U) QMC            (JASON) recommended hard right rudder to the OOD (LTJG           ).

Enclosures (12), (33)

89. (U) The OOD, JASON (LTJG           ) ordered "hard right rudder."

Enclosures (12), (31), (67)

90. (U) The helmsman (JASON) put the rudder over to the right.

Enclosures (31), (67)

91. (U) JASON's collision alarm was sounded.

Enclosures (12), (33), (34)

92. (U) QMC            switched on JASON's lmc and passed: "Collision, collision, all hands stand by for collision port side." BMOW (BM2           ) took the lmc and passed: "All hands brace for shock."

Enclosures (32), (33)

93. (U) At 2113W, the OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR           ), ordered through the conning officer (ENS           ) engine back full and then back emergency full.

Enclosures (10), (15), (35), (68)

94. (U) At 2114W, CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR           ), ordered WILLAMETTE's signal bridge to illuminate JASON.

Enclosures (4), (10), (36)

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95. (U) Upon illumination by unfiltered signal light, JASON appeared to be 2-300 yards from WILLAMETTE with a target angle of 300°.

Enclosures (4), (10), (36)

96. (U) Upon illumination by signal light, CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR , ordered right full rudder and the sounding of the collision alarm. WILLAMETTE's rudder indicator had moved to indicate approximately 25° right rudder when the collision occurred.

Enclosures (4), (10), (35)

97. (U) Between 2114W and 2115W, JASON and WILLAMETTE collided, with WILLAMETTE's bow penetrating JASON's hull port side forward at about frame 20 at an angle of about 30 degrees from JASON's longitudinal axis.

Enclosures (2), (4), (86), (87), (88), (89), (90), (91), (92)

98. (U) The weather at the time of the collision was:

Wind: 260° true at 14 knots  
Sea State: 2  
Visibility: Clear with moderate cloud cover and  
visibility to 10 nautical miles  
Barometer: 29.86  
Temperature: 75°F

Enclosures (4), (24), (69)

99. (U) Material condition YOKE had been set aboard JASON at 1516W and remained in effect at time of collision. General Quarters was called away at 2115W.

Enclosure (67)

100. (U) Material condition YOKE had been set aboard WILLAMETTE at 1630W and remained in effect at time of collision. General Quarters was called away at 2114W. Material condition ZEBRA was set at 2140W.

Enclosure (68)

101. (U) At the time of collision, WILLAMETTE's speed through the water had been reduced to approximately 5 knots.

Enclosures (4), (10)

102. (U) At time of collision, JASON's starboard shaft had reached about 50 RPM in the astern direction.

Enclosure (37)

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103. (U) At time of collision, WILLAMETTE's rudder order indicator indicated that WILLAMETTE's rudder had reached right 25°.

Enclosure (35)

104. (U) Shortly after collision, WILLAMETTE and JASON stopped engines.

Enclosures (11), (14), (67), (68)

105. (U) Within seconds of impact, there was fire and smoke on JASON. Within two (2) minutes of impact, a fire was reported in WILLAMETTE's bosn locker and her foc'sle was enveloped in flames and smoke.

Enclosures (2), (4), (10)

106. (U) At 2116W, WILLAMETTE backed engine one-third.

Enclosure (68)

107. (U) At 2119W, WILLAMETTE stopped engine.

Enclosure (68)

108. (U) At 2120W, WILLAMETTE backed engine one-third.

Enclosure (68)

109. (U) Soon after impact, CO WILLAMETTE stated on bridge-to-bridge radio that he was backing, attempting to clear. CO JASON concurred with backing due to fire.

Enclosure (2)

110. (U) At 2123W, WILLAMETTE backed engine two-thirds.

Enclosure (68)

111. (U) At 2125W, WILLAMETTE cleared free of JASON. The fire in WILLAMETTE's bow continued to burn.

Enclosure (68)

112. (U) At 2126W, WILLAMETTE backed engine full to pull away from fire burning on water's surface.

Enclosure (68)

113. (U) As JASON and WILLAMETTE separated, CO, JASON, directed the OOD to go ahead at 5 knots to clear a burning oil slick as WILLAMETTE backed away. The port engine developed vibrations and heavy grinding noises, was stopped and locked with the concurrence of CO, JASON. JASON next attempted to move away from the site

UNCLASSIFIED

using the starboard screw and right rudder; however, unable to make a starboard turn, the starboard screw was stopped and JASON coasted to starboard. This evolution was repeated several times successfully, moving JASON away from impact area.

Enclosures (2), (38)

114. (U) Reports on JASON indicated heavy smoke filling the ship and Class A/B fires in the vicinity of the collision, structural damage in the CPO berthing compartment, Repair 2, storerooms, media center, sickbay and fuel tanks.

Enclosure (2)

115. (U) At 2124W, Class B fire was reported in JASON's medical compartment. IC room filled with smoke. Both spaces were evacuated within moments.

Enclosure (67)

116. (U) At 2135W on JASON, fire and flooding was reported in "M and B" storeroom.

Enclosure (67)

117. (U) By 2236W on JASON, the Class A fires in CPO berthing, the print shop, and between the mess deck and repair 5 were contained and under control.

Enclosures (67), (98)

118. (U) At 2236W, JASON was listing 5° to port.

Enclosure (98)

119. (U) At 2348W, all fires were reported out on JASON.

Enclosure (98)

120. (U) At 0105W, JASON secured from General Quarters.

Enclosure (98)

121. (U) Shortly after the collision, DC Central in WILLAMETTE reported a Class A fire in the bos'n locker.

Enclosure (39)

122. (U) At approximately 2120W, a fire party entered the bos'n locker on WILLAMETTE and fought the fire for 10 minutes but could not advance into the space initially because of smoke, heat and intermittent flames.

Enclosure (40)

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosures (5), (17), (42)

138. (U) The CICWO, JASON (ENS                   ), was not formally qualified to stand the watch.

Enclosures (3), (16), (42)

139. (U) The last Command Inspection for JASON was conducted by COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC 7-11 May 1984. JASON was scheduled for routine Command Inspection on 10-14 March 1986.

Enclosure (77)

140. (U) The last Command Inspection for WILLAMETTE was conducted by COMNAVSURFGRU MIDPAC, 20-24 August 1984. The next Command Inspection for WILLAMETTE was scheduled for 24-28 March 1986.

Enclosure (77)

141. (U) It was CO, JASON's (CAPT                   ), watchstanding policy to permit two of three principal watch officers (OOD, JOOD and CICWO) to stand watch (not under instruction) without formal qualification.

Enclosures (3), (59)

142. (U) This watchstanding policy reflected in 141 above resulted in a watchbill for COMPTUEX 86-2A which provided, in two of three watch sections, two unqualified officers on the bridge (OOD and JOOD) with a qualified OOD standing watch as CICWO. In the remaining section, on watch during the incident, two qualified OOD's were on the bridge with an unqualified CICWO in CIC.

Enclosures (3), (42), (59)

143. (U) The one qualified officer, in the two watch sections discussed in 142 above, did not have the authority to relieve the deck and take the conn if a problem arose, even though the officer on watch as OOD was not qualified.

Enclosures (3), (62), (63)

144. (U) LT Kusumoto (USS JASON) was the navigator of the ship but did not have authority from the CO, JASON to relieve the OOD.

Enclosure (3)

145. (U) It was CO, JASON's (CAPT                   ), policy not to use radio telephones for "unnecessary" communications.

Enclosures (3), (12), (14)

146. (U) The OOD (LTJG                   ), JOOD (LTJG                   ) and CICWO (ENS                   ) were aware of the CO, JASON's, communication policy

UNCLASSIFIED

and felt inhibited from initiating communications with WILLAMETTE or other ships or elements of the task group.

Enclosures (12), (14), (16)

147. (U) CO, JASON (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_), had not promulgated Standing Orders under his own signature since assuming command 13 July 1984. The Standing Orders of the previous CO, JASON (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_), remained in effect.

Enclosures (2), (3), (62)

148. (U) CO, JASON (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_), and his bridge team received no valid recommendations or information from CIC while attempting to gain station astern of WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (3), (16)

149. (U) CIC in JASON was not aware of the actual formation base course and speed. CIC in JASON was not initially aware that JASON's bridge watch had assumed WILLAMETTE course and speed was 320°T at 12 knots. CIC in JASON requested formation course and speed from the bridge watch but received no response.

Enclosure (16)

150. (U) CIC in JASON was tracking WILLAMETTE on the DRT until 2051W.

Enclosures (16), (20), (21), (71)

151. (U) At 2051W, LTJG \_\_\_\_\_ and SM2 \_\_\_\_\_ advised CIC in JASON that they had visually identified WILLAMETTE and that JASON's CIC was tracking the wrong contact on the DRT as WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (20), (21)

152. (U) At 2057W, CIC in JASON began tracking JARVIS on the DRT as WILLAMETTE.

Enclosures (16), (20), (21), (71)

153. (U) CICWO, JASON (ENS \_\_\_\_\_), believed JASON had crossed ahead of WILLAMETTE (actually JARVIS) and that the OOD (LTJG \_\_\_\_\_), intended to turn to port to 208°T to circle in behind WILLAMETTE (actually JARVIS) to take station.

Enclosure (16)

154. (U) The CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR \_\_\_\_\_), believed JASON would turn to starboard after clearing JARVIS, parallel base course, slow, and slide back to station.

Enclosures (4), (10)

UNCLASSIFIED

155. (U) The CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR \_\_\_\_\_), believed that as guide of the formation WILLAMETTE was constrained from maneuvering from base course and speed until in extremis.

Enclosures (4), (5)

156. (U) The CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR \_\_\_\_\_), was confused as to JASON's true aspect until she was illuminated. CDR \_\_\_\_\_ believed that JASON presented a port quarter aspect prior to her illumination.

Enclosures (4), (5), (10), (11)

157. (U) The CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR \_\_\_\_\_), ordered JASON illuminated seconds prior to collision.

Enclosures (4), (5), (10), (11)

158. (U) Rule 7 of COLREGs defines "risk of collision" wherein it states:

"(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt, such risk shall be deemed to exist.

(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.

(c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, especially scanty radar information.

(d) In determining if risk of collision exists, the following considerations shall be among those taken into account:

(i) Such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change;

(ii) Such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range."

Enclosure (85)

159. (U) Rule 17 of COLREGs delineates the responsibilities of the stand-on vessel in a risk of collision situation wherein it states:

"(a) (i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.

UNCLASSIFIED

(a) (ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her maneuver alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules.

(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.

(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation in accordance with subparagraph (a) (ii) of this Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.

(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep out of the way."

Enclosure (85)

160. (U) WILLAMETTE is equipped with a RAYCAS V Collision Avoidance System. The RAYCAS V, while a sophisticated automatic plotting marine radar, is intended as an aid to navigation only. It will not and cannot make the many decisions common to the navigation of vessels at sea. The performance of the RAYCAS V is dependent on inputs from other own ship's electronics such as the speed log, gyrocompass and the radar modulator - transmitter/ (MTR) and deterioration of any of these units will degrade the results normally available from the RAYCAS V.

Enclosures (10), (84)

161. (U) During JASON's approach to WILLAMETTE, RAYCAS computed CPA's for JASON on WILLAMETTE of:

- a. 1.5 NM on WILLAMETTE's port bow (300°R)
- b. .75 NM on WILLAMETTE's port bow (335°R)
- c. .70 NM on WILLAMETTE's bow (000°T)

Enclosure (10)

162. (U) The OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), observed no appreciable course or speed change by JASON, either visually or by RAYCAS, from the time JASON cleared JARVIS until she reported her engines backing.

Enclosure (10)

163. (U) The OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), stated his experience as OOD in WILLAMETTE was that information from CIC was not as accurate as RAYCAS and was time late.

ALL B6

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosure (11)

164. (U) The OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR \_\_\_\_\_), stated that without RAYCAS he would have maneuvered the WILLAMETTE to port or starboard when risk of collision first presented itself. He stated that had the RAYCAS system gone down he would have "Bailed out."

Enclosure (11)

165. (U) Although OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR \_\_\_\_\_), understood that COLREGS specify that, when in extremis, emergency maneuvers require a turn to starboard, he decided not to turn to starboard so as not to present WILLAMETTE's vulnerable cargo sections to JASON's bow.

Enclosure (11)

166. (U) The DRT in WILLAMETTE was not manned/operated when FCC Wagner assumed duties as CICWO at 1930W and remained unmanned through time of collision.

Enclosure (17)

167. (U) It was doctrine on WILLAMETTE not to man/operate the DRT when Condition IV watch was set.

Enclosure (60)

168. (U) Just prior to and at time of the collision, Condition IV (peacetime cruising) watches were set in WILLAMETTE.

Enclosure (58)

169. (U) The OTC, Staff Watch Officer (LCDR \_\_\_\_\_), focused his attention more on the administrative responsibilities of the OTC than on JASON's movements through the formation.

Enclosures (8), (9)

170. (U) The OTC Staff Watch Officer (LCDR \_\_\_\_\_) was not particularly concerned about JASON's maneuvers to station once she (JASON) was past CPA with JARVIS.

Enclosure (9)

171. (U) The OTC Staff Watch Officer (LCDR \_\_\_\_\_) was not aware of JASON's approaching collision situation with WILLAMETTE until the collision was reported over radio-telephone circuits.

Enclosure (9)

172. (U) The OTC (CAPT \_\_\_\_\_) asked the Staff Watch Officer if JASON had "all the information she needed" in order to join the formation.

UNCLASSIFIED

Enclosures (7), (9)

173. (U) The OTC Staff Watch Officer (LCDR ) advised the OTC (CAPT that JASON was aware of information needed based upon his assumption that JASON had been up on communication circuits during the day.

Enclosure (9)

174. (U) During the ASW exercise, AB (OTC), AX (WHIPPLE), and AN (WHIPPLE) were all operating from WHIPPLE's CIC.

Enclosures (6), (8), (43), (44), (45)

175. (U) Formation plotting was done on WHIPPLE's NC-2. WHIPPLE's DRT, although available, was not manned during the ASW exercise on the evening of 10 February 1986.

Enclosure (9)

176. (U) During this incident, WHIPPLE's CIC Watch Team included three officers (LT , LTJG , ENS and nine or ten Operations Specialists (OS).

Enclosure (44)

177. (U) Chapter Five (Flagship Responsibilities) of CDS35INST C5000.1D provides: "While embarked, the Staff will direct the efforts of the Communications Organization to ensure proper support for the Squadron Commander... If required, the Staff will establish the watch bill in CIC to carry out the missions assigned."

Enclosure (81)

178. (U) The OTC Staff Watch Officer (LCDR S. ) did not specifically task the CIC Watch Team to make situational reports to him during his watch.

Enclosures (9), (44)

179. (U) The Staff Watch Officer's duties are delineated in Chapter 5 (The Staff Watch Officer Underway) of CDS35INST 5400.1C, dated 21 July 1982. These include where pertinent:

"f. Keep the commodore and the Chief Staff Officer advised of any radical or unusual movements of other units in formation. Periodically check other units assigned for correct station keeping and advise the Commodore and the Chief Staff Officer if a unit is more than 500 yards from assigned station or out of assigned area.

g. Report all contacts with men-of-war and all other surface contacts with a CPA of 3000 yards or less to any ship in the formation unless otherwise directed. Report such a contact

UNCLASSIFIED

before the range closes to 5 miles, if possible. In making your report, include at least the following information:

- (1) What contact is (your estimate).
- (2) Relative bearing.
- (3) Contact course and speed along with target angle or angle on the bow.
- (4) Bearing drift (right, left or steady).
- (5) Range, bearing and time of CPA to most threatened unit of formation (amplify with relative terms, i.e., off the stbd bow or quarter, etc.).

After making above report, continue to track and evaluate contact and advise the Commodore if situation changes to close CPA or increases threat to formation. Make frequent visual checks of contact and if possible, establish identity of the contact."

Enclosure (82)

180. (U) The OTC Staff Watch Officer (LCDR ) did not advise the OTC (CAPT ) of JASON's close maneuver (CPA less than 1000 yards) with JARVIS.

Enclosures (7), (9)

181. (U) During JASON's approach to JARVIS, the Bridge-in-Charge (CDR ) of JARVIS sighted one red light and one white light on JASON.

Enclosure (24)

182. (U) During JASON's approach to WILLAMETTE, the CO, WILLAMETTE (CDR ) sighted on JASON:

- a. One very bright white light forward and low (about 4 times the intensity of the after mast head light);
- b. One very dim white light aft and higher in the superstructure; and
- c. One bright red light low and slightly aft of the forward white light.

Enclosures (4), (5)

183. (U) The OOD, WILLAMETTE (LCDR ), sighted the following lights on JASON:

- a. Bright forward masthead
- b. Dim AFT masthead

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- a. Portside shell plating Frames 15 to 28, main deck to half deck are holed and torn (approx 520 sq. ft.).
- b. Portside shell plating Frames 16 to 27, half deck to 2nd deck, are holed and torn (approx 440 sq. ft.).
- c. Portside shell plating Frames 22 and 27, 2nd deck to 3rd deck, are holed and torn (approx 200 sq. ft.).
- d. Portside shell plating below 3rd deck from approximately Frames 20 to 28 is below waterline.
- e. Main deck plating Frames 19 - 21 from shell to 10 ft inboard and Frames 15 - 18 from shell to 4 ft inboard are ripped and torn (approx 80 sq. ft.).
- f. Half deck plating Frames 21 - 28 from shell to 15 ft inboard and Frames 16 - 21 from shell to 6 ft inboard are ripped and torn (approx 700 sq. ft.).
- g. 2nd deck plating Frames 21 - 26 from shell to 15 ft inboard are ripped and torn (approx 300 sq. ft.).
- h. 3rd deck plating Frames 23 - 27 from shell to 15 ft inboard and Frames 21 - 23 from shell to 3 ft inboard are ripped and torn (approx 324 sq. ft.).
- i. Below 3rd deck Frames 22 - 27 are at or below waterline (sq. footage unknown).
- j. Portside shell and affected deck stiffeners are torn, bent, twisted or missing (approx 400 ln. ft. of shell plating and deck stiffeners).
- k. Piping systems (fuel oil, CHT/plumbing, potable water, steam heating and salt water) in affected area (Frames 14 - 34, main deck to hull bottom) are broken, twisted or missing (approx 725 ft various size piping).
- l. Lagging and insulation in affected compartments (including piping) are torn, burned and water soaked (approx 670 ln. ft.).
- m. Deck tiling and terrazzo on affected compartment decks are broken, warped and soaked (approx 5,900 sq. ft.).
- n. Electrical damage to the affected spaces included that to power panels, lighting panels, transformers, connection boxes, lights, outlets, switches, IMC speakers fuse boxes, bunk lights, battle lanterns and telephones. (Cables could not be traced hand over hand due to the enormity of the damage and the quantity of damaged or lost equipment and length of electrical cables could not immediately be ascertained.)

UNCLASSIFIED

o. Missing and damaged sheetmetal work on affected vent ducting, MJ bulkheads, bunks, lockers, shelves, desks, etc., could not adequately be determined.

Enclosure (95)

205. (U) The following is a detailed assessment of structural and related damage suffered by WILLAMETTE as a result of the vessel's collision at sea with JASON.

a. Stem to Frame 10 starboard shell plating is crumpled and holed (approx 400 sq. ft.);

b. Stem to Frame 15 port shell plating is crumpled, ripped and holed (approx 1080 sq. ft.);

c. Port and starboard shell stiffeners are torn, twisted, warped and missing (approx 1,500 sq. ft. of shell plating stiffeners);

d. 01 level deck from bull nose to Frame 15 is warped, twisted, holed and missing from collision and resultant fire (approx 450 sq. ft.);

e. 01 level port/starboard bulwark (approx 240 sq. ft.) is torn, twisted or missing;

f. (1) each cast bull nose and (2) each cast mooring rings (closed chocks) are displaced but appear to be salvageable;

g. Main deck from stem to Frame 8 (approx 250 sq. ft.) is warped, torn or missing from collision and fire;

h. Main deck and 01 level deck stiffeners from stem to Frame 12 are bent, twisted or torn;

i. Approximately 150 sq.ft. of bulbous bow plating is holed, ripped or crumpled;

j. Bulbous bow internal stiffeners/transverse frames are twisted and torn;

k. Bos'n locker storage rack from stem to Frame 8 is twisted and torn (expanded metal type);

l. 01 level W.T. hatch into 1-H-O-A is warped and seals burned from fire;

m. Approx 100 ft. of countermeasure washdown piping and associated deck nozzles are torn, twisted or missing in compartment 1-H-O-A.

n. Forward bulkhead insulation in the anchor windlass room is salt water soaked and smoke damaged (replacement recommended due to possible corrosion on bulkhead underneath);

## UNCLASSIFIED

o. Vent ducting in bos'n workshop scorched and warped from fire, WT vent closure, electric heater and QAO covers burned (approx 100 ft. of ducting);

p. Bos'n locker sewing machine and stand destroyed by fire;

q. Bos'n locker storage "J" racks are fire, smoke, and salt water damaged;

r. Bos'n locker insulation on overhead and bulkheads is fire and smoke damaged (approx 5000 sq.ft.);

s. Forward anchor light mast/jack mast twisted; storage rack twisted and torn;

t. The following electrical damage was noted:

(1) Compartment 1-H-O-A

(a) 1 1 MC Speaker

(b) 1 Dial Telephone

(c) Fan

(d) 1 Battle Lattern

(e) 20 Connection Boxes

(f) 1 Thermostat

(g) 20 Electrical Receptacles

(h) 1 Vent Heater Controller

(i) 12 Flourescent Light Fixtures

(j) 1 Isolation Transformer

(k) Approx 2500 ft. associated cables

(2) Compartments 4-H-O-W (forward peak tank) and 4-19-0-W (clean water ballast tank)

(a) 2 TLI's

(3) 01 level FOC'SLE

(a) 1 1MC Speaker

(b) 1 Anchor Light

(c) 1 Marine Plug

