

USS RANGER [CVA-61]
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

RANGERINST 1300.1
12
10 September 1969

USS RANGER INSTRUCTION 1300.1

From: Commanding Officer, USS RANGER (CVA-61)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Temporary Assignment of Personnel

Ref: (a) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5400.1A, Article 3204
(b) COMNAVAIRPACINST 1300.11B
(c) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 1085.1A

Encl: (1) Requirements for Temporary Assignment of Personnel

1. Purpose. To promulgate the requirements for temporary assignment of personnel as required by references (a) and (b).

2. Discussion. References (a) and (b) provide for the temporary assignment of personnel to the Master-at-Arms Force, Mess Deck Master-at-Arms Force, Messmen, CPO Compartment Cleaners and various ratings and strikers when the Air Wing is embarked. In addition, the Air Wing (when embarked) shall provide men to supplement the ships company laundry to offset the increased workload. Reference (b) establishes this at a ratio of one man for every seventy-five men. Messmen and laundrymen perform an important service and assignment hereto is not to be used as a disciplinary measure or a means of relieving the departments and squadrons of less desirable personnel.

3. Assignment. Assignment of temporary assignment personnel shall be in accordance with enclosure (1).

4. Administration of Crew's Messmen

a. Transfers to and from messmen duties

(1) Ship's company messmen will be transferred to and from the S2M Division by written orders prepared and signed by the Personnel Officer. Messmen are required to check in and out at the Personnel Office using the form which is prepared for that purpose. Under no circumstances will messmen be transferred on verbal orders. Air Wing personnel will use a similar form to direct their men to and from the S2M Division.

(2) Personnel who are expected to be transferred or discharged from RANGER prior to completion of a normal tour of mess duties, shall not be assigned this duty.

(3) Personnel awaiting disciplinary action will not be assigned to duty as a crew's messman.

08113
ENCLOSURE (2)

b. Responsibility

(1) The Commissary Officer will assign duties of the personnel transferred to S2M Division and shall control their leave and liberty during this tour as a messman. Normally, only emergency leave will be granted while assigned to messman duties. The S2M Division Officer will assist the parent Division Officer in investigating and processing reports of UCMJ violations and represent messmen at mast.

(2) The parent division officer shall retain the responsibilities of administering and maintaining all required division records of personnel assigned duties as messman. He shall be responsible for the timely processing of mast reports and shall represent the individual, as required, at Executive Officer's Screening Mast and/or Captain's Mast in company with the S2M Division Officer and supervisory petty officer.

c. Reliefs

(1) Crew's messmen completing a normal tour will be relieved on the first Tuesday of each month. The Personnel Officer shall notify departments concerned sufficiently in advance of the tour completion date in order that the replacement can be provided prior to the date of actual relief. Normally, this notification will be about seven days.

(2) Personnel assigned messmen duties may be relieved due to hospitalization, other medical reasons as directed by the Medical Officer, unauthorized absence and confinement. They may not be relieved for any other reason without written justification to the Executive Officer.

(3) When personnel assigned to duty as crew's messmen are absent from these duties due to unauthorized absence or confinement, the parent department will be requested to furnish a temporary replacement. Upon completion of confinement or upon return from unauthorized absence, the regular messman will be continued on duty and the temporary replacement returned to the parent department. Periods of unauthorized absence and confinement will be made up at the end of the normal tour. Replacements will be furnished in the case of unauthorized absentees when the absentee has been gone seventy-two hours and in the case of confinement when the period of confinement exceeds seven days.

5. Liberty Cards. Liberty cards shall be issued in accordance with reference (c), therefore, departments assigning personnel to temporary assignment shall retain the regular liberty cards for reissue upon completion of this additional duty. Under no circumstances will regular division liberty cards be used while assigned temporary assignment. The Division Officer concerned shall be notified in writing whenever any individual in a "Restricted" status is assigned to a special detail.

B-6

Distribution: (See NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1A)
List I (Less R) (Case B)

USS RANGER [CVA-61]
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

Chicago #1
Entered 7/15/69
Officer, 2nd

RANGERINST 5500.2
05
29 July 1969

USS RANGER INSTRUCTION 5500.2

From: Commanding Officer, USS RANGER (CVA-61)
To: Distribution List

Subj: Security of the Ship

Ref: (a) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.1A
(b) NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5500.2A

Encl: (1) Diagram of external security posts
(2) Security posts manned while visiting a naval activity or civilian port CONUS
(3) Security posts manned while visiting a naval activity or civilian port outside CONUS
(4) Procedure for setting special security precautions
(5) Composition of armed emergency squads and machine gun squads

1. Purpose. An addendum to references (a) and (b) that delineates those additional procedures and/or responsibilities peculiar to USS RANGER (CVA-61).

2. General. External and internal security of the ship while in port and underway shall be administered in accordance with references (a) and (b); amplification and additional requirements to implement security precautions aboard RANGER are set forth below to cover the following situations:

a. Underway

- (1) External: Surface or airborne assault.
- (2) Internal: Riot control or disturbance.

b. In-Port

- (1) External: Any unauthorized boarding.
- (2) Internal: Riot control or disturbance.

3. Responsibility

a. The Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, in addition to the responsibility set forth in reference (b), is also responsible for the promulgation of special orders for the external security posts set forth in reference (b) and this Instruction.

b. Heads of departments shall provide the implementation of those provisions of references (a) and (b) and this Instruction under their cognizance. They shall provide the Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, with sentries as shown in enclosures (2) through (5) during in-port periods and assign personnel for armed emergency squads as indicated in reference (b) and for the machine gun squads. Rosters of personnel assigned to

ENCLOSURE (24)

0815

081

29 July 1969

security watches should reach the Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, at least twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled watch. All sentries assigned to security watches shall be directed to report thirty minutes prior to their watch to the Sergeant of the Guard, located in the Marine Detachment berthing spaces (3-69-0-L), for instruction and inspection. Personnel assigned to the armed emergency squads and machine gun squads will be personnel normally assigned to the landing party.

c. The Chief Engineer shall provide and maintain an alarm system by which the ~~OOD or JOOD~~ can sound an alarm. This system shall connect the ~~Quarterdeck and After Bow~~ with the Marine Detachment, with the ship's armory and ~~with the Master-at-Arms office.~~

d. The Weapons Officer shall provide five .45 caliber pistols with belts, holsters, and two loaded magazines each to be kept in the Quarterdeck small arms locker. Twenty-four M-1 rifles and two M-1 carbines shall be provided for the armed emergency squads. Six .30 caliber machine guns, twenty-one M-1 carbines and twelve .45 caliber pistols will be provided for the machine gun squads. Duty EOD personnel and their equipment shall be made available for use as necessary.

e. The Operations Officer shall provide signs in the language of the port, as specified in paragraph 5a(2)(i) of reference (b).

4. Normal External Security Precautions

a. External Security Post. In addition to the nine security posts listed in reference (a), the following security posts are also established.

<u>POST NO.</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT MANNED</u>
10	Pier	AIMD
11	Trash and Garbage Receptacle	Supply
12	AFT BROW	DECK
13	FWD BROW	SUPPLY

The external security posts to be manned during visits to various ports are shown in enclosures (2) and (3).

b. Picket Boat Patrol. The First Lieutenant shall provide for a picket boat equipped in accordance with reference (a). The picket boat patrol shall consist of the following personnel.

<u>BOAT CREW</u>	<u>DEPT PROVIDING</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>
Boat Officer	Deck Dept or Duty Section	.45 caliber pistol and two loaded magazines
Coxwain	Deck Dept	.45 caliber pistol and two loaded magazines
Bow-Hook	Deck Dept	.45 caliber pistol and two loaded magazines
Signalman	Communications Dept	
Sentry	Weapons Dept	.45 caliber pistol and two loaded magazines

<u>BOAT CREW</u>	<u>DEPT PROVIDING</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>
Gunner's Mate	Weapons Dept	Thompson SMG and two loaded magazines
Two Lookouts	Weapons Dept	M-1 rifle and two eight round clips each

5. Special Security Precautions. In the event of danger to the ship of large proportion, such as a riot, an undisciplined demonstration, a threat from helicopter or light aircraft, any mob situation, swimmers in the water, or a group of small boats, the Officer of the Deck should take special security precautions. Should any of the foregoing occur, the Officer of the Deck should take the steps outlined in enclosure (4).


6. Air Defense. In the event an actual threat or raid, airborne or surface, is imminent, "Air Defense" shall be sounded, in addition to taking special security precautions as outlined in paragraph 5. All air defense stations shall be manned and be prepared to repel attacks upon orders of the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, or the Command Duty Officer. Service ammunition shall be in the hoists and up to the carrier decks in all mounts at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. Armed emergency squads and machine gun squads shall be ordered to take positions in the flight deck catwalks and in the island structure.

7. Authorization to "Commence Firing". Security forces will not be authorized to "Commence Firing" until specifically instructed to do so by the Commanding Officer, the Executive Officer, or in their absence, the Command Duty Officer, unless there is a clearly identifiable, overt threat to the security of the ship or crew which absolutely cannot be prevented or arrested by other means.

B6

Distribution:
NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRFAC CV SHIP INSTRUCTION 5605.1A
List I, Case A

DIAGRAM OF EXTERNAL SECURITY POSTS



EXTERNAL SECURITY POST MANNED WHILE VISITING A
NAVAL ACTIVITY OR CIVILIAN PORT CONUS

1. While Berthed alongside a pier.

<u>POST MANNED</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>HOURS MANNED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
2	Weapons Dept	0800 - 0800	
4	AIR Dept	0800 - 0800	
6	Operations Dept	0800 - 0800	
8	Deck Dept	0800 - 0800	
9	Weapons Dept	0800 - 0800	
10	AIMD	0800 - 0800	(Pier)
11	SUPPLY	0800 - 0800	(T&C) See Note 1
12	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800	(Aft brow)
13	MARDET	0700 - 1800	(Fwd Brow)
	SUPPLY	1800 - 0700	(Fwd Brow)

NOTE #1 - The trash and garbage sentry will remain in the Marine Detachment Berthing Space as a supernumerary from 2200 until 0600.

2. While at anchor.

<u>POST MANNED</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>HOURS MANNED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800	See Note 2
3	AIR DEPT	0800 - 0800	
4	AIR DEPT	0800 - 0800	
7	OPERATIONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	
8	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800	See Note 3
9	WEAPONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	See Note 3

NOTE #2 - Sentry will execute the orders for post #1 and #2.

NOTE #3 - Sentries will also execute the orders for the trash and garbage sentry.

Enclosure (2)

EXTERNAL SECURITY POST MANNED WHILE VISITING A
NAVAL ACTIVITY OR CIVILIAN PORT OUTSIDE CONUS

1. While berthed alongside a pier or at anchor.

<u>POST MANNED</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT PROVIDING</u>	<u>HOURS MANNED</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800	
2	WEAPONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	
3	AIR DEPT	0800 - 0800	
4	AIR DEPT	0800 - 0800	
5	AIR DEPT	0800 - 0800	
6	OPERATIONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	
7	OPERATIONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	
8	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800	
9	WEAPONS DEPT	0800 - 0800	
10	AIMD	1800 - 0700(Pier)	See NOTE 1
11	SUPPLY DEPT	0800 - 0800(T&G)	See NOTE 1/2
12	DECK DEPT	0800 - 0800(Aft Brow)	NOTE 1
13	MARDET	0700 - 1800(Fwd Brow)	NOTE 1
	SUPPLY	1800 - 0700(Fwd Brow)	NOTE 1

NOTE #1 - If the ship is at anchor this post will not be manned.

NOTE #2 - The trash and garbage sentry will remain in the Marine Detachment Berthing Space as a Supernumerary from 2200 until 0600.

Enclosure (3)

SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

1. Reference (b) provides for two armed emergency squads and a picket boat patrol in the event of danger to the ship. In addition, the embarked Marine Detachment, the ship's fire party, and three machine gun squads are available to the Officer of the Deck. In the event of danger to the ship, as prescribed in paragraph 6 of the basic instruction, the Officer of the Deck will have the following word passed over the 1 MC.

a. Pass the word over all circuits of the 1 MC as the situation dictates:

(1) "All hands take special security precautions. Fire Party muster at Repair Locker ONE BRAVO."

(2) "All hands take special security precautions. Fire Party muster at Repair Locker ONE BRAVO. Muster the machine gun squads in Hangar Bay One."

2. When the word is passed over the 1 MC, the following action will be taken:

a. The duty armorer will man the ship's armory to issue weapons and ammunition as required.

b. The Marine Detachment will be armed and equipped as directed by the senior Marine on board from the Marine Detachment's armory. When armed and equipped, the senior Marine on board will muster the Marine Detachment in Hangar Bay One, and report to the Officer of the Deck for instructions.

c. The armed emergency squads, as provided for by reference (a), and the machine gun squads report to the ship's armory to draw arms and ammunition. When armed, each squad leader will muster his squad at the location set forth in reference (a) and report to the Officer of the Deck for instructions. The machine gun squads will muster in Hangar Bay One. The machine gun squads shall be organized in accordance with enclosure (5). In order to command as much of the waterline as possible, they will normally be deployed with one machine gun located in each quarter of the ship. The two remaining machine guns will be held in reserve on the Hangar Deck for use as necessary.

d. The armed picket boat crew will draw arms and ammunition from the ship's armory and man the picket boat. When the picket boat is manned and ready, the Boat Officer will report to the Officer of the Deck for instructions.

e. Duty EOD personnel shall report to the Officer of the Deck and be prepared to remove any explosives or mines attached to the ship and to inspect the underwater hull if necessary.

Enclosure (4)

RANGERINST 5500.2
29 July 1969

f. The ship's fire party shall muster and report to the Officer of the Deck. They shall be prepared to cope with any fires caused by demonstrators, terrorists, or by other causes.

Enclosure (4)

-2-

COMPOSITION OF ARMED EMERGENCY SQUADS AND MACHINE GUN SQUADS

1. The armed emergency squads provided by the Air and Weapons Departments shall consist of the following:

<u>NO.</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>DUTY</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>DEPT</u>
1		PO3	Squad Leader	M-1 Carbine	Air/Weapons
3		SN/AN	Fire Team Leader	M-1 Rifle	Air/Weapons
9		SA/AA	Rifleman	M-1 Rifle	Air/Weapons

2. Each of the three machine gun squads shall consist of the following:

<u>NO.</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>RATE</u>	<u>DUTY</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>DEPT</u>
1		PO2	Squad Leader	M-1 Carbine	Deck/AIMD/Weps
2		PO3	Fire Team Leader	M-1 Carbine	Deck/AIMD/Weps
2		PFC/PVT	Machine Gunner	MG/Pistol	MARDET
2		FN/FA	Asst. Machine Gunner	Pistol	Eng
4		SN/SA	Ammunition Carrier	M-1 Carbine	Deck



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
USS RANGER CVA 61
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601

Canc frp: DEC 72

RANGERNOTE 5510
05
11 April 1972

USS RANGER NOTICE 5510

Subj: Special Security Precautions in Port

1. Purpose. To promulgate Special Security Precautions that will ensure immediate response to various emergency situations.

2. General. Operation Babylon is the code name for initiating those Special Security Precautions necessary to protect the ship against bomb threats, dissident crowds and any other emergency situation demanding immediate action and/or increased physical security. Operation Babylon will be set in three ascending conditions, each requiring specific actions/preparations.

3. Action. Upon being alerted to a situation requiring increased security precautions, the Officer of the Deck shall cause to be announced "Operation Babylon" in the readiness condition required.

a. Condition III. The following events will occur:

(1) Command Duty Officer and Operations Duty Officer to the Quarterdeck.

(2) Alert Eight proceed to the Hangar Deck adjacent to the Quarterdeck and standby for specific instructions.

(3) Armed Marines to each brow.

(4) Communications Watch Officer stand by in Main Communications.

(5) Officer in Charge of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (if embarked) lay to the Quarterdeck.

(6) Duty Boat/Life Boat Crew man their boat.

(7) OOD/CDO notify the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer.

(8) CDO initiate preparation of OPREP THREE Report.

(9) Medical Department make emergency preparations.

(10) Man Signal Bridge. Prepare to activate searchlights during night hours.

(11) ACDO muster Departmental Duty Officers in Hangar Bay ONE.

08158

ENCLOSURE (26)

RANGERNOTE 5510
05
11 April 1972



(12) CMAA muster with the OOD.

(13) CMAA and duty MAA muster in Hangar Bay ONE with ACDO with three Walkie-talkie radios.

b. Condition II. The following events will occur;

(1) All steps in Condition III.

(2) Secure all brows.

(3) MARDET muster in berthing space.

(4) MAA Force muster at the MAA Shack.

c. Condition I. The following events will occur:

(1) All steps in Condition III and II.

(2) MARDET proceed to Hangar Bay ONE for assignment.

(3) CMAA and duty MAA proceed to Hangar Bay ONE.

(4) Man sponson watches (MARDT).

(5) Engineering provide portable spotlights (during night hours).

(6) In-Port Fire Party muster at Repair Locker ONE BRAVO (1B).

(7) Division DCPO's muster in Hangar Bay ONE.

(8) Two corpsman lay to Quarterdeck with B-2 bags.

(9) Commence search as directed by CDO. (MARDT, MAA & DCPO's).

(10) Evacuate threatened area when directed by CDO (MARDT & MAA).

(11) Launch Duty Life Boat as directed by CDO.

4. Effective Date. This notice is effective upon issue and will remain in effect until the above special security precautions are incorporated in the RANGER Security Instruction under preparation.

Distribution:
NAVAIRLANT/NAVAIRPAC CV SHIP INST 5605.1
List I (Less R), Case B

Authenticated by:

B6
Ship's Secretary

INCIDENT ON BOARD RANGER

- 25 MAY 72 SOS stickers appeared on doors and bulkheads throughout spaces on the 03 level and the After Mess Decks.
- 29 MAY 72 SOS stickers appeared on doors and pamphlets were stuck under the door of PAO, ADMIN, PERS and various other spaces on the 2nd deck.
- 7 JUN 72 Conversation overheard on sound powered circuit stating that when the ship moored there was to be a mass exodus from the ship without waiting for liberty to commence.
- 27 JUN 72 Fire hoses were found cut with what appeared to be a pen knife at fire stations #8 and #16.
- 29 JUN 72 Informants reported that personnel from AIR and ENG Departments planned a mass UA and missing movement when the ship got underway on 5 July.
- 7 JUL 72 Lock was discovered to be pried open on an inspection plate and a paint scraper found in reduction gear in #4 MMR.
- 9 JUL 72 Bomb threat was phoned to QD utilizing ship's service three digit telephone.
Telephone call to Engineering ordered evaporator secured.
Lenses to all battle lanterns leading to #2 Auxiliary were broken.
Damage to tachometer and lube oil pressure guage to #2 Ship's Service Turbo Generator.
- 10 JUL 72 Inspection of reduction gear revealed 12" stud had caused damage to reduction gear when attempting to get underway for sea.
SOS pamphlets and writing on bulkheads and doors on 2nd deck and in heads were found.
- 11 JUL 72 Second 12" stud was found in reduction gear.
Valve was found dismantled to blow down valve to #2 catapult.

08134

ENCLOSURE RST

LISTING OF TEMPORARY NUCLEAR PROPULSION ENGINEERS PRESENTLY
ONBOARD RANGER

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>RATE</u>
A	0	-
E	8	EM3
R	0	-
P-1	2	MM3
P-2	7	MM3
P-3	0	-
P-4	<u>0</u>	-
TOTAL	17	

ENCLOSURE (27)

USS RANGER (CVA-61)
FPO San Francisco 96601

ENGEPTINST 5400.4
62

25 APR 1968

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTION 5400.4

From: Engineer Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Cold Iron Watch

Ref: (a) CVA-61 ENG FORM 9401/5 (Current edition)

Purpose. To establish the functions, duties and responsibilities of cold iron watch.

Cancellation. ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTION 5400.1 of 1 March 1962, subject: Cold Iron Watch

2. Action

- a. The basic function of the cold iron watch will be to patrol dead stations; report and, in an emergency, correct any abnormal conditions; maintain security, watertight integrity and eliminate fire hazards.
- b. A cold iron watch will be stationed in each machinery room not steaming and where personnel are not working. This watch will consist of a qualified fireman in each dead space.
- c. The watch will detect and prevent flooding, fire, fire hazards, theft, sabotage, or any other abnormal condition. No unauthorized personnel will be allowed in dead spaces.
- d. No man will leave his space until properly relieved.
- e. The watch will report immediately, to Central Control, any abnormal conditions. Reports will be made hourly when conditions are normal.
- f. The duty BTC and MMC, assisted by other petty officers, shall insure that all watch standers under their respective cognizance are properly instructed and that the watch is properly stood.
- g. Specific duties and responsibilities are as outlined in reference (a).

B6 - 1

Distribution:
ENGEPT 5605.1
List I, Case A

ENCLOSURE 28

QUALIFICATIONS OF ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OFFICERS IN USS
RANGER (CVA 61)

1. Engineer Officer:

CDR , USN

Engineering Duty Officer

Reported in May 1971 for a 2 year tour

2. Main Propulsion Assistant:

LCDR

Surface Warfare Officer (1110)

Previous engineering experience as Engineer Officer in
USNA destroyer 600# plant

Reported in April for 18 mos tour

3. P-1 Division Officer

Ensign

OCS June 1971

Mechanical Engineering

1 Year experience with Eastman Kodak

No previous engineering experience

4. P-2 Division Officer

LTJG

OCS June 1971

Mechanical Engineering Degree

Graduate of 6 week Prospective Engineer Course

Previously Engineering Officer of an ATF

5. Prospective P-2 Division Officer

LT

LDG 6301

*All redactions
are B-6.*

ENCLOSURE 09

Ex BT1/WO

Low pressure boiler experience as Boilers Officer in Hancock

~~Has been onboard for 2 weeks~~

Has been onboard for 2 weeks

6. Assistant F-2 Division Officer

Ensign

USNA JUL 71

7. P-3 Division Officer and Boilers Officer

LTJG

OCS

CHEMICAL ENGINEERING DEGREE

No previous engineering experience

Due to be detached

8. Prospective P-3 Div Off/Boilers Officer

LT

NESEP

Ex ET3

Electronics Engineer

No previous engineering experience

9. P-4 Division Officer (Auxiliaries)

CWO

Reported DEC 71

Six years of experience as nuclear submariner

10. R DIVISION OFFICER

LTJG

Detaches in AUG

No relief assigned

Anticipate ENSIGN relief

*All redactions
are B-6.*

11. Repair Officer
LT
LDC
Detaches in AUG/WARRANT OFFICER Relief ordered
12. Material Officer/Ship's Fire Marshall
WO2
Detaches AUG, No relief ordered
13. Damage Control Assistant
LCDR
LDO
Reported APR 72
14. Electrical Officer
LT
LDO
Detaches in AUG
LT LDO ordered in
15. Electrical Material Officer
WO
Detaches in November
16. A DIV Officer
LTJG
USNA
SS Trained, Conventional Boats, then surfaced
Departs in OCT
17. A DIV MATERIAL
WO2
19. SM COORDINATOR
LTJG

*All redactions
are B-6*

Detaches in AUS


Insign relief ordered in

19. Engineering Department ADMIN OFF

ENS *Bye*

OCS

Journalism



Polaroid MP-3
Plus-X (K6)
PHAN -

10 July 72
2252 hrs.


ASA 125
- B-6

ENCLOSURE (30)



Polaroid MP-3
 Plus-X (K15) ASA 125
 PHAN
 10 July 72
 2252 hrs.
 B-6

ENCLOSURE (30)



Polaroid MP-3
Plus-X (fxs) ASA 125
PHAN-

10 July 72
2252 hrs.

136

MEASUREMENT (30)


Polaroid MP-3

10 July 72
2252 hrs

Plus - X (hrs) ASA 125

PHAN


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
ENCLOSURE (50)

ENCLOSURE (39)





ENCLOSURE (3)




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B.6

POLAROID MP-3
PLUS-X 4X5

ENCLOSURE (3)



12 JUL 68
2006


PHAN

V36

POLYAROID MAP-3

PHS-V HVS

ENCLOSURE (3)





12 JULY 22
2006


PHAN — B56

POLAROID MP-3
PLUS-X 4X5


ENCLOSURE (2)




ENCLOSURE (52)




ENCLOSURE (B)







ENCLOSURE 133



ENCLOSURE 33




ENCLOSURE 133



ENCLOSURE (33)




ENCLOSURE (37)






ENCLOSURE (3)

TOP



Looking down to stbd at lower pinion and bull gear. Aft stbd quadrant cover not removed. Object is threaded bolt approx 12" X 1 1/2".


ENCLOSURE 134



Looking down through the upper aft inspection port before quadrant cover was removed. Camera physically positioned slightly inside inspection port. Object shown is threaded bolt approx 12" X 1 1/2".

ENCLOSURE (34)

TOP




Looking from port. at mating surface of lower pinion and Bull gear, object shown is one (1) threaded bolt approx 12" by 1 1/2".


ENCLOSURE 84

477

ENCLOSURE (2)

from front looking at wiring - see lower
gear. Object is threaded bolt approx 1/2"






TOP

AFT


Looking down through the upper aft inspection port before quadrant cover was removed. Camera physically positioned slightly inside inspection port. Object shown is threaded bolt approx 12" X 1 1/2".

ENCLOSURE (34)



... ..

FABRIK VARESE (54)




TOP

AFT

ENCLOSURE (34)

Looking down through the upper aft inspection port before quadrant cover was removed. Camera physically positioned slightly inside inspection port. Object shown is threaded bolt approx 12" X 1 1/2".



Looking stbd at lower pinion and second reduction ball gear. Object is threaded bolt approx 12" X 1 1/2".


ENCLOSURE (34)

TOP

ENCLOSURE (35)

Port side looking aft at upper pinion and second reduction bull gear. Shows damage every fourth tooth.



AFT





Looking down aft from stbd at second reduction bull gear and upper pinion. Indicates damage on aft trailing edge of bull gear.

TOP




Looking to port at 2nd Reduction Bullgear, upper and lower pinion. Shows damage to trailing edge of Bullgear.

ENCLOSURE (3T)

Looking straight down on port side at upper pinion and
Bullgear. Shows damage to 2nd Reduction Bullgear.


TOP

ENCLOSURE (R)



Damage to second reduction bull gear
from shift side below lower pinion.


TOP





TOP

From top looking down aft
on port side of upper pinion
second reduction gear. Damage
shown on bull gear.




Looking straight down from starboard at damaged lower pinion 2nd reduction gear.

ENCLOSURE (37)




ENCLOSURE 37

Looking straight down from starboard at damaged Pin Reduction Bullgear.



ENCLOSURE (38)



1200


ASTERN

1200

PAIX

1

ENCLOSURE 38



ENCLOSURE (329)

ENCLOSURE (39)

ENCLOSURE (34)

ENCLOSURE (3)

Did you like what

did to the ship?

Went there more
some

Signed

N - T

to peace

PS Stay

away from the

generals this

weekend

ENCLOSURE (3)

ENCLOSURE (4)

CATCHES CHECK-BUCKET

7-13-72	1910	ALL SECURE
7-13-72	1947	All Secure
7-13-72	2007	Call Secure
7-13-72	2007	All Secure
7-13-72	2117	Call Secure
7-13-72	2152	All Secure
7-13-72	2200	all secure
7-13-72	2252	All Secure
7-13-72	2310	all secure
7-13-72	2405	all secure
7-13-72	2432	" "
7-14-72	0109	" "
7-14-72	0137	all secure
7-14-72	0155	all secure
7-14-72	0238	" "
7-14-72	0310	" "
7-14-72	0495	" "
7-14-72	0439	All Secure
7-14-72	0590	all secure
7-14-72	0637	all SECURE
7-14-72	0710	all secure
7-14-72	0822	partly received by ALL Secure
7-14-72	0965	ALL SECURE
7-14-72	0945	ALL SECURE
7-14-72	1034	All Secure
7-14-72	1105	All Secure

Propably Released by


Bbb


7-14-72 1215
 7-14-72 1300
 7-14-72 1338

DO NOT
 HIDE
 SP5

ENCLOSURE (46)

ENCLOSURE (4)





ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

A E R P1 P2 P3 P4

RATE	A	D	RATE	A	D												
ENC	1	1	EMCM	1	0	HTCM	1	0	MMCS	0	0	MMCS	1	1	BRC	1	1
EN1	1	1	EMCS	1	1	HTC	4	4	MMC	2	2	MMC	1	1	BTC	1	1
EN2	2	3	EMC	2	3	HT1	7	4	MM1	4	3	MM1	4	2	BT1	2	4
EN3	7	12	EM1	8	10	HT2	23	15	MM2	8	3	MM2	8	4	BT2	8	7
ENFN	0	5	EM2	23	13	HT3	15	28	MM3	7	8	MM3	7	12	BT3	7	5
ENFA	0	1	EM3	32	25	HTFN	2	11	MMFN	8	8	MMFN	8	15	BTFN	7	4
MMC	1	1	EMFN	11	7	HTFA	0	3	MMFA	0	1	MMFA	0	1	BTFA	0	3
MM1	8	8	EMFA	0	4	FN	40	5	BTCS	0	1	BTCS	1	0	MMC	0	0
MM2	10	11	ICC	1	1	FA	0	8	BT1	1	2	BT1	1	2	MM1	1	1
MM3	21	7	IC1	1	2	MRI	0	1	BT2	2	1	BT2	2	3	FA	0	8
MMFN	4	5	IC2	3	8	YNSN	0	1	BT3	10	5	BT3	11	9	MM2	1	0
MMFA	0	1	IC3	13	12				BT3	10	10	BT3	11	9	BR1	1	0
MRC	1	1	ICFN	8	3				BTFN	12	4	BTFN	12	4	MMFN	0	1
MR1	1	1	ICFA	0	1				BTFA	0	4	BTFA	0	2	FN	15	9
MR2	3	1	FN	25	13				FN	40	18	FN	40	11	FA	0	2
MR3	5	5	FA	0	8				FA	0	8	FA	0	18			
MMFN	1	1							FR	0	8	FR	0	0			
MMFA	0	2															
FN	40	28															
FA	0	8															
HT3	0	1															

TOTAL	A	D	TOTAL	A	D												
TOTAL	104	0	TOTAL	140	0	TOTAL	100	0	TOTAL	105	0	TOTAL	105	0	TOTAL	42	0
TAD	S		TAD	29		TAD	3		TAD	1		TAD	1		TAD	2	

	A	D
BT	95	77
MM	107	113
EM	78	83
EN	11	23
HT	46	65
MR	11	12
IC	23	25
BR	2	1

TOT 380 375

TOTAL TAD 35

TGO

NUCS
 A NONE
 E 8 EM3
 R NONE
 P 1 2 MM3
 P 2 7 MM3
 P 3
 P 4

YN3 1
 SN 3

UPDATED
 14 JULY 1972

ENCLOSURE 42

GRAND TOTAL 562

2 August 1972

Statement of LCDR _____, USN,

I have reviewed both the Smooth Engineering Log and the Supervisor of the Watch Log for the period 30 June 1972 thru 8 July 1972 with regard to jacking of Number Four Main Engine.

On 30 June 1972 at 1840 the Jacking Gear was engaged and the Main Engine jacked for the purpose of cooling the engine while changing status from underway to Cold Iron. Securing from the Jacking Process was not logged. However operator personnel recall it was secured sometime between 0200 and 0400 on 1 July 1972.

Number Four Main Engine was not jacked again until approximately 0900 8 July 1972.

All redaction
are B-6

ENCLOSURE (43)

TVZCZCNUC279

RUHBERA RUMJUA0369 2181 11000 RUHBERA RULSSAA

RUMJUA
ZNY CCCCC
ZCC

R 050356Z AUG 72

FM ADMIN COMNAVAFSPA0 SDIEGO CA

TO ALCARPAC

INFO RUHBERA/CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

RULSSAA/NAVSHIPSYS COMNAVSTA WASH DC

RUMJUA/NAVINSERVO SDIEGO CA

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L //NO5500//

REDUCTION GEAR SECURITY (U)

1. (C) A RECENT REDUCTION GEAR CASUALTY EMPHASIZES THE NEED TO IMPROVE PROTECTION OF THE MAIN REDUCTION GEARS FROM DELIBERATELY PLACED FOREIGN OBJECTS.

2. (C) AS AN AID IN DETECTING UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO MAIN REDUCTION GEARS THE FOLLOWING ACTION IS DIRECTED:

A. PLACE A LENGTH OF HIGH VISIBILITY (RED, YELLOW OR WHITE) HEAT SHRINK TUBING SIZED TO FIT THE DIAMETER OF THE MAIN REDUCTION GEAR COVER SECURING STUD BETWEEN THE TOP OF THE SECURING NUT AND THE TOP OF THE STUD, CUT TO LENGTH SO THAT THE TUBING DOES NOT EXTEND OVER THE END OF THE STUD, MARK THE HOLE FOR THE PADLOCK HASP AND PUNCH OUT PRIOR TO SHRINKING (A STANDARD PAPER PUNCH IS

DIB

5 AUG 72 10 19Z

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

PAGE TWO RUMJUA0369 C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUITABLE FOR THIS OPERATION), ALIGN PRE PUNCHED HOLES WITH HOLE IN STUD AND SHRINK INTO PLACE WITH A HEAT GUN. THIS INDICATOR CAN ONLY BE REMOVED BY DESTRUCTION AND IS EASILY REPLACED AFTER QUARTERLY OR OTHER INSPECTIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ENGINEERING OFFICER.

3. (C) IF UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO GEAR SETS IS SUSPECTED, EVERY EFFORT UP TO REMOVAL OF CASINGS OR SECTIONS OF CASING MUST BE EXERTED TO ALLOW SIGHTING OF ALL AREAS WHERE FOREIGN MATERIAL COULD BE LODGED BEFORE TURNING THE REDUCTION GEAR.

4. (C) THREE-QUARTER INCH HEAT SHRINK TUBING AVAIL IN SUPPLY SYSTEM UNDER FSN 5970-914-3117 (RED) 5970-057-3545 (YELLOW) 5970-812-1360 (WHITE). HEAT GUN SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ABOARD IN EM, IC, ET OR AHEAD WORKSHOPS. VARIATIONS OF THE ABOVE PROCEDURES MAY BE USED TO DETECT UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO OTHER MACHINERY SYSTEMS OR SPACES.

5. (C) IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE DAILY PMS REQUIREMENT FOR JACKING IDLE TURBINES AND REDUCTION GEARS WILL BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE A PHYSICAL CHECK OF THE PADLOCKS AND STRONGBACKS PRIOR TO STARTING THE JACKING GEAR MOTOR.

DELE 5 JUL 73

BT

#0369

AB 6
COMAR 70-0 70-X 01-X 00A-X 00-X 0/731.1 R/01

CVA 01-0A

ENCLOSURE (44)

FIRST

~~ENDORSEMENT~~ ENDORSEMENT on COMCARDIV THREE supplemental investigative report ser 030 of 20 Sep 1972

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Judge Advocate General
Via: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of
USS RANGER (CVA 61); supplemental investigation of

Ref: (d) COMNAVAIRPAC first end ser 011/0585 of 5 Sep 1972
(e) NAVSHIPS Technical Manual

1. Readdressed and forwarded for submission with reference (a), which was forwarded to the Judge Advocate General via Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet by reference (d).
2. By reference (d), this headquarters requested additional findings, opinions and recommendations concerning the watch procedures actually in effect aboard USS RANGER (CVA 61) prior to this incident, the responsibility for any deficiencies or deviations from applicable directives, and appropriate disciplinary action, if any. This supplemental report is only partially responsive to that request.
3. Findings of fact 12 and 13 and enclosures (4), (5) and (7), cited in support of these findings, are not considered relevant to the scope of this supplemental investigation, as defined in paragraph 7 of reference (d). Due to the restricted handling of Naval Investigative Service reports requested by that agency, enclosure (7) has been removed from the supplemental report.
4. It is noted that enclosure (6) is the official directive issued by the Commanding Officer, RANGER regarding ship security vice the draft submitted as enclosure (22) of reference (a). In addition, the last sentence of finding of fact 8 is misleading when stating that "It was determined that no other foreign material was present . . ." following the jacking of the No. 4 main engine on 9 July 1972. It should be more accurately stated that responsible officers aboard RANGER concluded from the action that they had taken up to 9 July 1972 that no other foreign material was present. That conclusion proved to be erroneous.
5. In reference to paragraph 9 of reference (d), Article 9420.112 of reference (e) already mentions the use of mirrors and periscopes for inspecting gears for the presence of foreign

matter. In reference to paragraph 10 of reference (d), a PMS feedback report has been submitted recommending that the daily requirement for jacking over idle turbines be expanded to include a physical inspection of the padlocks and strongbacks to ensure integrity.

6. Due to the length of time already elapsed since this incident occurred, the operating schedule of RANGER and the recent change of command at Carrier Division THREE, this headquarters is of the opinion that the limited aspects of this incident which remain unexplored do not justify prolonging this investigation.

7. By copy of this endorsement, Commanding Officer, RANGER is directed to take appropriate action to implement recommendations 3, 4 and 5 of this supplemental report.

8. Subject to the foregoing, the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the ^Ainvestigating officer are approved.

B.6 .

v

Copy to:
COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV SEVEN
CO USS RANGER (CVA 61) (complete)



[Redacted]

IN REPLY REFER TO:

CCD-3/33/hw

5800

Ser 030

20 SEP 1972

DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL All redactions are T6

- From: Commander Carrier Division THREE
 To: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
- Subj: Damage (possible sabotage) in Engineering Spaces of USS RANGER (CVA 61); supplemental investigation of
- Ref: (a) COMCARDIV THREE ltr ser 023 of 18 Jul 1972
 (b) NAVSHIPS Technical Manual
 (c) NAVINSERVO Report Control #07-08-72N12-AL77-6 UNA of 2 Aug 1972 (NOTAL)
- Encl: (1) Summary of supplemental unsworn statement of LCDR [redacted], USN
 (2) Summary of supplemental unsworn statement of CDR [redacted], USN
 (3) Summary of supplemental unsworn statement of CAPT [redacted], USN
 (4) Charge Sheet in case of [redacted], dated 2 Aug 1972, with Additional Charge Sheet dated 23 Aug 1972
 (5) Summary of supplemental unsworn statement of CDR [redacted], USN
 (6) USS RANGER INST 5500.2A of 11 Aug 1972
 (7) NISO Report ser 827 of 7 Aug 1972

Preliminary Statement

1. A further investigation to inquire into the circumstances connected with damage to equipment on board USS RANGER (CVA 61) has been conducted as requested in the first endorsement to reference (a), to supplement the basic report, concerning the procedures actually in effect and responsibility for any deficiencies or deviations from applicable directives with regard to the subject incident.

Supplemental Findings of Fact

1. At the time reference (a) was submitted the extent of damage to the reduction gear of number four engine had not been determined nor had an estimate of the cost of repairs been made. It has since been determined that the bull gear must be replaced and the cost is estimated at \$550,000.00. (Enclosure (4) and (5) hereto.)

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years.

Classification cancelled/changed to Unclassified by authority of [redacted]

COMNAVAIRPAC MSG of [redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

20/1968 OCT 72

(Date) (Signature) [Signature]
[Signature] / E-5 COMNAVAIRPAC Legal Office
(Rank), (Ship or Station)

2. The Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA) detected the inspection port with a broken lock during a routine inspection of all main engineering spaces which commenced about 1400 on 7 July 1972. The lock was broken and he opened the inspection port and observed the condition of the reduction gears. Chief Machinist Mate *RLC* and Petty Officer First Class *RLC* assisted in this inspection. Upon discovery of a wedge-shaped metal object in the vicinity, the Engineering Officer, CDR *RLC* was notified. At that time only the inspection port which had been tampered with had been opened by the Main Propulsion Assistant. The MPA had been delegated the responsibility for custody of main reduction gear inspection port locks and keys. (Enclosure (2) to reference (a) and enclosures (1) and (2) hereto).

3. The reduction gears were inspected through the ports later in the evening (about 2000) on Friday, 7 July 1972 and no damage was detected, although a bright spot on the side of the gear casing indicated that something might have been dropped in. Inspection of the sump revealed a paint scraper and several small pieces of copalite. (Enclosures (2), (6) and (7) to reference (a) and enclosure (2) hereto).

4. Although enclosures (2) and (7) to reference (a) indicate that number 4 main engine was jacked continuously from 1415, Sunday, 9 July to 0740, Monday, 10 July, enclosures (3) and (6) to reference (a) indicate that at about 1510 on Sunday, a delay was experienced when a casualty was detected requiring securing #4 deaerating feed tank. Enclosure (6) to reference (a) indicates the DA tank casualty was repaired at about 2400 on 9 July 1972; consequently, the engine was jacked only 8 hours and 35 minutes vice the 17 hours and 25 minutes indicated in reference (a).

5. Number four main engine was secured 1 July 1972 sometime between 0200 and 0400 until approximately 0900, 8 July 1972. (Enclosure (43) to reference (a)). This is in direct violation of articles 9411.171 and 9420.114 of reference (b) which requires that engines not under steam and not in drydock be jacked daily.

6. RANGER manning deficiencies result in certain PMS checks going unaccomplished. Jacking over main engines from 1 July until 8 July was one of those daily items not accomplished. (Enclosure (2)).

7. Approximately seventeen hours elapsed from the time of the first discovery of the broken lock on the inspection plate of number four main engine and the report of suspected tampering to the Commanding Officer. (Enclosure (2) to reference (a) and enclosure (3) hereto). During this period of time the paint scraper was detected. By the time the sump was re-inspected the Commanding Officer was returning onboard (0835 Saturday, 8 July 1972). Testing of automatic bus transfer switches had caused delays in pumping the sump and jacking over the main engines. The commanding officer was then notified of the situation. (Enclosures (2) and (3)).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5800

8. Visual inspection of the reduction gears on 7 and 8 July through the inspection ports and from inside the sump while the gears were jacked over approximately three quarters of a turn failed to reveal the presence of two studs which subsequently damaged the gears when the main engine was tested on Sunday, 9 July 1972. (Reference (c) and enclosure (2) to reference (a) and enclosures (2) and (3) hereto.) No unusual noises were detected while the gear was being jacked. It was determined that no other foreign material was present and the engine was placed back in commission.
9. The inspection ports of RANGER's reduction gears are poorly positioned for the detection of foreign objects. They are designed to inspect for gear wear. (Enclosure (7) to reference (a) and enclosure (2) hereto.)
10. As stated in finding of fact number 14 in reference (a) specified watch procedures were not being strictly followed prior to this incident resulting in periods of time when the spaces are unmanned. As indicated in enclosure (2), corrective action has been taken to ensure the presence of a watchstander at all times in cold iron spaces, however, one man cannot adequately maintain surveillance of a main engineering space due to the physical layout. (Enclosure (7) and (12) to reference (a).)
11. A new comprehensive internal Security Bill has been promulgated aboard RANGER. (Enclosure (6).)
12. The Naval Investigative Service Office, Alameda has completed the investigation of the subject incident (reference (c)). Fireman Patrick *B-6* has been charged with committing the offense and the pre-trial investigation is now in progress. (Enclosures (4) and (5).)
13. The suspect has a history of insanity in the family and has a brother who has been discharged from the Army and is now in prison at Leavenworth, Kansas. He has been placed on report 8 times aboard RANGER for a total of 11 minor offenses, although he was brought to Captain's mast for only one of these offenses. (Reference (c) and enclosure (7) hereto.)

Supplemental Opinions

1. Sabotage was committed onboard RANGER on or about 1 July 1972, probably by a member of the Engineering Department.
2. The MPA found an inspection port unlocked and acted in a responsible manner when he inspected the reduction gear through that port (and only that port) prior to notifying the Chief Engineer.
3. The jacking of number four engine subsequent to discovery of the broken lock on the inspection port and the paint scraper in the sump

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did not reveal any further foreign material in the gear complex; consequently, violation of Articles 9411.171 and 9420.114 of reference (a) in not jacking the engines daily is not germane to the prevention of the resultant damage suffered by RANGER.

4. The supervision of the cold iron watch in RANGER did not adequately provide for continuous manning of the main engineering spaces. Although adequate qualified watchstanders were available and assigned to watches, standard practice was that the watchstander departed the space for head calls and to awaken his own relief, resulting in periods of time when spaces were unmanned.

5. The lack of close supervision of the one man cold iron watches made it easier for a potential saboteur to damage critical machinery; however, the physical layout of a main propulsion engine room renders prevention of sabotage by a knowledgeable member of the ship's company virtually impossible unless additional manpower is assigned to each watch.

6. While the visual inspection of the number four reduction gears for additional foreign material was unsuccessful prior to hearing metallic noises when the engine was spun, the efforts were conscientious and were representative of action normally taken/recommended by Engineering Officers.

7. While the delay in reporting the incident to the Commanding Officer did not permit or aggravate the damage, a certain lack of prompt and complete command communication is indicated.

8. Internal security has been receiving increased emphasis and command attention onboard RANGER.

9. Every step possible must be taken to make it difficult for a mischievous youth or a determined saboteur to damage naval equipment; however, the secret to success in these efforts lies in a thorough and effective screening process which will eliminate undesirables and raise the standards of all naval personnel to a point where reliability and stability are commonplace. (The suspect in this case has a history of insanity in the family, a brother who received a dishonorable discharge, and he has been placed on report an excessive number of times without being referred to the Commanding Officer.)

Supplemental Recommendations

1. In addition to pending disciplinary action against the suspect ^{B-6} is recommended that charges be preferred against anyone who failed to disclose his knowledge of the offense prior to damage to the gears.

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2. No other disciplinary action is recommended.
3. Greater emphasis must be placed on keeping command advised in a timely manner of unusual incidents onboard RANGER.
4. RANGER PMS schedules must be maintained.
5. It is recommended that RANGER disciplinary cases involving habitual offenders be referred to the Commanding Officer in a continuing effort to identify those misfits who are unsuitable for naval service.
6. In addition to the recommendation that reference (b) be modified to improve inspection techniques, it is recommended that every facility be exploited to inspect machinery when untoward actions are suspected.

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SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNSWORN STATEMENT OF
LCDR . . . B-6 . . . USN

On 1 July 1972 there was a man assigned on watch in number 4 main engine room who should have been in the space in the 1600 2000 watch. We had adequate watchstanders for one man in each space and at that time we had some petty officers assigned cold iron in an attempt to beef up the quality of the cold iron watch. The Engineering Department was in four sections at the time and we had adequate qualified personnel to stand these watches.

The keys to the inspection ports of the main reduction gears have been placed in my custody as Main Propulsion Assistant. As Main Propulsion Assistant I am responsible for the inspection and maintenance of the main propulsion machinery under the direct supervision of the Engineering Officer.

Enclosure (1)

SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNSWORN STATEMENT OF
CDR R. L. USN

At the time of the initial discovery of the broken lock on the inspection plate on number 4 main engine, I was in conference with the Commanding Officer. The Main Propulsion Assistant proceeded to open and inspect the gears through the one inspection port with the broken lock. At that time he only looked into that one port. When the MPA contacted me, we had a discussion on the phone as to the extent of the inspection. We then decided to open all the inspection covers on the inboard side and drain the sump. Due to the power testing of the automatic bus transfer switch that was going on, it was late Friday night before all the inspection ports on the inboard side of the reduction gear were opened for inspection and the sump entered and inspected. The inspection was conducted by the MPA, R. L. MML, and 2 firemen.

The MPA discussed the possibility of the lock being broken by the working party that had cleaned the gearbox. At that point, before finding the paint scraper, we considered this a very real possibility. If I should run to the Captain each time I found something remiss, we would be in continual conversation. As soon as we established that it was an overt act, ie, the paint scraper was found and the sump re-inspected for any other debris, the word was passed that the Captain was coming aboard, and I met him on the quarterdeck.

I felt that we had adequate time for a thorough inspection, that we were not due to get underway for at least two days, and that by that time indications of attempted sabotage were positively evident.

Because of the construction of the RANGER gear box and the location of the inspection ports, it's practically impossible to view the point of the gears at which the bolt or bolts were laying. The eyes and the light must be in absolute alignment to see an object which is at the mesh line of the lower pinion and the bull gear. The placement of the inspection ports is such as to provide a view of the gear teeth and not to provide access for inspection to determine the presence of foreign objects. The inspection, which included jacking the engine approximately three quarters of a turn of the bull gear, without any unusual sounds, satisfied my mind that the gear was clear of foreign objects and I so informed the Commanding Officer.

With the shortage of people there are certain PMS checks that don't get accomplished. Jacking over main engines in this case was one of those daily items that just was not accomplished.

As far as the Cold Iron watch is concerned during the first week in July, one fireman was assigned to each dead space, however, since there are no heads available, a man on watch must leave the space to relieve himself and at that time did call his own relief (this has since been corrected). The occasional check by the watch supervisor and the mans hourly call into Central Control were the only checks available to ensure he was actually on watch. Since the subject incident occurred, I have had an officer or a petty officer on continuous random tour of the spaces.

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Enclosure (2)

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Mr. ^{B-6} Field Service Engineer, General Electric Company, is onboard to assist and advise in the repairs to RANGER's reduction gear. In Mr. ^{B-6} knowledge this is the first time that jacking the main gear did not indicate the presence or absence of foreign objects. In a similar case he would have recommended mirror inspection, however, without intimate knowledge of the reduction gears it would appear to the inspector that all points accessible from the lower inspection port were visible when, in fact, the junction of the main bull gear and the lower pinion contact points were almost out of the field of vision.

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SUMMARY OF SUPPLEMENTAL UNSWORN STATEMENT OF
CAPT *P-6*, USN

At 1724, 7 July 1972, CDR *P-6* visited me in my cabin. He departed at 1824. I left the cabin at 1826 to depart the ship. At that time there had been no report of any casualty. Upon arrival back aboard RANGER the next morning at 0835 the Chief Engineer met me on the quarterdeck. We proceeded to my cabin where he gave me a full report of the subject incident, including a description of the thoroughness of the inspection. When the Chief Engineer reported that the sump had been cleaned, an object found (the paint scraper), the gears inspected for damage, the sump refilled with oil and jacked over with no unusual sounds, and then he reports that he is 100% certain there is no gear damage. I accepted that as an indication of the thoroughness of the inspection.


Enclosure (3)

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