

To my knowledge what occurred was I came back down and got rid of all the stuff off the chart table for the DLRP and told him to get a fix. He could not get a fix. I believe that the ship had come to 110. I ordered P.O. to the bridge at maybe 0513. He went up a couple of minutes before the collision occurred. He was going up the ladderwell during the time of the collision. I sent him to the pilot house. Minutes after [redacted] left for the bridge is when the collision alarm went off.

I had been looking at the NTDS console at the tracks and seeing the logs making sure things were designated. Again, I did not feel comfortable with that because I couldn't get a good idea, a mental picture of how things were going. Prior to the collision I was spending more time on the charts. Each time that I was down in Combat I was looking over the surface tracker's shoulder. I never got a report of a ship passing close aboard. After the collision somebody told me that there was a surface contact that passed approximately 1500 yards across the bow.

As CIC Watch Officer it is my job to report contacts to the bridge with its course, speed and CPA. When the ship changes course the CPA is going to change. It is my job to control the information flow so that those changes are available to the OOD. In my watch section I controlled the information by looking at the NTDS console and looking at the logs and making sure the contacts were designated and the course speeds and the CPA's were logged in. I knew that these were being passed up. [redacted] was passing up CPA information. Yes, I think sending up the information is his job. Because we did not have a SPA-25 or a track sup, he was the man. I did not make any recommendations of courses to avoid to the bridge. Yes, that is part of the CICWO's job. Normally, we would have the SPA-25 and DRT, and this would be the place that I would be going to look at the surface picture. Yes, NTDS can show CPA.

The function of the bridge console operator was taking care of the bridge status board, taking care of the lookouts. When I say taking care of I mean receiving the information and passing it on. No, I did not receive any lookout information. I encouraged the bridge console operators to coordinate with the lookouts. For example: "Okay, you are going to have a contact coming up at about 030 relative. Keep your eye out for it." I have not seen the CIC Watch Officer have CIC pass up information to the lookout. The CIC Officer is in charge of the lookout training program. Yes, the bridge console operator is an OS. His immediate supervisor when he is on the bridge is the OOD. He is part of the CIC organization. As far as the status boards he is maintaining and the information from the lookouts that he passes to the OOD-I have no way of knowing how he is doing that on a consistent basis-the OOD would be his immediate supervisor. If he was doing a poor job or wasn't doing things right, the OOD would be calling me and kicking me in the pants, saying get this man going. Only one person mans the bridge console position, mans the phone and listens to the lookouts, and puts all the courses on the status board. Yes, he is moving around while up there. No, he was not giving the bridge any courses to avoid. Nobody else was giving recommendations. Yes it is normal for the CICWO to give courses to avoid. Because the SPA-25 and the DRT were relaxed CIC had difficulty getting an effective "big picture" of what was happening with surface contracts. The surface tracker was at times changing his scale I believe for the majority of the time he had it on the 16 mile scale. The SPQ-9 was in standby the 55 was satisfactory and I did not consider bringing up the SPQ-9. The people that were that in Combat were Gallow on the bridge console. Lapedes was the air tracker, [redacted] in the NTDS, [redacted] was Watch Supervisor, [redacted] was on charts, [redacted] was [redacted], [redacted]

All redactions are B-6

My name is B-6, CW02, USN. I have been in the Navy for 16 years. I reported onboard 30NOV88 TAD, permanently assigned 20JAN89, reported onboard 23JAN89.

Lookout training was scheduled, during westward transit from San Diego, weekly. This training was intended for First division and Supply department personnel. According to SORM, CICO is Lookout Training Officer.

I can not say for sure whether lookout training other than OJT was held while in the Gulf.

I attended two or three of the training sessions to see that they were actually being held.

Lookout training package, lesson plan notebook, was held by EWC B-6. During the spring and summer of this year, training was conducted by IS1(SW) B-6 and SM2(SW) B-6.

Sound powered phone procedures are contained in the lookouts PQS booklet.

I was not present when reporting procedures were taught, but in conversations with lookouts I received indications that they were taught. On various occasions while in the Arabian Gulf, I questioned lookouts on watch and received satisfactory answers from all except one lookout. This particular lookout had joined KINKAID in Bahrain a few days before. At that time I instructed the BMOW to put an experienced lookout with him and place him under instruction. The BMOW informed me the man was under instruction and his OJT instructor was in conversation with the bridge console operator concerning possible contacts. I verified this to be correct. The unsatisfactory answer I had received concerned A/C position angle reporting.

Lookout training records and list of qualifiers were to be held by the First Lieutenant.

CIC watchbill was set up in four sections after departure from the Gulf for condition IV open ocean steaming. One fourth of OI division on watch and one fourth available as on call if required. The premise here was to be able to go port and starboard again with a minimum of confusion.

I have examined TRADA reports submitted for exercises not contained in the latest COMNAVSURFPAC report. Navigation exercises not shown are:

MOB-N-2-SF dtd 891101
MOB-N-5-SF dtd 891008
MOB-N-7-SF dtd 890904 and 891113,

These were reported on TRADA reports subsequent to TRADA report #121 which is the latest in use by COMNAVSURFPAC.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

B-6
Signature

20JAN89
Date

B-6
LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

ENCLOSURE 25

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of dereliction of duty and that:

- a. I have the right to remain silent.) Init.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.) Init.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.) Init.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.) Init.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.) Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent) Init.
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement.) Init.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning.) Init.
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.) Init.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind have been exercised against me.) Init.

(Witness Signature) / 16 NOV 89 (Date) (Signature) TMC / 16 NOV 89 (Date)

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

All redactions are B-6

MY NAME IS . MY RATE IS TMC(AW/SW). I HAVE BEEN IN THE NAVY FOR 12 YEARS, 5 MONTHS AND 7 DAYS. I HAVE BEEN ONBOARD KINKAID FOR 9 MONTHS AND 14 DAYS.

I ASSUMED THE WATCH AS JOOD APPROX. 0337, RELIEVING STGC . PART OF HIS PASS DOWN WAS THAT THEY WERE CHANGING COURSE TO AVOID SHIPPING. THEY WERE ONLY REPORTING CONTACTS 25 DEG OFF EITHER BOW, THE RANGE OF CONTACTS TO REPORT WERE NOT GIVEN AS A PART OF PASS DOWN. WHEN I ASSUMED THE WATCH THE CONTACTS CONCERNED WERE ZULU AND YANKEE. AT APPROX, 0410 BOTH WERE PAST CPA AND WERE OPENING. ABOUT 10 MIN LATER THE CIC SCOPE OPERATOR DESIGNATED SEVERAL CONTACTS, WHICH WERE ALPHA ALPHA, WHICH HAD A CPA OF 3000YDS(IT WAS REPORTED TO THE CAPTAIN) AND ALPHA BRAVO, IT HAD A CPA OF 2,500YDS (IT TOO WAS REPORTED TO THE CAPTAIN). (CPA TIME WAS APPROX. 0425 TO 0430 FOR BOTH CONTACTS) NEXT CONTACTS WERE ALPHA CHARLIE, ALPHA DELTA AND ALPHA ECHO. ALL THREE CONTACTS WERE GROUPED TOGETHER ON THE RADAR, I LATER VISUALLY SIGHTED ALL THREE. DURING THIS TIME THE OOD HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE NEW CONTACTS. HE WAS AT THE QUARTERMASTERS TABLE DISCUSSING THE CHARTED DEPTH OF THE CHANNEL. LTJG CAME UP FROM CIC AND TALKED WITH THE OOD. BOTH WERE TRYING TO DECIDE IF THE BEACON THAT WE WERE SEEING WAS THE RIGHT ONE WITH QM3 I WALKED OVER TO THE TABLE TO LOOK AT WHAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT. WHEN THEY STEPPED AWAY FORM THE TABLE, I ASKED QM3 WHAT WAS THE OOD AND MR. SO CONCERNED ABOUT? AND HE SAID "THE WATER DEPTH". THEN I ASKED IF PUTTING THE FATHOMETER IN FEET WOULD THAT HELP THE SITUATION. HE SAID YES, I THEN CALLED SONAR CONTROL, TALKED WITH STG2 AND TOLD HIM TO SWITCH THE FATHOMETER TO FEET (AND HE DID). THE READING BEFORE THE SWITCH WAS 11 FATHOMS, AFTER THE SWITCH WAS 62 FEET. ALSO AT THE SAME TIME DISCUSSION WAS STILL GOING ON ABOUT THE BUOY. THE OOD THEN TOLD ME THAT HE WANTED TO STEER ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE BUOY BECAUSE THE WATER WAS DEEP THERE. I THEN WALKED BACK OVER TO THE JOOD TABLE AND AS I WAS GOING THERE I SAW ONE OF THE SHIPS FLASH A BRIGHT WHITE LIGHT. AT THIS TIME SHE LOOKED TO BE ABOUT 5000 TO 6000YDS AWAY BEARING 030 RELATIVE WITH A TARGET ANGLE OF ABOUT 330. I THE LIGHT WAS BRIGHT ENOUGH TO LIGHT THE ENTIRE BRIDGE. SAID TO THE OOD "SIR DID YOU SEE THEM LIGHTS." HE SAID "NO,". HE THEN CALLED UP TO THE SIGNAL BRIDGE AND ASKED SM2 "SIGS DID YOU SEE THAT LIGHT" SIGS REPLY WAS "NO SIR." I THEN SAID TO THE OOD "SIR THAT'S THE GUY WE NEED TO WATCH". LATER AFTER THE LIGHTS HAD FLASHED WE WENT TO THE STBD BRIDGE WING, I SAID "THAT GUY THERE (POINTING AT THE SHIP) IS THE ONE WHO FLASHED AT US". THE OOD SAID THAT MUST HAVE BEEN SOMETHING ON LAND. ALSO I COULD SEE ALL THREE SHIPS PORT RUNNING LIGHTS. ONE SHIP TURNED TO HIS PORT (ALPHA CHARLIE), WHICH DID NOT POSE A PROBLEM. SHE DID A STBD PASS APPROX. 2000YDS CPA, BEARING WAS 090. IN THE MEAN TIME ALPHA BRAVO LOOKED KIND OF CLOSE, SO I ASKED THE CIC CONSOLE OPERATOR THE CPA ON HIM. HE SAID "700YDS". I SAID TO THE OOD "SIR THAT'S KIND OF CLOSE ISN'T IT" HIS REPLY WAS "OH! THAT'S A 1000YDS, NO PROBLEM". THE SHIP PASSED AT APPROX. 700YDS ACROSS OUR BOW FROM STBD TO PORT. AFTER IT HAD PASSED I AGAIN SAW THE OTHER SHIP FLASH HIS LIGHTS, SHE WAS ABOUT 2000YDS. I THINK AT THIS TIME THE SIGNAL BRIDGE SAW IT BUT I'M NOT SURE. I SAID TO THE OOD "SIR, THIS GUY COULD BE A PROBLEM," AND HIS REPLY WAS "I'M MORE WORRIED ABOUT RUNNING AGROUND INSTEAD OF THAT SHIP". ABOUT FIVE MINUTES LATER I LOOKED AT THAT SHIP AND I COULD SEE THE COMPLETE OUTLINE OF THE SHIP. I SAID, "SIR, WE NEED TO DO SOMETHING". HE LOOKED AT THE SHIP THROUGH THE ALIDADE AND SAID "SHE'S OK, SHE HAS RIGHT BEARING DRIFT". I SAID "NO SIR, SHE HAS LEFT BEARING DRIFT". HE LOOKED A WHILE LONGER. AT THIS TIME WE WERE STEERING ON COURSE 110. WE BOTH LOOKED AGAIN AND I SAID "SIR SHE IS GOING TO HIT US", HIS ORDERS WERE CHANGE COURSE TO 100 AND FLANK 1. I GAVE THE ORDER. I ALSO TOLD THE BOS'N TO PASS THE WORD "BRACE FOR SHOCK". APPROX. 3 SEC LATER SHE COLLIDED WITH US. THE OOD STARTED BOUNCING UP AND DOWN SAYING " OH GOD HOW MANY MEN DID I

All redactions are B.6.

KILL?" I SAID TO HIM "SIR, GET IT TOGETHER" AND WE SOUNDED THE GENERAL QUARTERS ALARM AND PASSED THE WORD ABOUT THE FIRE THAT HAD BEEN REPORTED. WE THEN WENT TO THE STBD SIDE AND HEARD SOMEONE SING OUT "HELP HELP" AND "MAN OVERBOARD". WE STARTED THROWING LIFE RINGS INTO THE WATER AND RUBBER DUCKS. SOMEONE ON THE BRIDGE WING ASKED ME "CHIEF SHOULD WE THROW A SMOKE FLOAT IN THE WATER?", AND I "SAID NO THERE'S FUEL IN THE WATER". AFTER THINGS SEEMED TO BE UNDER CONTROL I (BY DIRECTION OF THE XO) WENT TO THE TORPEDO MAGAZINES TO ASSESS THE DAMAGE, BUT FIRST I HAD TO GO TO COMBAT SYSTEMS BERTHING TO GET THE KEYS TO THE MAG OFF OF STG2 RACK (CSA2 WORKCENTER SUPERVISOR) AFTER GETTING TO THE MAG AND LOOKING AT THE DAMAGE, I REPORTED BACK TO THE BRIDGE (XO) AND TOLD HIM WHAT I SAW. AFTER THIS I WENT BACK TO THE MAG AND STARTED GOING THROUGH THE RUBBLE LOOKING FOR EXPLOSIVES OR OTTO FUEL LEAKAGE.

NOTE: 1. OUR BASE COURSE WAS 136, HOWEVER WE WERE STEERING TO AVOID RUNNING AGROUND PLUS TO GET PROPER BEARING OFF THE BEACON THAT FLASHED FOUR BLINKS IN A ROW.

2. THE JOOD/CONNING OFFICER COULD NEVER OR WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO GIVE ENGINE OR RUDDER COMMANDS WITHOUT THE OOD'S DIRECTIONS/PERMISSION.

3. THE JOOD/CONNING OFFICER NEVER LEFT THE BRIDGE TO CHECK THE AFT LOOKOUTS.

4. I ONLY HANDLED THE SHIP ONCE DURING A TRAINING SITUATION, WHICH WAS A MAN OVERBOARD TRAINING FOR ALL JOOD'S WHO ROTATED THROUGH.

5. THE OOD WOULD TAKE THE CONN WHEN THE JOOD NEEDED TO MAKE A HEAD CALL.

6. THE JOOD/CONNING OFFICER DID THE CONNING, MANUEVERING BOARD AND SPA-25 RADAR SCOPE PLOTTING.

7. CIC SCOPE OPERATOR GIVES THE FIRST CONTACT REPORT, IF ANY MORE INFO IS NEEDED THE CONNING OFFICER OR WHO EVER HAD TO ASK FOR IT.

8. I HAVE NEVER BEEN TO EMERGENCY SHIP HANDLING SCHOOL.

9. DURING THIS WATCH MYSELF AND THE OOD DID NOT TALK MUCH ABOUT THE SURFACE PICTURE. HE SPENT MOST OF HIS TIME OVER ON THE CHART TABLE.

10. THE BRIDGE WATCH STANDING IS NOT FORMAL. THE HELM'SMEN DOES TALK TO THE BOS'N OF THE WATCH AND THE BRIDGE DID SOMETIMES GET A LITTLE NOISY.

11. I DO NOT REMEMBER AT ANY TIME IF THE BRIDGE TO BRIDGE RADIO WAS ON, NOR DID I HEAR A VESSEL CALLING OUR SHIP.

11. I WAS QUALIFIED AS JOOD 24 OCT 1989.

12. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I'D EVER STOOD WATCH WITH MR. WILLIAMS.

13. THE TIME I HAD THE FATHOMETER SWITCHED TO FEET WAS ABOUT 0430-0445.

14. BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION AND THE EVENTS THAT WERE GOING ON ON THE BRIDGE THERE WERE NO SCOPE HEAD OR MOBOARD DONE ON EITHER OF THESE CONTACTS.

15. WHILE ON THE 124 DEGREE COURSE I SAW A WHITE LIGHT FLASHING OFF THE PORT BOW THAT WOULD DO 4 QUICK FLASHES, GO DARK AND THEN REPEAT. WHEN I CAME TO THE 110 DEGREE COURSE THE LIGHT WAS THEN ABOUT 10 TO 15 DEGREES OFF MY STARBOARD BOW. WHEN THE SHIP FLASHED IT'S LIGHTS AT US FOR THE FIRST TIME IT WAS ABOUT 10 TO 15 DEGREES TO THE RIGHT OF THE WHITE FLASHING LIGHT.

I DO HEREBY SWEAR OR AFFIRM THAT THE ABOVE STATEMENT REFLECTS THE TRUTH TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE

SIGNATURE _____ DATE 19 NOV 89

LT, JAGC, USNR
OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO
ADMINISTER OATHS BY
10 USC 936(9)(1)

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are B-6

Looking up to flight deck I realized a lot of personnel were milling around so I shouted go get a AFFF hose from the hose reel and get some foam going from above. HTC emptied Repair III to the fantail, and had additional OBA's, canisters, hoses, etc., brought from Repairs II and V. Providing me with additional OBA men which I sent to relieve hose team personnel and investigator teams looking for flooding and any fires not previously known about. The port fantail P-250 was rigged and running in 15-20 minutes. I sent a hose team in through aft decon to aft starboard torpedo magazine athwartship passageway. DC3 and FC2 were courageous in their firefighting efforts here. They remained on their hose and continued firefighting even during the explosion, resulting from OTTO fuel cook off.

Eventually, about 25-30 minutes into the fire, I had HT1 rig the port P-250 to supply #4 AFFF station in order to lite off bilge sprinkling in JP-5 pump room to cover with foam blanket and to have it available for #3 GTG. When we energized bilge sprinkling to JP-5 pump room, it ran for a few seconds then stopped. It did however provide some foam to the space and the bilge pocket. Toward the end of the fire, HT1 did open port firemain loop aft to AFFF #4 and isolated it after the station riser but we maintained the P-250 connection just in case. To contain the fire we had a 1) hose entering from forward starboard torpedo magazine door 2) aft aftwarthship torpedo magazine passageway 3) HT shop athwarthship section toward machine shop providing cooling and fire boundary protection 4) starboard seasparrow deck 5) flight deck. I might add that the 2 1/2" brought to use on flight deck from hangar firestation, the bail and ball pin sheared and was no good. The nozzle was replaced and was eventually replaced by a 1 1/2" foam hose. Approximately 10-15 minutes into the fire the MS's were providing juice, water, UHT milk, soda's and sandwiches to fire fighters.

MSC(SW) set up OBA canister change-out on port seasparrow deck. Procured men from Repair II and rounded up OBA's and canisters from the OBA lockers around the ship.

IS1(SW) assisted by taking names and OBA lite-off times of OBA men entering as hose teams and/or investigators. I was also ensuring that anyone I sent in, to perform a task was not alone. (Two man rule). Utilizing the ship's walkie talkie various times I relayed information to bridge for further relay to DCC to ensure they were getting the picture and status.

Approximately 0700, was next time I looked at my watch, when I remember the time. At this point we had the fire out at least 15-20 min. With the fire and reflash watch set, additionally cooling and some overhaul began utilizing the NFTI with outstanding results showing us where the hot spots in the magazine were that needed cooling.

I received word that the CHENG and DCA wanted me to do a personal investigation and report to DC Central. This I did, and gave them as detailed report as I could at the time. After this DC1 came to me and reported that he had dewatered the escape trunk to JP-5 pump room and was not flooded as previously suspected. DC1 and I investigated JP-5 pump room tightening several dog nuts on the door and decided we would need to get it shored. Due to minor leakage we could not stop and the fact that it opens inward. Later that day we had to shore the aft IC room door.


All redactions are TS-6.

In closing I'd like to say, I believe there are some minor details I overlooked or am unaware took place. The bottom line here as far as the Damage Control it was a "Superb Effort" on the part of all hands involved. We trained for this type of scenario and did well. All the training paid off with dividends. I am extremely proud of the "courageous" effort of these men.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Decm (80) , B-6
Signature

Nov 89
Date



LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

MY NAME IS . I AM A CHIEF HULL TECHNICIAN. I HAVE BEEN IN THE NAVY FOR 11 YEARS. I REPORTED ONBOARD KINKAID 31OCT88. AT THE TIME OF IMPACT, I WAS IN THE CPO MESS STUDYING. UPON IMPACT, I EXITED THE MESS TO MAKE MY WAY TO REPAIR LOCKER 3. WHILE RUNNING DOWN THE PORT SIDE I ONLY SAW 3 OR 4 PEOPLE GOING FORWARD. THE SMOKE AT THIS POINT WAS MINIMAL AROUND SUPPLY BERTHING. AS I WENT DOWN THE LADDER ON THE PORTSIDE BY MEDICAL I THEN SAW A SMALL AMOUNT OF SMOKE IN THE PASSAGEWAY. BY THE TIME I GOT TO REPAIR LOCKER 3, I STILL DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND I WAS SHAKING AS I UNLOCKED THE REPAIR LOCKER. AT THAT POINT, GSM2 WAS WITH ME HELPING ME. I DIRECTED HIM TO GET INTO AN OBA. MY IMMEDIATE GOAL WAS TO ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH DCC. I FIRST TRIED THE DC WIFCOM. KNOWING THEY WOULD BE PRESET TO CHANNEL 1, I SWITCHED THE WIFCOM IN REPAIR 3 TO CHANNEL 1. I TRIED TO REACH THEM NUMEROUS TIMES TO NO AVAIL. I THEN TRIED THE 21MC AGAIN TO NO AVAIL. AT THIS POINT THERE WAS 4 OR 5 PEOPLE IN OBA'S. I SENT THEM IN GROUPS OF TWO TO BEGIN INVESTIGATING, SETTING ZEBRA AND ENSURING PEOPLE WERE OUT OF CBS, ENG AND SUP BERTHING. IT WAS AT THIS POINT, I PUT ON AN OBA MYSELF.

I THEN HEARD OVER THE 1MC THERE A FIRE IN THE STBD AFT REFUELING PIT, SO I TOOK 2 WIFCOMS WITH ME AND WENT TO THE FANTAIL TO SEE WHAT EFFORTS I COULD COORDINATE THERE. UPON GETTING TO THE FANTAIL I SAW DCCM(SW) WAS ON THE SEASPARROW DECK AND I WENT THERE. HE DIRECTED ME TO TAKE A TEAM INTO THE STATEROOM AREAS TO CHECK ALL THE STATEROOMS. I TOOK GSM3 AND ANOTHER PERSON THROUGH THE STATEROOMS TO INVESTIGATE THAT ALL PERSONNEL GOT OUT. AFTER DOING THAT WE WENT BACK TO THE SEASPARROW DECK AND REPORTED TO DCCM(SW) TART THAT IT LOOKED LIKE EVERYONE GOT OUT. BY THIS TIME THE FIRST HOSE WAS ON THE SEASPARROW DECK READY TO BE CHARGED.

INITIALLY, ALOT OF PEOPLE DID NOT KNOW REPAIR 3 WAS ACCESSIBLE WHICH IS WHY IT WAS MANNED WITH VERY FEW PEOPLE. DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF SMOKE SOON AFTER, AS PEOPLE WENT THROUGH THE SUPPLY PASSAGEWAY, THEY MAY HAVE ASSUMED THE AFT END OF THE SHIP WAS ON FIRE. AS ENOUGH PERSONNEL GOT TO THE FANTAIL, I SURRENDERED MY OBA AND BEGAN EFFORTS TO BRING ALL EQUIPMENT FROM REPAIR LOCKER 3 TO THE FANTAIL AS WELL AN ANY ADDITIONAL DC EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA. I ALSO COORDINATED EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A MANPOWER POOL ON THE FANTAIL.

I THEN BEGAN EFFORTS TO REACH THE USS RENTZ ON A PORTABLE DC WIFCOM RADIO, BUT HAD TO HAVE BRIDGE TO BRIDGE TELL THE RENTZ TO COME UP ON WIFCOM. WHEN THEY DID I TOLD THEM THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE THAT WE KNEW OF AND ALSO REQUESTED THEY SEND GASOLINE, 1 P-250 AND OBA'S WHICH WAS SENT OVER ON THE FIRST BOAT FROM THE RENTZ.

MY EFFORTS AT THIS POINT WERE TO ENSURE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANPOWER POOL. I ALSO ENSURED PEOPLE COMING OUT OF THE SHIP WERE COHERENT AND THEIR EYES WERE CLEAR AND THAT THEY WERE DRINKING THE JUICES PROVIDED BY THE MS'S.

FROM THIS POINT ON I COORDINATED EFFORTS ON THE FANTAIL AS AN OBA CHANGEOUT STATION AND MANPOWER POOL,

SOME OTHER THINGS I REMEMBER WAS WHEN THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED THERE WAS THE SOUND OF VENTING THEN THE AREA WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES AGAIN. BUT THIS WAS SOON UNDER CONTROL.

I ALSO REMEMBER GOING INTO THE HT SHIP TO RETRIEVE THE GASOLINE WE HAD STORED THERE AND REALIZING I WAS STANDING ANKLE DEEP ON LIQUID WHICH I BELIEVED TO HAVE

All redactions are B.6.

BEEN FUEL ON THE TOP. I STILL DIDN'T REALIZE THE HT/MR SHOP WAS DESTROYED OR EVEN THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE. I ONLY REMEMBER TELLING DCFA "THE HELL WITH GAS CANS LET GET OUT OF HERE." I DID THIS BECAUSE WE WERE ANKLE DEEP ON LIQUID AND IT WAS HOT. I REPORTED THAT I BELIEVED JP-5 PUMP ROOM WAS ON FIRE, FLOODED OR BOTH. WE SET ZEBRA ON THE WAY OUT OF THE HT SHIP.

I RETURNED TO THE FANTAIL AND THEN REALIZED MY BERTHING WAS FLOODED AND THE SURVIVORS WERE BEING RESCUED.

WE ALSO USED TWO NIFTI'S TO FIND THE HOT SPOTS TO FIND THE HOT SPOTS IN THE IN STBD TORPEDO MAGAZINE AFTER THE FIRE WAS OUT. THIS PROVED TO BE VERY BENEFICIAL.

ONCE EVERYTHING WAS CALMED DOWN AND REFLASH WATCHED WERE SET, THE SHIP GOT UNDERWAY AND WAS DOING WHAT I WAS TOLD ABOUT 10 KNOTS. I NOTICED THE LOAD SHIFT AND BUCKLE. WHEN I REPORTED THIS THE SHIP SLOWED AND I SAW NO OTHER SHIFTING.

I FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT DCCM(SW) EFFORTS AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SHIP'S STRUCTURE WERE VERY INSTRUMENTAL IN THE CONTROL OF THE CASUALTY. AS MASTER CHIEF WAS TRYING TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE CASUALTY, LT WAS ON THE SEASPARROW DECK, OUT OF BATTLEDRESS CONTRADICTING MOST OF THE ORDERS THAT DCCM WAS GIVING. I FEEL VERY STRONGLY IF PEOPLE WOULDN'T HAVE LISTENED TO DCCM THAT IT WOULD HAVE TAKE LONGER TO CONTROL.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature

20 Nov 89
Date

LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

All redactions
are B-6

My name is _____, my rate is QM1, I am TAD on USS KINKAID from USS STERRETT. I was asked to come over to help out. I arrived onboard I believe August 2nd. I have been in the Navy going on 13 years in February. My training has been mostly On the Job Training. I was not on the watchbill on 12 November 1989. My position onboard USS KINKAID is assistant to the Navigator and supervisor.

I was not asleep when the collision happened. I was getting up because I had the morning JOOD watch at 0645. The procedures for the navigation department for preparing for maneuvering restricted waters were that I would have had the navigation team up on the bridge setting up for navigation detail. Lt. McPhee required the navigation team be there when we were within 10 miles from land and any restricted areas. Since August I have participated in 20 to 30 sea details and 27 transits of the Straits of Hormuz. I have never made a Malacca straits transit onboard USS KINKAID however I did one on the USS STERRETT. The ports that I held sea and anchor detail onboard USS KINKAID included, Singapore, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, various anchorages for refueling in the Persian Gulf, Colombo, Phuket. In filling out the night orders I would put in the sunrise and sunsets, and what other information necessary. The Navigator would take care of the rest. Lt. McPhee would put in the night orders when entering landfall, certain times when the navigation team would have to be set up and times when they are expected to be there. If lights were to be used they would have been put in the night orders. I do believe this subject was overlooked. If there were going to be lights used, normally the QM's would have known about it. The ship was late getting underway from Phuket due to the Command Master Chief reported two and a half hours late. Approximately 0945. There was no navigation brief the day prior to the collision. There was a navigation brief prior to entering Phuket, but it did not cover the departing of Phuket. Yes there was a navigation brief on Hong Kong and it was scheduled the day before pulling into Hong Kong. For going through the straits of Malacca there was talks between myself and the Navigator about setting up a navigation detail. Navigation detail was set up to go down in the areas of Singapore. There were no navigation exercises since I have reported onboard. The quartermasters have many transits though the straits of hormuz and many port visits in the Persian Gulf. This kept the QM's up in knowledge. However, there was not a shipping watch discussed. My opinion of the quartermaster gang is they are very knowledgeable. They were very well trained prior to my arrival. As far as the PQS onboard ship, I have one quartermaster that is about 90% on his way to being Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist qualified. The rest of them are PQS qualified for QMOW with the exception of QMSA _____ who is under instruction. I am not qualified QMOW onboard USS KINKAID but I am qualified onboard USS STERRETT. Onboard they have SRN-18 satellite receiver and SRN-GPS receiver and SRN-12 Omega. SRN-18 works through the NTDS console. The SRN-12 is a back up for the SRN-25 that has the Omega system already built in. We have done alot of cerestrial practice in the Persian Gulf. I did assist Lt. McPhee at times with the ship's positions. I did also help with shooting stars. QM's are required to lay out a DR after every course change, fix, and every speed change. DR's were laid out one to two hours ahead of the fix. QM3 Swank was the QMOW on watch during the collision along with QMSA Smith under instruction. Out of the five QM's I would rank QM3 _____ . QM3 _____ was the plotter for Singapore. QM3 _____ had the midwatch prior to QM3 _____ prior to the collision. If something had to be put

All redactions are B-6.

out it would be put into the night orders or I would tell the QM's and have orders hanging in front of the chart table on the bridge. All QM's on the night of the collision did initial showing knowledge of the night orders. People from Combat came up to the bridge to compare fixes. We used all means on getting fixes for open ocean navigation. Usually the guy on the plot in Combat Information Center would come up to compare the fixes. Normally this is a second or third class. When the alarm goes off on the NTDS console the quartermaster of the watch will accept the fix and plot it. The console is manned by OS's. Quartermasters do not put their fixes into the NTDS program. The last time we conducted a time check was prior to us pulling out of Phuket between 0700 and 0800. Yes, there is a check off list that is used for setting up navigation details, but, we are not required to keep these after they have been used. This check off sheet is basically used to make sure the ship is ready to get underway. The fathometer is manned in sonar and we have a repeater that is located above the chart table. There are no reports made to the bridge from sonar, it is done by readout on the repeater located above the chart table. The depth is taken from the bottom of the sonar dome. Prior to the collision I was laying in my rack awake getting ready to get up to stand the JOOD watch. I heard the alarm go off and I got out of my rack and putting on my pants when the ship was hit. I was sleeping in first division berthing forward. At first I thought we were going to run aground. The ship felt like it was in a shock test. It gave a good jolt and I did fall down and I got up and put my pants on and then ran to the bridge. When I went to the bridge I saw everyone standing around looking confused so I went to the starboard side and saw what had happened. At that time I went back to the chart table and grabbed the deck log and looked at the chart. What went through my mind was at first we were outside of the channel. We were in the right side of the channel but we ended up in the wrong side of the channel. We appeared to be in the middle of the traffic scheme separation. They were using DR, they said they had no radar because of the monsoon clouds were blocking out the radar scope. I really do not recall what the OOD was doing at the time of the collision. To the best of my knowledge the Commanding Officer was not on the bridge. I believe that LCDR ~~46~~ was in charge at this time. The Executive Officer was on the bridge at that time. I have been through the Straits of Malacca two times. The first was with the USS STERRETT. There really was not much difference between the USS STERRETT and the USS KINKAID. In this part of the Straits we normally have the normal watch standing. Onboard USS KINKAID, I supervise the navigation detail to ensure all is going well. I make all my reports to the Navigator. I observe everybody to make sure they are all doing right. QM3 ~~36~~ and QM3 ~~36~~ are bearing takers and they both are very knowledge in their jobs. Probably the best of my team. Lt. McPhee did make constant reports during the navigation detail to the OOD and did compare fixes with Combat constantly. Combat has been coming up or making a phone call up to the bridge every half hour and comparing fixes with the quartermasters. Whether or not this happened the night of the collision, I don't know. I rate Lt. McPhee as one of the best Navigators that I have worked for and very much liked and very knowledgeable in his field. When we pulled out of Phuket, everyone felt happy and relaxed and ready to get home.

To my knowledge there has never been a low visibility drill while I have been onboard. Coordination with Combat was done precisely with the bridge. We did the swing up in the Persian Gulf one time. We made a new compensating card up because the other card was old.

To the best of my knowledge the light list and sailing directions for the Malacca Straits area were not reviewed by myself or my quartermasters. There is a good chance that Lt. McPhee did review them.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

TJB
Signature

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Date

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LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
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My name is SM2(SW) ^{Tyb} I have been in the Navy for five and a half years. My tour onboard KINKAID started on 26APR88.

On 11 NOV 89, SMSA ^{Tyb} and myself assumed the 00-07 watch, the OOD was LTJG ^{Tyb}; and the Conning Officer was TMC(SW) ^{Tyb} Early in the morning about two and a half hours before sunrise the OOD called up to the shack and told me to check a contact (approximately five degrees off the port bow) because it was flashing a dim white light. I reported to the OOD that the contact in question appeared to be a navigation buoy and that was the end of things for awhile. Twenty minutes later the OOD called back up for me to check another contact on the starboard side at approximately 035 - 040, before I could get to the starboard side he called back up and said "never mind, he didn't see them flashing anymore". Ten to fifteen minutes later the OOD again called back up for me to check the same contact that was now flashing. The contact was 2500 to 3000 yards ^{el} and had a target angle of 350. At first the contact appeared to be Alpha, Alpha. I tried to respond. I hadn't looked through the big eyes to see if it was a warship or a merchant, so I tried to respond to the contact using allied procedures for warships. That wasn't working so I quickly shifted to international procedure for merchant ships. The second set of flashes came four to five minutes before the collision. I think the contact was just simply trying to get my attention with the flashing light. The contact started getting closer and closer. I then began yelling down to the bridge, asking them "What the fuck are you guys doing"? At the same time I heard the engines wind up and felt the ship make what I felt was a standard port turn. I then again asked the bridge "What are you guys going to do?". My voice was almost hoarse from yelling so loud. I didn't understand why we didn't do a hard starboard turn vice the port; maybe all we would have done with a hard starboard turn would be to exchange paint. Just before the impact, I told QMSA ^{Tyb}, "you better hang on, because we are going to hit hard". If I hadn't wrapped my arms around the life rail, I would have been thrown over the side. After the collision I immediately noticed heavy black smoke coming from the after part of our ship, also smelled JP-5. After the collision, our ship came alongside the other ship (skin to skin). As soon as the other ship peeled off, I started to hear men in the water yelling for help. I then threw my filter off of my light and tried to illuminate the men in the water with a 12" searchlight. Before the collision, visibility to my knowledge was seven to eight miles. Note that it was raining earlier in the evening. I did not log nothing of the collision in my visual log due to trying to spot men in the water and looking for survivors. Another note about the lookouts, they were very poorly trained and didn't have much knowledge of deck watches with the exception of a few. In addition, lookouts are often put on watch without any under instruction watches.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

^{Tyb}
Signature

20 NOV 89
Date

^{Tyb}
LI, JAGC, USNCR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

QM3 156

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of dereliction of duty and that:

- a. I have the right to remain silent. (S) Init.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial. (S) Init.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both. (S) Init.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. (S) Init.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time. (S) Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent () Init.
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement. (S) Init.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. () Init.
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. () Init.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind/having been used against me. (S) Init.

Witness' Signature) 156 (Date) 14 NOV 89 (Signature) 156 (Date) 14 NOV 89

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

My name is *B. S.*, my rate is QM3. I am onboard the USS KINKAID. I have been in the Navy 3 years and 8 months. My EAOS is 18 December 1990. I have been onboard since December 1, 1988. My schooling consists of Rules of the Road. That is the only one I have gone to other than it was OJT. I did not go to "A" School. Prior to the KINKAID, I was onboard the USS ORION (AS 18). On November 12 at 0518, I was the Quartermaster of the Watch. At that particular time, a couple of minutes prior to the crash I was out investigating lights that we were coming upon. I was trying to determine which ones they were and I went to the starboard side and I saw a contact about 700 yards off our starboard bow. At that time Mr. *B. S.* ordered "all ahead, flank one; left 30 degrees rudder". I ran over to the collision alarm, did the collision alarm and announced over the ILC "all hands brace for shock" twice.

Yes, I had the 0400-0800 watch. Yes, this is the chart that was used the night of the collision. Here are my DR's, the point Charlie, the yellow buoy that we were supposed to have on our starboard bow. Yes, I recognize these entries as my own handwriting. The chart number is 71270. When I took the watch we were right here at 100 37 East, 003 13 North. The shipping conditions were very heavy. As far as I could see as we got near the opening of the straits, it even got more heavier. I was fixing the ships condition by satellites from the SRN-25. Right after I assumed the watch, I checked the SRN-25 and I got a transit satellite at 0337, I laid that down and DR'd off of that. That was a SRN-25. We get an alert on that like we do in the bridge console. We were in time zone -7 Gulf. I relieved the watch at 0344. At 0337, I punched the numbers 51 on the SRN-25 checking my satellites to see which one I got and that was the latest one in. Nav 2 is a transit satellite, it updates itself by satellites. This comes off the transit satellite. Yes, there is a 2000 fix by Nav 2 and there is another 2030 zulu fix by Nav 2. The Nav 2 updates itself by transit satellite and also from Omega but it will have to forced to accept the fix. The last good fix on the chart is 1832 zulu. We have a 2037 satellite pass. It is not in the ship's position log. The reason why it is not in the ship's position log is at the time I was laying it down and we came to a turn at that time. The fix is on the chart but no in the ship's position log. The 2100 zulu DR is strictly taken from the chart based on course and speed. 2203 zulu is an EP. The last fix had been 1832 zulu. The collision happened at 2218 zulu. The watch before me was using Nav 2. I was always taught not to use that due to the fact that it may be in error or incorrect. When I took the watch I was logging the best I had. Not a Nav 2. There is a standing order for how to fix the ship's position or to make entries into the position log. CINCPACFLT and OPNAVINST tells the way that I did it.

At 0346, we turned to course 140 and we came to speed of 18 knots. At 0400 local, I got on Omega and it was 19.3 miles off at a direction of 273. The GPS was not locked in and I did not get no satellites in between that time. So, I used the next best thing, which is a DR, based on course and speed. At 0430, we started seeing some illuminations of lights. I could not picture which lights they were at the time so I used a DR again at 0430 local. At 0432 we changed course to 135 again based on a DR, remained our speed of 18 knots. At 0440 we changed course to 180 and maintained our speed of 18 knots. Then, I briefly picked up the yellow flashing buoy on my port side. I started to decipher whether it was the buoy that we were supposed to have on our starboard bow. It was a yellow flashing buoy flashing four ten seconds. That was about time 0443 when I started seeing the buoy on the port. No, it does not have a number. We did not prepare a list of lights for us to find during the transit of the straits. I looked down on the chart, based on our DR and course and speed that in the

vicinity of the mouth of the straits there should be a yellow buoy flashing four ten seconds. I started to identify it. I did not have a stopwatch, I had my own watch. At 0449 we changed course to 124. The buoy was now about five degrees off my port bow. I picked up another light and then I took a bearing off the yellow light and a white light that was flashing oddly off the port beam and based on them two I got a EP and I recommended that we come to course 126. I thought it was either this light here flashing ten seconds, 16 miles, 12 meters high or flashing ten seconds, 11 miles, 11 meters high.

I was also starting to pick up two more lights off our starboard bow and I started to decipher which ones they were and try to identify it. I had no radar picture at all. All I was getting was sea return and cloud return. Very dense clouds were coming from the 55. Omega was still not cutting, I tried to take another fix on the Omega and it was still off and based on a DR, and EP came to the course 110. On course 110 the yellow buoy was now off my starboard bow. Time for the EP was 0503 based on two bearings, one off the yellow straight ahead of the starboard bow and the other off the port beam. No, that is not in the bearing book. At 0503 based on a EP I held us in our own lane in the traffic separation scheme. The OOD decided, based on our track, we should have the buoy on our starboard bow. When we were on course 124, I recommended that we stay on course to take it port to make sure we were in our own line of the traffic separation scheme and to intersect our track down here at point Charlie. Point Charlie was on our sail plan. He wanted to take it on our starboard so we could get on track. He changed course to 110 at time 0457 in the log. I had an assistant up there but I was maintaining the deck log sir. He went up to try to identify what lights were flashing. From 0457 until the time of collision we remained on course 110 at 18 knots. When I looked up at the clock it was 0518. I do know for a fact that we were doing 18 knots the whole time. The 0517 fix, I thought I was picking up radar off the land over here and it turned out to be clouds. No sir, I do not think that the 0517 was the real position. That was two ranges. I was using radar Nav in addition to using buoys and nav aids to fix my position. The radar was all cluttered. I had it out to approximately 40 miles and it was still solid cloud cover. It was picking up the heavy thunderstorms. All I saw was just cloud and sea clutter, I thought I was picking up land to the Northeast over here Maunugrove and Paluakaling at distance of about 30 miles. It is correct to say that we have been instructed by standing orders by the Navigator, QM1 or the Captain's standing orders to notify the OOD or whoever when we have landfall. That night I did not really know that I was picking it up until some of the clouds had moved around on the PPI scope and I thought I was picking up land. The OOD was busy figuring out the contact and what lights were what. The traffic was very dense and it was getting just a little bit confused up there. Yes, the 0517 fix was plotted right before the collision. At that particular time the GPS lock was coming in and out. At that time I looked up from what I was doing and wrote it down in the deck log. I was on the port bridgeway about 0510 identifying lights. Then I came back in and was looking at the SPA-25, trying to get a radar fix. Thought I had a landfall, I plotted the 0517 and just finished what I thought was a fix. I looked toward the starboard bow and noticed a port running light and two white mast head range lights. I noticed that the contact was still coming on his course and speed. It occurred to me that he wasn't backing down or slowing and I ran over to the collision alarm, threw the collision alarm. I threw the collision alarm based on what I saw. It appeared to me that we were going to hit. Yes, I was at the chart table, looked up and saw it and then went to the LMC and announced "all hands brace for shock". The JOOD was doing a solution over by the NTDS console. He warned the OOD a couple times. Hey, this guy is getting close, lets do something about the contact and according to what I heard, neither one of them contacted the CO. The JOOD was TMC (AW/SW) B-6

TMC B-6 had the con. Yes, he was at the NTDS console working CPA on a contact. The reports coming from the lookouts on the port were that there was a guy bearing 355 at a range of approximately 2100 yards off the port bow. Starboard, I do not know about because I was on the port bridgeway. From what I heard the NTDS console operator didn't notify the OOD either of the guys presence. Yes, there is an OS on the NTDS console. I am not for sure who the OS was on the console. At the same time I had all ahead flank one for 21 knots and same time have a left nothing. I couldn't get it all in but it was a left full rudder and then immediately after I got a left 15 rudder. All of that in seconds. QM3

B-6 showed up after the collision and took the deck log. There was men over the side and mass confusion up there. After he hit us he pushed us quite a ways and then he back off of us and then we started drifting downward. The position was just a quick look at the GPS. I do not know how good it is. We have pretty close to 4 1/2 miles from the EP. Pretty close but about a mile off. The only good fix I had was 0337. Everything else was DR, EP, and at the collision a GPS. As soon as we hit we lost power. The SRN-25 has a ten minute emergency battery. We lost power on the bridge instantaneously. I went over to the helm console and the boatswains mate of the watch said "hey, we got no power at all to the helm console, it is dead". It was all dead. We lost total power on the bridge. Before the collision we sounded five short blasts. From what I heard and seen, the contact did not sound any whistle at all. He kept on his course of speed, he didn't try to evade us at all. When the left full rudder turn was made there was no whistle signals made for turning to port. Just five short blasts. Just before the collision alarm was sounded, the whistle was sounded by I do believe by the messenger of the watch. He was told to do the five short blast by the OOD. The Navigator or the QM1 did not get the QM's together before leaving Phuket and talk about going through the Straits of Malacca. No, there was no nav brief conducted for the Straits of Malacca. No, I did not read the sailing directions for the Straits of Malacca prior to taking the watch. Nobody that I am aware of read the sailing directions for Malacca at anytime. Based on going through the Straits the first time during the day time it was pretty hilly. Yes sir, being hilly I would expect to be able to cut radar fixes. I expected to pick up radar around 0515 or 0530. I was expecting to find landfall just about the time it happened. No, there was nothing in the night orders stating to expect to make landfall at. Yes, it is the custom that the Navigator put down in the night orders when we would expect to make a landfall or a light or something like that. No sir, he did not do it this night. I don't think the OOD expected to make a landfall. We went into Phuket the 7th. The night orders of the 6th was the last time I would have made a landfall at night. Yes, there was lights there in Phuket. We went into Colombo on the 2nd or 3rd of November or around there. When I got here onboard the KINKAID I was standing QMOW under instruction for a month and then I got my interim qual for QMOW and I started to standing it by myself from I guess mid January until now. No, I do not have my final qual on this ship. I am interim qual since January. I was not given a time period to get my final qual. From what I know, nothing is holding me up on finishing my final qual. Yes I have completed all my PQS and turned my book into my Division Officer in April this year. I was standing QMOW watches alone during REFTRA. Navigation did very well during REFTRA. The bridge team did very excellent in low vis and radar and for loss of our gyros, open ocean navigation we did very well. Since the end of REFTRA I have done no exercises or drills such as low vis or loss of gyros since REFTRA. REFTRA was March 17, 1989. The Navigator during REFTRA was Lt. B-6 He left in August of 89. Lt. McPhee took over as Navigator a couple of days prior to B-6 departing the ship. No, the previous Navigator did not conduct training with the quartermasters during the


deployment to the MIDEAST force. Once we hit Subic, we lost our QM1 and the Navigator, Mr. [redacted] took over as Division Officer and I took over as LPO which I had since April 1. I was acting LPO until QM1 [redacted] came onboard August 3rd. Basically, Mr. McPhee and the new QM1 took over about the same time; about two weeks apart. I knew I did not have a fix since 0337 but I felt pretty good about the 0337 fix. No sir, I did not feel uncomfortable with the position. In accordance with the fathometer we were just crossing the 30 fathom mark at that time. I felt comfortable with the fix that I knew where we were. I then recommended to take the yellow buoy to the port. The OOD wanted to take it to the right and get on our track. The OOD came over and we were pretty well off when a couple of times we got into a disagreement where we were at. He said that my DR's wasn't taking in account for set and drift or for the advance and of the ship. I said "no sir, that is correct. it does not, at the time where you turn that is where you turn". Also LTJG [redacted] came up to the bridge two or three times. I had a hard time getting to my chart due to the fact that the OOD and the JOOD and the CIC Watch Officer were right there at the chart and I couldn't get through to it. This is between 0410 and 0455 when he came up two or three times. They were in doubt as to where they were. Officer of the Deck was LTJG [redacted], Conning Officer was TMC (AW/SW) [redacted], CIC Watch Officer was LTJG [redacted]. TMC [redacted] was the Conning Officer and the JOOD. The current was probably two or three knots from probably 210. The discussion between the CIC and the OOD/JOOD concerning the contact was pretty well busy and up to date. Both times the Captain wasn't even notified of any contacts. As far as I know the Captain was not notified of anything during my watch. During the time I was on watch I remember is we took one contact approximately 800 yards across the bow and took another one approximately 700 yards down the starboard side. On my watch, I never saw the OOD call the Captain. When they get within 10,000 yards the OOD gives him a contact report bearing, range, CPA, bearing drift, request permission to maintain speed or change course or their recommendation. We are in the same sections with the JOOD. We are in six watch sections. My relationship with [redacted] was that he would come over, he'd talk to me, confirm with me about the situation for navigational picture wise. Often he asked for my recommendations based on my knowledge and what he saw on the chart and all the information relative to him. Recently based on the fact of the past few months since entering the Persian Gulf alot of the OOD's started not to confirm with the QMOW or anything like that, they just said "I am going to do this; I am the OOD, I am running the show". A couple of times I got into arguments with ok saying "look, you should confirm with me when you do anything, there may be something there that you might run aground or hit". A couple of times I got into big arguments about that. Also, about crowding around the chart and not letting me get to the chart, I would get into arguments and say "hey, back off". No, I have never had to call the Navigator. Yes, it is standard practice to notify the LPO or the Navigator when we have a confrontation with the OOD. Usually, after my watch I went and told QM1 about the situation, saying "hey the situation has to be corrected. I don't like them crowding around my chart, it is my watch and I want to have free access to my charts, that is my job". QM3 [redacted] lays out the chart to get ready for the transit. As far as I know, the LPO did not look at it and approve it. I do believe that the Navigator did get a chance to look at it as far as I know, the CO never saw the chart. Yes, I have a copy of the sailing plan. The tracks were laid back in the month of October. QM3 [redacted] is the chart petty officer. I basically take care of deck logs, 3-M maintenance man as well. Celestial navigation was done by QMC [redacted] back during REFTRA and was very well trained in it and he was training us until he departed the ship in Hawaii. QM1 [redacted] was also very knowledge of celestial and was teaching us

All redactions are B-6

until he departed in Subic due to medical reasons. After QM1 left we were up there basically every night. It was getting up nights to shoot celestials, sunlines. Once we hit the Arabian sea the clouds blurred from getting a chance whatever. The QM1 onboard now has been onboard since August. The celestial fixes were taken by Lt. QM3, me, and once or twice QM3 would get up and take some. QM3 would take sunline. We all got up there as much as we could. When we lost the QM1 the work load sort of doubled on us as far as responsibility wise. As far as my observations since August QM1 was getting our training back on track, our DC, 3-M, admin paper work, helping us with pubs. He was helping relieve some of the load that was put on us due to the fact that QM1 was not here. He was getting us back on track and up to date. Many times we would come up there and check up on us and ask if we had any problems. During the Straits of Hormuz transits we was up in the chartroom or in the pilot house. He would always be in that area in case we need help with anything.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature

 20 Nov 89
Date

 _____


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Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

All redactions are TS-6

My name is _____, I have been in the Navy approximately 15 months. I have been onboard USS KINKAID since March 89. My rate is Signalman Seaman Apprentice. Petty Officer _____ and I were called over the 21MC and told that we were getting light. Petty Officer _____ answered the call from the port 21MC extension and said something about receiving an Alpha, Alpha and that is only a one person job. I was inside the signal shack. At that time I can't recall for sure if they had the word passed or not to "brace for shock". I loosened up my knees and grabbed onto the safe. My first thought was that we had run aground. As the shock started to get worse I opened up the door to go out. I shut it behind me and walked over the deck to where SM2 _____ was, on the starboard side, and all I could see was the smoke. My first thought was the smoke was from the stacks from being so close. And then I could smell fuel. And then a few minutes after that I saw the rear end of the ship come in contact with us and I felt the bump. Basically, I did not see a whole lot of the collision.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature _____
Date 19 NOV 89



LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

All redactions are B-6

My name is _____, Seaman Recruit. I have been in the Navy for about 11 1/2 months. This is my first ship. I reported onboard June 6, 1989. I am assigned to First Division.

I was the aft lookout. We stay in a position for one hour and then we rotate around. I am still in the process of having my PQS signed off. I was told the proper procedures for the sound powered phones, know the proper procedures for reporting surface and air contacts, how to give ranges, bearings (true and relative, positions of aircraft and things like that. BM3 _____ and BM3 _____ trained me on these subjects. Yes, I was given a PQS book. I am about half way through the book. I also stand Helmsman and port and starboard lookouts. I have my lee helmsman signed off by BM3 _____ and BMSN _____. I turned it in to BMC and BML _____ and they said they were going to take it from there and that was about a month ago and I have not heard anything. I am lee helmsman qualified but not helmsman qualified. I am ship's control console operator qualified. Overall, training in operating, orders and shifting the rudders have been learned by hands on from the guys that trained me.

I had been on watch as aft lookout about 45 minutes prior to the collision. I was back there on the fantail standing on the port side of the gun mount. I was on sound powered phones, on the JL circuit. When I came back to relieve the watch there was numerous surface contacts ranging from 600 to 1000 yards and up to 8 miles on the horizon. They were anywhere from 150 to 270 relative. I had a better view of the port side as far as relative bearings go because the gun mount was obstructing most of my view on the starboard. Some were close as 500 to 1000 yards. After the lookout had gone through what was going on he said that they all had been reported, to keep an eye out on them and report if one of them got too close or anything that I noticed out of the ordinary. At which time I had one or two more small contacts up there on the horizon that I reported. These new contacts were back aft anywhere from 160 to 180 in that general area. The JL connects into a hatch that covers the AFFF station on the port side and there was a circuit right there on the side of that. The cord I would say is about 10 to 12 feet. I can't get beyond the center of the gunmount. Before the collision I never saw the contact. The port side that was almost completely obstructed by the gun mount and the seasparrow deck. I had heard reports of a guy getting close over the sound powered phones. I heard the starboard lookout was reporting a surface contact with a target angle of about 315 and that is about all I really heard about it. This was anywhere from 5 to 10 minutes before the collision prior to the collision when I heard him. I only recall one report at the time. The starboard lookout reports to the bridge radar console operator. CIC is on the same line and we generally report it to the bridge operator and they will let CIC, the OOD and the Conning Officer as to what we have seen and what our relative bearings are on it. I only heard one report about 5 to 10 minutes. If I see a contact I would report it to the bridge console operator, give him the range, relative bearing, it helps if I know true bearing. From there, they usually have me keep an eye on him, report any bearing drift changes that I might see or anything like that and that is generally it. As starboard lookout we determine bearing drift according to the target angle to his ship to our relative bearing by off the relative. As aft lookout, I have always done it by following the direction of the ship because we do not have a polaris back there. Yes, the CIC and the bridge console operator does tell us what the contact is that we saw. This does not happen all the time, it pretty much depends on who is the console operator or who is on the phones in CIC. A lot of them will tell us who it is and a lot of them just acknowledge and take it from there to the OOD and the Conning Officer. There was no excitement on the JL circuit. The next thing I knew was I

All reductions are D-6

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ENCLOSURE (1)

heard the LMC go off "brace for shock" followed by the collision alarm. At this point I went to the port life rail, the closest place I could brace and still try to maintain contact with the bridge. After the alarm, I heard nothing over the sound powered phones. At the moment of impact was bad. It shook me pretty bad. I was braced on the port life rail it shook me back and forth and then the fantail on the port quarter of the fantail was pushed under the water. The water knocked me clean of my brace and the fantail continued to roll under the water. The entire fantail was underwater as the ship righted itself from the roll to port when the collision occurred. I was knocked clean off the life rail and was in the water, the current pushed me over the starboard side at which time I struck the starboard life rail. I was ripped of my sound powered phones and my shoes at the same time. I was in the water for what seemed like forever but a very short time, no more than 30 seconds. I was very wet at the time and scared. At which time I hit the starboard life rail, came into it with my shoulder, I did not know what happened. I knew we had been hit by something. I did not know by what. I did not have my bearings too well after being tossed all over. I grabbed the starboard life rail hoping the fantail did come back up out of the water and if it didn't I was just going to let go and hope somebody saw me. The fantail did come back out of the water. I looked up and saw the tanker backing away and fire coming up out of the seasparrow deck. I climbed back up on the fantail and tried my soundpowered phones and could not contact no one. They were shot, gone. I went to the ship's service dial telephone located on the fantail. It was also out of service. I went into the aft decon station on the port side up past the port torpedo mag and looked to the starboard side and saw the fire in the starboard torpedo mag at that time so I knew it was quite a bit more extensive that what I saw from topside. At this point I went to the messdecks which was the closest phone I could find that was in service. I reported the bridge at the time that I had an unknown class fire in the starboard torpedo mag and coming out of the seasparrow deck. I returned topside by another direction, proceeded back to the seasparrow deck at which time I ran into Master Chief *Y/b*, Damage Controlman and he told me to proceed down to repair 3 and get an OBA on and come back up and see what I could do to help. I came back up topside. There were several other people out there at the time that had hoses laid out and ready to go. As we got ready to charge them we had firemain pressure at which point there were several other OBA men on the scene so he dispersed several of us to the stateroom areas to make sure everybody got out and start checking for people. We went and searched and found nothing. We came back out and they had rigged the P-250 pumps on the fantail and had the suction hose over the side into the sea and had them running at which point we had begun fighting the fire. We had no water until we had the P-250's running. We had two running, one port and one starboard. The rotation from port lookout to aft lookout and then to the starboard lookout and then to the helm. We were preparing for Westpac when I first came onboard. At the beginning of Westpac I started standing watches by myself. The ship had been out twice; each for a short amount of time. Once over to Bravo pier and the other was for the dependent's cruise. After these two trips I got put into a watchsection. I was only standing lookout watches. There is no requirement to my knowledge of having to have the PQS for lookout before standing watch. Prior to watchstanding I did not really get any formal training. I am a non-designated seaman, I did not go to apprenticeship training. I went to RM "A" school and had a academic drop, I believe. At which time I immediately got put into the fleet so I never had any training. No, I did not go to seaman school. I was taught proper procedures for sound powered phone talking in boot camp. I have been to maybe three or four lookout training sessions onboard the ship. Most of it was when I first came onboard. A lot of the training was hands on with two Boatswain Mates. One was BM3

and the other has left the ship, BM3 ; during a watch. We did have one formal training session that I can recall down in the deck office. That was with BMC and BM1 I never have received any training from an OS or CIC Watch Officer or CIC Officer. I have never received any training from any of those. I was on port lookout from 0345 to 0445. To the best of my recollection, I remember reporting maybe five to ten contacts or somewhere in that general area. Most of the ranges were well along the horizon. It was probably right around six miles. We had real low visibility that night. There were thunderstorms in the area and it was raining when I came on watch. The running lights varied. They were going all different directions that night. Most of them I would pick them up by their mast light. I saw just about as many red lights as I did see green lights. Prior to the ship that hit us we had a couple of ships pass fairly close, approximately 500 to 1000 yards. It was closer than most. I believe we had one on starboard that was not real close but close enough to where you could make out a good size on it. If it had been a clear night we would have been able to pick up the name with binoculars. That was back when I was on the aft lookout. All the contacts on the port side was I would say was about three miles. Lookout training was conducted in the Deck Office in an informal manner.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

 _____
Signature

^{NOV}
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_____ Date

 LI, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

All redactions
are B-6

My name is Seaman [redacted] II, BMSN. My duty station is the USS KINKAID (DD 965). I have been in the Navy for three years, ten months and 17 days. I have been onboard the KINKAID three and a half years. I reported June 16, 1986. My official duties was the Boatswain Mate of the Watch. BM3 was the assigned Boatswain Mate of the Watch on the watchbill but we had been rotating. They just switched First Lieutenant's so I am not for sure if LTJG [redacted] knew. The old First Lieutenant, LTJG [redacted], the BMC and the BM1 knew. He knew we were rotating. We got a new First Lieutenant in Phuket. I am PQS qualified as Boatswain Mate of the Watch. Since we came out of NASSCO shipyard. I started getting signed off Boatswain Mate of the Watch. My book was signed off about two months after that. I think it was June or July of 1988. I was standing Boatswain Mate of the Watch during REFTRA. Usually when we rotate we don't have a messenger in our section so when I am Boatswain Mate of the Watch or BM3 [redacted] is Boatswain Mate of the Watch we both rotate the same way. We take the helm and we rotate the helm to the port lookout and the port lookout goes to aft lookout. The aft lookout goes to starboard lookout comes in the bridge and takes the helm. The Boatswain Mate of the Watch takes the helm until the rotation is finished. It normally takes 10 to 15 minutes. No longer than 15 minutes. The accident happened about 15 to 20 minutes after 0500.

At approximately 0445 I took the helm. The OOD and the JOOD was asking everybody to keep it quiet on the bridge and all the other watchstanders because there was a lot of contacts out there. I am not for sure, but I think they were looking for buoys that were supposed to be out there. I heard the quartermaster saying there was supposed to be some buoys out there. I heard the OOD and the quartermaster talking about looking for buoys. After we finished the rotation I went out to the starboard bridgeway and I grabbed some binoculars and was helping them look. That is when Chief [redacted] noticed that the ship had a 000 target angle and it was heading towards us. I saw the port running light. I saw the mast head light. Usually when I am up here and they are looking for contacts, I grab binoculars and go help them look for it. Yes, I went to the starboard bridgeway. I heard TMC tell the OOD that "the ship was getting close, it had a 000 target angle. That is a port running light there and we have got to do something". Yes sir, the JOOD told the OOD, "the ship with a 000 target angle and that we had to do something". As the ship kept getting closer, the JOOD told him again "we are going to have to turn or something, that ship is getting too close". TMC had the conn. No, I did not hear BM3 [redacted] yell in a course/rudder speed from the bridgeway. From what I have always seen, the Conning Officer will usually make a recommendation to the OOD and the OOD will listen to the recommendation and if he agrees with him he will tell them. It was not more than a couple of minutes when the first recommendation was made to the OOD about we had to do something then he told him again. After the OOD noticed that the ship was getting closer that is when he decided to come left. We were steering course 110 at the time. The OOD told the JOOD to come left to 100. I am sure about that. I went to stand by the helmsman because he is kind of new onboard and he sometimes stutters or something when they give him an order. So, I stood next to him to help him out and they gave him an order to come left to 100. He said come left to 100, ay. He used five degrees of rudder and at that time I looked and I knew the ship was going to hit us. I pushed SM [redacted] off of the helm and increased the rudder to left 10. That is the most we can use when they give us a come left course. So, I went to left 10 and the ship just kept getting closer and it looked like it was going to run into the bow so I had my hand on the throttles. I grabbed the throttle and went all ahead flank one and then they gave the order "go all ahead". While they were saying all ahead, I said they are already ahead flank one. I am not for sure if

All redactions are B-6.

it was the OOD or JOOD said "aye" and that is when they hollered brace for shock. OOD started to sound the ship's whistle. Right when he started to blow the ship's whistle that is when the ship hit. I got thrown off the helm and thrown into the boatswain table. I got back up and grabbed the LMC tried pass general quarters and it wouldn't go over the LMC we lost power. The ship's control console went black. I don't really know how far the ship rolled over because like I said I got threw into the table. When I came back up the ship that hit us was still coming into us. They were like coming back around into us. The ship was pushing us. I tried to sound the alarms but because of loss of power the alarms would not go off. Then the phone rang and it was the aft lookout. He was calling from the messdecks. He reported a fire back aft by #3 waste heat boiler room and seasparrow deck. I told him to get out of there so he does not get trapped back aft by the fire. It was about ten minutes when the LMC came back in operation. I went and checked the starboard lookout to see if he was okay, which was BM3 ³⁶ He was out there when we got hit. I asked him if he heard somebody screaming because I had an operation on my ears and it is still hard to hear at times. He said he thought it was the fire team. I told him no it was not the fire team because they would be hollering "sweep the nozzle". That is when I saw someone floating in the water. I hollered out man overboard starboard side and we started throwing life jackets in the water. I never got a left full rudder. All I got was a come left, which means you can use up to 10 degrees. The watch was pretty quiet on the bridge. The OOD and JOOD was on their scope over there tracking their contacts. I never heard anybody talk about calling the Captain. The Captain arrived on the bridge right after it hit, him and the XO come running up on the bridge. The Captain just came up in his underwear. I believe he came from his at sea cabin. I have stood alot of watches in the time I have been here. I was surprised that they were not calling the Captain. They should have called him way long before they even noticed the ship coming at us because of the distance they were away from us. I never seen a ship come close but people told me that there had been another that came close. I was running the night orders at the time. The lookouts said another ship had come close. I believe they said it was on the starboard side. The Captain's standing night orders I would take to Combat and get the CIC Watch Officer and the CIC Watch Sup to sign them and then I would take to CCS and get the EOW to sign them and bring them back up to the bridge. CIC and the bridge do not talk very loud when talking on the scopes on the other side of the bridge. I did not notice any confusion on the bridge as to where we were or anything. I did not hear any comments under their breaths or anything. I did not hear any recommendations from anybody except for the OOD or JOOD. The only recommendation I heard up there was when the JOOD was recommending to the OOD to turn or do something because the ship was getting too close. The ship did respond to flank one by the time we hit. It had just started to pick up. It seemed like as soon as I did flank one we were getting hit. It couldn't have been no more than 15 to 20 seconds. I don't think our lookouts are trained the way they should be. They could be trained alot better. I don't remember any training we have had on this cruise. Target angle of OOD to me means that the ships coming straight right at us. When I went out to the bridgewing I did see flashing lights but they were flashing before that. A new seaman recruit who comes onboard is usually put him under instruction most of the time until he gets qualified on the helm. Times are various for qualifying. To be qualified as helmsman means being able to relieve the helm, being able to say back order that had been given to the helm such as change of course and change in speed. He has to have all his PQS signed off on the helm before he stands watch. Usually when we do it we get him up there and the guy that he is under instruction with with goes ahead and relieves the helm and then comes back and explain to him on how to steer the ship or what to look for to keep in on course and let him drive but with

My name is . I am an Operations Specialist Second Class. I have been in the Navy for seven years and three months. I have been onboard the USS KINKAID since June 25, 1988. Prior to departing Phuket, Thailand, OS1(SW) got together with the Watch Supervisors to review the watch bill and conditions listed on the watchbill as far as when to "man-up" combat fully, utilizing the SPA-25 and the DRT.

OS1 explained to us that during our transit through the Straits of Malacca, we would undoubtedly encounter some heavy traffic lanes in which case an entire section would be needed to fully man CIC. This was during our pre-underway brief.

I was Watch Supervisor for the 20-24 watch with a partially manned CIC. Traffic was relatively light so in my opinion, unnecessary to fully man CIC. During the course of my watch I was approached by a "Khaki clad" person, whom I am unable to identify, and requested to know when CIC would have a full team with all stations manned. Together we reviewed the chart and estimated to be within an expected area of heavy traffic some time on the midwatch. After giving him the information he requested I continued with my watch.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature

19 Nov 89
Date

LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
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All redactions are B-6

My name is OS2 [redacted] I have been in the Navy for 4 years and 2 months. I reported onboard USS KINKAID 28 July 1988. I was the surface tracker during the incident. I was sitting at the surface tracker console and about 0448 we started doing a couple of course changes which was 180 which I later learned the Watch Officer had recommended because they (CIC Navigation) held us North of track. A couple of minutes later we did one to 124, no one knew what was going on. Next came down a course of 110 and by this time it was close to 0515 when the accident occurred. At that time we had three contacts coming in close and we had just had a couple of two or three just pass down our beams. Like 1,000 yards from us. No one really was making any other recommendations because the traffic was so close and we were trying to figure out why we came to 124. At this time I got two more contacts to designate and when I was getting ready to log them and trying to record a new DLRP I heard brace for shock. I looked up and saw a symbol right in front of us. Yes, I was tracking this guy all along. He was about on 312 about 12 knots.





Yes, I passed the CPA to the bridge but it was incorrect cause when we designated it was at about time 0448 and we were doing 180. And so the one that was in the log was a 13,000 yard CPA. We were going South and he was coming West-North West. Then we changed course to 124 and then 110 by that time we were right up on him. The guy on the bridge should update the status of contacts (CSE, SPD, CPA and time) on the bridge. After the collision, approximately 0900 I walked up on the bridge and noticed the bridge console operator had updated some of the contacts, bjt didn't have the times written down for the updates. The last bearing and range, that he had up on the bridge was about 128 at about 10,000 for AG and he was in the process of updating them again. I was sitting surface tracker on the surface tracker console.

OS3 [redacted] was sitting at the track sup console. Prior to the incident the DLRP was being updated. The DLRP is usually 250 miles down PIM. There is no hard core evidence that the program will mess up with DLRP isn't ahead of PIM, but like to keep it ahead of PIM. (I also remember reading it in the Link 11 SOM that it was a good idea to keep DLRP ahead of PIM). I believe that we split skunks AE and AF just prior to incident which was why I thought we were making our course changes to avoid traffic. I believe the Skunk Alpha Golf was the one that we collided with. Prior to the incident, approximately 15 minutes, Skunk Alpha Delta had passed down our port side at approximately 1,000 yards. I had asked the Watch Supervisor were we worried about close CPA's because that contact had skinned us. I don't really know if he comprehended what I was saying because, I didn't get a solid reply back. I gather he was doing something with the chart. I can never recall getting close CPA alerts on this program. No courses were recommended to the bridge to open CPA's. I feel that our lookouts are good, although I don't recall hearing many lookout reports on the morning of the incident. I believe I had all of Rentz's tracks in local stores. At approximately five minutes before the accident the Watch Officer asked me where did I hold the buoys. I held us approximately two and a half miles North of the Southern buoy. After that I was starting to see and log Skunk AH and AI and also writing down the coordinates for a new DLRP when I heard brace for shock. The last 15 minutes prior to the incident I do not recall receiving any lookout reports pertaining to the ship that collided with us over the JL circuit. Nothing more to add.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature _____ Date 19 NOV 89
All redactions are TB6
LT, JAGC, USNR
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39
ENCLOSURE (1)

SURFACE PICTURE AT APPROXIMATELY 0500
TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.



My name is _____, I have been in the Navy for one year and three months. I reported onboard USS KINKAID March 18, 1989. I was the bridge console operator. I was up on the bridge giving bearing ranges and the CPA's from the NTDS console to the Conning Officer, who was TMC. I was primarily giving CPA's only when the Conning Officer asked for them and it was about 15 to 20 minutes from the last calculated before the collision, the closest contact had passed starboard side 780 yards prior to the collision. I was listening for the lookouts. Fifteen to 20 minutes prior to the collision there was no reports from the lookouts. They had just rotated and the starboard lookout didn't say anything to me. I was updating the board. I had two already updated and was working on some more. When I looked up due to the fact that someone sounded like the OOD jumping from the starboard bridgewing back into the bridge requesting to go full ahead and saying that we were going to hit a ship. Yes, this ship was one of the ones on my board but I can't tell you which one it was due to the fact I was in the process of updating. We went full ahead and I looked up and noticed the contact it had to about 200 yards away and starting traveling down the starboard bridgewing toward aft. The next order I heard was "brace for shock" from the Officer of the Deck, which I braced for shock. Remembering hearing the Boatwains and I think the collision alarm going off. At that time about 30 seconds after I braced for shock, we hit and I relaxed and the next thing I heard was the aft lookout reporting a class alpha fire on the seasparrow deck. I know how to use the bridge console but I am not PQS signed off. KINKAID was driving through the middle of four contacts.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.


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Date

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All redaction
are B-6



2-5 min before collision

all B6

BM3 , I just got relieved from aft lookout and that was like approximately about a quarter till 0500. I was rotating the aft lookout up to the starboard lookout. That is where I was when the incident happened. As soon as I come up there I relieved Seaman , he was on the starboard lookout at the time. He told me that all these contacts were around him he had already reported in. Skunk designations not used between lookouts and bridge/CIC. I took over the phone and the next thing I seen was a bright light from a distance of about bearing 045. The contact was about/maybe a good mile and a half to two miles out. He had one mast head light and one red running light with his flashing bright light. The light was coming from targe angle approximately 315. He was flashing his light on and off constantly. Then he stopped flashing for awhile and approximately ten seconds later they came back on again. The bright lights kept flashing. As I was looking through the binoculars, which does not work to good, I reported to the bridge and said, "hey, there is a contact out here that keeps flashing his white forward light. I reported in and said hey, there is a contact out here that keeps flashing white lights. Maybe a signalman on there is trying to reach us or what. So, I don't know what happened from there. I contacted TMC , the Conning Officer who was on the bridge at the time. I notified the Conning Officer and told him hey, there is a ship out there that keeps flashing lights. The next thing I know they contacted a signalman and the signalman looked through the big eyes and see if they are saying anything, but what they seen was a mast headlight and a red running light. Looking through the binoculars they were going this direction and we were heading this way. We were heading the direction of the collision course. We was still around 045, somewhere around there. His target angle I would say about 315 or around there. Well, see he was this way and we were here like this. BM3 is holding his hands approximately 330. Yes that is correct. The next thing I knew our ship was getting closer and closer. The next thing I knew was that Mr. who was the OOD was just running wild. I mean he was kind of frustrated, he didn't act like he knew what to do. I recommended "flank three, and use a right full rudder" to avoid from collision. It was obvious you could see that we was hitting the collision course right there. I did not see the merchant ship change course. He was still far enough to where we could avoid the problem. I was basically talking to the Boatswain Mate of the Watch, SN when I said "ahead full, and right full rudder". Approximately 45 seconds later the OOD ordered up "all ahead flank one". I heard the short blasts from my ship but did not hear any from the merchant vessel. All I seen was a big boom and then I saw the fire.

All redactions are B-6

After the collision, the OOD said "Oh my god, what did I do". I did not know of any course changes. I did not see the OOD or the JOOD take any visual bearings on contact with the pelorous. Chief _____ was next to me when I reported the contact. I told him also that hey, I think we are on the collision course. He needed to do something fast and then I heard him say something to the OOD. Neither the OOD or the JOOD responded. Mr. _____ was out on the bridgewing looking through the binoculars. We do get some feedback from the JL phone talker depending on who is on watch.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

Signature _____

19 NOV 89
Date


/LT, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

All reflections are D-6.


BM 3

DRAWINGS

AT PT OF FLASHING
WHITE LIGHT



COLLISION
AT COLLISION



My name is . I am onboard the USS KINKAID. I am a QMSA. I have been onboard USS KINKAID about a year. I reported onboard January of 89. I attended QM "A" school for about two to three weeks and then I had OJT. I left QM "A" school because it is hard for me to learn through books. The morning of the collision I was Quartermaster under instruction trying to get my PQS signed off. That morning I was assigned to do the weather. The weather that night was cloudy, raining and lightning the weather was not extreme but it was pretty bad. I relieved the watch at 0345 that morning. The prior QMOW he had told us that we have a satellite that just came in at 0337. It was a satellite fix. He told us that we had buoys coming up to shoot and to compare fixes with Combat. I could not recall if they mentioning expected lights coming up or that would be within visibility. I do remember him saying that we do have buoys coming up to shoot. The biggest thing about the turnover was there was buoys to shoot and the Omega had basically went out. There was some lights up ahead. A red light and a green light, the buoy lights, and I did see I think a yellow light further up ahead. I don't recall if there was a list of lights expected to be seen. I don't know how much I have left to be qualified. The QMOW seemed to think that we were right where he had us on the plot. He seemed to be pretty confident. The OOD did not seem to be too confident and there was some conflict about lights ahead. The OOD had said that the yellow light that we saw up ahead was not what the QM said it was. It was just like a discussion, it wasn't really a fight. The OOD was distracting the QMOW. I was out doing the weather during the time of the quarrel. They did not use a stopwatch, I guess they were just counting seconds. A stopwatch was available but was not used. After all the watches were relieved we had been having a hard time cutting a fix and QMOW had been trying to find a way to cut a fix. At the time that they were at the chart table we had just passed a ship down the starboard side. It was as close as about the length of this ship. That scared me. That happened about 10 to 15 minutes prior to the collision. I wouldn't even say 15 minutes, more like 10 minutes. Nobody talked about calling the Captain. I was scared, at the time when that ship passed on the starboard I knew it was wrong. I know it was suppose to be port to port. I ran out to the bridgewing to see how close it was. I thought it was going to hit us. I went up to the signalman's shack to get a better look and as I was looking at the ship a flashing light was flashing in my eyes so I turned to look where the flashing light was and it was the ship that hit us. I think the ship that hit us was trying to signal us. I hollered for a signalman to see what they were flashing. At that time I could not tell which way they were going. I think the signalman came out of the signal shack. I believe prior to the collision he was in the signal shack. The time I was up there I didn't see him so I hollered at him and he came out of the signal shack. I seen the flashing light so I turned toward the signal shack and hollered and said come out and see what they are signaling to us. At that time had also called up on the box for him and the signalman come running out and I am looking through the big eyes and I could tell at this time he was coming at us. I hollered down to the Officer of the Deck. I said we got a ship coming at us and the signalman comes tap me on the shoulder and I move out of the way and he looks through the big eyes and sees the ship and runs to the lamp and he hollers to the OOD saying he is signaling Alpha, Alpha. He starts signaling a few times. The Officer of the Deck was LTJG he JOOD was TMC(AW/SW) and the Quartermaster of the Watch was QMS There was nothing in the pass down log that I saw. There was nothing said to do directly to do anything. The signalman start signaling to him and at this time it was too late. I felt the ship pulling to the left. I heard "brace for shock", so I grabbed hold of the rail. Yes, the ship rolled over to the port. About 10 degrees. I held on to the starboard life rail and it just

All redactions are B-6.

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(1)

picked me up. We had a little training on the SRN-25 and I do believe we had some training on lighthouses. The training was held in the pilot house. I do believe the difference between Nav 1 and Nav 2 is that Nav 1 is not as good. It is normal to have Nav 2, if nothing else you don't have GPS, you just put it on Nav 2. The position in Nav 2 is not logged in as a fix. It is used as a DR. I think he used a satellite for the fix and he may have got another fix prior to the collision but it was crowded around the chart table. Being only under instruction I did not want to be in the way. I went over and attended to the weather. That is when I saw the ship pass down the starboard side. I heard the JOOD tell the OOD that have to do something about this contact. No, I did not hear them about telling the Captain. as the Boatswain Mate of the watch. I don't know if is designated Boatswain mate of the watch but he was acting Boatswain mate of the watch. He is a BMSN I believe. When I said that did the right thing I heard that had turned left without being told and pushed all ahead one without the Officer of the Deck telling him. He pulled the ship's whistle. I don't know if this did happen, that is what I heard. It is all hearsay. In my opinion, the ship would have hit alot more forward if had not done what he done. If not had not taken charge of the engines and the steering and the helm the ship would have been hit more forward. That is my own opinion. After the collision the lights stayed on for I would say a good five to ten minutes. After this I went to my repair locker. I am in repair locker number 3. Yes, they did report "man overboard". I do believe that QM3 hollered "man overboard". We were throwing life rings and flares so we could see the people in the water. As far as the turnover, and what I heard the turnover was we had buoys coming up and the Omega was down and we had a satellite fix that just came in. I was told that the Omega was cutting no fix. The turnover took I would say to five to seven minutes.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

The above statement reflects the transcript created from taped, ORAL, SWORN testimony in my presence. N N N

16 NOV 89

Signature Date

LI, JAGC, USNR
Officer Authorized to Administer
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

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My name is *Bb*, I am an OS2. I reported onboard KINKAID August 30, 1987. My EAOS is February 2, 1992. I attended OS "A" school and Harpoon SWG-1 Alpha and Engager planner.

I was CIC watch supervisor. I came on at 0400. When I took the watch it had been fairly slow. It had been busy before but had run into a real slow period the last couple of hours. They had split down from the full blown watch down to what we were doing in open ocean. We did not man the DRT and SPA. Everything came out of NTDS and moboards on the chart table. At the time when I took the watch we had four active contacts and they were a good 30,000 out and one coming in. Our position was roughly getting ready to come into the mouth of the Straits of Malacca. Before we left the Persian Gulf, we discussed with our CICO and our LPD about standing down to six on and six off. So, we would not have as many people in Combat at one time. We could utilize two people on NTDS to do all the tracking do contacts on moboards and send the information up that way without utilizing the SPA and DRT. It was understood it was the Watch Officer's discretion and I had inputs as well if we needed to bring online the DRT and SPA-25. If contact were not heavy or the traffic was not bad it was the Watch Officer's discretion whether we could go with the short watch instead of the full blown watch. If other personnel were needed they would come up and they would man up. They were not called unless it was necessary. Yes, the CICWO did have a approved watch bill before we implemented. There was an approved copy of the watchbill. Three of my men were on the 0000-0400 watch. About an hour and a half to two hours before I came on with my men they were let go again because the Watch Officer said it had slowed down to where we don't need them anymore. When we took the watch everything was normal. The contacts were relatively light contacts. We did have one coming in which I believe it was Alpha Golf and I guess maybe 30 minutes had expired. I was paying close attention to our navigation picture. We couldn't cut nav because we weren't close enough to any land at time. They were not getting Omega, SATNAV'S and GPS fixes. The QM on the bridge was using the DR system. He got an Omega fix then DR'd off of it. We were trying to pinpoint where we were at. I had the track supervisor verify through the Rentz. The track sup was using the link, and the gridlocking and going off our DLRP and our grid to see how accurate we were to where we held ourselves in the system. Our pads were not over a minute and a half each. I have a habit of updating our nav system in NTDS at least every hour if not every half hour. The link with the Rentz was good until about 0430. We started losing the link because our DLRP had fallen behind us. For some reason, I don't know why but it has since I have been on this ship and it has been operational when the DLRP falls behind us the NTDS Program degrades. Usually we have it out a good distance ahead of us and we shift it in front of us again. We were in the process of coming up with a new DLRP. When we compared positions with the Rentz it was close but it wasn't more than two miles out. What come up to myself and the Watch Officer was that we were coming into the traffic separation scheme. The way the PIM was it had us cutting the traffic separation scheme very close as to being on the correct side. In fact at 0400 we were on the wrong side of the traffic separation scheme even though we were not in it yet. The PIM would bring us down into the right side. What concerned myself and the Watch Officer was trying to see what we could do to get us down there into the scheme. The man that was on the charts, *Bb*, was put on the scope because we had buoys coming up and I can cut fixes from them. I can cut fixes and they aren't the most accurate in the world but you can cut a fix off the buoy. You can give it so much leeway but you can get a cut off a buoy and get a EP, which is better than a DR. About 0430-0445

we were going to call up the guys again because we were getting into an area that had land on both sides and I might be able to cut navs. I told the Watch Office what I thought it would be a good idea to man the DRT and SPA-25. It was getting to the point where we may need them. We dual track with the Rentz. We bring his tracks into our local stores. We were paying attention, trying to find out where we were at. The QM's cut a fix and DR'd out at 0400. At 0430 they did another DR. The last time I believe the QM's had gotten a Omega and had DR'd off that last Omega which at least an hour earlier. I know from 0400 on there was nothing but DR's. All the ship's positions were DR's except for the 0500 fix. We had two buoy fixes. We identified the buoys off the radar itself. No sir, nobody went up to identify the light characteristics to see if it was a buoy. There were four contacts. The first one was at 15 nautical miles away. This is I believe around 0430. We had three and one behind coming up between them. Prior to 0500, Lt. [redacted] went up to the bridge and told them we need to go South to get on the correct side of the traffic separation scheme. I was helping [redacted] out on the charts. Mr. [redacted] was there observing us. We came to 180 and I believe it was 8 minutes that we were on that course of 180. Mr. [redacted] said that we should come South below our original PIM to enter the scheme. The ship went to course 180 after [redacted] went up to the bridge. Eight minutes later the ship came to 124. They gave us no reason or indication why. Petty Officer [redacted] had given the information to the bridge on Alpha Golf. They acknowledged it. All the other contacts as well were on the VP board. When we came to 124 we did not understand because we had not been on course 180 long enough according to the position we had us. That is when I went ahead and DR'd out for eight minutes after 180 and told Mr. [redacted] this is wrong and it was not going to work. I asked him why they are doing this because they never called down to Combat. We did not get a response from the bridge.

Mr. [redacted] / was in charge of what was being said with the bridge. It was coming up on 0500. That is when we decided to go cut these buoys even though we know it is not the best, it will give us something. No, I was not comfortable with the position of the ship. The bridge changed course North again. That really threw us off. We did not know what they were doing. We still did not get anything from the bridge. When we came to course 110 the surface tracker said these guys are going to skin us close. I don't believe we have a buzzer alarm for a close CPA in our system. I have never heard it pop up. Honestly, I have never seen it. OS2 [redacted] was assigned as Track Supervisor but was acting as Surface Tracker. The 40 radar was up. The track sup was on the JL, he was also on DSA with the Rentz. When Petty Officer [redacted] told us that this ship is going to skin us close. I asked Petty Officer [redacted] if he had sent this information to the bridge. He said yes and they acknowledged it. At that time I went over and started to look at the console. That is when it came apparent that I needed to go to the bridge. I looked at 110 again and told Mr. [redacted] I was going to the bridge. I did not like it because of the ship's position. I grabbed the position log and headed for the bridge via the stairwell. Half way up the stairwell was when I heard the collision alarm go off. The bridge was dark but I could here people screaming "GQ, brace for shock and collision". There was many voices. It was commotion. When I heard brace for shock, I dropped the book and grabbed a hold of the ladder and we got hit. I did not hear any course changes on the way to the bridge. I came to CIC and asked [redacted] hit us. He said Alpha Golf hit us. We were using CPA's out of NTDS for what we were passing up to the bridge. If a contact has less than 5,000 yards at open ocean waters we would do a moboard on it. Politics in the division is why I am Watch Sup instead of OS2 [redacted] because he is senior to me. It seems that our division does not like his attitude. He may be qualified for CIC watch sup from the Oldendorf. While we were in the Persian Gulf and out here in

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open ocean and on our way home since we are on a relaxed watchbill, we were trying to get him trained. In the Persian Gulf we did alot of training. I can't say that everybody who stands a watch on a position i.e., DRT, surface, RT; it is fully qualified. They won't stand track sup or watch sup or nav until they are fully qualified. They won't stand the other watches unless they have already stood them under supervision and their PQS is started and there is somebody there to watch over them. The Division Officer does the paperwork for interim quals and then submits them to the Commanding Officer. I believe the interim quals themselves are in their service records. Yes, it is the CICWO's job to disseminate information to the bridge. Everything that goes through the JL circuit is told to myself or the Watch Officer. Petty Officer [redacted] is very good. He is my track sup and no one else does it. He is very good about telling me everything that goes up to the JL. Seaman [redacted] was on the other end of the JL circuit on the bridge. Petty Officer [redacted] computes the CPA that is marked on the status board on the bridge. He is permitted to hook the contact, get the CPA, read bearing, range and time of CPA without asking anyone else. That is his job. The majority of the Watch Officers use the bitch box to pass information to the bridge. [redacted] was on the bridge and [redacted] as in Combat. There were five people in Combat on the watch. I believe that OS2 [redacted] typed the watchbill up himself. I believe that he just put names with the exception of mine and Petty Officer [redacted] in a spot. [redacted] is not qualified as a track sup. He is almost completed. I believe he is down to just standing watches. [redacted] has been onboard awhile. I can't remember how long he has been onboard. The deal with training is a sticky situation. Our chief was in the process of redoing all our training. He had to go on emergency leave and I am getting rid of one collateral duty and taking over training. We don't have the LJV circuit manned. The CPA information comes from the NTDS system. No, we were not doing CPA's using moboard. Like I said the way the bridge was going and the information from Mr. McCurdy, my attention was thrown to the navigation picture because of us being to the North of the scheme. Mr. [redacted] was standing between myself and Petty Officer [redacted]. He was looking at the NTDS console at the contacts and did not acknowledge anything directly to me. When we changed course Mr. [redacted] was standing right next to the Track Sup and the information that I was getting was the same time so I did not basically turn around and say anything to Mr. [redacted]. He was getting all the information that I was getting. The bridge will normally ask the bridge console operator when they want a updated course or speed or updated CPA. CPA's should be done when we have a course change or when the bridge ask for one. To do it on a course change it should be done whenever they ask and we would give it to them. I have no answer as to why there was no entry after 0448. When you think that you have something that you think is a buoy you are going to catch it and you will start tracking it. If he does not have a course and speed and you correlate the way I explained how we did before he would go in the log as being a skunk, unless as a mistake, like maybe you have seen in examples before that the skunk had been put in and might have a course in speed, a very low speed and then later as we got closer into visual range we would get in range of contact the JL talker starts to probe his lookouts for identifications and if it comes up alright OS's tracked another buoy. We are required to log all contacts upon initial detection. The DRT did work before the collision but does not now, with the exception of speeds lower than five knots. At a speed lower than five knots the bug does not track on course and jumps around. This happens only when the ship falls below five knots while using the pit sword. It was not being used the night of the collision. It had been used earlier that night for tracking contacts. When I took the watch, the Watch Officer before had let the other people stand down the watch cause I guess he made a decision that it was alright that they did not need the DRT at

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