



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND  
WASHINGTON, DC 20362-5101

IN REPLY REFER TO  
5830  
OPR: 06D2  
Ser 06B/984  
14 September 1990

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on RADM ' Pj-6  
14 Dec 89

USN, invest rpt of

From: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command  
To: Judge Advocate General (Code 33)

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED  
WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON  
12 NOVEMBER 1989

1. Forwarded in accordance with the Judge Advocate General's  
Routing Endorsement (Bound No. (2669-90)) with the following  
comments.

a. With regard to recommendation 11, concur with the  
actions of the Third Endorser (COMNAVSURFPAC) in the development  
of formal operator instruction for the AN/SRN-25 Navigation Set  
and review of affected PQS Standards.

b. With regard to recommendation 17, the following pertains  
concerning the AN/SRC-53 Damage Control Wirefree Communication  
System (DC WIFCOM):

(1) USS KINKAID is equipped with a Limited DC WIFCOM  
System that is configured with the antenna cable installed on  
only the Damage Control Deck. The portable radios which are  
provided for scene leaders and investigators are equipped with  
speaker-microphone accessory units. A similar system installed  
in USS CONOLLY was recently upgraded to a FULL DC WIFCOM System  
which provides full radio coverage throughout the ship and  
includes improved accessory ear-microphones for use by  
investigators. The performance of the FULL DC WIFCOM System was  
evaluated as operationally effective and suitable and as  
supporting a recommendation for full production for FF, DD and CG  
class ships with three repair lockers during OPEVAL conducted in  
USS CONOLLY (DD 979). Beginning in FY91, Limited DC WIFCOM  
installations will be upgraded to the FULL DC WIFCOM  
configuration.

(2) The ear-microphones which are included in the FULL  
DC WIFCOM System configuration will provide improved  
communication in noisy environments and are suitable for use with  
the Oxygen Breathing Apparatus or hearing protection devices.

(3) Although the investigation findings indicate that  
the DC WIFCOM antenna on the Damage Control deck was damaged, the  
report was silent on the degree of impact on topside coverage.  
The FULL DC WIFCOM System does not include topside antenna  
installation. A topside survey, data analysis and assessment of

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corrective action required will be addressed as emergent funding requirements. Any required system modifications will be included as a POM 94 Issue.

2. Subject to the foregoing, the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer, as acted upon by prior endorsers, are concurred in.

B-6

Executive Director for  
Weapons and Combat Systems

Copy to:  
CNO  
COMNAVSURFPAC  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
CTF-75  
USS KINKAID (DD 965)  
NAVSAFECEN  
CINCPACFLT



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-7000

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800  
Ser 00J/ 6842  
**12 JUL 1990**

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on RADM  
14 Dec 89

, USN, invest rpt of

From: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet  
To: Judge Advocate General

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED  
WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON  
12 NOVEMBER 1989

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. The following actions are taken with regard to the  
recommendations of the investigating officer.

a. Recommendations 1 through 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 are  
approved and have been, or are in the process of being,  
implemented.

b. With regard to recommendation 8, concur in the actions of  
the First Endorser (Commander, SEVENTH Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT)).

c. With regard to recommendation 10, concur with the  
actions of the First Endorser (COMSEVENTHFLT) and Second Endorser  
(Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(COMNAVSURFPAC)) that the assignment of enlisted naval personnel  
as watchstanders should remain within the discretion of the  
Commanding Officer, except for those enlisted personnel assigned  
as Officer of the Deck Underway, in which case authority must be  
requested from the Immediate Superior in the chain of command  
pursuant to reference (b).

d. With regard to recommendation 15, concur with the action  
of the Second Endorser (COMNAVSURFPAC) that

*B-5*

e. Recommendation 16 is disapproved.

*B-5*

....., is not recommended. Furthermore, the findings  
of fact, opinions, and recommendations contained in the instant  
investigation relating to safety mishap reporting are  
inappropriate. Accordingly, findings of fact 241 through 245 and  
opinions 26 through 29 are disapproved and enclosure (121) is  
removed from the investigation.

*2669-90*



sub]: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

f. With regard to recommendation 17, COMNAVSRFPAC is directed to initiate appropriate correspondence to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, regarding the addition of a Damage Control Wirefree Communications (DC WIFCOM) head set to improve communication in noisy environments, a survey of DC WIFCOM coverage topside, and the requirement, if any, for additional DC WIFCOM antennas. A status report should be forwarded to Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet by 1 October 1990.

3. Subject to the foregoing, the findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations of the investigating officer, as acted upon by prior endorsers, are approved.



C.R. LARSON

copy to:  
CNO (complete)  
COMNAVSRFPAC  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
CTF-75  
USS KINKAID (DD 965)  
NAVSARFECEN



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE FORCE  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92155-5035

5800  
Ser 006/8625

09 APR 1990

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on RADM B-6 . . . USN ltr rpt of 14 Dec 89

From: Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
To: Judge Advocate General  
Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(2) Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION  
INVOLVING USS KINKAID AND M/V KOTA PETANI THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER  
1989

Ref: (b) COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.1F Chapter 15 Section 1 Article 15108

Encl: (124) CO, USS KINKAID (DD 965) ltr 5800 Ser 090/90 of 14 Mar 90

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. The facts are summarized as follows: At 1000, 11 November 1989, USS KINKAID departed Phuket, Thailand for Singapore, entering the Straits of Malacca, on a southerly course. Between 0418 and 0519 on 12 November 1989, KINKAID was in transit through the Straits and was attempting to resolve an uncertain navigational picture. At 0519 KINKAID collided with M/V Kota Petani, causing the death of the navigator, serious injury to several crewmembers and significant damage to both KINKAID and M/V Kota Petani. Review indicated, during the transit prior to the collision, the watch section was comprised of inexperienced and, in several instances, unqualified personnel. A navigation brief had not been given, and a number of required preparatory actions had not been taken. At the time of the collision, the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer and Navigator were not awake nor on the bridge.

3. Concur with recommendations 1 through 5 and the action by Commander, SEVENTH Fleet, as reported in the first endorsement. LTJG B-6 was convicted at General Court-Martial, pursuant to his pleas, of negligent dereliction of duty and of negligently hazarding a vessel. He was sentenced to receive a letter of reprimand and to be dismissed from the naval service. Charges have been referred to General Court-Martial against CDR B-6 alleging dereliction of duty and hazarding a vessel. The case is expected to go to trial in April 1990 in San Diego.

4. With regard to recommendations 6 and 7, inquiry indicates Commander, Naval Surface Group Western Pacific has issued nonpunitive letters of caution to LCDR B-6 and LCDR B-6 Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet concurs in this action.

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1989

5. Concur with action taken by Commander, SEVENTH Fleet with regard to recommendation 8.

6. With regard to recommendations 9 and 13, by enclosure (124), Commanding Officer USS KINKAID advised the recommended action has been taken.

7. With regard to recommendation 10, concur with Commander, SEVENTH Fleet's statement use of enlisted watchstanders is a matter within the discretion of the commanding officer and, absent abuse of that discretion, should remain so. It is axiomatic Surface Warfare Officers need extensive watchstanding experience to master the craft of seamanship. COMNAVSURFPAC's policy, contained in reference (b), has been reviewed in light of this collision. That policy is reaffirmed and is quoted for non-holders of reference (b):

"a. If the command considers that circumstances meet the criterion for assignment of petty officers as Officer of the Deck Underway, authority for such action must be requested from the Immediate Superior in Command with full justification, prior to such assignment, along with the proposed time frame for the use of petty officers in this capacity.

b. When qualified, petty officers may be assigned duty as Junior Officer of the Deck Underway. When it is necessary to assign petty officers to such duties, first priority in selection of qualified petty officers should be those outstanding petty officers who are prospective warrant officer or commissioned officer nominees, or who have such outstanding potential that they could be appointed directly to warrant or commissioned officer status in time of war or national emergency. ESWS qualification is tangible evidence of such potential."

Paragraphs c, d, and e permit the assignment of qualified petty officers as CIC Watch Officer, Engineer Officer of the Watch, and Officer of the Deck Inport.

8. With regard to recommendation 11, a three day operator course for the AN/SRN-25 is being developed by FTC San Diego and will first be available in June, 1990. The course designation will be J-061-0627. The SRN-25 is not specifically mentioned in either the Ship Control and Navigation (43492-2B) or Surface Warfare Officer (43101-4C) PQS documents. The stated requirements are not equipment specific, but are generic in nature. COMNAVSURFPAC has tasked the PQS Development Group to review the affected PQS Standards on a priority basis to determine what changes are appropriate.

9. Concur with recommendation 12. It is both inspiring and gratifying to read about the heroic actions of DCCM B-6 HTC B-6, FC2 B-6, DC3

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID AND M/V KOTA PETANI THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

B.6 and ICFN ~~ty~~<sup>b</sup>, who risked their lives to save their ship. Their rapid and aggressive response in the face of an extremely dangerous situation was certainly instrumental in minimizing the damage to USS KINKAID. Inquiry with Commander, Task Force SEVENTY FIVE indicates appropriate commendatory recognition has been initiated for the above named individuals and others deserving of recognition.

10. With regard to recommendation 14, the crew certification was conducted by Commander, Naval Surface Group Western Pacific prior to KINKAID's departure from Subic Bay on 20 March 1990.

11. Recommendation 15 is disapproved.

OPNAVINST 3120.32B (SORM), COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.3A and the cover sheet for the Engineer's Bell Log Form (NAVSEA Form 3120/1) have been reviewed for clarity and consistency.

a. Both instructions and the cover sheet to the NAVSEA form require the Engineer's Bell Log be maintained in the event of automatic data logging equipment failure.

b. OPNAVINST 3120.32B further states, "When propulsion engines or motors are controlled directly by the bridge through electro/mechanical/electronic means, the Bell Book need not include engine orders provided the Deck Log records such orders. The Bell Book and Deck Log shall show the time the control of engines or motors is assumed and relinquished by the bridge." The cover sheet to NAVSEA form 3120/1 (8-85) states, "When engines (motors) are being controlled directly from the bridge, the Deck Log shall serve in place of the Bell Log." COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.3A is mute on this point since further reiteration or amplification is unnecessary.

12. While recommendation 16 is noted, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific does not concur in opinions 26 through 29.

a. Many, if not all, substantive issues addressed by aircraft mishap investigations under OPNAVINST 3750.6Q are covered in adequate detail by present procedures under OPNAVINST 5102.1C, with similar protection of confidentiality of statements and prohibition of the use of the report by the JAGMAN Investigation. Additionally, adequate specific guidance on the conduct of safety investigations is contained in the Handbook for the Conduct of Forces Afloat Safety Investigations (NAVSAFGEN 5102/29).

b. While the concern over the time constraints imposed by OPNAVINST 5102.1C is understood, believe these reporting requirements are realistic. Immediate notice of potential force-wide safety issues is of paramount importance. While these time requirements may in some circumstances

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result in a report being submitted with incomplete information, paragraph 302b(4) provides for the submission of a follow-up report if such is deemed necessary because of additional information becoming available.

c. It is recognized section 605 of OPNAVINST 3750.6Q provides for the transfer of mishap investigation responsibilities to seniors in the chain of command in specific circumstances. While no such requirement exist in OPNAVINST 5102.1C, neither does this instruction prohibit the assignment of a safety investigator by an officer senior in the chain of command to ensure objectivity in serious mishaps. Of note, OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, paragraph 603 a(3) recognizes the need for aviation mishap boards to exist at the individual squadron level:

(3) The system of squadron level AMBs avoids delays in commencement of investigations, shifts in investigative responsibilities, and the travel and temporary duty costs which often result when mishaps are investigated by other than squadron level AMBs. Additionally, it would often be wholly impractical for other than a squadron level AMB to investigate a naval aircraft mishap occurring at a remote Marine deployment site or at sea.

While such isolation from other investigative resources is the exception for an aviation squadron, which usually operates as part of an air wing, it is often the rule for surface combatants.

d. In sum, while there are differences in the mishap investigation procedures between the aviation and surface communities, in the opinion of Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the specific mishap investigation board procedures of OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, procedures designed in great part to address collateral FAA requirements, would prove unduly burdensome in the case of deployed surface units. There are valid concerns regarding the adequacy of training of command safety officers between the communities, and the possible impact of this training on the ability of an individual to adequately investigate mishaps. Nevertheless, in most cases, difficulty in proper investigation and reporting of surface ship mishaps appears to be the inability of the individual units to follow the established procedures and guidelines, rather than with the guidelines themselves. Accordingly, any proposed revisions to the mishap investigation and reporting regulations should be approached cautiously to ensure we address the true cause of the problem and not simply act to further complicate or, indeed, duplicate efforts and results.

13. Subject to the above, the proceedings, findings of fact, opinions and recommendations of the investigating officer, as acted upon by previous endorsements, are approved.

B-6

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION  
INVOLVING USS KINKAID AND M/V KOTA PETANI THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER  
1989

Copy to:  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
CTF 75  
USS KINKAID (DD 965)  
NAVSAFGEN

36/90



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-7000

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800  
Ser 00J/1215  
05 FEB 1990

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on RADM *B-6*, USN, invest rpt  
of 14 Dec 89

From: Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet  
To: Judge Advocate General  
Via: (1) Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(2) Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet  
(3) Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE  
COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID AND M/V KOTA PETANI THAT  
OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

- 1. Readdressed and forwarded for endorsement.

*B-6*

Fleet Judge Advocate

Copy to:  
JAG (Advance)  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
CTF-75





DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96601-6003

IN REPLY REFER TO

5800

Ser 013/ 0042

18 Jan 89

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RADM *B-6*, USN, ltr report of 14  
December 1989

From: Commander, SEVENTH Fleet  
To: Judge Advocate General  
Via: (1) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE  
COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID AND M/V KOTA PETANI THAT  
OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

Encl: (123) Statement of CDR *B-6* of 5 Jan 90

1. Readdressed and forwarded.
2. The findings of fact and opinions of the investigating officer are approved.
3. Recommendations 1 and 2 are approved. An Article 32, UCMJ investigation has been convened to investigate charges against CDR *B-6* and LTJG *B-6*. Commander, SEVENTH Fleet has requested Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command to characterize CDR *B-6* detachment from command as "for cause" and will initiate similar requests to so characterize LTJG *B-6* detachment and remove his Surface Warfare Trainee Designation (1165). Additionally, Commander, SEVENTH Fleet has requested the Secretary of the Navy to delay CDR *B-6* promotion to O-6 due to pending disciplinary action.
4. Recommendations 3, 4, and 5 are approved. Commander, SEVENTH Fleet conducted nonjudicial punishment hearings on 5 January 1990 and awarded punishment to LT *B-6*, QM1 *B-6* and OS2 *B-6*.
5. Recommendation 8 is disapproved.

*B-5*

6. Recommendation 10 is disapproved.

*B-5*

Subj: INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE  
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OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

7. Subject to the foregoing, the remaining recommendations are  
approved. By copy of this endorsement, Commander Task Force  
Seventy Five is directed to ensure compliance with  
recommendations 9, 12, 13 and 14. |

B-6  
Vice Admiral  
U. S. Navy

Copy to:  
COMNAVSURFPAC  
CTF 75  
USS KINKAID (DD 965)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
COMMANDER NAVAL SURFACE GROUP WESTERN PACIFIC  
COMMANDER TASK FORCE SEVENTY-THREE  
COMMANDER LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE SEVENTH FLEET  
COMMANDER TASK FORCE SEVENTY-FIVE  
COMMANDER SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE SEVENTH FLEET  
FLEET POST OFFICE  
SAN FRANCISCO 96601-6011

5880  
Ser 0031/1591

14 DEC 1989

From: Rear Admiral U.S. Navy  
To: Commander SEVENTH Fleet

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED  
WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON  
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Ref: (a) JAG MANUAL

- Encl:
- (1) COMSEVENTHFLT msg 150022Z Nov 89
  - (2) Certified copy, USS KINKAID INST 1601.2H  
(Commanding Officer's Standing Orders) dated  
17 Jun 88
  - (3) Captain's Night Orders book
  - (4) Certified copy, Underway Officer Watch Bill
  - (5) Signature acknowledgment page for November 1989 of  
Commanding Officer's Standing Orders.
  - (6) Certified copy, CIC watch bill
  - (7) Certified copy, 1st Division Underway Watch Bill
  - (8) Certified copy, USS RENTZ (FFG 46), General Log of  
12 Nov 89
  - (9) Certified copy, USS RENTZ CIC Surface Contact Log  
from 12 Nov 89
  - (10) Certified copy, USS RENTZ Ship Position Log  
from 12 November 1989
  - (11) Certified copy, USS RENTZ navigation chart in use  
0518, 12 Nov 89
  - (12) Statement of LCDR [redacted] USNR,  
/1115, TAO/CICWO, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89
  - (13) Statement of LT [redacted] USN,  
/1110, OOD, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89
  - (14) Statement of ICC (SW) [redacted] USN,  
/1110, OOD, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89
  - (15) Statement of OS3 [redacted] USN,  
Track Supervisor, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89
  - (16) Statement of OS2 [redacted] USN,  
Shipping Officer Watch, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89
  - (17) Statement of OS2 (SW) [redacted] USN,  
/1110, OOD, USS RENTZ, 12 Nov 89  
CIC Watch Supervisor, USS RENTZ,  
12 Nov 89
  - (18) Statement of CDR [redacted] USN,  
/1110, Commanding Officer, USS KINKAID,  
with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached

All redactions are B-6

*Retention = Readiness*

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

- (19) Statement of LCDR [redacted], USN, 1110, Executive Officer, USS KINKAID with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached
- (20) Statement of LCDR (Frosted) [redacted], USN, 1110, Operations Officer, USS KINKAID, with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached
- (21) Statement of LT [redacted], USN, 1110, Combat Systems Officer, USS KINKAID
- (22) Statement of LT [redacted], USN, 1110, Engineer Officer, USS KINKAID
- (23) Statement of LTJG [redacted], USNR, 1165, OOD, USS KINKAID with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached
- (24) Statement of LTJG [redacted], USN, 1160, CIC Watch officer, USS KINKAID, with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached
- (25) Statement of [redacted], USN, 7121, Assistant CIC Officer, USS KINKAID
- (26) Statement of TMC (AW/SW) [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID, with Article 31, UCMJ rights attached
- (27) Statement of DCCM [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (28) Statement of HTC [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (29) Statement of QM1 [redacted], USN, TAD to USS KINKAID from USS STERETT (CG 31)
- (30) Statement of SM2 (SW) [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID with diagram attached
- (31) Statement of QM3 [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID, with Article 31, UCMJ. rights attached
- (32) Statement of SMSN [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (33) Statement of SR [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (34) Statement of BMSN [redacted], II, USN, USS KINKAID
- (35) Statement of OS2 [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (36) Statement of SA [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (37) Statement of QMSA [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (38) Statement of OS3 [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (39) Statement of OS2 [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID
- (40) Statement of OSSN I [redacted], USN, USS KINKAID, with diagram attached

All redactions are B-6.

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

- (41) Statement of BM3 \_\_\_\_\_, USN, USS KINKAID, with diagram attached
- (42) Statement of IS1 \_\_\_\_\_, USN, USS KINKAID
- (43) Statement of QMSA \_\_\_\_\_, USN, USS KINKAID
- (44) Statement of OS2 \_\_\_\_\_, USN, USS KINKAID
- (45) Statement of \_\_\_\_\_, USN, \_\_\_\_\_ 24, USS KINKAID
- (46) Statement of SR \_\_\_\_\_, USN, \_\_\_\_\_, USS KINKAID
- (47) USS KINKAID, Combat Information Center (CIC) navigation chart in use at time of collision
- (48) USS KINKAID, bridge navigation chart in use at the time of collision
- (49) USS KINKAID, CIC Surface Contact Log
- (50) USS KINKAID, CIC Log
- (51) Certified copy, USS KINKAID, CIC Log, post collision, 12 Nov 89
- (52) USS KINKAID, Deck Log, 12 Nov 89
- (53) USS KINKAID, Deck Log, 13 Nov 89
- (54) Certified copy, USS KINKAID, Compass Log, 12 Nov 89
- (55) USS KINKAID, Weather Log, 12 Nov 89
- (56) USS KINKAID, Engineering Smooth Log, 11 Nov 89
- (57) USS KINKAID, Engineering Smooth Log, 12 Nov 89
- (58) USS KINKAID, Engineering Smooth Log, 13 Nov 89
- (59) USS KINKAID, Engineering Bell Book, 11 Nov 89
- (60) USS KINKAID, Engineering Bell Book, 12 Nov 89
- (61) USS KINKAID, Engineering Bell Book, 13 Nov 89
- (62) USS KINKAID, bridge Ship Position Log
- (63) Certified copy, USS KINKAID, proposed navigation track for transit from Phuket to Hong Kong (Sail Plan)
- (64) USS KINKAID, bridge Standard Bearing Book
- (65) USS KINKAID, CIC Ship Position Log
- (66) USS KINKAID, Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Log
- (67) USS KINKAID, CIC Radar Navigation Log
- (68) USS RENTZ, statement of assistance rendered and damage incurred
- (69) Certified copy of Certificate of Death, DD form 2064, ICO LT \_\_\_\_\_ dated 12 Nov 1989
- (70) Memo from LCDR \_\_\_\_\_, USS KINKAID Operations Officer
- (71) Memo from Damage Control Assistant, USS KINKAID to Commanding Officer, USS KINKAID dated 16 Nov 89
- (72) Memo from Supply Officer, USS KINKAID to Executive Officer, USS KINKAID, estimate of losses and damage to "D" storeroom
- (73) Excerpts from OPNAVINST 5102.1C, Mishap

All redactions are D-6.

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

- Investigation Reporting
- (74) COMNAVSURFPAC 222144Z NOV 89
  - (75) Statement of personnel actions in damage control effort on board USS KINKAID
  - (76) Certified copy of business cards of agents and surveyors
  - (77) Certified copy of extract, Sailing Directions (Planning Guide) for the Indian Ocean, 3rd Edition, DMA Pub 170-1988
  - (78) Certified copy of extract, Summary of Correction, Charts, June 1989, Volume 3
  - (79) Certified copy of extract, List of Lights and Fog Signals for Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, DMA Pub. 112-1989
  - (80) Investigating Officer, Dead Reckoning Trace (DRT) reconstruction
  - (81) Investigating Officer, navigation chart reconstruction
  - (82) USS KINKAID, list of injuries
  - (83) M/V KOTA PETANI, notice of legal claim
  - (84) Excerpts from OPNAVINST 3750.6P, Naval Aviation Safety Program
  - (85) USS KINKAID, Navigation Brief for entry into Singapore conducted 13 Nov 89
  - (86) USS KINKAID, 8 o'clock Reports for 13 Nov 89
  - (87) USS KINKAID, 8 o'clock Reports for 11 Nov 89
  - (88) USS KINKAID, CASREP status as of 11 Nov 89
  - (89) Certified copy, LTJG B-6, OOD qualification letter
  - (90) USS KINKAID INST 1410.2A (Personnel Qualification Standards) dated 17 Sep 87
  - (91) OPNAVINST 3500.34C (Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) Program) dated 27 Mar 80
  - (92) Certified copy, COMNAVSURFPACINST 1410.1 (Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) Program) dated 8 Jan 87
  - (93) Fleet Training Group report on navigation exercises conducted 15 Mar 89
  - (94) COMDESRON FIVE report of Navigation Check Ride conducted 10 June 89
  - (95) Certified copy of extract, American Practical Navigator, Pub. 9, Vol I, 1984
  - (96) COMNAVSURFPACINST C3516.6B, (DD-963 Combat Systems Doctrine) dated 28 Aug 87
  - (97) (a) Copy of COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.2B (Navigation Standards and Procedures) dated 8 June 88
  - (b) Copy of COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.3B (Standardized Navigation Program) dated

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5 June 89

- (98) Copy of USS KINKAID INST 5040.1 (Division in the Spotlight Program) dated 5 Apr 88
- (99) Copy of USS KINKAID INST 1414.1 (Enlisted JOOD Qualification) dated 17 Sep 89
- (100) Copy of USS KINKAID Notice 5215, (Effective Instructions and Notices) dated 7 Sep 89
- (101) Certified copy, USS KINKAID INST 3530.1 (Navigation Bill) dated 5 Oct 87
- (102) Copy of extract, OPNAVINST 3120.32B (Standard Organization and Regulations of the U. S. Navy) dated 26 Sep 86
- (103) Copy of extract, COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.3A (Engineering Department Organization Manual for Naval Diesel/Gas Turbine Ships) dated 23 Oct 85
- (104) USS KINKAID INST 5402.1G (Casualty Control Procedures During Restricted Maneuvering) dated 5 Jul 88
- (105) Photographs of damage to M/V KOTA PETANI taken by investigating team, 15 Nov 89
- (106) Photographs of damage to USS KINKAID taken by ship's company and investigating team 12 and 13 Nov 89
- (107) Photographs of charts, logs and status boards of USS KINKAID taken by ship's company, preserved from the time of collision
- (108) Photographs of damage to USS RENTZ taken by investigation team, 13 Nov 89
- (109) USS KINKAID NOTE 1301 (Officer Assignments), undated and unsigned
- (110) Transcript of tape of Bridge-to-Bridge Radio telephone comms, 12 Nov 89, provided by USS RENTZ
- (111) LT. B-6 memo dtd 4 Dec 89
- (112) Certified copy of extract, Sailing Directions (Enroute) for the Straits of Malacca and Sumatera, DMA Pub 174-1989
- (113) Certified copy of extract, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, (72 COLREGS)
- (114) Statement of review of USS KINKAID PQS Program and Watch qualifications
- (115) Memo on KINKAID Unit Training Readiness Status Report (TRADA) dated 29 Sep 89
- (116) NSRF Subic Bay estimate of permanent repairs (with diagrams) and SEVENTH Fleet Salvage Officer's estimate of temporary repairs
- (117) Copy of extract, 1988 PQS Catalog
- (118) Copy of extract, Personnel Qualification Standard for Ship Control and Navigation

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- (119) COMNAVSURFPAC CO/XO listing of 7 Mar 89
- (120) Investigating Officer's memorandum
- (121) USS KINKAID 011600Z DEC 89 Subj: Limited Use Safety Mishap Report
- (122) Glossary

#### PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. On 12 November 1989, I was appointed, by oral appointment, to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the 12 November 1989 collision between USS KINKAID (DD 965) and merchant ship M/V KOTA PETANI, a vessel registered in Kingstown, ST. Vincent and the Grenadines. As directed by enclosure (1), an investigation was conducted in accordance with reference (a). The directions contained in enclosure (1) have been accomplished. All reasonably available evidence has been collected or will be forthcoming under separate cover as it becomes available.

2. This investigation was conducted in compliance with the Privacy Act, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 31 and section 0306 of reference (a). In compliance with section 0308 of reference (a), all social security numbers contained herein were obtained from official sources and were not solicited from the individuals. This investigation is being conducted and this report is being prepared in contemplation of litigation and for the express purpose of assisting attorneys representing interests of the United States in this matter.

3. Article 31 UCMJ rights were administered to all witnesses suspected of committing an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Where applicable, waiver of Article 31 rights is evidenced by a written, witnessed acknowledgment and waiver form attached to the witnesses' written statement. All interviews of witnesses conducted by the Investigating Officer were tape recorded under oath and then transcribed into a written statement. After review and correction, each witness signed their final statement, once again under oath and witnessed by my Assistant Staff Judge Advocate.

4. I arrived on board USS KINKAID (DD 965) 13 November 1989 while the ship was underway in the Strait of Singapore. All interviews were conducted on board KINKAID during the period of 14 November to 18 November. Additionally, all evidence was gathered during this period. I was assisted in this investigation by CDR *B-6*, CTF 75 Assistant Operations Officer, LCDR *B-6*, CTF 75 Flag Secretary, LT *B-6*, CTF 75 Assistant Staff Judge Advocate and QMC (SW) *B-6*, CTF 73 Task Force Scheduler. Additional assistance was provided by LCDR *B-6*, Seventh Fleet

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Salvage Officer and LCDR *D-6*, CTF 73 Type Desk Officer.

5. Many of the personnel interviewed provided preliminary statements to the Investigating Officer. In all cases, preliminary statements were provided only by personnel who were not suspected of violating the UCMJ. The final statement of these witnesses reflects a combination of their preliminary statement and their taped interview.

6. Difficulties were encountered in reconstructing the events leading up to and at the time of the collision because of the failure of KINKAID's log keepers to properly record both the routine and extraordinary events which transpired. Many standard log entries were missing. As an aid, the Investigating Officer used available log entries from both KINKAID and USS RENTZ (FFG 46) as well as witness statements to produce reconstructions of KINKAID's track and the surface summary plot. This report relies heavily on the testimony of KINKAID's crew and the charts prepared by the investigation team. All witnesses were helpful and cooperative. CDR *B-6*, Commanding Officer, USS KINKAID, spoke with an attorney by telephone before being questioned by the Investigating Officer and subsequently supplying a statement.

7. The Investigating Officer and Assistant Staff Judge Advocate were allowed on board M/V KOTA PETANI on 15 November 1989. The Master provided general information about his ship, cargo, makeup of crew, destinations and damage control effort. No other information was provided. Photographs of M/V KOTA PETANI's interior and exterior damage were taken by my Assistant Staff Judge Advocate and are included in enclosure (105). Attorneys representing the owners have filed a claim for damages against the United States with the U.S. Embassy in Singapore. A copy of their claim has been telefaxed to the Department of the Navy, Judge Advocate General, Admiralty Division. Enclosures (9), (47) and (48) are reproductions of portions of the charts in use in USS RENTZ and USS KINKAID. Since they only reflect the navigational track, it is recommended that any subsequent reviewer use an updated Defense Mapping Agency Chart 71270 as the reference point for review of these enclosures.

8. Enclosures (105), (106), (107) and (108) are sets of photographs obtained during the course of the investigation. Enclosure (105) contains photos taken 15 November 1989 by my Assistant Staff Judge Advocate and reflect the damage to M/V KOTA PETANI. Enclosure (106) contains photos of the damage to KINKAID and were taken 12 and 13 November 1989 by KINKAID's ship's company and my Assistant Staff Judge Advocate. Enclosure (108) contains photos of damage suffered by RENTZ in fighting the fire on board M/V KOTA PETANI. They were taken by my

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Assistant Staff Judge Advocate on 13 November 1989. Enclosure (107) contains photos of charts and contact boards in use in KINKAID at the time of the collision and were taken by personnel on board KINKAID after the collision.

9. All times used in this investigation are local time (-7 Golf) unless otherwise indicated. An advance copy of this report has been forwarded to the Department of the Navy, Judge Advocate General and includes all original logs and charts acquired during the course of the investigation. An advance copy has also been forwarded to the Navy Safety Center. Where not specifically noted, all copies are certified to be true.

#### FINDINGS OF FACT

1. USS KINKAID (DD 965) was commanded by Commander <sup>B-6</sup> <sub>B-6</sub> U. S. Navy, on 12 November 1989. (Enclosure 109)

THE TIMELINE OF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT OCCURRED 11 AND 12 NOVEMBER THAT LED UP TO THE COLLISION BETWEEN USS KINKAID AND MERCHANT SHIP M/V KOTA PETANI WAS AS FOLLOWS:

#### 11 NOVEMBER 1989

2. 1000- KINKAID departs Phuket, Thailand in company with USS RENTZ. (Enclosure 50)
3. 2015- KINKAID commenced Engineering Casualty Control (ECC) drills. (Enclosure 56)
4. 2327- KINKAID comes to 22 knots to regain Position and Intended Movement (PIM) and join with RENTZ. (Enclosure 56)
5. 2330- KINKAID SECURED FROM ECC DRILLS. (Enclosure 56)

#### 12 NOVEMBER 1989

6. 0001- KINKAID fixes its position at 04-10.6N and 099-47.4E by OMEGA. (Enclosure 62)
7. 0017- The following is paraphrased from KINKAID's Deck Log: The ship is presently on base course of 159T at 22 knots. Engineering equipment status: #1 and #2 boilers on line, #1B and #2B GTM's on line (Note: Ship's Deck Log incorrectly reports #2A and #2B GTM's on line) in split plant mode, #1 and #2 generators on line, #1B and #2B steering pumps on line, port cable, main gyro. Darken ship, material condition yoke set. Condition of

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- readiness IV EMCON Condition Delta set. OTC and SOPA is USS KINKAID. Flagship is USS KINKAID. (Enclosure 52, 57)
8. 0100- KINKAID's published Sail Plan schedules them to reach Point "B" (04-00N and 99-51.2E) and adjust to new course 136.4T. Speed of Advance (SOA) is 15.2 knots. (Enclosure 63)
  9. 0248- KINKAID changes speed to 17 knots. (Enclosure 52)
  10. 0330- KINKAID changes speed to 18 knots. (Enclosure 52)
  11. 0337- During watch turnover, QM3 : gets a Transit satellite fix from the AN/SRN-25 and plots it on the chart (Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) chart #71270, Strait of Malacca - western part). (Enclosure 31, 48)
  12. 0337- The fix places KINKAID at 03-16N and 100-35.6E. QM3 fails to log the fix in the Ship Position Log. This is the last good fix KINKAID has prior to the collision. (Enclosure 31, 62)
  13. 0344- QM3 assumes the watch as Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW). (Enclosure 31)
  14. 0344- QMSA is standing watch under instruction with QM3 and was monitoring the weather picture. (Enclosure 43)
  15. 0347- TMC (AW/SW) takes the Conn and relieves as Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD). (Enclosure 26, 52)
  16. 0355- LT , KINKAID's Engineer Officer, relieves as Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). (Enclosure 22, 57)
  17. 0418- LTJG - relieves as Officer of the Deck (OOD). KINKAID is on course 140T at 18 knots. (Enclosure 23, 52)
  18. 0418- KINKAID is north of the track listed in the Sail Plan due to maneuvers to avoid shipping during the previous watch. (Enclosure 23)
  19. 0425- LTJG relieves as Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO). (Enclosure 24, 50)
  20. 0425- Dead reckoning tracer (DRT) and AN/SPA-25 radar repeater in CIC are not manned. Contact closest points of approach (CPAs) are being computed on Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS). (Enclosure 24, 39, 44)

All redactions are B-6

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

21. 0425- On the 0400 to 0800 watch SM2 *B-6* is Signalman Supervisor and SMSA is Signalman of the Watch (SMOW). (Enclosure 30,32)
22. 0432- KINKAID comes left to course 135T. (Enclosure 50, 52)
23. 0432- *B-6* goes to the bridge to discuss the navigation picture with LTJG *B-6*. CIC holds KINKAID entering the westbound lane of the traffic separation scheme (TSS) located in the western end of the Strait of Malacca. LTJG *B-6* recommends that KINKAID come south (to the right) to line up with the eastbound lane of the TSS. LTJG *B-6* is also concerned about a charted wreck in the TSS. (Enclosure 23, 24, 44)
24. 0440- KINKAID comes right to course 180T. (Enclosure 23, 31, 50, 52)
25. 0443- QM3 *B-6* sees a flashing light, which he believed to be yellow, presenting four flashes followed by a period of darkness, which he estimates to be repeating every 10 seconds, located off KINKAID's port side. (Enclosure 31)
26. 0445- QMSA *B-6* records weather conditions. KINKAID is experiencing a thunderstorm with lightning; visibility is recorded as 8 NM. (Enclosure 55)
27. 0445- CIC designates new radar contact "AD" (track # 3670). CIC reports that "AD" bears 132T at 24,600 yards from KINKAID, is on course 315T at 15 knots and has a CPA of 067T at 10,500 yards at 0508 on KINKAID's current course and speed. (Enclosure 49)
28. 0446- CIC designates new radar contact "AE" (track # 3673). CIC reports that "AE" bears 129T at 26,900 yards from KINKAID, is on course 331T at 13 knots and has a CPA of 077T at 16,200 yards at 0510 on KINKAID's current course and speed. (Enclosure 49)
29. 0447- CIC designates new radar contact "AF" (track # 3667). CIC reports that "AF" bears 133T at 27,500 yards from KINKAID, is on course 270T at 05 knots and has a CPA of 072T at 13,188 yards at 0531 on KINKAID's current course and speed. (Enclosure 49)
30. 0448- CIC designates new radar contact "AG" (track # 3677). CIC reports that "AG" bears 131T at 33,500 yards from KINKAID, is on course 311T at 10 knots and has a CPA of 071T at 16,400 yards at 0524 on KINKAID's current course and speed. (Enclosure 49)

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31. 0448- LTJG [redacted] and QM3 [redacted] hold KINKAID in the eastbound lane of the TSS. LTJG [redacted] alters KINKAID's course to 124T to regain PIM. New CPAs of active contacts are not computed. (Enclosure 23, 31, 39, 40, 50, 52)

32. 0448- CIC's position for KINKAID indicates the ship is turning too early to line up with the eastbound lane of the TSS. (Enclosure 24, 44)

33. 0450- LTJG [redacted] returns to the bridge to confirm the navigation picture and the position of visual navigation aids. (Enclosure 24)

34. 0450- LTJG [redacted] LTJG [redacted] and QM3 [redacted] are attempting to locate Buoy "OF", the characteristics of which are shown on the chart as "FL(4)Y10s." They believe they visually identify a flashing light (4 flashes followed by a period of darkness) 5 degrees off the port bow as the yellow flashing light on Buoy "OF". (Enclosure 23, 24, 31, 81)

35. 0450- TMC [redacted] is not involved in resolving the navigation picture and is not aware of the charted color of the light on Buoy "OF". He sees the flashing light as white. (Enclosure 25)

36. 0457- KINKAID comes left to course 110T to pass the light which has been identified as Buoy "OF" on KINKAID's starboard side. New CPAs of active contacts are not computed. (Enclosure 23, 31, 39, 40)

37. 0457- The flashing light off of the port bow that has been identified as Buoy "OF" is now on KINKAID's starboard bow. (Enclosure 26, 31, 40, 50, 52)

38. 0458- QM3 [redacted] plots an estimated position (EP) based on lines of bearing from Blenheim Shoal Light, located off KINKAID's port beam, and the flashing light located 5 to 10 degrees off KINKAID's starboard bow which he identified as Buoy "OF". QM3 [redacted] fails to record the EP in the Ship Position Log and the lines of bearing in the Standard Bearing Book. (Enclosure 48, 62, 64)

39. 0500- Actual enlisted manning of CIC is:

|                         |      |
|-------------------------|------|
| Watch Supervisor        | OS2  |
| Track Supervisor/       |      |
| Surface Tracker         | OS2  |
| Air Tracker             | OS3  |
| Communications          | OSSA |
| Bridge Console Operator | OSSN |
| Charts and Logs         | OSSN |

All redactions are TS-6  
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(Enclosure 24, 37, 39, 40, 44, 45)

40. 0500- Actual enlisted manning of the bridge from now until the collision is:

|                   |      |
|-------------------|------|
| BMOW              | BMSN |
| Helm              | SR   |
| Port Lookout      | SN   |
| Starboard Lookout | BM3  |
| Aft Lookout       | SR   |

(Enclosure 33, 34, 36, 41, 46)

41. 0500- OSSN sees on the bridge NTDS console that KINKAID is about to pass through the middle of four surface contacts. (Enclosure 40)

42. 0500- Two surface contacts pass less than 1,000 yards from KINKAID, one to port and one to starboard. (Enclosure 31, 33, 39, 40, 43)

43. 0500- CIC plots a fix using NTDS range and bearing from a NAV REF point to the north (Blenheim Shoal Light) and from a NAV REF point to the south (Buoy "OF") of CIC's dead reckoning track. This fix is not recorded in the CIC Ship Position Log, nor are the range and bearing to these navigation aids listed in the Radar Navigation Log. This fix places KINKAID in the separation zone between the eastbound and westbound lanes of the TSS. (Enclosure 45, 47, 65)

44. 0503- QM3 plots an EP based on lines of bearing from Blenheim Shoal Light, located off KINKAID's port beam, and the flashing light located 5 to 10 degrees off KINKAID's starboard bow which he identified as Buoy "OF". QM3 fails to record the lines of bearing in the Standard Bearing Book, but does record the EP in the Ship Position Log. (Enclosure 31, 48, 62)

45. 0503- QM3 logs a fathometer reading of 12 fathoms. (Enclosure 31, 48, 62)

46. 0503- TMC directs QM3 to shift the fathometer to the foot scale. The fathometer readout changes from 11 fathoms to 62 feet. (Enclosure 26)

47. 0503- TMC and BM3 see a bright flashing light from a contact off KINKAID's starboard bow. (Enclosure 26, 41)

48. 0503- TMC estimates the range to the contact as 5,000 to 6,000 yards. (Enclosure 26)

49. 0503- LTJG does not see the flashing light.

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(Enclosure 23, 26)

50. 0503- SM2 is called to identify the light but the light has stopped flashing and he does not see it. (Enclosure 26, 30)

51. 0503- TMC and LTJG ; go to the starboard bridge wing. TMC identifies a contact off KINKAID's starboard bow to LTJG as the contact that flashed its lights. (Enclosure 26)

52. 0503- BM3 informs TMC of the contact off KINKAID's starboard bow. They determine that the contact has a 315 degree target angle. The contact is showing masthead, range and port side lights. The target angle and bearing to the contact place KINKAID as the "give way" vessel and the contact as the "stand on" vessel. (Enclosure 26, 41, 113)

53. 0510- Contact off of KINKAID's starboard bow flashes a light again. LTJG, TMC and SM2 see the light. (Enclosure 23, 26, 30)

54. 0510- SM2 attempts to read the light and answer but is unable to do so. (Enclosure 30)

55. 0510- TMC tells LTJG that "this guy could be a problem." (Enclosure 26)

56. 0510- LTJG ; answers that "I am more concerned with running aground instead of that ship." (Enclosure 23, 26)

57. 0513- LTJG orders OS2 to the bridge to resolve the discrepancy between CIC's position and the bridge's position. (Enclosure 24, 44)

58. 0515- RENTZ hears an excited voice over channel 16 bridge-to-bridge radio call "Naval vessel on my bow, Naval vessel on my bow." hears no reply. (Enclosure 13)

59. 0515- TMC does not recall any transmissions on channel 16 bridge-to-bridge radio prior to the collision. (Enclosure 26)

60. 0515- TMC again warns LTJG about the contact on KINKAID's starboard bow. Neither TMC nor LTJG take visual bearings of the contact. (Enclosure 23, 26, 120)

61. 0515- LTJG looks at the contact and says "She's OK, she has left bearing drift." He sees a target angle of 200 to

All redactions are B-6.

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230 degrees and believes he is in an overtaking situation. (Enclosure 23, 26)

62. 0515- A light rain passes over KINKAID but does not impair visibility. (Enclosure 36)

63. 0517- QM3 plots a GPS fix on the bridge chart. QM3 looked up at the AN/SRN-25, saw that GPS had locked in and plotted the fix. QM3 did not record this fix in the Ship Position Log. The fix places KINKAID in the westbound lane of the TSS. (Enclosure 31, 48, 62)

64. 0518- TMC tells LTJG that the contact is going to hit KINKAID. (Enclosure 26)

65. 0518- LTJG tells TMC to "Come left to 100T. All engines ahead Flank One." TMC gives the order to the helm. (Enclosure 23, 26)

66. 0518- SR puts on 5 degrees of left rudder to execute the "come left" order. BMSN pushes SR off the helm and increases the rudder from left 5 degrees to left 10 degrees to increase the rate of turn. (Enclosure 34, 36)

67. 0518- LTJG orders the Collision and General Quarters Alarms sounded and he starts sounding the danger signal (5 short blasts) on the ship's whistle. (Enclosure 23, 31)

68. 0518- QM3 announces "Brace for shock" over the 1MC and activates the Collision Alarm. (Enclosure 31)

69. 0518- CDR awakens when the word "Brace for shock" is passed. (Enclosure 18)

70. 0518- The shafts are starting to respond to the Flank One engine order. LCDR USN, Executive Officer, awakens when KINKAID increases speed just prior to the collision. (Enclosure 19, 22, 23, 46)

71. 0519- The bow of the M/V KOTA PETANI strikes KINKAID at frame 400 on the starboard side. The collision angle was near perpendicular. (Enclosure 8, 12, 15, 30, 31, 41, 106)

72. 0519- The force of the collision causes KINKAID to heel over to port and pushes the fantail under water. (Enclosure 33)

73. 0519- Central Control Station (CCS) takes control of throttles from the bridge after the collision. Propulsion Auxiliary Control Console (PACC) operator puts both engines at idle and the electrical plant splits itself out on fault current

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detect (1S-3S and 2S-3S). All alarms on #3 GTG sound, all fire pumps trip off and firemain pressure is lost. (Enclosure 22)

74. 0521- The two ships drift apart until they are approximately parallel, with KINKAID's bow even with M/V KOTA PETANI's stern. (Enclosure 19)

#### NAVIGATION

75. USS KINKAID INST 3530.1 "Navigation Bill" dated 05 Oct 87 requires:

- The Navigator brief the Bridge Team prior to entry into piloting waters.
  - The Navigator sign the Magnetic Compass Record Book and submit it to the Commanding Officer for his approval on the last day of the quarter.
  - The Navigator adjust and compensate the magnetic compass at least once a year and submit to the Commanding Officer the results for approval.
  - The gyro and magnetic compass be compared and the results recorded in the Magnetic Compass Record Book for each course change and at least every 30 minutes.
  - The QMOW notify the OOD, Assistant Navigator and Navigator of any sighting of land or navigational aid and landfalls.
  - The QMOW take navigational fixes at least every 15 minutes while in coastal waters and notify the OOD when visual aids to navigation are sighted; or the expected sightings of such aids are not obtained within 15 minutes of the predicted time of sighting.
  - The QMOW, when within visual or radar range of land, verify his fix accuracy every 30 minutes with CIC. If the fixes do not concur, CIC and the bridge are to immediately take another fix and if the two fixes still do not concur, the QMOW shall call the Navigator.
- (Enclosure 100, 101)

76. A navigation brief was conducted prior to KINKAID entering Phuket, Thailand. (Enclosure 29)

77. KINKAID's Sail Plan for entering the Strait of Malacca had the ship entering the strait from the north, requiring the ship to cross in front of ships exiting the westbound lane of the TSS. (Enclosure 48, 63)

78. KINKAID did not conduct a navigation brief prior to entering restricted waters as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.2B. (Enclosure 18, 19, 20, 24, 29, 97)

79. The Commanding Officer verbally approved the Sail Plan from

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Phuket, Thailand to Hong Kong. CDR <sup>B-6</sup> states that the navigation brief for the Strait of Malacca was not planned to be conducted until late in the morning of 12 November. However, this navigation briefing was not scheduled for 12 November by the Executive Officer. (Enclosure 18, 19)

80. The Navigator and Assistant Navigator did not use the pre-underway/entering restricted waters preparations check list provided in COMNAVSURFPACINST 3516.6B prior to entering the Strait of Malacca. (Enclosure 29, 31)

81. RENTZ watchstanders reported that merchant shipping near the northwest entrance to the Strait of Malacca was heavy during the early hours of 12 Nov 89. (Enclosure 12, 13, 15, 16, 17)

82. RENTZ reported that One Fathom Bank Light was visible approximately 1/2 hour before they saw the light on Buoy "OF". (Enclosure 68)

83. A review of KINKAID's Deck Logs reveals that land falls, sighting of navigation lights and setting of Special Sea and Anchor Detail are not routinely logged. (Enclosure 120)

84. RENTZ recorded in their Ship Position Log at 0537 their position as 02-57.7N 100-55.9E. RENTZ recorded in their Surface Contact Log at 0537 that KINKAID bears 323T at 13,500 yards from RENTZ. This places KINKAID at 02-58.1N 100-51.9E. (Enclosure 9, 10, 81)

85. KINKAID's Deck Log contains two entries and two positions for the collision. They are: "0518 - Hit a tanker at 02-56.7N 100-51.2E" and "0519 - Collision in Straits (sic) of Malacca, went to General Quarters, 02°55'N 100(sic)49.6'E". (Enclosure 52)

86. Once in the TSS, RENTZ noticed that all merchant shipping was following the TSS. (Enclosure 17)

87. LTJG <sup>B-6</sup> could not see the magenta strip that delineated the separation zone between the east and westbound directions of the TSS in the red light of KINKAID's bridge. (Enclosure 23, 24)

88. The Commanding Officer was not notified by LTJG <sup>B-6</sup> when he and QM3 <sup>B-6</sup> were in doubt about the ship's position, as required by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders. (Enclosure 2, 23, 31)

89. CIC made no recommendations to the bridge during this watch concerning "courses to avoid" either M/V KOTA PETANI or any

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other contact. (Enclosure 24)

90. There was no stopwatch on the bridge to assist in the identification of lights by their published characteristics. (Enclosure 31)

91. While KINKAID was in restricted waters, QM3 *B-6* recorded soundings in the Ship Position Log vice, as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.3B, the Standard Bearing Book. (Enclosure 62, 64, 97)

92. COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.3B requires ship's position to be fixed at intervals of 15 minutes or less when within 50 NM of land. QM3 *B-6* was unable to take fixes at this interval. (Enclosure 31, 48, 62, 97)

93. QM3 *B-6* plotted EPs at 0458 and 0503. These EPs were obtained by lines of bearing from two lights and plotted on the bridge navigation chart. The 0458 EP is not recorded in the Ship Position Log. None of the lines of bearing are recorded in the Standard Bearing Book. (Enclosure 31, 48, 62, 64)

94. The navigation chart being used on the bridge at the time of the collision did not have shoal water marked as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.2B and COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.3B. (Enclosure 48, 97)

95. Neither CIC nor the bridge logged radar landfall. (Enclosure 50, 52)

96. The 0500 "fix" cut in CIC from two NTDS NAV REF points was not logged in the Radar Navigation Log. OSSN *B-6* reported that the log was only used when the Special Sea and Anchor Detail was stationed. KINKAID had neither stationed the Special Sea and Anchor Detail nor the Navigation Detail (Enclosure 39, 40, 45, 52, 67)

97. KINKAID did not operate their fathometer in trace mode during Special Sea and Anchor Detail or when piloting in restricted waters as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.3B. (Enclosure 21, 97, 120)

98. There were no reports over the JL S/P phone circuit of any contacts for the 15 to 20 minutes prior to the collision with M/V KOTA PETANI. (Enclosure 33, 39, 40, 41)

99. CDR *B-6* Night Orders for 11/12 Nov 89 included a wake-up call for 0600 on 12 Nov 89. (Enclosure 3)

100. LTJG *B-6* did not notify the Commanding Officer of

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navigational sightings or radar landfall as required by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders. (Enclosure 2, 18, 23)

101. LTJG \_\_\_\_\_ did not notify the Commanding Officer when the ship was 2NM off PIM, nor did he notify the Commanding Officer of course and speed changes required to regain track, as required by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders. (Enclosure 2, 18, 23)

102. Between 0455 and 0518 there was confusion on the bridge of KINKAID about the location of Buoy "OF". (Enclosure 23, 26, 31, 43)

103. QM1 \_\_\_\_\_ is the assistant to the Navigator and senior quartermaster on board KINKAID. (Enclosure 29)

104. Neither the Navigator, LT \_\_\_\_\_ nor QM1 \_\_\_\_\_ prepared a list of lights or navigation aids expected to be seen prior to entering restricted waters. (Enclosure 29)

105. Neither LT \_\_\_\_\_ nor QM1 \_\_\_\_\_ conducted a briefing for the quartermasters prior to commencing transit of the Strait of Malacca. (Enclosure 29, 31)

106. A review of KINKAID's Commanding Officer's Night Orders since August 1988 revealed that none listed lights or navigation aids expected to be seen during the night. (Enclosure 3, 120)

107. QM1 \_\_\_\_\_ did not review, and it is unknown whether LT \_\_\_\_\_ reviewed, the Sailing Directions (Enroute) for the Straits of Malacca and Sumatera (DMA Pub 174-1989) or List of Lights (DMA Pub 112-1989) prior to the transit. (Enclosure 29, 31, 79, 112)

108. Sailing Directions (Planning Guide) for the Indian Ocean (DMA Pub 170-1988) gives the rules for the TSS in use in the straits of Malacca and Singapore. Rule 3 states that "All vessels navigating within the traffic separation scheme shall proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in the general direction of traffic flow for that lane and maintain as steady a course as possible consistent with safe navigation." (Enclosure 77)

109. Sailing Directions (Enroute) for the Straits of Malacca and Sumatera state that a master of a tanker in 1974 reported that "...caution must be exercised at all times throughout the passage, the period requiring the most concentration was the approach to One Fathom Bank owing to the scarcity of objects for accurately fixing the ship's position." (Enclosure 112)

110. KINKAID did not sound required whistle signals in

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accordance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) when KINKAID altered course to 100T immediately prior to the collision. (Enclosure 23, 26, 113)

111. The Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Telephone Log is improperly maintained. Many entries are not logged and, in fact, the last entry was 2 Nov 89. For example, there is no entry stating that a radio check was conducted on 11 Nov 89 prior to KINKAID getting underway from Phuket, Thailand. (Enclosure 66)

112. Eyewitnesses on KINKAID did not see M/V KOTA PETANI make any course changes to avoid collision or hear any whistle signals prior to the collision. (Enclosure 23, 26, 41)

113. KINKAID, as the "give way" vessel in a crossing situation where risk of collision is deemed to exist, was required by the 72 COLREGS to maneuver in such a way as to keep clear of the "stand on" vessel (M/V KOTA PETANI). (Enclosure 26, 30, 41, 113)

114. M/V KOTA PETANI, as the "stand on" vessel in a crossing situation where risk of collision is deemed to exist, was required by the 72 COLREGS to maintain course and speed until it was apparent that the "give way" vessel (KINKAID) was not taking sufficient actions to avoid a collision. At that time it becomes the responsibility of the "stand on" vessel to maneuver to avoid a collision. (Enclosure 26, 30, 41, 113)

115. COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.2B designates the Executive Officer as being responsible for oversight of the ship's navigation team. (Enclosure 97)

116. Only 3 of 6 sets of binoculars available for use by the bridge watchstanders were considered usable. The other 3 sets had damaged optics and could only be used by closing one eye. (Enclosure 21, 41)

117. BM3 <sup>By</sup> was using one of the defective pairs of binoculars while standing starboard lookout at the time of the collision. (Enclosure 41)

118. KINKAID's navigation brief for its 13 Nov 89 entry into Singapore was not signed by the Commanding Officer. It was a copy of the brief used in July 1989, with pen and ink changes for tides and currents, and incorrectly stated that KINKAID was going to the Man of War Anchorage vice Sembawang Shipyard as scheduled. (Enclosure 85)

119. No tides or currents were computed for entry into the

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Strait of Malacca. (Enclosure 120)

120. Fleet Training Group examiners assigned KINKAID marks of "SAT" to "Outstanding" on KINKAID's overall performance in navigation exercises conducted on 14 and 15 Mar 89. (Enclosure 90)

121. KINKAID scored 89 "SAT" during a precision anchoring exercise conducted during the March 1989 Fleet Training Group examination. (Enclosure 90)

122. KINKAID scored 81 "SAT" on a loss of gyro piloting exercise conducted during the March 1989 Fleet Training Group examination. (Enclosure 90)

123. KINKAID had passed a navigation check ride conducted by COMDESRON FIVE on 10 Jun 89 with scores as follows:

|            |                         |     |             |
|------------|-------------------------|-----|-------------|
| MOB-N-4-SF | Piloting by Gyrocompass | 98  | Outstanding |
| MOB-N-6-SF | Low Visibility Piloting | SAT |             |
| MOB-N-7-SF | Loss of gyrocompass     | 100 | Outstanding |

(Enclosure 94)

124. KINKAID experienced a total turnover of navigation supervisory personnel from the time they completed the navigation check ride in June 1989 to the night of the collision on 12 Nov 89. The Navigator left in August 1989 and the QMC and QM1 left in July 1989. QM1 <sup>3-6</sup> reported to KINKAID on 2 Aug 89, TAD from USS STERETT (CG 31) to fill the gapped QM1 billet. (Enclosure 23, 29, 93)

125. After the collision, the navigation practices observed on board KINKAID by the investigating team on 13 and 14 Nov 89 while KINKAID was in the Strait of Singapore and proceeding to Sembawang Shipyard were unsatisfactory. Some of my observations were:

- At one point while in piloting waters, KINKAID did not get a fix for over 45 minutes. When the Commanding Officer asked the Navigator if he had a fix, the Navigator pointed to a position and stated that it was a "good fix." In fact, the Navigator had no fix and the position shown to the Commanding Officer was manufactured with "rubber dividers." The Navigator never informed the Commanding Officer that he was having difficulty getting a fix. (Investigating Officer's Note: I was personally on the bridge during the entire 45 minutes that KINKAID's navigation team was unable to obtain a fix. During this time I was apparently the only person on the bridge that was aware of KINKAID's position. At no time during this 45 minute period was KINKAID in danger of running aground. Once I

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discovered that KINKAID's navigation team did not have a clear navigation picture, I did not leave the bridge until I became satisfied that the navigation team had in fact obtained a clear navigation picture.)

- Navigation information for CIC was not being routinely passed to the Navigator and the Navigator did not compare information that he did get from CIC with his own navigation picture.

- KINKAID's best surface radar, the AN/SPQ-9A, was in operation, but it was not being used by CIC or the bridge for navigation or surface contact tracking.

- On three separate occasions visibility degraded to less than 1,000 yards in fog and rain and KINKAID failed to station the Low Visibility Detail.

- When the gyro compass failed during the transit, the navigation team made no attempt to pilot by alternate means. They gave up and waited until the gyro was restored.

- The fathometer was not in trace mode as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 3530.2B.

- There was no Shipping Control Officer assigned.

- QM1 <sup>3-6</sup>, the Assistant Navigator, was not an active participant in the navigation of the ship.

- There was no attempt to coordinate time of fixes between the bridge and CIC.

- There were no posted tides and currents.  
(Enclosure 96, 97, 120)

#### WATCH ORGANIZATION

126. USS KINKAID INSTRUCTION 1601.2H (Commanding Officer's Standing Orders) requires that the OOD notify the Commanding Officer when the CPA for any contact is less than 10,000 yards. The instruction also requires that, unless modified in the Commanding Officer's Night Orders, the Commanding Officer be notified if the OOD plans on making a course or speed change.  
(Enclosure 2)

127. Commanding Officer's Night Orders for 11/12 Nov 89 do not provide any supplemental directions to waive any portions of the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders. (Enclosure 2, 3)

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128. TMC and LTJG signed their acknowledgment of the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders for the month of November 1989. LTJG had not. (Enclosure 2, 5)

129. LTJG, TMC and LTJG initialed the Commanding Officer's Night Orders for the 0400-0800 watch 12 Nov 89. (Enclosure 3)

130. The Commanding Officer was contacted at approximately 0415 by TMC concerning the close CPA of a contact. That contact was believed to be surface contact designated "AA" or "AB." No other calls were made to the Commanding Officer during this watch. (Enclosure 18, 23, 26)

131. Reconstruction of KINKAID's surface plot indicates that surface contacts designated "AD", "AE", "AF" and "AG" were reportable to the Commanding Officer as defined in the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders but, in fact, were not reported. (Enclosure 2, 18, 23, 26, 49, 80)

132. The reconstructed DRT trace and the CIC Surface Contact Log from RENTZ indicated that the contact that struck KINKAID was KINKAID's contact "AE" (NTDS track #3673). (Enclosure 9, 49, 80)

133. The reconstructed DRT trace shows that in the hour prior to the collision at least four contacts came within the 10,000 yard minimum CPA specified in the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders for reporting to the Commanding Officer. None of these contacts were reported to the Commanding Officer by the OOD or JOOD as required. (Enclosure 2, 23, 26, 80)

134. The contact later identified as M/V KOTA PETANI was not reported to the Commanding Officer in accordance with his standing orders. (Enclosure 18, 23, 26)

135. LTJG did not notify the Commanding Officer when KINKAID made course changes at 0432, 0440, 0448 and 0457 as required by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders. (Enclosure 2, 23)

136. As JOOD and Conning Officer, TMC I was assigned responsibility for conning the ship, working maneuvering boards and computing AN/SPA-25 scope head CPAs on contacts. (Enclosure 26)

137. Due to the large number of surface contacts, TMC was neither working maneuvering boards nor keeping a scope head plot of contact CPAs. (Enclosure 26)

All redactions are B-6

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138. From 0400 to the time of collision, TMC : B-6 and LTJG B-6 did not discuss management of the surface picture. LTJG B-6 spent the bulk of his time at the chart table. (Enclosure 26)
139. LCDR B-6 reviewed each Officer Bridge Watch Bill with the Senior Watch Officer. Strengths and weaknesses of the watch standers were discussed. (Enclosure 19)
140. KINKAID established a program whereby enlisted personnel could qualify for and stand JOOD watches. All six JOODs on the watch bill at the time of the collision were enlisted. (Enclosure 20, 26, 99, 100)
141. LCDR B-6, USN, Operations Officer, had not discussed with the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer the plan for a reduced CIC watch during the return transit, nor his direction that the DRT and AN/SPA-25 radar repeater were not to be normally manned. (Enclosure 6, 18, 19, 20)
142. KINKAID's CIC watch bill had not been signed or initialed indicating approval by the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Operations Officer, Acting CIC Officer or Leading OS. Personnel indicated on the watch bill as the approving authorities were an OS2 and an OS3. (Enclosure 6)
143. The CIC watch bill listed two sections, sections 1 and 2, which were further broken down into sections 1(a) and 1(b) and sections 2(a) and 2(b), effectively creating a four section watch bill. The watch bill was designed to allow augmentation of on watch personnel with the other half of the numbered section, if directed by the CICWO. The watch bill had the following statement about operation of the DRT and AN/SPA-25: "Note: DRT and AN/SPA-25 will not be utilized except for navigation/heavy traffic areas as deemed necessary by the CICWO. The DRT will be pre-set with all amplifying data available for emergencies (ie: MOB, TMA, SAR, etc.) when not being utilized." (Enclosure 6, 20, 44)
144. Implementation of the four section CIC watch bill occurred with the stipulation that immediate augmentation was available if the situation required. (Enclosure 6, 20, 24, 25)
145. During the 0000-0400 watch on 12 Nov 89, CIC manned up the DRT and AN/SPA-25 for 1.5 hours. On 12 Nov 89 the Dead Reckoning Analyzer and Indicator (DRAI) had two faults. One was a faulty course and speed display. The second pertained to the DRT jumping approximately 1/4 to 1/2 inch. This jump was obvious and was not considered to be a problem. (Enclosure 21, 38)

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146. LTJG discussed manning up the DRT and AN/SPA-25 radar repeater with OS2 prior to the collision. (Enclosure 24)

147. LTJG was under the impression that the other half of the CIC watch section was up and about and subject to near immediate recall. He was not aware that the other half of the section was asleep. (Enclosure 24)

148. LTJG attempted to get extra manning in CIC because "I knew CIC did not have a good picture of what was happening." (Enclosure 24)

149. CIC was not updating surface contacts' course, speed or CPAs when KINKAID or the contact changed course. (Enclosure 39, 40, 44)

150. CIC did not update surface contacts' course, speed or CPAs because they thought the Bridge Console Operator was updating them. (Enclosure 39, 44)

151. CPAs were being passed to the Conning Officer by the Bridge Console Operator only when the Conning Officer asked for them. (Enclosure 40)

152. KINKAID was operating the AN/SPS-55 surface search radar and AN/SPS-40B air search radar. The AN/SPQ-9A surface fire control radar was in "pre-standby" mode which requires approximately 5 minutes to radiate. (Enclosure 21, 24, 44)

153. The DRT and AN/SPA-25 were not manned at the inception of the 0400-0800 CIC watch. (Enclosure 44)

154. OS2 was acting as Surface Tracker, Surface Track Log Keeper, DSA net R/T Talker, JL S/P Phone Talker and Track Supervisor at the time of the collision. (Enclosure 24)

155. The bridge Surface Contact Status Board was in the process of being updated at approximately 0515 and listed the following contacts at the time of the collision:

AD, bearing 122T, range 15,000 yards, (no course, no speed, no CPA)

AE, bearing 125T, range 3,000 yards, course 321T, speed 14 knots, (no CPA)

AF, bearing 128T, range 18,400 yards, (no course, no speed, no CPA)

AG, bearing 138T, range 10,000 yards, course 321T, speed 12 knots, (no CPA)

(Enclosure 51, 107)

All redactions are B-6.

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156. LTJG <sup>o-b</sup> and OS2 <sup>o-b</sup> did not routinely receive the reports from the lookouts that were being passed on the JL S/P phone circuit. (Enclosure 24, 44)

157. No "course to avoid" recommendations are logged in the CIC Log for 12 Nov 89. (Enclosure 50)

158. A review of the CIC Log for the previous month revealed only two instances, 19 Oct 89 and 12 Nov 89, where it is logged that CIC made a recommendation to the bridge on a "course to avoid" a contact. (Enclosure 50)

159. KINKAID did not man the 1JV S/P phone circuit as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST C3516.6B (DD-963 Combat Systems Doctrine). (Enclosure 96)

160. KINKAID's aft lookout's S/P phone cord, which attached on the port side of the fantail, was of such length that it prevented him from being able to go beyond the centerline of the ship toward the starboard side. (Enclosure 33)

161. The First Division and CIC watch bills are approved by the Operations Officer. (Enclosure 20)

162. KINKAID has established a restricted maneuvering doctrine but its rules were not in effect at the time of the collision. (Enclosure 52, 57, 100, 104)

163. KINKAID's bell logger/data logger was out of commission at the time of the collision and the ship's Deck Log was serving in place of the Engineer's Bell Log. OPNAVINST 3120.32B states "On ships where Bell Book entries are recorded through use of electronic bell/data logger, equipment being placed out of commission does not alleviate the ship of the responsibility to maintain a Bell Book as prescribed above. Should such a casualty occur, a Bell Book shall be maintained on the Bridge, Propulsion Central Control Station, or Main Engine Room, as prescribed by the Commanding Officer." COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.3A (EDORM) does not provide guidance on the keeping of the Engineer's Bell Log when the automatic bell logger/data logger is out of commission. The instruction sheet accompanying the Engineer's Bell Log form (NAVSEA 3120/1) states that "When engines (motors) are being directly controlled from the bridge, the Deck Log shall serve in place of the Bell Log." (Enclosure 59, 60, 61, 102, 103)

#### TRAINING/PQS

164. The following reflects the qualification status of

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personnel assigned to the bridge, CIC and signal bridge at the time of the collision:

| Name  | Watch at time of Collision | Qualified |
|---|----------------------------|-----------|
| CIC   |                            |           |
| LTJG  | CICWO                      | Yes       |
| OS2   | CICWS                      | Yes       |
| OS2   | Surface Track              | Yes       |
| OS3   | Air Tracker                | No        |
| OSSN  | Charts/logs                | Yes       |
| OSSN  | R/T Talker                 | No        |
| BRIDGE  |                            |           |
| LTJG  | OOD                        | Yes       |
| TMC   | JOOD                       | Yes       |
| QM3   | QMOW                       | No        |
| BM3   | STBD/LKT                   | Yes       |
| BMSN  | BMOW                       | No        |
| SN  | P/LKT                      | Yes       |
| SR  | Aft/LKT                    | No        |
| SR  | Helm                       | No        |
| OSSN  | Bridge Console Operator    | No        |
| SIGNAL BRIDGE   |                            |           |
| SM2   | Signalman Supervisor       | No        |
| SMSA  | SMOW                       | No        |
| (Enclosures 4, 6, 7, 30, 31, 32, 40, 43, 44, 46, 89, 92, 114) |                            |           |

165. QM3 has an interim qualification for QMOW, dated 7 Feb 89, entered in his service record. The interim qualification shows no evidence of having been approved by the Commanding Officer; had no list of specific items not accomplished; or a due date when final qualifications were required to be obtained as required by COMNAVSURFPACINST 1410.1. (Enclosure 31, 92, 114)

166. On the 1st Division watch bill, BM3 was the assigned BMOW and BMSN was the assigned helmsman. At the time of the collision BM3 was standing watch as starboard lookout and BMSN was standing watch as BMOW. BM3 and BMSN routinely swapped watch stations with each other on their own volition. (Enclosure 7, 34, 41)

167. LTJG had been qualified as a CICWO since 4 Nov 89 and was standing his second watch as CICWO. (Enclosure 24)

168. The qualification board which certified LTJG for CICWO was comprised of the Operations Officer, CIC Officer, CG Division Officer and Outboard Officer. The Commanding Officer

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was present for portions of the board. LTJG passed the board. (Enclosure 20)

169. TMC had been qualified as a JOOD since 22 Oct 89. (Enclosure 20, 26)

170. TMC total shiphandling experience was one man overboard drill and independent steaming. He had not attended any ship handling schools. (Enclosure 26)

171. The Conning Officer, , recognized that the ship was on a collision course with M/V KOTA PETANI but did not feel that he had the authority to make a course or speed change without the OOD's permission. (Enclosure 26)

172. COMNAVSURFPACINST 1410.1 requires that personnel with interim qualifications be so indicated on the watch bills. There are no interim qualified personnel indicated on KINKAID's 1st Division and CIC watch bills. (Enclosure 6, 7)

173. The ship's Deck Log for 14 Sep 89 does not reflect a loss of steering exercise that is reported in KINKAID's 29 Sep 89 TRADA report as having been accomplished on 14 Sep 89. KINKAID was in port for the entire day on 14 Sep 89. (Enclosure 115, 120)

174. The ship's Deck Log for 16 Sep 89 does not reflect a MOB-N-2-SF open ocean navigation exercise that is reported in KINKAID's 29 Sep 89 TRADA report as having been accomplished on 16 Sep 89. (Enclosure 115, 120)

175. The ship's Deck Log for 23 July 89 does not reflect a MOB-N-7-SF piloting and loss of gyro exercise that is reported in KINKAID's 29 Sep 89 TRADA report as having been accomplished on 23 July 89. (Enclosure 115, 120)

176. LT had been KINKAID's Navigator since August 1989. (Enclosure 29)

177. No drills or exercises have been conducted in the Navigation Department since REFTRA was completed on 17 Mar 89. (Enclosure 29, 31)

178. Lookout training was conducted 26 and 27 June and 3, 4, 17 and 18 July 1989 by IS1. It consisted of presenting lessons to two groups with each group receiving training during three different sessions. No training was conducted after entering the Arabian Gulf 1 Aug 89. (Enclosure 42)

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179. OPNAVINST 3120.32B designates the CIC Officer as the Lookout Training Officer. (Enclosure 102)

180. LCDR *B/G* relieved LCDR *B/G* USN, as Executive Officer, USS KINKAID, on 1 Oct 89. He reported the following conditions when he relieved:

- There was a backlog of officer fitness reports and enlisted evaluations in ship's office (some of which were over one year old).
- There was no routing or administrative tickler system.
- An officer long range training and relief plan (LORTARP) had not been submitted in 1 1/2 years.
- Planning Boards for Training had not been held since KINKAID entered the Arabian Gulf in August 1989.
- KINKAID's overall organization was poor.
- Crew appearance and ship cleanliness and preservation (both inside the ship and topside) was poor.
- Sponsor and "I" Division programs were dormant. (Enclosure 19, 20, 42, 119)

181. LCDR *B/G* reinstated Planning Boards for Training and revitalized reviews of division and administrative training programs using a "Division in the Spotlight" system and designated an officer to be KINKAID's PQS Coordinator. He had completed a review of five divisions prior to the collision. He also cleared the backlog of officer fitness reports and enlisted evaluations in ship's office and instituted a procedure to submit them on time in the future. He restarted the administrative tickler and began improving KINKAID's cleanliness and preservation. (Enclosure 19, 98, 100)

182. The AN/SRN-25 is not supported by a separate PQS and its operation is not included in the PQS for Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW). (Enclosure 117, 118)

#### DAMAGES

183. Damage to KINKAID is as follows:  
- Hole in starboard side (classical "v" notch) centered at frame 400 at the starboard torpedo magazine, approximately 15 feet wide at the waterline and 50 feet wide at the 01 level,

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extending below the waterline to 4 feet from the starboard shaft.

- Flight deck notched in to a point 3 feet from the ship's centerline.

- RAST track destroyed.

- Holed/flooded compartments:

DFM tank (6-382-3-F)

Berthing Compartment (3-394-1-L)

Athwartships passageway (3-382-01-L)

Supply storeroom (3-382-4-A)

- Destroyed or severely damaged compartments or equipment:

Starboard torpedo magazine (1-390-1-M)

Eight MK 46 torpedoes

Sea Sparrow magazine (01-398-0-M)

Machine shop (2-387-01-Q)

Stateroom (01-370-1-L)

NR 3 fueling station

Fanroom (1-382-3-Q)

Fanroom (01-385-1-Q)

Passageway (01-382-1-L)

Passageway (1-382-01-L)

(Enclosure 86, 106, 116, 120)

184. The following systems or equipment were damaged in the collision:

#### OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

- AN/SRQ-19A (Outboard) antenna array - one element destroyed, one element damaged but repairable, unknown loss of wiring and junction boxes in area of collision damage, after one-third of array is inoperative.
- After kingpost - condition unknown, no power currently available.
- UNREP station 7 and associated UNREP gear locker destroyed.

#### COMBAT SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT

- AN/SQR-19 TACTASS - data transmission lines cut.
- AN/SLQ-25 Nixie - remote control data transmission lines were cut but system still is operational in local mode.
- MK 32 SVTT - starboard torpedo tubes destroyed along with all handling equipment.
- MK 330 Torpedo Setting Panel - located in starboard torpedo magazine and was destroyed.
- Torpedo Strikedown System- no power to system. Possible heat damage. Hatch appears to be jammed.
- CIWS MT 21 - pipe elbow for sea water cooling system was in MR shop being repaired. Elbow lost in collision.
- MK 29 GMLS - data transmission lines between launcher and the SDC are cut.
- MK 45 MOD 1 LWGM MT 52 - no HP air or power is available

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to mount.

#### ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

- NR 4 hot water heater
- 1 washer
- 1 dryer
- Load Center 42
- Degaussing System
- NR 3 GTG - appears to be out of alignment
- JP5 Flight Deck Hose Reel
- Fuel Oil Transfer System (Aft)
- NR1 AFFF Station - part was in MR shop, destroyed
- NR4 AFFF Station - siezed
- NR4 Fire Pump - part was in MR shop, destroyed
- Machine shop and all associated equipment
- Following piping systems in the vicinity of the collision:chill water, fresh water, sea water, fire main, flushing water, LP air, HP air, fuel oil transfer, bleed air, waste drains, secondary drainage
- Aft stbd fueling pit (UNREP station 7)  
(Enclosure 70)

185. Temporary repairs to KINKAID are estimated to cost \$800,000 and require 25 days to complete. (Enclosure 116)

186. Permanent repairs to KINKAID are estimated to be \$3,766,120. Replacement of eight MK 46 torpedoes is estimated at \$1,655,936. Damage to the inventory of "D" Bulk storeroom is estimated at \$1,124,953. Estimated cost to replace the RAST System is \$4,000,000. (Enclosure 72, 111, 116)

187. Damage to M/V KOTA PETANI was:

Damaged bow (all damage contained forward of the collision bulkhead)  
Paint locker - fire damage  
Line locker - fire and collision damage  
(Enclosure 105)

#### DAMAGE CONTROL EFFORT

188. The Commanding Officer arrived on the bridge immediately after the collision. He then left the Executive Officer in charge on the bridge and went to Damage Control Central (DCC) to monitor the firefighting efforts. (Enclosure 18, 19)

189. The Executive Officer arrived on the bridge shortly after the collision. (Enclosure 19)

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190. The lights in CIC went out for about 30 seconds after the collision. (Enclosure 37)

191. The bridge lights went out for approximately two minutes after the collision. (Enclosure 46)

192. Due to loss of fire main pressure, DCC ordered two P-250 pumps rigged on the fantail for firefighting. Both pumps started on the first pull and both pumps were delivering water to fight the fires before normal fire main pressure was restored. (Enclosure 22, 27, 29)

193. Shortly after the collision, damage to the fire main loop was isolated. Number 1, 2, 3, and 5 fire pumps were restarted and firemain pressure was restored to the forward two-thirds of the loop. (Enclosures 22, 57)

194. Approximately 15 minutes after the collision, #1B GTM was stopped due to concern about possible damage to the starboard shaft. Due to loss of control air, caused by ruptured LP air lines in the area of the collision, the engine was stopped with the clutch engaged. (Enclosure 22)

195. Noise from the numerous ruptured piping systems in the area of the collision and the collision alarm being stuck in the "on" position caused the teams operating topside to have difficulty communicating. (Enclosure 27)

196. Numerous class "A" and "C" fires were identified and isolated. (Enclosure 22)

197. A class "B" fire in the aft starboard fueling pit was caused by residual fuel in the lines. (Enclosure 22)

198. A Class "D" fire erupted in the starboard torpedo magazine due to leaking OTTO II fuel. (Enclosure 22)

199. The Commanding Officer authorized the flooding of the torpedo magazine but, due to collision damage to the magazine sprinkling system, the magazine could not be flooded. (Enclosure 18, 22)

200. DCCM <sup>B-6</sup> USN, was the individual at the scene of the damage and was in charge of the damage control effort. After the collision he proceeded to the amidships quarterdeck area and directed personnel there in the initial efforts to attack the fire on the starboard side. After that effort was underway, DCCM <sup>B-6</sup> proceeded to the Sea Sparrow deck and fantail. There he took immediate and positive control of the situation. DCCM <sup>B-6</sup> quickly calmed everyone and organized

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everyone into coordinated, effective teams. Within 10 to 15 minutes of the collision, DCCM had two P-250's running on the fantail, supplying water and AFFF to the fire on the Sea Sparrow deck and starboard torpedo magazine. DCCM also directed personnel on the flight deck to use the FP-1000 to attack the fire from above. DCCM complete reports from the scene and his expert evaluation of the damage to outlying compartments kept Damage Control Central (DCC) and the Commanding Officer fully informed of the progress of the damage control effort and the condition of the ship. (Enclosure 27, 28, 75)

201. HTC, USN, was Repair III On-scene Leader. After the collision, HTC proceeded to Repair III and coordinated initial damage control efforts. When the passageway outside of Repair III filled with smoke, HTC directed personnel to don OBAs and to relocate Repair III for emergent requirements. HTC advised the bridge to contact RENTZ and have them come up on DC WIFCOM (common channel) so that he could personally pass resupply requirements to RENTZ. (Enclosure 27, 28, 29, 110)

202. FC2 and DC3 led hose teams to combat the fire in the starboard torpedo magazine. They aggressively attacked the fire with the knowledge that the space contained explosives and hazardous material. FC2 and DC3 were in the magazine when they heard the sound of OTTO II fuel escaping from a damaged, pressurized torpedo fuel tank. They calmly backed their hose teams out of the space before an explosion occurred. Shortly after evacuating the magazine an explosion did occur. They immediately re-entered the magazine and continued to fight the fire. (Enclosure 27, 28, 29)

203. FC2 and ICFN volunteered to enter the starboard torpedo magazine to check for unexploded ordnance. In a dangerous and toxic environment, they had to remove their OBAs to crawl through a split in the magazine bulkhead in order to enter the space and then redon their OBAs. While in the magazine, FC2 and ICFN fought and extinguished numerous fires and cooled the torpedoes in the torpedo tubes to prevent a second explosion. (Enclosure 27, 28, 29)

204. All fires were reported out at 0630. (Enclosure 50, 52)

205. Navy Firefighting Thermal Imager (NFTI) was very useful in locating hot spots in the torpedo magazine fire. NFTI was also used by the reflash watch to monitor hot spots in the magazine. (Enclosure 27, 28)

206. At the time of the collision, berthing compartment

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3-394-1-L was occupied by five crewmembers (all chief petty officers). Four of these crewmembers were either sucked out or swam out of the hole in KINKAID'S starboard side and ended up in the water. The fifth also exited through this hole but was able to clamber up the side of the ship to safety. SM2 *RB* used a 12" searchlight to assist in locating the men in the water after the collision. All four crewmembers who went into the water were recovered by KINKAID'S motorwhale boat. (Enclosure 19, 30)

207. Power to after steering was lost at the time of the collision. It was restored at 1037 by rigging emergency power cables. (Enclosure 57, 22)

208. The following damage control equipment failed or did not work as expected:

- #4 AFFF station. When attempting to activate bilge sprinkling in JP-5 pump room, #4 AFFF station ran for only a few seconds and stopped.

- DC WIFCOM. Degraded due to poor coverage topside, damage to the antenna system on the DC deck, noise topside from ruptured piping systems and the P-250 engine noise.

- Repair III DC S/P Circuit (5JZ) - Grounded or shorted out due to damage.

- Fire hoses. Four fire hoses burst.

- Firemain. Firemain was severed at the HT shop by the collision. Firemain was restored by isolating the after loop with designated isolation valves. (Enclosure 22, 27, 57, 71)

209. OBA canisters were consumed at a high rate due to the amount of exertion required in fighting the fire. (Enclosure 71)

#### INJURIES

210. LT McPhee, USN, died on 12 Nov 89 while on board KINKAID. (Enclosure 69)

211. LT McPhee's death resulted from neck and head trauma incident to KINKAID'S collision with M/V KOTA PETANI. Death was instantaneous. (Enclosure 69, 82)

212. LT McPhee occupied the top bunk in a three tiered bunk system. (Enclosure 120)

213. The impact between the two ships caused the bulkhead adjacent to LT McPhee's bunk, as well as the overhead, to collapse inward and downward to the position where LT McPhee was sleeping. (Enclosure 106)

214. EMC *B-6* suffered fuel and seawater inhalation

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as a result of entering the water after the collision. The final medical diagnosis in his case was a laceration to the scalp which required sutures and a left ankle sprain. He was treated at Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore and subsequently medevaced to the United States. (Enclosure 82)

215. CTMC suffered fuel and seawater injection as a result of entering the water after the collision. The final medical diagnosis in his case is pneumonia due to fuel and seawater inhalation. He was treated at Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore and subsequently medevaced to the United States. (Enclosure 82)

216. DCC suffered fuel and seawater injection as a result of entering the water after the collision. The final medical diagnosis in his case is pneumonia due to fuel and seawater inhalation. He was treated at Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore and subsequently medevaced to the United States. (Enclosure 82)

217. OS2 suffered blunt trauma to his left upper back and shoulder. He was treated and returned to duty subject to further evaluation. (Enclosure 82)

218. ENFN suffered from fuel in his eyes, was treated and returned to duty subject to further evaluation. (Enclosure 82)

219. SN suffered back spasms. He was treated and then released by Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore. He was returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)

220. STGC suffered multiple lacerations, two sprained ankles, a right knee sprain and broken toe. Surgery on his foot was required. He was treated at Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore and subsequently medevaced to the United States. (Enclosure 82)

221. GMC suffered multiple minor lacerations. He also suffered irritation to both eyes as a result of entering the water after the collision. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)

222. GSM1 suffered a sprained ankle and was treated and released by Mt. Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Singapore. He was returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)

223. SN suffered blunt trauma to his left upper back and left shoulder. He was treated, released and returned to duty subject to further evaluation. (Enclosure 82)

All redactions are B-6  
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224. OS3 suffered a left knee strain. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
225. SN suffered chemical (fuel) burns to both feet. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
226. FCC suffered a lower back strain. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
227. EM3 suffered chemical (fuel) burns to his right hand. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
228. HT1 suffered a blunt trauma to his left middle finger. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
229. DS2 suffered a lower back strain. He was treated, released and returned to duty. (Enclosure 82)
230. HM1 provided all initial treatment to the injured crewmembers on 12 Nov 89. He was assisted by HM2 in the treatment of injured crewmembers on 13 Nov 89. (Enclosure 120)
231. All injured crewmembers were on board KINKAID at the time of the collision. (Enclosure 120)
232. RENTZ took the seriously injured KINKAID crewmembers on board for transfer to Singapore for further medical evaluation on 13 November 1989. (Enclosure 68)

#### RENTZ AND M/V KOTA PETANI

233. RENTZ provided a P-250 pump, gasoline, hoses, ten OBAs, OBA canisters and two torpedo chocks to KINKAID to assist in damage control efforts. (Enclosure 68)
234. At 0716, 12 Nov 89, RENTZ went alongside M/V KOTA PETANI and assisted in putting out fires in M/V KOTA PETANI's bow area. (Enclosure 68)
235. RENTZ deployed two fenders between RENTZ and M/V KOTA PETANI, but one fender broke on impact. (Enclosure 68)
236. Contact between M/V KOTA PETANI and RENTZ during the firefighting effort caused the following damage to RENTZ:
- Port HF fan antenna-sheared off
  - Port fan antenna supports-sheared off

All redactions<sub>35</sub> are D-6.

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- Two port bridge wing supports-bent and creased
- Two boat deck support stanchions-bent or sheared
- Forward masker belt-bent
- Accommodation ladder upper platform- cracked
- Boat deck coaming-lip bent  
(Enclosure 68, 108)

237. The M/V KOTA PETANI's crew was not adequately equipped to fight the fire on board. Almost entirely due to the efforts on the part of RENTZ, the fires were extinguished by 0740. (Enclosure 68)

238. Capt *B-6* J, Master Mariner, and *B-6* Engineer, both located in Singapore, were designated agents of the owners of M/V KOTA PETANI. (Enclosure 76)

239. A joint survey was arranged between Capt *B-6* Master Mariner, representing the interests of Pacific International Lines, operators of M/V KOTA PETANI, and Mr. *B-6* President of Marine Technology Incorporated, representing the interests of the United States. (Enclosure 76, 83)

240. A legal claim was filed on 13 Nov 89 with the U. S. Embassy in Singapore by Drew and Napier, a law firm based in Singapore representing the owners of M/V KOTA PETANI, for damages incurred in the collision with KINKAID on 12 Nov 89. (Enclosure 83)

#### SAFETY MISHAP REPORT

241. OPNAVINST 5102.1C governs mishap investigation and reporting with the exception of aviation related mishaps. It requires the commanding officer to investigate and report various mishaps. (Enclosure 73)

242. OPNAVINST 3750.6P governs aviation related mishaps and requires, for Class "A" mishaps, an Aviation Mishap Board be designated by the Aircraft Controlling Custodian from sources external to the concerned chain of command. (Enclosure 84)

243. OPNAVINST 3750.6P requires reports of Aviation Mishap Boards be submitted within 30 calendar days following the mishap. (Enclosure 84)

244. OPNAVINST 5102.1C requires that mishaps resulting in a fatality be reported within 24 hours. (Enclosure 73)

245. OPNAVINST 5102.1C requires that all mishap investigations of material (property) damage be released to the Navy Safety

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Center within 20 days of the mishap. (Enclosure 73)

246. The results of the required mishap investigation conducted by KINKAID are reported in accordance with OPNAVINST 5102.1C by USS KINKAID 011600Z DEC 89. (Enclosure 121)

247. Several points made in USS KINKAID 011600Z DEC 89 are at odds with evidence obtained during this investigation. (Enclosure 121)

#### OPINIONS

1. Using the available information in KINKAID's and RENTZ' logs, records and charts in use at the time of the collision and the statements from on watch personnel, I was able to reconstruct the navigation picture in the time period prior to the collision. Enclosure 81 is that reconstructed navigation chart. I have come to the conclusion that KINKAID was in the westbound lane of the TSS when she collided with M/V KOTA PETANI. The cross hatched area on the reconstructed chart represents an area of probability where I am confident the collision occurred. This area is defined by four points. Two points are obtained using dead reckoning (DR) tracks laid down from KINKAID's 0337 Transit SATNAV fix, which is KINKAID's last good fix prior to the collision. The first DR represents the ship's ordered speed of 18 knots to the time of collision. The second DR track is for 16 knots, a reduced speed over the ground which takes into consideration the possible effects of a fouled bottom, currents, etc, to the time of collision. The third point is KINKAID's 0517 GPS fix. The fourth point is the range and bearing to KINKAID from RENTZ, as reported by RENTZ after the collision. (Finding of Fact 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 57, 63, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 93, 96)

2. I believe that the critical error made by the Bridge Watch Team was the misidentification of the light on One Fathom Bank. This misidentification caused the Bridge Watch Team to erroneously conclude they observed Buoy "OF", a buoy located in the eastbound lane of the TSS which, they planned, should eventually pass down KINKAID's starboard side. I note that the lights on One Fathom Bank and on Buoy "OF" are both "group flashing four," but are otherwise different. The List of Lights and Fog Signals for the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, (DMA Pub 112 - 1989), indicates One Fathom Bank Light is a concrete tower, 112 feet in height, equipped with a group flashing four white light having a period of 20 seconds and a range of 23 nautical miles. RENTZ

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reported that they saw One Fathom Bank Light approximately 30 minutes before they saw the light on Buoy "OF." Buoy "OF" is a "special marker buoy," not primarily intended to assist navigation, but to indicate special features. The charted characteristics of Buoy "OF" indicate it is a spar buoy with a group flashing four yellow light with a 10 second period. Visibility of the light is considerably less than One Fathom Bank Light due to their differences in height and luminous intensity. LTJG and QM3 did not time the light they observed and that QM3 used as one of his points for his lines of bearing that resulted in the 0458 and 0503 EPs. Although LTJG, LTJG and QM3 all say that the flashing light they saw on KINKAID's port bow was yellow, they all knew that they were looking for a yellow light before they actually saw it. TMC was not involved in resolving the navigation picture and was not aware what color the light was supposed to be. He reported that the flashing light he saw was white. When the 0458 and 0503 EPs are replotted using One Fathom Bank Light, vice Buoy "OF", the EPs fall right on my reconstructed DR and are consistent with the other information that is plotted on the reconstructed chart. In my judgment, misidentification of One Fathom Bank Light resulted in the OOD's decision to alter course to the left, to 110T, to take what he believed to be Buoy "OF" to starboard. This decision was fateful. This course would have taken One Fathom Bank to starboard and did, in fact, cause KINKAID to cross the separation zone and enter the TSS westbound lane where the collision with M/V KOTA PETANI occurred. (Finding of Fact 13, 15, 17, 25, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 78, 79, 82, 87, 90, 93, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 125)

3. Since the DRT was not in use, a DRT geographical plot of the surface contact picture is not available. Using the available information in KINKAID's logs, records and Bridge Surface Status Board and the statements from on watch personnel, I was able to reconstruct the surface contact picture in the time period prior to the collision. Enclosure 80 is a reconstructed DRT trace of the surface contact picture. I have come to the conclusion that KINKAID was transiting through a group of surface contacts in the westbound lane of the TSS when she collided with M/V KOTA PETANI. KINKAID was the "give way" vessel according to 72 COLREGS and KINKAID must shoulder the majority of the blame for the collision. I believe that M/V KOTA PETANI was KINKAID's contact "AE" (NTDS track #3673). The reconstructed DRT trace also shows that at least four surface contacts passed within 10,000 yards of KINKAID in the hour prior to the collision and that at least two contacts passed within 2,000 yards (one within 1,000 yards). LTJG did not call the Commanding Officer for any of these contacts. (Finding of Fact 7, 9, 10, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49,

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50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 71, 86, 112, 113, 114, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 143, 146, 153, 155)

4. The primary cause of the collision was a fixation by both the bridge and CIC on resolving their poor navigation picture, to the exclusion of surface contact management. This fixation on the navigation picture caused both CIC and the bridge to neglect the surface contact picture and not recognize that they were on a collision course with M/V KOTA PETANI until it was too late. CIC and the bridge disregarded the basics of surface contact management. CIC and the bridge did not compute maneuvering board or scope head CPAs on contacts. They did not integrate reports from the lookouts with the radar picture. CIC did not update the NTDS CPAs when KINKAID changed course. CIC did not make any recommendations on "courses to avoid" for contacts with close CPAs. There also was insufficient exchange of information between the CICWO, OOD and/or JOOD. The bridge did not take visual bearings on contacts to determine bearing drift and risk of collision. Since he was oblivious to the surface picture, the OOD did not call the Commanding Officer as he was required to do and, thereby, did not afford the Commanding Officer the opportunity to save his ship from standing into danger. (Finding of Fact 20, 31, 36, 41, 42, 51, 52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 89, 98, 102, 126, 127, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 143, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157)

5. Contributing causes of the collision were:

a. Poor organization on the bridge and CIC to manage the surface contact picture.

(1) CIC was half manned, with only five enlisted watchstanders.

(2) DRT, AN/SPA-25 and maneuvering boards were unmanned in CIC.

(3) LTJG \_\_\_\_\_, the CICWO, and OS2 \_\_\_\_\_, the CIC Watch Supervisor (CICWS), were almost totally cut out of surface contact management. For example, CPAs at time of initial contact report were passed directly to the Bridge by OS2 \_\_\_\_\_, the Surface Tracker, without the CICWO and CICWS being aware of them. Further, reports from the lookouts were not relayed to the CICWO or CICWS. Neither knew that CPAs were not being updated.

(4) The classical functions of CIC to collect, display, evaluate and disseminate information were not done. What surface contact information was collected was not being

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displayed or evaluated and was not being disseminated properly.

b. A very inexperienced CIC and bridge team. Total cumulative experience of the OOD, JOOD and CICWO in standing the watches to which they were assigned was less than 3 months.

c. A complete lack of preparation by the Commanding Officer and Navigator for the transit of the Strait of Malacca. (Finding of Fact 7, 20, 31, 36, 39, 78, 79, 80, 89, 90, 94, 96, 104, 105, 106, 107, 116, 117, 119, 136, 137, 140, 143, 146, 149, 151, 154, 155, 156, 156, 158, 159, 166, 167, 169, 170)

6. CDR was negligent in the performance of his duties as Commanding Officer in that he:

a. Failed to make adequate preparations for the safe navigation of KINKAID through the restricted waters of the Strait of Malacca. His lack of supervision, advance planning and attention to detail in preparing his ship for this transit significantly contributed to the conditions which led to confusion on the bridge and in CIC in the hour prior to the collision. There was no navigation brief held prior to commencing this transit (nor was one ever scheduled); no list of lights and/or Nav aids was provided in the Night Orders; CDR did not ensure that the Navigator was on the Bridge for the transit and CDR, himself, was in his bunk.

b. Failed to ensure that safe navigation and proper seamanship were maintained on board KINKAID.

c. Failed to keep himself appraised of what watch stations were being manned.

d. Failed to ensure adequate personnel were on watch as required by the tactical situation.

e. Failed to ensure that personnel standing watch were qualified for those watches.

(Finding of Fact 20, 31, 36, 39, 40, 69, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 104, 105, 016, 107, 109, 111, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 161, 164, 165, 166, 177, 178, 188, 211, 212, 213)

7. LCDR KINKAID's Executive Officer until 1 Oct 89, was negligent in the performance of his duties as Executive Officer in that he failed to adequately supervise KINKAID's PQS, training and watch qualification programs during his tour. The unsatisfactory PQS qualification status of KINKAID's watchstanders, the lack of a viable lookout training program and

All redactions are B6.

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the lack of regularly scheduled Planning Boards for Training during his last two months on board are all indicative of long standing neglect of training on board KINKAID. The unsatisfactory training program that LCDR [redacted] inherited was in such poor shape that LCDR [redacted], despite strong personal effort, could not bring it up to satisfactory standards in his short time on board prior to the collision. In this regard, I also note that LCDR [redacted] was also required to devote significant time and energy after he relieved as Executive Officer to clearing an inexcusable backlog of evaluations and fitness reports still in ship's office (some of which were over one year old). (Finding of Fact 164, 165, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181)

8. LCDR [redacted], in his six weeks on board prior to the collision, had quickly recognized serious shortcomings in KINKAID's training and numerous other administrative programs. By his own initiative he reinstated Planning Boards for Training and revitalized review of division and administrative training programs using a "Division in the Spotlight" system. Reviewing one division a week, LCDR [redacted] had completed five divisions prior to the collision. In the course of his reviews, LCDR [redacted] had not yet recognized the full magnitude of KINKAID's serious failings in watchstander PQS qualifications. Notwithstanding the above, LCDR [redacted] had been on board six weeks and should have had time to take note of the navigation situation on board KINKAID. LCDR [redacted] was negligent in the performance of his duties in that he failed to adequately monitor the navigation team. (Finding of Fact 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 90, 94, 96, 97, 104, 106, 107, 115, 118, 119, 124, 125, 139, 164, 165, 166, 177, 178, 180, 181, 189)

9. LT [redacted] was negligent in the performance of his duties as Navigator in that he failed to make appropriate preparations for KINKAID's transit through the restricted waters of the Strait of Malacca. His lack of planning and preparation for the transit, as evidenced by a lack of a navigation brief, lack of briefings for the quartermasters, no list of lights and Navaids in the Night Orders, and not being on the bridge when KINKAID entered restricted waters contributed to the chain of events that lead to the collision. (Finding of Fact 13, 14, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 90, 94, 96, 97, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119, 164, 165, 176, 177, 210, 211, 212, 213)

10. LTJG [redacted] was negligent in the performance of his duties as OOD in that he failed to:

- a. Stand a proper watch as Officer of the Deck. LTJG [redacted] failed to:

All redactions are B-6.

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- Organize his bridge watch to safely pilot the ship and avoid shipping and failed to monitor the performance of his bridge watch standers.

- Utilize the capabilities of his CIC watch to assist in safe navigation and the maintenance of a complete surface picture.

- Accurately fix KINKAID's position at the required frequency.

- Keep himself appraised of the surface contact picture.

- Ensure the safe navigation of KINKAID in accordance with the most basic Rules of the Nautical Road, as they apply to traffic separation schemes, crossing situations, the use of sound signals and the use of bridge-to-bridge radio telephone.

- Recognize sufficiently early that risk of collision with M/V KOTA PETANI existed and take appropriate, early and decisive action to remove such risk.

- Initiate appropriate emergency shiphandling maneuvers to avoid collision once he recognized that collision was imminent.

b. Inform the Commanding Officer of the close CPAs of surface contacts, as he was required to do by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders.

c. Inform the Commanding Officer of course changes, as he was required to do by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders.

d. Inform the Commanding Officer and the Navigator when he was in doubt as to the ship's position, as he was required to do by the Commanding Officer's Standing Orders.

e. Inform the Commanding Officer and the Navigator that CIC and the Bridge disagreed with the ship's position, as he was required to do by KINKAID's Navigation Instruction.

(Finding of Fact 12, 17, 20, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 44, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69, 75, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, 110, 113, 116, 117, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 149, 150, 151, 155, 166)

11. LTJG *Bb* was negligent in the performance of his duties as CIC Watch Officer in that he failed to:

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- a. Maintain a complete surface contact picture.
- b. Adequately involve himself in the management of the surface picture.
- c. Be aware of CPAs to contacts.
- d. Be aware of lookout reports.
- e. Make recommendations on "courses to avoid" to the bridge.
- f. Take appropriate actions to get CIC adequately manned. (Finding of Fact 19, 20, 31, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 89, 95, 96, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157)

12. OS2 *B. B* 1 was negligent in the performance of his duties as CIC Watch Supervisor in that he failed to:

- a. Maintain an accurate and complete surface contact picture.
- b. Provide adequate support to the CICWO in the management of CIC.
- c. Monitor the management of the surface picture. OS2 Tidwell left it to OS2 Randolph, the Surface Tracker, to do without supervision.
- d. Be aware of CPAs to surface contacts.
- e. Be aware of lookout reports.
- f. Ensure that CIC was adequately manned and organized to handle the surface contact load. (Finding of Fact 20, 31, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 89, 95, 96, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157)

13. LCDR *W. B* was negligent in the performance of his duties as Operations Officer and Senior Watch Officer in that he failed to:

- a. Ensure that personnel assigned to Bridge and CIC watch bills were PQS qualified to stand their watch.
- b. Obtain the Commanding Officer's or Executive Officer's approval of the plan to have CIC in a four-section, Condition IV watch rotation for the transit from Phuket, Thailand to Hong Kong. This reduced manning resulted in a grossly undermanned

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

watch in CIC, and one which was totally inadequate for piloting in restricted waters and congested waters.

c. Ensure adequate professional standards were maintained in CIC.

d. Ensure KINKAID had an adequate lookout training program. (Finding of Fact 31, 36, 39, 95, 96, 98, 125, 139, 141, 142, 143, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 164, 166, 172, 178, 179)

14. QM1 <sup>B-6</sup> was negligent in the performance of his duties as Assistant Navigator in that he failed to make appropriate preparations for KINKAID's transit through the Strait of Malacca. His lack of planning and preparation for the transit, as evidenced by the lack of a navigation brief, lack of briefings for the quartermasters, no list of lights and Nav aids in the Night Orders, not adequately monitoring the performance of the QMOWs and not being on the bridge when KINKAID entered restricted waters, were contributing factors in the chain of events that lead to the collision. (Finding of Fact 13, 14, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 90, 94, 96, 97, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 116, 117, 119, 164, 165, 176, 177, 210, 211, 212, 213))

15. KINKAID's officer watchbill showed that the OODs were rotating in four sections, the JOODs in six sections and CIC watch officers in four. Of the 14 "officer watch stations," only six were filled with commissioned officers. The use of enlisted men to fill officer watch stations is not inherently wrong. Our senior enlisted ratings have a vast store of technical knowledge and many of them have the requisite experience to qualify for deck and CIC watchkeeping duties. Commanding Officers can and should tap this store of experience when the need exists to fill gaps in their officer watch bills, and to keep a ready pool of qualified watchstanders, capable of handling any emergency. It is, however, wrong, in my judgment, to use enlisted watchstanders simply to relieve junior officers of the "burden" of watchkeeping. This practice deprives young Surface Warfare Officers of critical bridge and CIC watchstanding experience. The stock in trade of a Surface Warfare Officer is his collection of sea going skills, gained through countless hours of routine watchstanding. This is the store of experience that can be called upon in an emergency situation to avoid causing just such an accident as this collision. It is these countless hours of watchstanding which create captains who will not permit their ships to stand into such danger. The Commanding Officer of KINKAID, by having his most experienced officers off the watchbill and in using enlisted men to fill in officer positions, deprived himself of the very people who were best qualified and who may have avoided

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the collision. He not only sold his junior officers short but, in effect, was mortgaging the future health of an important part of the Surface Warfare community. (Finding of Fact 4, 140, 169, 170)

16. The PQS Program in KINKAID was faulty. Supervisory personnel were not monitoring its implementation and were not routinely verifying PQS qualification status against watch bills. (Finding of Fact 164, 165, 166)

17. The AN/SRN-25 is a capable piece of electronic navigation equipment. However, its various modes are complicated and its displays may cause untrained personnel to have a false sense of security as to the ship's position. Furthermore, there is no PQS on the operation of the AN/SRN-25 to ensure that QMOWs and OODs are trained in its operation. (Finding of Fact 182)

18. KINKAID's damage control effort was exceptional. The rapid and professional response of the crew in controlling the damage and combating the fires was most significant in lessening the extent and cost of damage and preventing further loss of life. (Finding of Fact 188, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209)

19. Although numerous members of KINKAID's crew contributed to the superb damage control effort, the efforts of DCCM , HTC , FC2 , DC3 and ICFN were truly heroic. DCCM and HTC organized the fire fighting effort on the fantail and Sea Sparrow deck. They assembled effective and motivated fire fighting hose teams that courageously attacked the fire from all angles. Two P-250s were running on the fantail, supplying water and AFFF to the fire on the Sea Sparrow deck and starboard torpedo magazine within 10 to 15 minutes of the collision. Their efforts before the collision in damage control training on KINKAID paid off that night. FC2 and DC3 led hose teams to combat the fire in the starboard torpedo magazine, aggressively attacking the fire, even after an explosion occurred. ICFN and FC2 volunteered to enter the dangerous and toxic environment of the starboard torpedo magazine to check for unexploded ordnance and fight fires still burning. The rapid and effective response reflected the high level of damage control training in KINKAID. (Finding of Fact 192, 200, 201, 202, 203)

20. KINKAID's lookout equipment (such as binoculars, S/P phone headsets and cords, foul weather gear, etc.) has numerous deficiencies and requires a complete evaluation and inventory prior to subsequent underway operations. (Finding of Fact 90, 116, 117, 160)

All redactions are B-6.

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

21. The navigation team that completed REFTRA in March 1989 and the navigation check ride in June 1989 was a totally different team than the one responsible for KINKAID's navigation on 12 Nov 89. The previous Navigator had left in August, and the QMC and QM1 detached in July. This high turnover of key Navigation Department personnel was significant. Coupled with KINKAID's poor training and qualification program, and ineffective supervision by the Commanding Officer and new Navigator, the results were an untested and inexperienced navigation team which failed to make adequate preparations for a potentially difficult transit of a busy shipping area. (Finding of Fact 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 104, 105, 106, 107, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180)

22. Log keeping and navigation plotting procedures in KINKAID were inadequate with regard to events leading up to and concerning the collision. Navigation (both in CIC and on the bridge), Radar Contact, CIC and Deck logs and CIC and bridge navigation charts did not present an accurate, complete picture of events and conditions on 12 Nov 89. As a result, witnesses and participants in the investigation were required to rely, in part, on possibly less accurate recollections of events/conditions days after they occurred in order to piece together a factual picture of the events leading to the collision. The reconstructed navigation chart and DRT trace that I developed (enclosures 80 and 81) provide the best picture that I can determine of what actually happened in KINKAID the night of the collision. A better, more accurate, picture could have been developed if proper log and chart entries, recorded coincident with the actual events, were made. The need for accurate log-keeping should be emphasized in KINKAID. Additional training may be required for watchstanders and supervisors. (Finding of Fact 7, 12, 31, 36, 38, 43, 44, 63, 83, 85, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 111, 149, 150, 151, 155, 157, 158, 173, 174, 175)

23. In KINKAID, the Conning Officer also is responsible for plotting scope head CPAs on the AN/SPA-25, working maneuvering board CPAs and making reports to the CO. In this case, the Conning Officer also felt that he could not give an engine or rudder order without first gaining the approval of the OOD. This is unsatisfactory. The Conning Officer should be just that, the Conning Officer. If he has to get the OOD's permission prior to giving an order, he is not the Conning Officer. To burden the Conning Officer with additional tasks takes away from his singular responsibility - which is the safe maneuvering of his ship. This watch organization in KINKAID in effect rendered TMC 3-6 totally ineffective as the Conning Officer and in fact made him little more than a "parrot" for the OOD. (Finding of Fact 15, 51, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65, 136, 171)

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

24. KINKAID was not keeping an Engineer's Bell Log in CCS. Their automatic bell logger/data logger was out of commission. OPNAVINST 3120.32B (SORM), COMNAVSURFPACINST 5400.3A (EDORM) and the printed cover sheet for the Engineer's Bell Log form (NAVSEA Form 3120/1) are unclear and somewhat contradictory on where the Engineer's Bell Log will be kept if the automatic bell logger is out of commission. It is my opinion that the Deck Log is not an appropriate substitute for the Engineer's Bell Log and that a separate Bell Log should be kept in CCS if the automatic bell logger is out of commission, even if engines are being controlled from the bridge. (Finding of Fact 163)

25. Injuries sustained in this accident by EMC, CTMC, DCC, OS2, ENFN, SN, STGC, GMC, GSM1, SN, OS3, SN, FCC, EM3, HT1, and OS2 were incurred in the line of duty and not due to their own misconduct. (Finding of Fact 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231)

26. OPNAVINST 3750.6P (governing instruction for aviation mishap investigation and reporting) provides more thorough and useful guidance than does OPNAVINST 5102.1C. (Finding of Fact 241, 242, 243, 244, 245)

27. OPNAVINST 5102.1C (governing instruction for non aviation mishap investigation and reporting) requires that the commanding officer in a non aviation mishap conduct his own safety mishap investigation and submit the report. This creates the potential for bias which is excluded by the independent Aviation Mishap Board required by OPNAVINST 3750.6P. (Finding of Fact 241, 242)

28. The timeliness requirements of OPNAVINST 3750.6P are more realistic than those of OPNAVINST 5102.1C. (Finding of Fact 243, 244, 245)

29. The completeness and accuracy of KINKAID's mishap report (USS KINKAID 011600Z DEC 89) suffered from an attempt to meet deadlines while not enjoying the use of an independent mishap investigating body. (Finding of Fact 246, 247)

30. The noise from ruptured piping systems, P-250s and the collision alarm (stuck in the "on" position) significantly degraded DC WIFCOM communications. Personnel had to hold the microphone/speaker directly against their ears to communicate. (Finding of Fact 208)

31. Limited DC WIFCOM antenna coverage topside resulted in nulls that hampered communication. (Finding of Fact 208)

All redactions are D-6.

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that Commander, Seventh Fleet request Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command to characterize CDR detachment from command of USS KINKAID as "for cause." It is further recommended that he be charged with violating Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty) and Article 110 (Improper Hazarding of Vessel), and that a pretrial investigation under Article 32, UCMJ be convened to investigate these charges. His failure while in command to make adequate preparations for the safe navigation of KINKAID through the restricted waters of the Strait of Malacca; to ensure that an experienced, trained, qualified and briefed team was on watch; to personally supervise the transit; and to ensure safe navigation and proper seamanship warrant this action. (Opinion 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23)

2. It is recommended that Commander, Seventh Fleet request Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command to characterize LTJG detachment from USS KINKAID as "for cause." It is further recommended that he be charged with violating Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty), Article 108 (Suffering Military Property of the United States to be lost, damaged, or destroyed) and Article 110 (Improper Hazarding of Vessel), and that a pretrial investigation under Article 32, UCMJ be convened to investigate these charges. It is also recommended that LTJG designation as a surface warfare trainee (1160), be removed and he be redesignated as a general unrestricted line officer (1100), in accordance with OPNAVINST 1412.2E and MILPERSMAN 1410270. His failure to keep a proper watch, as well as his failure to inform the Commanding Officer of the close CPAs of surface contacts, course changes and the confused navigation picture warrant these actions. (Opinion 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 22, 23)

3. It is recommended that QM1 be charged with violating Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty) for failing to discharge his responsibilities as Assistant Navigator/Senior Quartermaster in preparing and planning for the safe navigation of his ship in restricted waters. It is recommended that he be required to answer such charges at Flag Mast. (Opinion 2, 4, 5, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22)

4. It is recommended that KINKAID's Operations Officer, LCDR be charged with violating Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty) for failing to ensure that CIC was adequately manned and prepared for this transit and to ensure that qualified personnel were on watch. It is recommended that he be required to answer such charges at Flag Mast. (Opinion 4, 5, 13, 16, 22)

All redactions are B-6.

Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

5. It is recommended that OS2 <sup>B-6</sup> be charged with violating Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty) for failing to perform his duties as CIC Watch Supervisor in coordinating CIC's support to the CICWO and the bridge. It is recommended that he be required to answer such charges at Flag Mast. (Opinion 4, 5, 12, 22)

6. It is recommended that KINKAID's former Executive Officer, LCDR <sup>B-6</sup>, be issued a nonpunitive letter cautioning him of the need to more closely monitor training and administrative programs for which he is responsible. A proposed nonpunitive letter of caution is being forwarded under separate cover in accordance with section 0512(e) of reference (a). (Opinion 7, 16)

7. It is recommended that KINKAID's Executive Officer, LCDR <sup>B-6</sup> be issued a nonpunitive letter cautioning him of the need to more closely monitor KINKAID's navigation team. Further, he should be cautioned to proceed in greater depth in his review and overhaul of KINKAID's training and watch qualification programs. A proposed nonpunitive letter of caution is being forwarded under separate cover in accordance with section 0512(e) of reference (a). (Opinion 2, 4, 8, 14, 16, 21, 22)

8.

B-5

9. It is recommended that KINKAID's current Commanding Officer be directed to review his CIC and bridge watch organization to ensure that the watch is organized as directed by the DD-963 Combat Systems Doctrine and that the classical functions of CIC (Collect, Display, Evaluate, and Disseminate) are reinforced on board KINKAID. In conjunction with this review, it is also recommended that he review and improve the accuracy and thoroughness of log-keeping throughout KINKAID. (Opinion 3, 4, 5, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24)

10.

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Subj: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989

11. It is recommended that a formal school on the operation of the AN/SRN-25 be instituted for navigators and quartermasters on ships with AN/SRN-25s installed or outfitted for deployment. I recommend that a PQS be developed on a priority basis on the operation of the AN/SRN-25, and that this qualification be made mandatory for QMOWs on ships equipped with the AN/SRN-25. (Opinion 17)

12. It is recommended that Commanding Officer, USS KINKAID initiate commendatory action to recognize the heroic and tireless actions of DCCM B-6 HTC B-6, FC2 B-6, DC3 B-6 and ICFN B-6 in the damage control effort on board KINKAID after the collision. He should feel free to recommend other crew members for commendatory action and recognition as well. (Opinion 18, 19)

13. It is recommended that Commanding Officer, USS KINKAID inventory and assess all lookout equipment (such as binoculars, S/P phone headsets and cords, foul weather gear, etc.) for adequacy for underway operations. (Opinion 20)

14. It is recommended that Commander Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific conduct a crew certification on KINKAID in accordance with Appendix R of COMNAVSURFPACINST C3501.6B prior to KINKAID's departure from Subic Bay to ensure that watchstanding training and organizational deficiencies identified in this investigation have been corrected. (Opinion 4, 5, 16, 20, 21, 22)

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17. It is recommended that Commander Naval Sea Systems Command investigate the addition of a DC WIFCOM head set to improve communication in noisy environments, survey DC WIFCOM coverage topside and add additional antennas as required. (Opinion 30, 31)

B-6

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FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO RHHMBRA/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

RUWDTAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA

RUHHWIA/CTF SEVEN FIVE

RUEAHOF/NAVY JAG ALEXANDRIA VA

RUHGJPD/USS KINKAID \$\$\$

BT

UNCLAS //N05800//

SUBJ: USS KINKAID COLLISION

A. COMSEVENTHFLT LTR 588B SER 013/1163 OF 14 NOV 89 (NOTAL)

1. REF A QUOTED FOR INFO:

QUOTE

FROM: COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

TO: REAR ADMIRAL <sup>B-6</sup>, U.S. NAVY

SUBJ: INVESTIGATION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE COLLISION INVOLVING USS KINKAID THAT OCCURRED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989.

REF: (A) JAG MANUAL

1. UNDER CHAPTER V, PART C, OF REFERENCE (A), YOU HAVE BEEN

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE, AS SOON AS PRACTICAL, INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES

SURROUNDING THE SUBJECT MISHAP. THIS CONFIRMS MY ORAL APPOINTMENT OF 13 NOVEMBER 1989.

2. YOU ARE TO INVESTIGATE ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MISHAP, INCLUDING THE CAUSE, RESULTING INJURIES AND DAMAGE, AND ANY FAULT, NEGLIGENCE, OR RESPONSIBILITY. YOU MUST EXPRESS YOUR OPINION OF THE LINE OF DUTY AND MISCONDUCT STATUS OF ANY INJURED SERVICE MEMBER; BUT NO OPINION MAY BE EXPRESSED CONCERNING A DECEASED MEMBER. YOU SHOULD RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE, DISCIPLINARY, AND COMMENDATORY ACTION. REPORT YOUR FINDINGS OF FACT, OPINIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY 13 DECEMBER 1989, UNLESS AN EXTENSION OF TIME IS GRANTED.

IN PARTICULAR, YOUR ATTENTION IS DIRECTED TO SECTIONS 0306, 08, 0505, 0817, 0906, CHAPTER 12, AND APPENDIX A-3-A OF REFERENCE (A), AND ARTICLE 31, UCMJ.

THIS INVESTIGATION IS APPOINTED IN CONTEMPLATION OF LITIGATION FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ASSISTING ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS MATTER.

<sup>B-6</sup>  
VICE ADMIRAL

U. S. NAVY

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CO..XD..OPS..ADPS..ADMIN..CBS..ENG..EMO..HSL..ASWO..OT..SUP  
CICO..CICE..COMMO..RMC..LPO..RM1..RM2..GMF..CIBS..PUBS..RB..S/G

U N C L A S S I F I E D  
ENCLOSURE (1)

PRIORITY  
150022Z NOV 89



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
USS KINKAID (DD-965)  
FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96670-1203

IN REPLY REFER TO:

KINKAIDINST 1601.2H  
17 Jun 88

USS KINKAID (DD 965) INSTRUCTION 1601.2H

Subj: STANDING ORDERS

Ref: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1973, Chapter 7  
(b) Ship's Organization and Regulations Manual, Chapter 4  
(c) COMDTINST M16672.2A (U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Rules)  
(d) ATP-1C Volume I and II  
(e) Watch Officer Guide  
(f) OPNAVINST C5711.94 (INCSEA Agreement)  
(g) KINKAIDINST 5402.1G (Restricted Maneuvering Doctrine)  
(h) KINKAIDINST 3501.4B (Helo Operations Bill)  
(i) KINKAIDINST 3516.1A (Fighting Instructions)

1. Purpose. These Standing Orders are addressed primarily to the Officer of the Deck (OOD). Their purpose is to provide a generalized and permanent set of orders for the conduct of that watch underway and at anchor. These Standing Orders, together with the Night Orders, will comprise the Captain's Order Book and will guide the OOD's actions while on watch. Additionally, they will serve as a basis for prospective OOD watchstanders.

2. Cancellation. USS KINKAID Instruction 1601.2G of 15 September 1987 is hereby cancelled.

3. Role and authority of the Officer of the Deck. The Officer of the Deck is the Officer-in-charge of the watch section while he is on watch. He has authority from the Commanding Officer over everyone in the ship except the Executive Officer. In the Commanding Officer's absence, the Executive Officer is authorized to relieve him. He will do this only when he believes this action is necessary for the safety of the ship. The OOD is responsible for the safe and professional operation of KINKAID during his watch. He is to ensure the proper conduct of the bridge watch, the performance of CIC, and the accurate exchange of information with the Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). He is expected to have a thorough working knowledge of these Standing Orders, as well as the Rules of the Road, ATP-1C (Vol I, II) and watchstanding procedures contained in references (a) through (h). This knowledge, coupled with the good judgement he has already demonstrated in order to obtain qualification as Officer of the Deck, will serve as the basis for his performance.

4. Standing Orders.

a. CALL THE COMMANDING OFFICER IF IN DOUBT.

b. Understand and comply with the applicable sections of the Ships Organization and Regulation Manual (SORM), Rules of the Road, ATP-1C (Vol I, II), pertinent Ship, Type and Fleet Regulations and Operations Plans/Orders.

*Certified  
True copy*

ENCLOSURE (2)

c. Be thoroughly familiar with the tactical situation before relieving. Get briefed by the CICWO or TAO on the way to the bridge. If there is anything amiss, call the Commanding Officer at once.

d. Do not relieve as OOD until the JOOD and CICWO/TAO have relieved and settled into their watch. The JOOD should relieve at 15 minutes before the hour, the CICWO/TAO on the hour, and the OOD should relieve 15 minutes past the hour.

e. Tactical Action Officer (TAO):

(1) General. The Tactical Action Officer, when assigned, is the Commanding Officer's direct representative in all matters concerning the tactical employment and defense of the ship. In the Commanding Officer's absence from CIC, he has the authority to fight the ship as outlined in the ship's Fighting Instruction, reference (i). He shall be responsible for both the safe and proper operation of the combat systems, and for the performance of other duties as may be prescribed by the Commanding Officer.

(2) Relation to the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer may direct the TAO on matters concerning his general duties and safety of the ship. When the Commanding Officer is not present, the Executive Officer may direct the TAO how to proceed in time of danger or during an emergency. He may and should, when in his judgement it becomes necessary, relieve the Tactical Action Officer. The Commanding Officer will be promptly informed whenever the TAO is relieved in compliance with this article.

(3) Relation to the Officer of the Deck. The TAO will direct the Officer of the Deck as necessary to fight or defend the ship. The Officer of the Deck shall follow the direction of the TAO except when, in his judgement, such actions or maneuvers would place the ship in immediate danger. If such is the case the OOD will decline the direction and immediately inform the Commanding Officer. In all cases, the Commanding Officer shall be kept informed and advised of any actions not consistent with his desires or other established standard procedures.

f. When maneuvering to avoid a stand-on vessel, do it early (usually when the separation is 5-6NM) and with a course change large enough to be unmistakable. Sound appropriate whistle signals. Avoid crossing ahead of stand-on vessels. In international waters, with KINKAID as the stand-on vessel, if deemed prudent to maneuver, make a clear and recognizable course and/or speed change but avoid turning to port. Sound appropriate whistle signals to indicate maneuvering as required by Rules of the Road.

g. Have all running lights checked well before sunset and every 30 minutes while they are in use. If running lights are essential to ship's safety, use them regardless of lighting conditions ordered, and then inform the Commanding Officer. Have the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch check for violations of darken ship conditions at least once each watch.

h. When the visibility is reduced to 2 miles or less, ensure the following actions are taken: immediately (1) slow to a safe speed, (2) turn on running lights, (3) sound fog signals, (4) implement the remainder of the low visibility bill, and (5) call the Commanding Officer and the Navigator.

1. During low visibility conditions, if another vessel is detected by radar alone, determine immediately if a close quarters situation is developing or if risk of collision exists. If it does, make early course and/or speed changes to avoid collision. When you cannot avoid a close quarters situation with a vessel forward of the beam, reduce speed to bare steerageway or, if necessary, take all way off. In taking action to avoid collision during low visibility conditions, do not:

(1) Change course toward a vessel forward of the beam except to overtake the vessel.

(2) Change course toward a vessel either abeam or abaft the beam.

j. Notify the EOOW in CCS before the ship enters a restricted maneuvering situation. This includes proceeding in reduced visibility, operating in a close formation of ships, operating within five nautical miles of land, conning along side, and operating helicopters. Set engineering restricted maneuvering condition red or yellow as appropriate. Reference (g) pertains.

k. Beverages may be consumed on the bridge provided they do not interfere with watch performance or hazard equipment on the bridge. Do not permit smoking on the bridge at night.

1. At anchor, have an anchor bearing taken and recorded in the Bearing Record Book at least every 30 minutes. Plot the ship's position routinely every 30 minutes; every 15 minutes if winds increase to 25 knots or more. Have the anchor watch inspect the anchor chain at least every 30 minutes for indications of dragging and report to the OOD. When winds increase to 25 knots or more, make preparations to get underway on 15 minutes notice.

m. Be forehanded, rehearse emergency situations mentally, and organize and train the watch team to respond rapidly and effectively with a minimum of prompting. A quiet, well organized bridge is a prerequisite to competent teamwork. Don't hesitate to augment the watch if the situation warrants. Keep the bridge as dark as possible at night.

n. Be vigilant. The OOD is KINKAID's best lookout. Use mechanical and electronic aids, but check observations, including visual perceptions, against one another. Always step onto the bridge wing in the direction of a turn. When conning alongside, ensure the new course is clear when breaking away. Learn to recognize ship aspects and determine approximate ranges with both binoculars and night vision devices.

o. Ensure the lookouts are prepared to stand their watch correctly. Night vision devices, binoculars and foul weather gear may be necessary to ensure the lookouts do their jobs properly. Require the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch to rotate lookouts at intervals not to exceed 30 minutes.

p. When assigned to station in formation ensure KINKAID stays within station limits of +2 degrees bearing and  $\pm 10\%$  of required distance or as directed by OTC. When assigned a screen sector, patrol the sector randomly and aggressively.

q. When operating with an aircraft carrier, do not get closer than 3000 yards ahead, 2000 yards abeam or 1000 yards astern of the carrier (the 3-2-1 rule).

r. The Officer of the Deck shall permit no person to go aloft on the mast or stacks or to work over the side except when the wind and sea conditions will not expose him to danger, and then only when all applicable safety precautions are observed and the Commanding Officer's permission has been obtained. During periods of heavy weather or when the ship is maneuvering at high speeds the Officer of the Deck will positively control access to all weather decks.

#### 5. Helicopter Operations.

a. General. These instructions are promulgated in reference (h). Items mentioned below are listed for emphasis and are considered the most important aspects of helicopter operations. During helicopter operations, the Officer of the Deck will take steps to minimize Foreign Object Damage (FOD) hazards and maximize personnel safety. To this end he shall:

(1) Ensure all personnel not involved in helicopter operations stand clear of all weather decks aft of frame 292. No soft hats are to be worn topside during helicopter operations.

(2) Ensure no helicopter is unchocked or moved without the permission of the Commanding Officer.

(3) Ensure the helicopter checkoff list located in the bridge OOD folder is executed for helicopter operations. Ensure the wind envelope and ship's pitch and roll are in accordance with requirements set forth in NWP 42 series. The FOD walkdown must be thorough and complete.

(4) Only the Commanding Officer may grant permission for a green deck.

b. The safety requirements of flight operations demand that every person involved devotes his entire attention to the tasks at hand. The Officer of the Deck is directed to discontinue flight operations in the event that any question of safety arises.

6. Reports to the Commanding Officer. The Commanding Officer is ultimately responsible for the entire ship and everyone on board. Therefore, the OOD must keep the Commanding Officer informed of all conditions which could affect the safe and professional operation of the ship. Never hesitate to call the Commanding Officer in order to keep him fully informed or clarify any doubts. The OOD is specifically directed to use any reasonable means to awaken the Commanding Officer and inform him in the following instances:

a. Prior to executing maneuvers to a new station (including rotation of formation axis). When orders to change station are received via the immediate executive method, commence the maneuver, and then inform the Commanding Officer.

b. For any contact with a closest point of approach (CPA) less than 10,000 yards, notify the Commanding Officer prior to it reaching (10 NM). Provide information in the following order: KINKAID's course and speed, the contact's present position (relative), target angle, bearing drift, approximate course and speed, CPA (relative), time in minutes to CPA, and a recommended course of action. Do not delay taking action or reporting because of a lack of information such as when a small boat is detected close at hand.

c. Do not execute a tactical signal until it is fully understood. Request it be repeated if necessary. Verify all signals with the CICWO/TAO.

d. Before changing course or speed, unless otherwise directed in the Night Orders.

e. For navigational sightings (positively identify using a stop watch), or non-sighting (if not sighted within 15 minutes or 10 degrees of expected bearing), similarly for radar landfall (if not made within 10% of expected range), except as directed in the Night Orders.

f. For deviations from the proposed navigational track beyond 2NM and for course/speed changes to regain the track. Also call the Navigator.

g. For any unusual phenomena or hazards to navigation which are detected. Also call the Navigator.

h. Change in vital equipment status.

i. If any piece of navigation equipment (running lights, radar, OMEGA, NAVSAT, fathometer) fails to operate correctly or if there is doubt as to its reliability. Also call the Navigator and log the discrepancy in the Ship's Deck Log.

j. Significant changes in weather (reduced visibility, .04 inches per hour change in barometric pressure, marked change in wind and sea conditions). Also call the Navigator.

k. Any hostile or potentially hostile contacts, including sonar contacts.

l. In formation, when units join or detach, or are seriously out of station.

m. When out of station by more than  $\pm 2$  degrees bearing or  $\pm 10\%$  of range to the guide.

n. If in doubt, call.

7. Reports to the Squadron Commander Embarked. 0800, 1200 and 2000 position reports may be made by messenger if the embarked commander is not on the bridge. All other reports shall be made in accordance with instructions of the commander embarked (either to the commander personally or to his Staff Duty Officer). The Squadron Commander's arrival and departure on the bridge and in CIC will be announced.

8. Judgement. These Standing Orders reflect the Commanding Officer's standards for the watch underway and at anchor in KINKAID. It is not possible to create a checklist of specific responses and actions for every conceivable situation. These Standing Orders are guides to action, not inflexible rules of conduct.

In short, the OOD will always use his professional knowledge, common sense, and good judgement to preserve the safety and fighting ability of the ship. Remember:

"THE SUPERIOR OFFICER OF THE DECK is best defined  
as one who uses SUPERIOR JUDGEMENT  
to keep out of situations  
requiring the use of his SUPERIOR SKILLS"

B-6

## CAPTAIN'S NIGHT ORDERS

|   |                           |                          |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| SHIP (NAME & NUMBER)<br><b>USS KINKAID (DD-965)</b> | TIME ZONE<br><b>-7G</b>   | DATE<br><b>11 NOV 89</b> |
| ENROUTE<br><b>FROM PHUKET, TH</b>                   |                           | <b>TO HONG KONG, HK</b>  |
| OPERATING WITH<br><b>USS RENTZ (FFG-46)</b>         |                           | AREA                     |
| OTC<br><b>CDR</b>                                   | FLAGSHIP<br><b>DD-965</b> |                          |
| SOPA<br><b>CDR</b>                                  | FLAGSHIP<br><b>DD-965</b> |                          |

### STANDARD TACTICAL DATA

|                |              |                       |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| FORMATION      | ZIG ZAG PLAN | SINUOUS CLOCK CAM NO. |
| BASE COURSE    | SPEED        | KTS RPM               |
| FORMATION AXIS | GUIDE SHIP   | BEARING               |
|                |              | DISTANCE              |
|                |              | YARDS                 |

### SCREEN DATA

|             |                 |          |                 |  |                     |
|-------------|-----------------|----------|-----------------|--|---------------------|
| TYPE SCREEN | SCREEN AXIS     | CIRCLE   | NO. STATIONS    | NO. SHIPS  | UNASSIGNED STATIONS |
| SCREEN CDR  | SCREEN CDR SHIP |          | OWNSHIP STATION | PATROLLING STATION                                       |                     |
|             |                 |          |                 | <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO |                     |
| STA SHIP    | STA SHIP        | STA SHIP | STA SHIP        |  |                     |
|             |                 |          |                 |  |                     |
|             |                 |          |                 |  |                     |

### OWN SHIP DATA

|                                    |                                      |  |  |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| BOILERS ON THE LINE<br><b>1,2</b>  | GENERATORS ON THE LINE<br><b>1,2</b> | PLANT<br><b>2, 23</b><br><input type="checkbox"/> CROSS CONN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPLIT | SHIP DARKENED<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO |
| MATERIAL CONDITION<br><b>YOKIE</b> | CONDITION OF READINESS<br><b>TV</b>  | GUNS MANNED<br><b>—</b>  | EMCON CONDITION<br><b>D</b>  |
| EQUIPMENT CASUALTIES               | ETR                                  |  | ETR  |
| 1. <b>ECU</b>                      | <b>UNK</b>                           | 4.   |  |
| 2. <b>TAS MK 23 RADAR</b>          | <b>UNK</b>                           | 5.   |  |
| 3.                                 |                                      | 6.   |  |

### WEATHER DATA

|                        |                       |                         |                        |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| SUNRISE<br><b>0600</b> | SUNSET<br><b>1801</b> | MOONRISE<br><b>1440</b> | MOONSET<br><b>0320</b> |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|

#### NAVIGATION AND WEATHER REMARKS

**PARTLY CLOUDY WITH SHOWERS AND ISOLATED THUNDER SHOWERS. WINDS E TO NE 10-15 KTS WITH HIGHER GUSTS IN SHOWERS. SEAS 4-3 FEET.**

all Blb

ENCLOSURE 1

A 1700 COPY  
 LT. JUDGE USNS  
 WITH: 10 USS 238 161 121  
 3

NIGHT INTENTIONS

- ① WE EXPECT TO CONDUCT ELL DRILLS FROM 2000G TO 0100G. USE SPLIT PLANT FOR DRILLS.
- ② WE EXPECT TO CONDUCT A CIC PUBEX (EVENT 12002) FROM 0000G TO 0400G.
- ③ WE EXPECT TO CONDUCT AN EW PUBEX (EVENT 12003) FROM 0400G TO 0800G
- ④ READ AND SIGN FOR READING CO.'S STANDING ORDERS FOR NOVEMBER.
- ⑤ UPON COMPLETION OF ELL DRILLS, REMAIN IN SPLIT PLANT AND CATCH UP WITH USS RENTZ. ONCE WE CATCH UP, SLOW TO BASE SPEED OF 16 KTS, TAKE TACTICAL CONTROL OF RENTZ, AND PLACE HER ~~4000~~ 4000 YDS AFTREN.

1. CARRY OUT STANDING NIGHT ORDERS. CHECK THEM OVER TO REFRESH YOUR MEMORY.

2. ETERNAL VIGILANCE IS THE PRICE OF SAFETY  
3. CALL ME WHEN IN DOUBT AND IN ANY EVENT AT 0600

| WATCH  | OOD | BMOW | JOOD | AMOW | EOMM | CIC NO | REMARKS |
|--------|-----|------|------|------|------|--------|---------|
| 20-24  |     |      |      |      |      |        |         |
| 00-04  |     |      |      |      |      |        |         |
| 04-08* |     |      |      |      |      |        |         |


WATCH REMARKS

IF WE DON'T FALL TOO FAR BEHIND RENTZ, WAIT ON FORM 1 UNTIL 121000G. SK

All redactions are TB6.

\* RETURN TO CAPTAIN BY 0800





|       | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 |
|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 00-04 |    | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  |
| 08-08 |    | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  |
| 08-12 | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  |
| 16    | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  |
| 16-18 | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  |
| 18-20 | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  |
| 20-24 | ①  | 4  | 3  | 2  | ①  | 4  | 3  |

Obtained from  
 RT. 146 station  
 13 NOV 85

LT. JAGC, USNR  
 AUTH: 10 USC 936 (a) (1)

UNDERWAY WATCHBILL: PHUKET TO HONG KONG (11-17 NOV)

|   | <u>OOD</u> | <u>JOOD</u> | <u>CICWO</u> |
|---|------------|-------------|--------------|
| 1 | LT         | TMC         | OS1          |
| 2 | LTJG       | QM1         | CWO2         |
|   | LT         | U/I         |              |
| 3 | LTJG       | IS1         | LTJG         |
| 4 | LTJG       | SMC         | OS1          |
|   |            | FO2         | ENS S (U/I)  |
|   |            | OTMC        |              |
|   |            | BTGC        |              |

- JOOD'S ARE IN SIX SECTIONS AND ROTATE INDEPENDENTLY OF OTHER FOUR SECTIONS
- WATCHES WILL BE DOGGED 18-18 AND 18-19.
- JOOD'S ARE REMINDED THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO SAMPLE THE ENLISTED MESS AND FILL OUT THE EVALUATION FORMS. OFFGOING JOOD SAMPLES. (04-07 BREAKFAST, 07-12 LUNCH, 12-18 DINNER)
- LT Y WILL COORDINATE TO RELIEVE OS1 SHAW OR OS1 HOMPEBOR AS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ATACO COVERAGE FOR FLIGHT OPS

SUBMITTED: \_\_\_\_\_

REVIEWED: \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

*All redactions are B-6.*

COMMANDING OFFICER'S STANDING ORDERS REQUIRED SIGNATURES

|      | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|------|---------|----------|----------|
| LCDR |         |          |          |
| LT   |         |          |          |
| LTJG |         |          |          |

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COMMANDING OFFICER'S STANDING ORDERS REQUIRED SIGNATURES

OCTOBER

NOVEMBER

DECEMBER

ENS

ENS

CWO2

CWO2

STGCS (SW)

✳

EWC (SW)

OSC (SW)

SMC (SW)

TMC (SW)

OS1

OS1 (SW)

OS1

IS1 (SW)

QMI (SW)

✳ STGC (SW)

) CTML (SW)

LCDR

B-6

ENCLOSURE (5)

Should situations warrant, appropriate watch stations will be filled accordingly by the remainder

1

of the on section. (ie; GUNEX, PUBEX, TORPEX, etc.)

Watches will be in a eight hour rotation. (0800-1600, 1600-2400  
0001-0800). Watches will be relieved on the hour to allow for the  
oncoming 0800-1600 watchstanders to attend quarters.

Submitted by: OS2 B6  
OS2

Reviewed by: OS1 B6

Approved by: OS<sup>3</sup> B6  
OS<sup>2</sup>  
1

The following CIC watchbill is submitted for our return trip to San Diego, Ca.

|          | <u>Section 1(A)</u> | <u>Section 1(B)</u> |
|----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| W/S:     | OS2                 | OS3                 |
| TRK SUP: | OS3                 | OS2                 |
| AIR TRK: | OSSN                | OS2                 |
| COMMS:   | OS2                 | OS3                 |
| BRIDGE:  | OSSN                | OSSN                |
|          | OSSN                | OS3                 |

|          | <u>Section 2(A)</u> | <u>Section 2(B)</u> |
|----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| W/S:     | OS2                 | OS2                 |
| TRK SUP: | OS2                 | OS3                 |
| AIR TRK: | OS3                 | OS3                 |
| COMMS:   | OSSN                | OSSN                |
| BRIDGE:  | OSSN                | OSSN                |
|          | OS3                 | OSSN                |

*Certified True Copy*  
11/1  
LT. JAGC, USNR  
AUTH: 10 USC 936 (a) (1)

(Positions of personnel may change, qualifications permitting)

*All reductions are B-6*

NOTE: DRT AND AMPA 25 WILL NOT BE UTILIZED EXCEPT FOR NAVIGATION/  
HEAVY TRAFFIC AREAS AS DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE CICWO.  
THE DRT WILL BE PRE-SET WITH ALL AMPLIFYING DATA AVAILABLE  
FOR EMERGENCIES (IE; MOB, TMA, SAR, ETC.) WHEN NOT BEING  
UTILIZED.

Watch Supervisors will ensure chow reliefs are cycled from thier A/B section:

Clean-up will be conducted by the A/B section respectfully and prior to turn over to relieving section(1/2).

ENCLOSURE 1a

DATE 11 Nov 89

FIRST DIVISION  
UNDERWAY WATCH BILL

SECTION ONE

BMOW BM3  
MSG \_\_\_\_\_  
HELM ✓ \_\_\_\_\_  
P/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
S/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
A/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_

SECTION TWO

BMOW BM3  
MSG \_\_\_\_\_  
HELM BM3 \_\_\_\_\_  
P/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
S/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
A/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_

SECTION THREE

BMOW \_\_\_\_\_  
MSG BM3 \_\_\_\_\_  
HELM \_\_\_\_\_  
P/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
S/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
A/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_

SECTION FOUR

BMOW BM3 \_\_\_\_\_  
MSG \_\_\_\_\_  
HELM \_\_\_\_\_  
P/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
S/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_  
A/ LKT \_\_\_\_\_

SUBMITTED BY: BM3  
LPO

*WON, WAC*

APPROVED BY: [Signature]  
FIRST LT

APPROVED BY: [Signature]  
DEPT. HEAD

*Certified True Copy*

LT. JAGC, USNR  
AUTH: 10 USC 936 (a) (1)

*All redactions are TS-6*

ENCLOSURE 178

|              |           |             |              |      |       |      |     |            |            |       |       |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|------|-------|------|-----|------------|------------|-------|-------|
| ORIG. CODE A | SHIP TYPE | HULL NUMBER | SHEET SERIAL | YEAR | MONTH | ZONE | DAY | SHIP NAME  | USE CODE B | CLASS | HANDL |
| N            | FFG       | 46          | 49           | 9    | 11    | G    | 12  | USS RENTZ  | CIC        |       |       |
|              |           |             |              |      |       |      |     | USE OF LOG |            |       |       |
|              |           |             |              |      |       |      |     | A          | WATCH      |       |       |

| TIME    | REMARKS   |
|---------|---|
| 18 — 21 | 23  |
| 0045    | Property Relieved by LT   |
| 0045    | ASSUMED THE WATCH, STREAMING AS BEFORE.   |
| 0053    | C/C 145°  |
| 0155    | C/C 142°  |
| 0110    | C/C 137°  |
| 0205    | C/C 137°  |
| 0340    | % 125° (T)  |
| 0349    | WATCH PROPERLY RELIEVED BY LCDR S   |
|         | ASSUMED THE WATCH   |
| 0408    | % 135° (T)  |
| 0413    | % 140° (T)  |
| 0519    | USS KINKAID HAS BEEN HIT ON HER STRD. BRIDGE<br>WING LAT 03 06.52 LONG. 100 47.38. Transiting<br>Malacca Straits. KINKAID HAS FIRE AFT.<br>KINKAID WISHES OUR UNIT TO TAKE STATION<br>1000 yds off her port beam. |
| 0518    | % 5 kts   |
| 0521    | Kinkaid reports Men overboard Pt 2 Stbd. Side<br>Kinkaid reports collision Pt 2 Stbd. side with Flooding<br>damage unk<br>Left 10° rudder   |
| 0527    | 02 55 N 100 53 E KINKAID'S LAT & LONG.<br>Kinkaid requires rescue & assistance & also reliefs   |
| 0529    | % 25 kts  |
| 0532    | Rentz LAT 03 07 N 100 47 E<br>Have comms with Kinkaid on FW C&R & DSA<br>Kinkaid reports two men overboard on both port &<br>stbd sides   |
| 0536    | Right Full rudder   |
| 0539    | Rentz standing by with motorwhale boat to<br>recover their men in the water<br>Sending Navy Blue Voice Report to NAVCAMS  |

All reductions  
 are B-6


CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY

\* DENOTES LATE ENTRY

ENCLOSURE 81

12 Nov 89

|      |      |        |     |                 |     |    |
|------|------|--------|-----|-----------------|-----|----|
| 0458 | 3667 | AF     | 100 | 3'              | 311 | 15 |
| 0459 | 3673 | AE     | 085 | 4 <sup>s</sup>  | 305 | 11 |
| 0501 | 3605 | AH     | 119 | 20 <sup>4</sup> | 298 | 09 |
| 0501 | 3615 | AI     | 117 | 29 <sup>3</sup> | 295 | 13 |
| 0502 | 3626 | AJ     | 130 | 23'             | 300 | 11 |
| 0507 | 3636 | AK     | 122 | 29 <sup>8</sup> | 302 | 09 |
| 0509 | 3626 | AJ     | 130 | 18'             | 283 | 08 |
| 0512 | 3605 | AH     | 109 | 11'             | 298 | 12 |
| 0512 | 3615 | AI     | 112 | 19 <sup>6</sup> | 297 | 14 |
| 0512 | 3636 | AK     | 119 | 25 <sup>3</sup> | 302 | 09 |
| 0513 | 3626 | AJ     | 128 | 13 <sup>8</sup> | 301 | 10 |
| 0516 | 0033 | AL     | 121 | 8 <sup>9</sup>  |     |    |
| 0519 | 0026 | KINKAD | 337 | 15 <sup>4</sup> | 103 | 15 |
| 0520 | 3626 | AJ     | 125 | 7 <sup>8</sup>  | 301 | 10 |
| 0520 | 3605 | AH     | 064 | 4'              | 298 | 12 |
| 0520 | 3615 | AI     | 096 | 10 <sup>6</sup> | 297 | 14 |
| 0520 | 0026 | KINKAD | 331 | 17 <sup>8</sup> | D1  | W  |
| 0529 | 3646 | AM     | 303 | 20 <sup>5</sup> |     |    |
| 0529 | 3605 | AH     | 349 | 5'              |     |    |
| 0531 | 0026 | KIN    | 327 | 18 <sup>9</sup> | D1  | W  |
| 0532 | 3605 | AH     | 351 | 4 <sup>3</sup>  | 322 | 12 |
| 0532 | 2011 | AM     | 200 | 17 <sup>0</sup> | 119 | 14 |



SHIP POSITION LOG

|           |   |             |    |      |       |      |     |           |         |       |       |
|-----------|---|-------------|----|------|-------|------|-----|-----------|---------|-------|-------|
| SHIP TYPE |   | HULL NUMBER |    | YEAR | MONTH | ZONE | DAY | SHIP NAME | STATION | CLASS | HANDL |
| N         | A | F.F.G.      | 46 | 9    | 11    | G    | 12  | NAV LOG   |         |       |       |
| 1         | 2 | 3           | 4  | 5    | 6     | 7    | 8   | 9         | 10      | 11    | 12    |

| TIME | POSITION TYPE | CODE A | QUALITY CODE B | RESET | LATITUDE |      |     | LONGITUDE |      |     | REMARKS |
|------|---------------|--------|----------------|-------|----------|------|-----|-----------|------|-----|---------|
|      |               |        |                |       | DEG      | MIN  | N/S | DEG       | MIN  | E/W |         |
| 0300 | SADR          |        |                |       | 03       | 14.5 | N   | 00        | 29.6 | E   |         |
| 0330 | SADR          |        |                |       | 03       | 12.8 | N   | 100       | 34.8 | E   |         |
| 0400 | SADR          |        |                |       | 03       | 07.0 | N   | 100       | 42.0 | E   |         |
| 0430 | SADR          |        |                |       | 03       | 01.1 | N   | 100       | 47.8 | E   |         |
| 0500 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 51.0 | N   | 100       | 56.7 | E   |         |
| 0530 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 52.7 | N   | 100       | 55.9 | E   |         |
| 0540 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 59.0 | N   | 100       | 55.5 | E   |         |
| 0545 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 55.6 | N   | 100       | 54.5 | E   |         |
| 0600 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 57.1 | N   | 100       | 53.3 | E   |         |
| 0615 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 57.2 | N   | 100       | 52.5 | E   |         |
| 0630 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 57.4 | N   | 100       | 52.5 | E   |         |
| 0645 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 56.5 | N   | 100       | 53.5 | E   |         |
| 0700 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 56.5 | N   | 100       | 53.3 | E   |         |
| 0715 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 57.0 | N   | 100       | 52.0 | E   |         |
| 0730 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 57.2 | N   | 100       | 52.0 | E   |         |
| 0745 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 59.0 | N   | 100       | 51.0 | E   |         |
| 0800 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 58.4 | N   | 100       | 51.6 | E   |         |
| 0815 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 58.5 | N   | 100       | 52.6 | E   |         |
| 0830 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 58.7 | N   | 100       | 52.7 | E   |         |
| 0845 | SADR          |        |                |       | 02       | 58.5 | N   | 100       | 52.6 | E   |         |

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 B-6 903

| CODE A - POSITION TYPE |                    |    |               | CODE B - POSITION QUALITY |            |    |                           |
|------------------------|--------------------|----|---------------|---------------------------|------------|----|---------------------------|
| DR                     | DRAI position      | OM | Omega fix     | TA                        | TACAN fix  | XL | Excellent (within 1/2 mi) |
| EP                     | Estimated position | RA | Radar fix     | VI                        | Visual fix | GD | Good (1/2 to 1 mi)        |
| LA                     | LORAN A fix        | SA | Satellite fix | XX                        | Other      | FA | Fair (1 to 3 mi)          |
| LC                     | LORAN C fix        | SI | SINS position |                           |            | PR | Poor (over 3 mi)          |



IF CLASSIFIED, STAMP  
 DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTION HERE

IF CLASSIFIED, STAMP  
 SECURITY MARKING HERE

ENCLOSURE P1



ADVISEMENT STATEMENTS FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION

(WITNESS)

NAME: LCOR

B/B

RANK/RATE: LCOR

ACTIVITY: U.S.S. RENTZ

UNIT: \_\_\_\_\_

TEL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 12 NOV 89, 1989, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement statements from \_\_\_\_\_


PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. Authority. 44 U.S.C. Section 3101; 5 U.S.C. Section 301; 10 U.S.C. Sections 972(5); 2733; 6148; 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346, 2871-2880; 31 U.S.C. Sections 82a; 240-243; 71-75, 951-953; 37 U.S.C. Section 802; 38 U.S.C. Sections 105; 42 U.S.C. Sections 2651-2653; 49 U.S.C. Section 1901.

2. Principal Purposes. The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purposes:

- a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, dates of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.
- b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.
- c. Determinations on liability of personnel losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.
- d. Evaluations of petitions, grievances, and complaints.
- e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.
- f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.
- g. Public information releases
- h. Evaluations of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.



Statement of LCDR

TS6

USNR,

TS6

12 November 1989

I assumed the watch as TAO/CICWO at 0349G with RENTZ as guide and KINKAID in station astern of RENTZ approximately 5-7NM. RENTZ and KINKAID were transiting the Malacca Strait, RENTZ was on course 125 deg true 17 knots, to avoid contacts at 010-030 deg relative. Track course was 137 deg true. RENTZ informed KINKAID of all course and speed changes via circuit TA 200Z (Navy Red) and speed changes to avoid shipping and to maintain PIM. After three contacts passed down starboard side CIC recommended course 140 deg true to regain track and to open majority of contacts which were approaching from 350-000 deg relative. Most contacts which were heading north west appeared to be on the north side of separation zone and had cpa's of approximately 1000 to 3000 yards to RENTZ. Overall traffic was heavy and required operators to use both maneuvering boards and NTDS to verify close contact's CPA, course and speed. Extra man was assigned to maintain an accurate nav plot with marginal to good radar fixes when compared to GPS.

Prior to the incident, approximately 0430G, KINKAID had come right of track course 137 deg true to avoid a contact. At 0500G RENTZ location established by radar ranges and visual bearings was south of separation zone with the majority of the northwest bound traffic north of the separation zone. At about the same time I noticed that KINKAID had come left to course 110 deg true by NTDS. It also appeared that KINKAID was going to cross the separation zone with a close CPA to several contacts in the north bound traffic channel. Observation was based on the course KINKAID was on, position in relation to RENTZ'S track and KINKAID'S position in relation to north bound traffic.

KINKAID was approximately 18,000 yards astern of RENTZ. At 0519G KINKAID informed RENTZ that they had been hit by merchant on their starboard side. At this time I notified bridge and told them to slow to 5 knots, upon informing the Captain, RENTZ proceeded to KINKAID'S position to provide assistance.

TS6

ADVISEMENT STATEMENTS FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION

(WITNESS)

NAME: TJB TJB RANK/RATE: LT

ACTIVITY: U.S. NAVY UNIT: USS REATZ TEL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 17 NOVEMBER, 1989, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement statements from \_\_\_\_\_.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. Authority. 44 U.S.C. Section 3101; 5 U.S.C. Section 301; 10 U.S.C. Sections 972(5); 2733; 6148; 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346, 2871-2880; 31 U.S.C. Sections 82a; 240-243; 71-75, 951-953; 37 U.S.C. Section 802; 38 U.S.C. Sections 105; 42 U.S.C. Sections 2651-2653; 49 U.S.C. Section 1901.

2. Principal Purposes. The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purposes:

a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, dates of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.

b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluations of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases

h. Evaluations of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

3. Routine Uses. In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purposes indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Veterans' Administration for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans and survivors benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning payment of relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. Disclosure is voluntary. If you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of this investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

112 NOV 89  
\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

Statement of LT

Tyb , USN, Tyb

12 November 1989

I was Officer of the deck on the 0200-0700 watch on the morning of 12 November 89. Weather throughout the watch was overcast, with relative winds generally off the port beam (300-330 degrees relative) and varying in intensity between 10 and 25 knots. There were intermittent showers, and an unusual amount of electrical activity, but visual range was generally greater than twenty thousand yards. Seas were twenty degrees off the bow and running about 4-6 feet. Base course throughout much of the watch was 137 deg true 17 knots with a course change to 122 deg true upon reaching pt. "C" at the mouth of the traffic separation scheme at approximately 0530 local. During turnover I was informed by the previous Officer of the Deck, LTjg Bb, that though KINKAID had made us the guide in a screen kilo formation with herself in a sector 5,000-10,000 yards off our port quarter, she had been conducting ECC drills and had fallen approximately 9 miles astern of us and was slowly regaining her position. The Captain's night orders emphasized the heavy traffic in the area, the importance of working aggressively with combat on contact management, and reiterating the importance of calling the Captain whenever in doubt. My JOOD was ICC(SW) Bb.

Throughout the watch traffic was exceedingly heavy, with normally 4-6 active contacts whose CPA's were close aboard to either port or starboard and requiring extra scrutiny at any one time. During the beginning of the watch (0200-0430), contacts would generally appear between 350-010 degrees relative with a relative movement which would take them down RENTZ starboard side. At about 0330 three such contacts appeared visually on the horizon about ten degrees to port. Navigation lights indicated a starboard aspect with a target angle of about 010R-030R. Scopehead plotting and NTDS info from combat indicated all three would have CPA's close aboard to starboard with one CPA under a thousand yards. At this point I contacted the Captain, explained the situation and requested permission to alter course to port from 131T to 125T. Closest CPA resulted in 5700 yards to starboard. He concurred with my recommendation and reminded me to inform KINKAID of my course change. After the contacts were clear I contacted the Captain for permission to alter course to starboard to 140T to intercept PIM at point "C" and had combat inform KINKAID of my actions. Captain concurred.

After turning to 140T at about 0415, the traffic pattern began to change. The majority of contacts still appeared visually to 350R-000R, but now they all showed port aspects and CPA's became close aboard to port. Visual sightings of NAVAIDS were taken and there was heavy small craft traffic off their port side which was assumed to be fisherman. At about 0500 myself and the JOOD stepped out on the port bridge wing to inspect three contacts on the horizon at about 10NM with the big eyes. All

three showed port running lights, target angles of approximately 330-350 and strong left bearing drift. At this time these three contacts were separated by about 8000 yards from one another. I also took a visual sighting of KINKAID. She was roughly 13,000 yards off the port quarter. During the previous RENTZ course change from 137T to 125T to avoid shipping, KINKAID had remained on 137T and slowly closed distance to RENTZ, once RENTZ was on 140T, KINKAID showed a port running light and a target angle of 350. As we watched, KINKAID presented with a port beam aspect and proceeded to pass under our stern and reappear on the starboard beam. No contacts were between RENTZ and KINKAID. Once on RENTZ starboard beam, KINKAID steadied up on what appeared to be base course of 137T for a few moments and then again maneuvered to port, showing a starboard beam aspect, and apparently returning to RENTZ port quarter. While KINKAID was moving back to RENTZ port quarter, three contacts in question passed abeam RENTZ port side no closer than 8000 yards. What had been the furthest contact was in the process of overtaking the other two and occulted their running lights as it approached CPA. The time was about 0500. At roughly 0515 an excited voice came over bridge to bridge radio channel 16 and said "Naval Vessel on my bow, Naval Vessel on my bow" and that was all. I immediately scanned the radar and the horizon, but there were no contacts within ten thousand yards which were even remotely approaching RENTZ. Shortly thereafter I was about to call the Captain to inform him that RENTZ had reached point "C" and request position to turn to new course 122T, when the TAO came over the 21MC and informed the bridge that KINKAID had a collision. I immediately had the JOOD slow the ship to 5 knots, woke the Captain, explained the situation as I knew it and began to monitor bridge radio circuits for any information. The Captain came to the bridge, took the CONN, had me order CCS to bring up a second gas turbine and a third diesel. The ship was turned back toward the KINKAID, the crew woken up, and the boat deck manned and rescue and assistance detail was ordered to the flight deck. Information from KINKAID included that she had four men in the water and was asking for assistance from our motor whaleboat. At this time I was relieved as OOD by the Navigator, LTjg B-6 and informed the Captain I was going to the flight deck to organize the rescue and assistance efforts as DCA.

B-6

-LT USN

ADVISEMENT STATEMENTS FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION

(WITNESS)

NAME: B-6

RANK/RATE: E-7/ICC

ACTIVITY: US NAVY.

UNIT: USS RENTZ

TEL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 12 NOV, 1989, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement statements from \_\_\_\_\_.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. Authority. 44 U.S.C. Section 3101; 5 U.S.C. Section 301; 10 U.S.C. Sections 972(5); 2733; 6148; 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346, 2871-2880; 31 U.S.C. Sections 82a; 240-243; 71-75, 951-953; 37 U.S.C. Section 802; 38 U.S.C. Sections 105; 42 U.S.C. Sections 2651-2653; 49 U.S.C. Section 1901.

2. Principal Purposes. The information which will be solicited is intended principally for the following purposes:

a. Determinations on the status of personnel regarding entitlements to pay during disability, disability benefits, severance pay, retirement pay, increases of pay for longevity, survivor's benefits, involuntary extensions of enlistments, dates of expiration of active obligated service, and accrual of annual leave.

b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluations of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases

h. Evaluations of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

B-2(1)

ENCLOSURE (1)

14

3. Routine Uses. In addition to Being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purposes indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Veterans' Administration for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans and survivors benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning payment of relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. Disclosure is voluntary. If you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of this investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

B-6 J 112 NOV 89  
(Signature) (Date)

Statement of ICC(SW)

B-6

USN,

B-6

12 November 1989

I was the Junior Officer of the Deck and had the Conn on RENTZ from 0200 until 0530. On or about 0530 while steaming on course 140 Degrees true at 17 knots the bridge watch team was informed by CIC that the KINKAID has been in a collision. RENTZ was beginning to enter the traffic separation scheme at the north entrance to the Malacca Straits. KINKAID has been steaming approximately 18,000 yards behind the RENTZ with a relative bearing of about 180-190 degrees.

Earlier I has noticed the KINKAID making abrupt maneuvers in zig zag pattern. I assumed the KINKAID was avoiding shipping which had been passing down my starboard and port side. The only contacts that had been passing RENTZ from 0500 - 0530 were designated by combat as AG - AJ. The contacts were approaching RENTZ as they were departing the Malacca Strait and the traffic separation scheme. At the time of the collision the RENTZ's surface status board on the bridge had no contact's with a CPA of less than 6,000 yards. No channel 16 warning had been heard of the collision. At that time the bridge team had heard one call from a "Merchant Tanker calling Navy Warship". After CIC called the bridge, I went to the port side big eyes, looked back at a relative bearing of about 200 degrees and saw the merchant vessel still at close quarters with the KINKAID, possibly still engaged, with smoke or steam visible (at first thought it was fog or rain). The OOD sent Boatswain Mate of the Watch to call up the Captain immediately, as soon as the Captain entered the bridge he assumed the CONN. RENTZ changed to a reciprocal course increased speed and proceeded to provide assistance as required by the KINKAID.

B-6

ADVISEMENT STATEMENTS FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION

(WITNESS)

NAME: BIG

RANK/RATE: OS<sup>5</sup>

ACTIVITY: USS RENTZ

UNIT: PTF-46

TEL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 12 NOVEMBER, 1989, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement statements from \_\_\_\_\_.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. Authority. 44 U.S.C. Section 3101; 5 U.S.C. Section 301; 10 U.S.C. Sections 972(5); 2733; 6148; 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346, 2871-2880; 31 U.S.C. Sections 82a; 240-243; 71-75, 951-953; 37 U.S.C. Section 802; 38 U.S.C. Sections 105; 42 U.S.C. Sections 2651-2653; 49 U.S.C. Section 1901.

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b. Determinations on disciplinary or punitive action.

c. Determinations on liability of personnel losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluations of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases

h. Evaluations of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

B-2(1)

ENCLOSURE 15

3. Routine Uses. In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purposes indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Veterans' Administration for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans and survivors benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning payment of relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

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D-6  
(Signature)

12 Nov 79  
(Date)

Statement of OS3

B-6, USN, B-6

12 November 1989

0445G I assumed duties as Track Supervisor from OS1 <sup>B-6</sup>. Link was up and sweet. Good communications with KINKAID on DSA 281.7 MHZ and excellent data signal quality on 3285 HF. DLRP was 04 degrees 00 N 100 degrees E. RENTZ (call sign Z) had duties as NCS. RENTZ was on course 140 T, at 16 knots heading along PIM In the Straits of Malacca.

RENTZ was conducting frequent course changes to avoid shipping in a heavily saturated area. Upon assuming Track Supervisor I correlated all shipping with the shipping officer, OS2 <sup>B-6</sup>, and designated several contacts as buoys, the correlated to charted buoys. Following that, I correlated all dual tracks with KINKAID.

At 0519G KINKAID was bearing 337T, range 15400 yards from RENTZ on course 103T, at 15 knots. At time 0449 and 0504 I requested KINKAID to take all tracks abaft of RENTZ beam into local stores and assume tracking responsibility for them, KINKAID gave a roger out in both instances. At that time KINKAID had only one track in local stores, "AK" TN 3696 bearing 122T, range 29,800 yards from RENTZ. At time of the collision KINKAID had four contacts closing her with CPA's of less than 5,000 yards. They were scrubbed onboard RENTZ by the OOD at times 0456, 0500, 0501, 0503, and were tracking as follows:

AD - CUS 304T, 12-16 Knots  
AE - CUS 314T 11-12 Knots  
AF - CUS 316T 08-15 Knots  
AG - CUS 304T 09-12 Knots

None of these tracks were held in local stores by KINKAID during any time before collision.

The Singapore Merchant Vessel involved in the incident is believed to have been skunk AE. Although "AE" was scrubbed on the bridge and past and opening from RENTZ, the surface tracker continued to track her and all other contacts within 20NM IAW standing orders. Upon collision, lost comms with KINKAID over DSA and lost data and interrogation over Link 11. At that time RENTZ assumed NCS and had KINKAID assume picket.

B-6

ADVISEMENT STATEMENTS FOR JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION

(WITNESS)

NAME: < B-6

RANK/RATE: OS2

ACTIVITY: \_\_\_\_\_

UNIT: USS Rentz FFG-46 TEL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Today, 12 Nov., 1989, I acknowledge that I have received the following advisement statements from \_\_\_\_\_

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

This statement is provided in compliance with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579) which requires that Federal agencies must inform individuals who are requested to furnish personal information about themselves as to certain facts regarding the information requested below.

1. Authority. 44 U.S.C. Section 3101; 5 U.S.C. Section 301; 10 U.S.C. Sections 972(5); 2733; 6148; 7622-7623; 28 U.S.C. Sections 1346, 2871-2880; 31 U.S.C. Sections 82a; 240-243; 71-75, 951-953; 37 U.S.C. Section 802; 38 U.S.C. Sections 105; 42 U.S.C. Sections 2651-2653; 49 U.S.C. Section 1901.

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c. Determinations on liability of personnel losses of, or damage to, public funds or property.

d. Evaluations of petitions, grievances, and complaints.

e. Adjudication, pursuit, or defense of claims for or against the Government or among private parties.

f. Other determinations, as required, in the course of naval administration.

g. Public information releases

h. Evaluations of procedures, operations, material, and designs by the Navy and contractors, with a view to improving the efficiency and safety of the Department of the Navy.

B-2(1)

16  
ENCLOSURE 11



Statement of OS2

BB ----, USN, BB

12 November 1989

The Shipping Officer watch was established at 0500 due to traffic density. I assumed duties as Shipping Officer at that time. I noticed many contact CPA's closer than 2,000 yards. RENTZ maintained a moboard plot on all of these contacts until passed and opening. The cargo ship later identified as Kota Pentani avoided us at a CPA greater than 2,000 yards. As we were preparing to come left to avoid a different contact of interest, I noticed KINKAID had changed course to 107T to avoid Kota Pentani. At that point I realized KINKAID might have turned to late to avoid the contact. KINKAID had a second contact on her starboard quarter at approximately 3,000 yards and then the Kota Pentani straight off her bow for approximately 1,000 yards. I noticed KINKAID and the Kota Pentani's video merge. Approximately two minutes later KINKAID came over EW C&R and said she was struck by a cargo ship, and she was at GQ.

BB



3. Routine Uses. In addition to being used within the Departments of the Navy and Defense for the purposes indicated above, records of investigations are routinely furnished, as appropriate, to the Veterans' Administration for use in determinations concerning entitlement to veterans and survivors benefits; to Servicemen's Group Life Insurance administrators for determinations concerning payment of life insurance proceeds; to the U.S. General Accounting Office for purposes of determinations concerning payment of relief of accountable personnel from liability for losses of public funds and related fiscal matters; and to the Department of Justice for use in litigation involving the Government. Additionally, such investigations are sometimes furnished to agencies of the Department of Justice and to State or local law enforcement and court authorities for use in connection with civilian criminal and civil court proceedings. The records of investigations are provided to agents and authorized representatives of persons involved in the incident, for use in legal or administrative matters. The records are provided to contractors for use in connection with settlement, adjudication, or defense of claims by or against the Government, and for use in design and evaluation of products, services, and systems. The records are also furnished to agencies of the Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities, court authorities, administrative authorities, and regulatory authorities, for use in connection with civilian and military criminal, civil, administrative, and regulatory proceedings and actions.

4. Disclosure is voluntary. If you do not provide the requested information, any determinations or evaluations made as a result of this investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

RB-6  
(Signature)

12 NOV 89  
(Date)

Statement of OS2(SW)

B6

USN,

B6

12 November 1989

I was CIC Watch Supervisor on RENTZ. At approximately 0500 local RENTZ entered the Strait of Malacca. KINKAID was of our stern at 16,000 yards. Visibility was good and traffic was moderately heavy although following the traffic separation scheme. KINKAID and RENTZ had good Link 11 data transfer and sat Comms on Link Coordination, Navy Red, EW Coordination and reporting as well as Bridge to Bridge.

KINKAID had not been taking RENTZ surface tracks into local stores, although had been requested to track all contacts aft RENTZ's beam locally.

At 0515 local, radar navigation was inaccurate and the navigation plot was still being supplemented by GPS and satellite dead reckoning. The bridge was utilizing visual fixes.

At 0517 local, it appeared on radar that the KINKAID was left of the proposed track. The KINKAID was in a head on situation with two surface contacts.

At 0518 I observed the KINKAID make a course change approximately 15 degrees to port. I attempted to contact KINKAID via Navy Red to warn them of my observation, I had no Comms on Navy Red at that time, the CIC Watch Officer was informed, communication was established on EW C&R.

At 0519 local, KINKAID contacted RENTZ via EW Coordination and reporting and advised RENTZ that she has been struck on her starboard side, aft, EW Coordination was established as the primary status reporting circuit. RENTZ then came about to provide rescue and assistance.

- B6 -

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of Dereliction of duty, violation of order and that:

- a. I have the right to remain silent.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

Init.  
Init.  
Init.  
Init.  
Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning.  
*I HAVE CONSULTED WITH A JAG OFFICER*
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

Init.  
Init.  
Init.  
Init.  
Init.

Witness Signature \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) *11600089* / Signature \_\_\_\_\_ (Date) *116 NOV 89*

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

*All reductions are B-6*

STATEMENT OF CDR <sup>B-6</sup>  
COMMANDING OFFICER

I was asleep in the Sea Cabin when I was awakened by word being passed on the LMC to brace for shock and the near-simultaneous sounding of the collision alarm. I immediately jumped out of bed and ran to the Bridge. However, the collision occurred before I got there. As I ran onto the Bridge, I looked aft on the starboard side and saw the motor vessel KOTA PETANI, a container ship, at a right angle to KINKAID aft of the helo hangar. The KOTA PETANI then disengaged from the starboard quarter and turned to a reciprocal heading and drifted away from KINKAID. I asked the OOD why he had not called me concerning the contact, and his answer was that he was concerned with finding out where he was in the traffic separation scheme, and that he was not paying adequate attention to the contact situation. I asked if CIC had reported the contact closing KINKAID and was told it had been reported when it was at a greater range, but that CIC had lost track of it in the sea return. I noted that the weather was clear and that although still fairly dark, light was beginning to show on the eastern horizon.

After the collision, there were reports of fires in the Seasparrow magazine (which contained no ordnance) (Class A), the Starboard Torpedo magazine (Class D), and the starboard after refueling pit (Class B). Leaving the Executive Officer on the Bridge, I went to DCC to monitor the firefighting efforts. Shortly after arriving in DCC, the fire in the refueling pit and Seasparrow magazine were reported out. However, the one in the Torpedo magazine was still burning. I ordered the magazine flooded, but the collision had damaged the flooding system, and it could not be flooded. Hose teams from Repair 3 entered the magazine from above and fought the fire, extinguishing it in about one hour. The fire reflashed several times, apparently as a result of the ignition of leaking OTTO fuel.

Also, shortly after entering DCC, it was reported that there was one confirmed death, the Navigator, LT Sean McPhee, and that there were three men overboard. The motor whaleboat was lowered and all personnel in the water were recovered.

The collision occurred at frame 407 which is roughly centered on the starboard torpedo magazine, After Overflow Quarters (AOQ) and the HT shop. The men in the water were Chiefs berthed in the After Overflow Quarters who had exited the space through the rupture in the hull.

During the firefighting effort, main propulsion was restored to both shafts. I returned to the Bridge after the fire in the Torpedo magazine was out and learned that although we had propulsion on both shafts, we did not have steering available. I also learned four of the personnel from AOQ were injured; two had possible broken ankles and 3 had suffered fuel inhalation, probably from the starboard JP-5 tank which had been ruptured during the collision. I decided to transfer them to RENTZ, in case more rapid MEDEVAC might be required. This was accomplished via RENTZ'S Motorwhale Boat. Once RENTZ'S Motorwhale Boat was clear, I ordered the ship to 5 knots and that it be steered by engines until steering could be restored. Steering was restored after about an hour by rigging casualty power cables.

After consulting with my Engineer Officer, my Damage Control Assistant and the Master Chief Damagecontrolman, it was determined the 10 KTS was a prudent speed in the light sea state of the strait. I ordered the ship to 10 KTS at that point. Subsequently, it appeared that the deck in the Starboard Torpedo magazine shifted slightly, and I reduced speed to 8 KTS.

Addendum to Statement of  
C B-6 .....  
Commanding Officer

16Nov89

There are separate enlisted watchbills for CIC, the Bridge, and the Quartermasters. The Operations Officer, who is the Senior Watch Officer, customarily approves the CIC and Bridge enlisted watchbills. The Navigator approves the Quartermaster watch bill. I approved the Officer Bridge/CIC watchbill.

Although not stated in my standing orders, I expected CPA's of contacts to be obtained both by scopehead and by maneuvering board on the Bridge, and that they be compared with CPA's obtained by CIC. Contact reports given to me include a statement of how the CPA was determined.

I had verbally approved a sail plan from Phuket to Hong Kong which was plotted on a chart by the Navigator. I also released a MOVREP which contained our track data.

On the night prior to the collision, the Navigator informed me that we would be entering the first traffic separation scheme of the strait about 0500, but because of the width of the strait at this point, and the width of the separation scheme, he requested to delay presenting a plan for transitting the southern portion of the Strait until the next morning. I concurred with this and intended that we have a Navigation Brief late in the morning and set the Navigation Detail shortly prior to the entrance to the Final Traffic Separation Scheme of the strait (Point "D"). Our arrival there was scheduled for 1744G, but because of our speed, we would have probably arrived there about one hour ahead of PIM, or about 1644G. My intention was to spend most of the day on the Bridge because I anticipated encountering numerous contacts as we moved toward Singapore.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

C D/b  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

19 NOV 89  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

( T56  
\_\_\_\_\_  
VT, JAGC, USNR  
Officer Authorized to Administer  
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of Subjection of Duty and that:

- a. I have the right to remain silent. (R) Init.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial. (R) Init.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both. (R) Init.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. (R) Init.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time. (R) Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent (R) Init.
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement. (R) Init.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. (R) Init.
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. (R) Init.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (R) Init.

(Witness Signature) B26 11/16/89  
(Date)

(Signature) B26

(Date) 11/16/89

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

16Nov89

Statement of LCDR

136

USN

On the evening of 11 November 1989, I held Eight O'Clock Reports in the Wardroom at 1900. We had a lot of business to cover, and we went until about 2000. Towards the end of the meeting the CO walked into the Wardroom. At the end of Eight O'Clock Reports, I reviewed the Night Orders with LT McPhee, the Navigator. We talked briefly about how he was going to set up procedures for navigation as we got towards the Singapore Straits. At that point he needed to get the Night Orders signed by the CO and go on watch. Therefore, we decided to firm it up first thing in the morning. At that point, I left the Wardroom to have a counseling session with the Command Master Chief in my stateroom. I remember stopping briefly in the Ship's Office, Radio, and the Bridge that evening, but I do not remember the time. I spent the majority of the evening in my stateroom completing paperwork. I went to bed at about 0030 on 12 November 1989.

I was awakened by a marked increase in the speed of the engines, followed by a turn. I then heard the sound of the collision. I could hear the crush of impact along with several things being snapped off. I also then heard a noise which sounded like the Aft CIWS firing. I jumped up, put on my pants, shoes, and shirt and ran into the passageway. It seemed as though we were listing slightly to starboard and down slightly by the stern. I grabbed the first man I saw and told him to run through the staterooms to make sure everyone was getting out, as I thought we might be starting to sink. I ran into the XO's ladderwell and told three men to make sure the berthing compartments aft were open and that people were getting out. I then ran to the Bridge. When I reached the Bridge, I ran to the starboard wing and saw what I thought at first to be fog. However, I later discovered it was smoke. The merchant vessel was at about a 30 degree angle with our starboard side, with it's deck housing coming towards our bridge. It eventually ended up parallel to us pointed in the opposite direction and began to move aft. At that point, I was unable to determine exactly where we had hit. I am not exactly sure of the time line, however, I do remember going to CIC to ensure that the OPREP was going out and that USS RENTZ had been contacted. The CO departed the bridge to go to CCS to monitor the Damage Control effort. I went back to the bridge and received reports of men overboard. It was dark, but you could make out men in the water with life rings and floating debris. We decided to launch the Motor Whale Boat to recover the men and I tasked the Operations Officer to get the boat manned. At this point, I also became concerned about the location of the ship and had the Bridge Watch try to determine our position and drift. At this point we did not have throttle or steering control on the Bridge, but had propulsion available to the port shaft. I became concerned that we were drifting down onto the merchant sitting astern. I directed the OOD to put 20% pitch on the port shaft to move away from the merchant. We then put the motor whale boat in the water. LTJG IP-6 did a superb job in directing the Whale Boat to pick up personnel in the water. By this time USS RENTZ was visible closing in. I was not sure how many men we had in the water, so as we were picking them up with our boat, I requested that RENTZ make a circle around us to try and see if we had any additional men overboard. RENTZ also contacted the merchant vessel to see if they needed assistance. I became aware that there had been a death in one of the staterooms, but they had not identified the body. One of the officers in that room I had sighted. We passed the word for another and he contacted the Bridge. We then surmised that it was Lt McPhee. We brought our

boat alongside to port and unloaded our four men who had gone overboard. They were taken to Forward Battle Dressing (BDS), because Sick Bay was inaccessible due to damage. We were still trying to get steering control on the Bridge, but to no avail. However, we were able to get turns on the starboard shaft. We began trying to maneuver with opposing engines. At some point during these events, I went to Repair 5 to see if they needed anything. They indicated more people. I went to the Focsle to see if they were organized into teams. They were, and I sent a team to Repair 5. I went to Forward BDS to see if we had injuries. HMI TSG informed me that they had fuel inhalation and could get pneumonia. We were not sure of their total injuries. All were able to talk, and three were able to walk. None appeared serious, but the HMI and I decided we needed to send them to RENTZ for better care. I went back to the Bridge. At this time, RENTZ was proceeding to the merchant to render assistance. I requested that when they had finished that they return for a transfer of injured by their boat. I decided to bring our boat back on board. After a while, RENTZ began to return and we transferred our injured to their Whale Boat with the starboard J Bar Davit on the focsle with the horse collar and one stokes stretcher. I do remember chopping several OPREPS during this time. At some point in time I found the supply officer and told him to break out food, water, and sodas and start distributing them to the crew. He was already in the process of taking care of some of these items. They were also able to feed breakfast to crew that morning. I was not able to keep an accurate picture of the damage control problem. I was aware of the fire in the torpedo magazine and sent TMC TSG to try and locate a key to open it. I also was aware that the sprinkler system was unable to be energized to flood the space. I also observed the explosion that occurred in the torpedo magazine, from the starboard bridgewing. I was quite concerned because I knew we had hose teams close by. I was also aware that AOQ Berthing was flooded, and that the supply storeroom became flooded. For some reason, I thought that JP-5 Pump Room had also been flooded. Early on, I was concerned about getting a muster. I was also concerned about detracting from the Damage Control effort in order to get it. I discussed it with the Operations Officer. He came up with an excellent plan, and we executed it. It took about 15 minutes, but we had a full muster. At this point, I knew we did not have a firm identification of the body, although Lt McPhee was the only one missing on the muster. HMI TSG and PNC TSG went back and confirmed to me that it was Lt McPhee. They then took him and placed him in a body pouch and placed him in a refer. At this time, I sent a message to the CNSP DAB indicating one officer had died and that everyone else was safe. We had a number of reflashes after the initial fire was out. At some point, the CO returned to the Bridge. I decided that we needed to focus on getting steering back, so that we could begin to get into port. I was also worried about not being able to steer in a shipping lane. I went to after steering to see if they were making progress. Casualty power was rigged, and after much effort, they were able to regain steering. I know this is probably not in the sequence that it occurred. I also know this is not all that took place that morning. However, it is what I can remember at this point.

TSG  
LCDR USN

ADDENDUM TO STATEMENT OF LCDR

I ARRIVED ON BOARD USS KINKAID ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1989, WHILE AT SEA IN THE PERSIAN GULF. I RELIEVED ON 1 OCTOBER 1989 AS THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER. MY FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE SHIP WERE NOT GOOD. THE OVERALL ORGANIZATION OF THE SHIP WAS POOR. PART OF THIS WAS DUE TO THE HIGHLY FLEXIBLE SCHEDULE FOUND IN THE MIDDLE EAST FORCE, PART OF IT WASN'T. PLANNING BOARD FOR TRAINING HAD NOT BEEN CONDUCTED IN SEVERAL WEEKS. THE DAILY SCHEDULE WAS WRITTEN ON A DAILY BASIS. THE SHIP'S ADMIN TICKLER HAD NOT BEEN UTILIZED IN ABOUT 1 1/2 YEARS, AND HAD TO BE RECONSTRUCTED. THERE WAS NO ROUTING SYSTEM, WITH MANY ACTION ITEMS BEING ROUTED DIRECTLY TO THE ACTION OFFICER. THERE WERE FITREPS IN THE SHIP'S OFFICE THAT WERE OVER ONE YEAR OLD. A LORTARP HAD NOT BEEN SUBMITTED IN 1 1/2 YEARS. THE SHIP'S SPONSOR PROGRAM WAS DORMANT. THERE WERE PEOPLE ON BOARD WORKING IN THEIR DEPARTMENTS THAT HAD NOT BEEN THROUGH I-DIVISION. THE RETENTION EFFORT WAS NOT GOOD. CREW APPEARANCE WAS POOR, WITH MANY SAILORS NOT SHAVING BEFORE ATTENDING QUARTERS. CLEANLINESS AND PRESERVATION WAS POOR. TOPSIDE PRESERVATION WAS ALSO POOR. BERTHING COMPARTMENTS WERE IN VERY POOR CONDITION. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE CREW, CPO'S AND OFFICERS WERE EXTREMELY POSITIVE, WITH AN EXTREMELY GOOD ATTITUDE TOWARDS TEAMWORK. I FOUND THEM EXTREMELY RECEPTIVE TO LEADERSHIP AND GUIDANCE. IT SEEMED THAT THEY KNEW THE SHIP COULD BE GOOD AND WANTED TO WORK HARD TOWARDS GETTING THERE. I DID ENCOUNTER A LITTLE OF A "WAIT UNTIL TOMORROW ATTITUDE" ON THE PART OF MANY, HOWEVER, THAT WAS EASY TO RESOLVE. I ALSO FOUND THAT DAMAGE CONTROL WAS EXTREMELY GOOD, AND THAT A LOT OF EFFORT HAD BEEN PUT INTO IT. I ALSO FELT THAT PNC , WHO HAD RECENTLY REPORTED ON BOARD, WAS STARTING TO TURN THE CORNER IN THE SHIP'S OFFICE. I FELT I HAD A GOOD "TEAM" OF DEPARTMENT HEADS, AND I THINK WE WERE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS IN TAKING THINGS IN THE DIRECTION I WANTED TO GO. WE QUICKLY REORGANIZED PB4T, AND STARTED MAKING THE PLAN OF THE WEEK AND POD WORK. I STARTED DOING MESSING AND BERTHING ON A DAILY BASIS, WITH THE FIRST ONE TAKING ALMOST TWO HOURS. THE CO STARTED COMING AROUND WITH ME ONCE A WEEK TO DO MESSING AND BERTHING. THE CONDITION OF BERTHING COMPARTMENTS AND HEADS WAS BEGINNING TO COME UP TOWARDS STANDARDS. I STARTED DOING PERSONNEL INSPECTIONS OF DIFFERENT DIVISIONS AT QUARTERS EVERY DAY. I REINITIATED THE DIVISION IN THE SPOTLIGHT PROGRAM, WHERE FOR ONE WEEK A GIVEN DIVISION RECEIVES; A REVIEW OF PQS, A REVIEW OF TRAINING, A FORMAL PERSONNEL INSPECTION BY THE XO, A ZONE INSPECTION BY THE CO, A PMS INSPECTION BY THE 3M COORDINATOR, A CO'S CALL, AND A REVIEW OF DAMAGE CONTROL BY THE DCA. I HAD COMPLETED FIVE DIVISIONS PRIOR TO 12 NOVEMBER 1989. THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF LT MCPHEE, PNC , AND THE SHIP'S OFFICE, WE REBUILT THE TICKLER AND STARTED TO MAKE IT WORK. WE ALSO COMPLETED ALL OVER DUE EVALUATIONS AND FITREPS, AND GOT THEM IN THE MAIL. WE INITIATED A PROCEDURE FOR GETTING EVALS/FITREPS OUT ON TIME. WE STARTED REVIEWING PROSPECTIVE LOSSES AND STARTED INTERVIEWING PEOPLE. WE "REVITALIZED" REENLISTMENT CEREMONIES. WE STARTED A PROGRAM TO CONDUCT AN AWARDS REVIEW FOR PEOPLE PRIOR TO THEIR END OF TOUR. WE STARTED A PASSAGEWAY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, AND HAD JUST COMPLETED THE FIRST PHASE. WE ALSO STARTED DOING PASSAGEWAY FIELD DAYS AND CO'S PASSAGEWAY INSPECTIONS. THE CLEANLINESS OF THE SHIP WAS COMING UP. WE CALLED A MEETING ON TOPSIDE PRESERVATION AND CAME UP WITH A TOPSIDE PRESERVATION PLAN. PROGRESS IN TOPSIDE IMPROVEMENT WAS STILL DEFICIENT WHEN THE COLLISION OCCURRED. WE REINSTITUTED EMPHASIS ON PMS SPOT CHECKS. WE SCHEDULED PMS SPOT CHECKS FOR THE CO AND XO IN THE POD. WE ALSO STARTED A WEEKLY MEETING FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS, CO, XO AND THE 3M COORDINATOR TO DISCUSS 3M ISSUES, REVIEW WEEKLY REPORTS, AND REVIEW SPOT CHECKS. OUR RAR WAS HIGH, BUT THE AMOUNT OF SPOT CHECKS BEING DONE WAS STILL BELOW WHAT I WANTED. WE STARTED A NEW PROCEDURE IN THAT THE FIRST WEEK A NEW MAN WAS ON BOARD, HE WAS IN I DIVISION. THERE WAS A LOT OF RESISTANCE TO THIS, BECAUSE IN SOME CASES WE HAD

All reductions are B-6.

I DIVISION FOR ONLY ONE OR TWO MEN, BUT IT WORKED. WE REINITIATED THE SPONSOR PROGRAM WITH A PACKAGE AND LETTER GOING TO EACH PROSPECTIVE GAIN. EACH SPONSOR WAS ALSO REQUIRED TO SEND A PERSONAL LETTER. WE HAD BEGUN TO ADDRESS SOME CREW ISSUES OF CONCERN INCLUDING:

- WENT TO LAUNDRY TWICE PER WEEK
- PLAN TO REHAB MESS DECKS
- REINSTITUTED THE CREWS LOUNGE
- REHAB PLAN FOR SHOWERS/SINKS
- IMPROVED ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING
- MORE EMPHASIS ON PEOPLE RELATED ISSUES (E.G. QUICK PROCESSING OF CHITS)
- IMPROVED BERTHING

AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, I HAD INSPECTED THE PQS AND TRAINING OF FIVE DIVISIONS. I HAD OUTLINED SOME DEFICIENCIES IN EACH DIVISION, AND WAS CONDUCTING THESE INSPECTIONS AS THE BASE LINE. MY PLAN WAS TO IDENTIFY DISCREPANCIES DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF INSPECTIONS AND THEN MONITOR CORRECTIONS DURING THE SECOND AND SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS. OVERALL, I WOULD HAVE CALLED THE PQS AND TRAINING PROGRAM AS AVERAGE. SOME DIVISIONS WERE VERY GOOD, AND SOME NOT GOOD. I ALSO DESIGNATED MR. *Do* TO BE THE PQS COORDINATOR, AS THERE WAS NOT ONE PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED. IN THE AREA OF NAVIGATION, I WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NAVIGATOR, LT MCPHEE. HE WAS A BRIGHT AND AGGRESSIVE NAVAL OFFICER, WHO WAS DOING A SUPERB JOB. MY INVOLVEMENT IN NAVIGATION INCLUDED REVIEWING TRACKS PRIOR TO THE APPROVAL BY THE CO. I ALSO MADE IT A HABIT TO DO SPOT CHECKS OF OUR POSITION/TRACK BETWEEN CIC AND THE BRIDGE SEVERAL TIMES PER DAY. I HAD FOUND THE COORDINATION ON NAVIGATION, BETWEEN CIC AND THE BRIDGE HAD NOT BEEN UP TO STANDARDS. THESE SPOT CHECKS WERE HELPING TO KEEP THEM "ON THEIR TOES." DURING SEA DETAIL, I WOULD MONITOR THE NAVIGATION PICTURE. I WOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE NAVIGATION BRIEFS. THE NAVIGATION BRIEFS WERE NOT AS DETAILED AS I DESIRED THEM TO BE. I ENCOURAGED DEPARTMENT HEADS TO DO MORE PLANNING AND INPUT MORE INTO THE BRIEFS. I WANTED TO INCLUDE ITEMS SUCH AS WHEN WE WOULD PLACE FENDERS, HOW WE WOULD MAKE OUR TWIST, OR HOW WE WOULD USE TUGS. I WANTED NAVIGATION BRIEFS TO BE A WHOLE WALK THROUGH. I FOUND THAT EVERYONE EXCEPT THE BRIEFER WOULD REMAIN SILENT. I WOULD THEN HAVE TO PLAY DEVIL'S ADVOCATE AND DRAG THE REST OF THE INFORMATION OUT. THE DEPARTMENT HEADS STARTED BEING MORE PREPARED, BUT WE STILL HADN'T ACHIEVED THE GOAL. I OFTEN HAD TO PUSH HARDER TO GET PEOPLE TO ATTEND THESE BRIEFS THAN I SHOULD HAVE. MY FEELING TOWARDS NAVIGATION WAS MIXED. I WAS GENERALLY COMFORTABLE WITH OPEN OCEAN NAVIGATION. OCCASIONALLY, I HAD TO GET INVOLVED WITH HELPING TO SORT OUT DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN WHERE CIC AND THE BRIDGE HELD US. ONE TIME COMES INTO MIND WHEN THE BRIDGE HELD US WELL INSIDE THE IRANIAN IEZ AND CIC DID NOT. THAT WAS QUICKLY RESOLVED. I ALSO HAD TO GET INVOLVED A FEW TIMES DURING SEA AND ANCHOR DETAIL. AN EXAMPLE WAS GOING INTO COLOMBO, SRI LANKA WHEN THE VISUAL BEARING TAKERS COULD NOT GET A GOOD FIX BECAUSE OF CONFUSION OVER DIFFERENT CHURCHES ON THE CHART. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE WELL OUTSIDE THE BREAKWATER. WE SLOWED AND THE QM1 AND I WENT AROUND AND IDENTIFIED A GOOD ROUND OF VISUAL POINTS. HE AND I THEN SHOT A ROUND OF BEARINGS, GOT A GOOD FIX, AND EVERYTHING THEN FELL INTO LINE. I HAVE TO ADMIT THAT I BECAME CONCERNED EACH TIME WE WENT IN OR CAME OUT OF MINA SULMAN. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT SEA DETAIL WITH FEW REFERENCES. I NEVER FELT COMFORTABLE DURING SEA DETAIL THERE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT NECESSARILY ATTRIBUTE THAT TO THE NAV PERSONNEL. ALL OTHER TIMES, WE HAD GONE INTO ANCHOR AT FULJARAH, SITRAH AND PHUKET. THESE NAVIGATION DETAILS WENT VERY SMOOTHLY, AND ANCHORING WAS DONE WELL. I REVIEWED EACH OFFICER'S BRIDGE WATCHBILL WITH THE SENIOR WATCH OFFICER

AND SIGNED THEM BEFORE THEY WENT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER. THE SENIOR WATCH OFFICER AND I WOULD DISCUSS EACH ONE REVIEWING STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES ETC. THE CO NEVER DISCUSSED ANY WEAKNESSES OF LTJG TS/b. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS A STRONG OOD. THE CO ONLY MENTIONED ONE OOD THAT HE FELT HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH. THAT WAS LTJG TS/b I THINK HE FELT HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH BEING ABLE TO COMMUNICATE CLEARLY WITH HIM. I DID NOT MENTION THIS DURING THE ORAL QUESTIONING, AS I DID NOT REMEMBER THIS UNTIL AFTERWARDS. THE CO MENTIONED TO ME AT TIMES THAT HE GOT A LOT OF CALLS AT NIGHT. HE WOULD REFER TO HOW GOOD A NIGHT IT WAS BY THE NUMBER OF CALLS HE GOT. THIS WAS NEVER PRESENTED IN THE TONE THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD NOT CALL HIM, AND WAS ONLY MEANT AND UNDERSTOOD AS A HUMOROUS THING. I CONDUCTED A PQS AND TRAINING INSPECTION OF NAV/ADMIN ON 7 OCTOBER 1989. TRAINING WAS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY, AND WAS DOCUMENTED. PQS WAS DEFICIENT, IN THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE A LIST OF QUALIFICATION SIGN OFF PERSONNEL AND DID NOT HAVE POA AND Q'S FOR ALL PERSONNEL. THE NAVIGATOR HAD THOSE ITEMS FOR ACTION, AND WAS TO BE INSPECTED DURING THE NEXT ROUND OF INSPECTIONS.

JUST BEFORE THE TIME OF THE COLLISION, THE MOOD ON BOARD WAS POSITIVE. THE FEELING WAS THAT KINKAID WAS ON THE UPSWING AND THAT WE WERE STARTING TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEMS OF THE PAST. THE SHIP WAS STARTING TO GET CLEANED UP AND WE WERE AGGRESSIVELY TRYING TO FIX MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES. THE CREW WAS STARTING TO REALIZE REAL PRIDE IN THE SHIP. THERE WAS ALSO A GREAT DEAL OF ELATION ABOUT BEING OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THERE WAS ALSO A BIT OF A TENDENCY FOR PEOPLE TO START "DROPPING THEIR GUARD." I HAD ADDRESSED THIS SEVERAL TIMES AT OFFICER'S CALL, IN THE WARDROOM, AND IN CIC. I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS THE MOST DANGEROUS TIME OF THE DEPLOYMENT AND THAT WE NEEDED TO KEEP SHARP. THIS WAS ADDRESSED AT OFFICER'S CALL THE DAY PRIOR TO THE COLLISION. AS WE WERE GETTING READY TO LEAVE THE PERSIAN GULF, I HAD MADE IT KNOWN TO THE SENIOR WATCH OFFICER THAT I WANTED TO REMAIN IN CONDITION III WHILE WE WERE IN WESTPAC. I REGISTERED DISBELIEF AT THE CO'S SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO GO TO CONDITION IV, BUT I DID NOT DISCUSS IT WITH HIM IN PRIVATE.

TS/b  
LCDR M  
USN

THIS STATEMENT CONTAINS FIVE PAGES. I HAVE REVIEWED THE CONTENTS OF THE FIVE PAGES, AND SWEAR THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE ABOVE FIVE PAGES IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

19 NOVEMBER 1989

Witnessed  
TS/b  
19 NOV 89



17 NOVEMBER 1989

FROM: LCDR. [REDACTED], USS MINKAID OPERATIONS OFFICER  
TO: CTF 75 INVESTIGATIVE BOARD

SUBJ: STATEMENT CONCERNING INVESTIGATION INTO COLLISION

I, LCDR. [REDACTED], AM THE OPERATIONS OFFICER ON USS MINKAID (DD-988). I AM A PROVED LOOK, AND HAVE BEEN IN THE U.S. NAVY SINCE GRADUATING FROM THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY ON MAY 28, 1980. MY PREVIOUS TOURS HAVE INCLUDED THE USS KIMITE (CVN-68), USS DALE (CG-19) AND THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY. I AM A QUALIFIED NUCLEAR ENGINEER. I REPORTED ON BOARD MINKAID ON 20 APRIL 1989, TOOK LEAVE, AND RETURNED ON 7 MAY 1989. IMMEDIATELY UPON REPORTING IN MAY, I OBSERVED MEVEY SS-5 AND THEN ACTED AS A JAC FOR THE PERIOD OF TRAINING AND DE-INSPECTION FOR ORNISE MISSILE TACTICAL QUALIFICATION. AFTER THE COMBAT, I COMMENCED RELIEVING AS OPERATIONS OFFICER, ON ABOUT 30 MAY, AND RELIEVED ON 10 JUNE. THE SHIP DEPLOYED FOR THE PERSIAN GULF ON 16 JUNE 1989.

IMMEDIATELY UPON RELIEVING AS OPERATIONS OFFICER, MY FIRST PRIORITIES WERE TO TRAIN AND REVISE THE OPERATION OF CIC. THE SHIP HAD NOT DEPLOYED SINCE 1984, AND HAD JUST COMPLETED AN EXTENDED OVERHAUL FOLLOWED BY PRE-DEPLOYMENT WORK-UPS. I ENDEAVORED TO FORM CIC INTO A FIRST CLASS TEAM, UTILIZING MY EXPERIENCE ON USS DALE (CG-19) WHERE I WAS THE ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT CIC HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN FLEET OPERATIONS FOR SOME TIME, BUT THEY QUICKLY ADAPTED ONCE GIVEN DIRECTION. I RIGIDLY ENFORCED THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND ENSURED THAT ALL CIC WATCH SUPERVISORS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR SECTIONS. SENIOR [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

WERE EXCEPTIONAL IN ASSUMING THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES. THERE WERE OTHER OS'S WHO WERE MORE SENIOR, BUT MANY DID NOT WISH TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF WATCH SUPERVISOR, AND PREFERRED TO ACT AS TRACK SUPERVISORS, OR AT OTHER WATCH STATIONS. WHILE I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THESE INDIVIDUALS I FELT THAT IT WAS PREFERABLE TO HAVE PERSONNEL WHO WANTED THE JOB, RATHER THAN FORCE IT ON AN UNWILLING INDIVIDUAL. FIRST DIVISION ALSO REQUIRED ATTENTION, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATION AND LEADERSHIP. VERY LITTLE TRAINING WAS DOCUMENTED PROPERLY, ALTHOUGH REVIEW OF REFTRIA AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT INSPECTIONS REVEALED THAT THEY WERE A VERY CAPABLE DIVISION AND HAD DONE WELL ON ALL EVOLUTIONS. THE FIRST LIEUTENANT WAS LTJG [REDACTED], AND HE WORKED DILIGENTLY ON IMPROVEMENTS ONCE SHOWING WHAT WAS REQUIRED AND HOW TO ACCOMPLISH IT. LT [REDACTED] WAS THE CIC OFFICER, WHO HAD RECENTLY RELIEVED AS JIC, AND HE ALSO RAPIDLY INSTITUTED THE REFORMS I REQUESTED. BY THE TIME THE MINKAID REACHED THE PERSIAN GULF ALL CIC AND DECK TEAMS WERE PROVEN PROFESSIONALS, WHO PERFORMED ADMIRABLY THROUGHOUT OUR DEPLOYMENT THERE.

DURING OUR TRANSIT TO THE GULF AND WHILE THERE JIC WAS IN A PORT AND STARBOARD ROTATION, WITH ALL PERSONNEL ON THE WATCH BILL. AS WE WERE PREPARING TO LEAVE THE GULF, I WAS APPROACHED BY THE JIC ABOUT REVISING THE ROTATION IN CIC. HE STATED THAT THE OS'S HAD TALKED WITH OTHER SHIPS, AND THAT MOST DID NOT UTILIZE THE CRT. HE PROPOSED THAT THE CRT NOT BE MANNED, NOR THE AN/SPA-25 RADAR REPEATER, AND THAT ALL SURFACE TRACKING BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA NODS. I AGREED TO A TRIAL PERIOD ONCE WE OUTCHOPPEL, AND STATED THAT THE CRT AND SPA-25 WOULD BE MANNED IN AREAS WHERE THERE WAS HEAVY SHIPPING TRAFFIC, SUCH

All reductions are B-6.

3 STRAITS AND SHIPPING LANE. I ALSO STATED THAT IF I WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF CIC DURING ONE OF THE CLEAN TRACES, OR IF THEY FAILED TO APPROPRIATE ANY OF THE SCHEDULED WATCHES IN THE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS, THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY RE-INSTITUTE THE PORT AND STARBOARD ROTATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT EACH WATCH SECTION WOULD BE SPLIT IN TWO, AND THAT ANY EXTRA PERSONNEL REQUIRED WOULD BE MANNED UP UPON REQUEST. WE HAD BEEN CONDUCTING AN AGGRESSIVE POC QUALIFICATION PROGRAM IN THE GULF, AND MANY OF THE OS'S HAD PROGRESSED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY WERE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING MOST ALL WATCH STATIONS IN CIC. I BELIEVE THAT I MENTIONED THE CHANGES I WAS ALLOWING IN CIC TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AT DINNER OR IN PASSING, BUT I DID NOT FORMALLY PRESENT HIM WITH MY PLAN, NOR DID I DISCUSS IT WITH HIM IN DETAIL. THEREFORE, THE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED IN CIC WERE NOT DONE WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT I EVER INFORMED THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE CHANGES.

THE ENLISTED GOOD QUALIFICATION PROGRAM WAS DEvised TO ALLOW E-1 AND ABOVE RATE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO STAND BRIDGE WATCHES. MANY CHIEFS AND FIRST CLASS PETTY OFFICERS HAD INDICATED A DESIRE TO DO SO, AND THE PROGRAM WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED. ENLISTED GOOD'S WERE FIRST USED WHEN BMC WAS PLACED ON THE BRIDGE WATCHBILL ON 5 OCTOBER. TWO WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION FROM THAT TIME ON AND QUALIFIED GOOD ON 22 OCTOBER, AND WAS PLACED ON THE WATCHBILL ON 23 OCTOBER AFTER OUR LAST STOP IN BAHRAIN. WE WERE IN A STRAIGHT FOUR SECTION ROTATION ON THE BRIDGE FROM THEN UNTIL 31 OCTOBER. AFTER WE LEFT THE PERSIAN GULF ON 31 OCTOBER THE BRIDGE WENT TO FIVE SECTION WATCHES, HOWEVER, THE GOOD'S WERE IN SIX SECTION. AFTER OUR PORT CALL IN BUKHAR, THE BRIDGE AND CROWS WERE IN FOUR SECTIONS, BUT THE GOOD'S REMAINED IN SIX. THEREFORE IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO STOOD APPROXIMATELY 16-18 WATCHES AS A QUALIFIED GOOD PRIOR TO THE COLLISION.

WITH RESPECT TO THE CONSTRUCTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND APPROVAL OF WATCH BILLS, THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE SUBMITTED. THE FIRST DIVISION WATCHBILL WAS APPROVED BY MYSELF. WHILE I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE BOATSWAIN'S MATES, I DID NOT VERIFY THE QUALIFICATIONS PRIOR TO SIGNING THE WATCHBILL, BUT RATHER TRUSTED THE FIRST LIEUTENANT TO HAVE DONE SO. NO WHERE ON ANY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT WATCHBILL ARE INTERIM QUALIFICATIONS INDICATED AS REQUIRED BY THE SHIP'S INSTRUCTION. BMC IS QUALIFIED AS A LOOK-OUT, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS BEEN QUALIFIED AS A EMOW FOR QUITE SOME TIME, HOWEVER IT IS NOT INDICATED IN HIS SERVICE RECORD AS REQUIRED. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS LOST IN SHIP'S OFFICE SOMETIME BACK IN APRIL. WHEN HE WAS QUALIFIED. THE CIC WATCHBILL IS CONSTRUCTED BY THE OS LEADING PETTY OFFICER, AND REVIEWED BY THE LPO, ASSISTANT CIC OFFICER, CIC OFFICER, AND APPROVED BY MYSELF. I DID NOT APPROVE THE WATCHBILL IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF COLLISION, NOR HAD I SOUGHT OUT THE DIVISION OFFICER TO INQUIRE WHY ONE HAD NOT BEEN SUBMITTED. WHEN CONSTRUCTING THE OFFICER'S WATCHBILL I ATTEMPTED TO PAIR UP THE MORE EXPERIENCED INDIVIDUAL'S WITH THE LESS EXPERIENCED. FOR EXAMPLE, A NEWLY QUALIFIED GOOD WOULD BE PAIRED WITH AN EXPERIENCED GOOD AND CROWS. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR ALL OTHER WATCHSTATIONS. LONG HAD BEEN STANDING GOOD IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND SINCE LTJG HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN QUALIFIED CROWS, I HAD PAIRED THEM ON THE WATCHBILL. THE ENLISTED GOOD'S WERE IN A MORE LIBERAL ROTATION, AND THUS STOOD WATCHES WITH DIFFERENT GOOD'S AND CROWS EACH WATCH. THESE WATCHBILLS WERE PREPARED BY MYSELF, REVIEWED BY THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AND APPROVED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER. THE IMPLEMENTATION

All redactions are B-6.

IF THE ENLISTED JOOD'S HAD ALLOWED ME TO LET JUNIOR OFFICERS TO CHECK INSTRUCTION WATCHES FOR THE WATCH STATIONS THAT REQUIRED FOR THEIR PERSONAL SWC QUALIFICATIONS. THE WATCHBILL IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF COLLISION DID NOT HAVE LT. OR LTC. STANDING OFFICER WATCHES AS THEY WERE QUALIFYING AS EODW. NEITHER MYSELF NOR THE COMBAT SYSTEMS OFFICER, LT. WERE ON THE WATCHBILL. LT LAMTIC WAS STANDING THE 04-08 EVERY MORNING AS EODW. ALL THREE DEPARTMENT HEADS HAD STOOD TAC WHILE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. ANOTHER ISSUE IS IF ANY OOD'S HAD SPECIFICALLY TOLD THE JOOD'S NOT TO DO ANYTHING WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE OOD, IN EFFECT "HAND-CUFFING" THE JOOD'S. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH ALL OOD'S AND FOUND THAT WHILE THEY NEVER EXPLICITLY STATED THIS AS POLICY, IT WAS NORMAL FOR THE JOOD TO ADVISE THE OOD OF HIS INTENTIONS PRIOR TO TAKING A COURSE OF ACTION. A FEW OF THE OOD'S ARE PRESENTLY ON LEAVE AND I HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO QUESTION THEM WITH RESPECT TO THIS MATTER.

WITH RESPECT TO THE QUALIFICATION BOARD FOR LTJG. THE FOLLOWING APPLIES. THE CIC WATCH OFFICER BOARD FOR LTJG WAS HELD ON 4 NOVEMBER 1988 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLAN OF THE WEEK. THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD CONSISTED OF MYSELF, LT. THE SIC DIVISION OFFICER, LT. THE CO DIVISION OFFICER, AND LT. THE OUTBOARD OFFICER, WHO IS ALSO QUALIFIED CIC WATCH OFFICER. THE COMMANDING OFFICER WAS PRESENT AT THE BOARD, ALTHOUGH NOT CONTINUOUSLY. HE HAD OTHER MATTERS TO ATTEND TO, AND WOULD SIT IN AND ASK QUESTIONS WHEN HE COULD. UPON COMPLETION OF THE BOARD, WE FOUND LTJG FULLY DESERVING OF QUALIFICATION, AND INFORMED THE COMMANDING OFFICER THAT WE FOUND HIM QUALIFIED. I INFORMED LT OF THE RESULTS OF THE BOARD, AND HE NOTED SUCH IN HIS WHEELLOOK FOR PRODUCTION OF THE QUALIFICATION LETTER. USUALLY I WOULD WAIT FOR THE QUALIFICATION LETTER TO BE FORMULATED AND THEN PRESENT BOTH THE LETTER AND THE PQS BOOK TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER FOR SIGNATURE. WE ENTERED PORT AT PHUKET, THAILAND A COUPLE OF DAYS LATER, BUT I DID NOT SEE THE QUALIFICATION LETTER, AND ASSUMED THAT IT WAS BEING PREPARED AS LT WAS VERY CONSCIENTIOUS ABOUT PREPARING ALL LETTERS WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE COMPLETION OF THE BOARDS. I ASSUME THAT LT HAD NOT YET HAD THE LETTER PREPARED PRIOR TO THE COLLISION.

A FEW MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES WHICH PERTAIN TO THE INVESTIGATION FOLLOW. IT WAS MY POLICY THAT ALL RECOMMENDATIONS PASSED TO THE BRIDGE BE LOGGED IN THE CIC LOG. THE FUNCTION OF THE BRIDGE CONSOLE OPERATOR, AS STATED IN THE CIC STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES APPROVED BY MYSELF, IS TO INFORM THE OOD OF ALL CONTACTS, COURSES, SPEEDS AND CPA'S, UPDATE THE STATUS BOARD ON THE BRIDGE, CORRELATE SKINER WITH WIDE TRACK NUMBERS, AND ACCEPT OR REJECT SATNAV FIXES BY THE DIRECTION OF THE CIGWO OR TAC. THE BRIDGE CONSOLE OPERATOR IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE CIC WATCH SUPERVISOR AND CIGWO FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES, AND IS MONITORED BY THE OOD. IF THE OOD IS UNHAPPY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BRIDGE CONSOLE OPERATOR, THEN HE ADVISES THE CIGWO AND/OR WATCH SUPERVISOR TO THAT EFFECT FOR RECOMMENDATION. THE BRIDGE CONSOLE OPERATOR ROTATES AS DIRECTED BY THE CIC WATCH SUPERVISOR. PLANNING BOARD FOR TRAINING WAS HELD REGULARLY PRIOR TO REACHING THE PERSIAN GULF, FOR PURPOSES OF REVIEWING TRAINING AND REVISING THE PLAN OF THE WEEK. AFTER WE DEPARTED, WE HELD SEVERAL PB FOR T'S, BUT FOUND THAT IT WAS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVISE A WEEKLY SCHEDULE WITH THE CONSTANTLY CHANGING SITUATION IN THE GULF. THEREFORE, AROUND MID-AUGUST, PB FOR T WAS HELD ONLY SPORADICALLY, UNTIL LCDR BELIEVED AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER. IN EARLY

All redactions are B-6.

OCTOBER. AT THAT TIME PE FOR 7 WAS RE-INSTITUTED AS A WEEKLY REQUIREMENT, AND WAS NEVER CANCELLED. HOWEVER, PE FOR 7 WAS DELAYED WHILE IN PORT PHUKET, THAILAND, AND WAS SCHEDULED FOR 12 NOVEMBER. THE PREVIOUS PE FOR 7 SCHEDULED ALL TRAINING AND EVENTS THROUGH 11 NOVEMBER TO COVER THIS TIME FRAME. DURING PREVIOUS TRANSITS OF INTERNATIONAL STRAITS, A NAVIGATION BRIEFING HAD BEEN CONDUCTED. THIS WAS TRUE FOR THE TRANSIT OF THE SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS DURING OUR TRANSIT FROM CALIFORNIA, AND THE PREVIOUS TRANSIT OF THE STRAITS OF MALACCA. THE PREVIOUS STRAITS OF MALACCA TRANSIT HAD BEEN AIRLIFTED DURING THE UNDERWAY BRIEF FROM SINGAPORE. WE DID NOT BRIEF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ EACH TIME WE TRANSMITTED THERE, AS THIS WAS A REGULAR OCCURRENCE, NOR DID WE EVER SET A NAVIGATION DETAIL FOR A STRAITS OF HORMUZ TRANSIT, EXCEPT FOR MAYBE ONE FIRST TIME THROUGH. NO NAVIGATION BRIEFING WAS HELD FOR THE RECENT STRAITS OF MALACCA TRANSIT, PRIOR TO THE COLLISION.

SINCE I WAS NOT ON THE WATCHBILL, I REGULARLY VISITED CIC TO SEE HOW OUR NEW SYSTEM FOR WATCHES WAS WORKING, AND ALSO FREQUENT AT THE BRIDGE. ON THE NIGHT OF THE COLLISION I STOPPED BY CIC AFTER ABOUT ONE O'CLOCK REPORTS TO SEE HOW THINGS WERE DEVELOPING. I NOTED THE RADAR PICTURES, AND TALKED WITH [REDACTED] WHO WAS THE WATCH SUPERVISOR. I DO NOT RECALL WHO WAS THE WATCH OFFICER AT THE END OF MY WATCH, I BELIEVE. I DO REMEMBER NOTING THAT THE 1ST AND 2ND SURFACE TRACKS WERE NOT MANNED, AND WERE ONLY BEING MANNED BY THE 3RD AND 4TH WATCHES. HE INDICATED THAT MANNING THESE STATIONS WAS PLANNED FOR THE NEXT WATCH, AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN DOING SO. I REMEMBER STATING THAT HE SHOULD MANN IT UP EARLIER IF THE SHIPPING TRAFFIC INCREASED. HOWEVER, AT THAT TIME THERE WERE ONLY ABOUT FOUR ACTIVE SURFACE TRACKS, AND THE NETS TRACKER WAS UPDATING THEM PROPERLY AND WITH NO DIFFICULTY. ALL SEEMED NORMAL AND PROPER IN CIC, SO I WENT TO RADIO TO PICK UP ANY TRAFFIC AND THEN WENT TO THE WARDROOM TO WORK ON OUR NEXT QUARTER'S SCHEDULE AND LONG RANGE SCHEDULE. I WORKED UNTIL ABOUT 0200 OR 0230 AND THEN WENT TO MY RACK. I HAD THOUGHT ABOUT GOING BACK BY RADIO AND CIC, BUT WAS VERY TIRED AND OPTED NOT TO.

AFTER FALLING ASLEEP I REMEMBER BEING AWAKENED BY THE IMO, BUT DO NOT RECALL WHAT HAD BEEN PASSED. THERE WAS THEN A LOUD CHURCHING NOISE, AND WHAT SOUNDED LIKE AN EXPLOSION. THE SHIP STOPPED SUDDENLY, AND SEEMED TO PITCH FORWARD. IT THEN ROLLED TO STARBOARD AND BACK TO PORT. DURING THIS I JUMPED OUT OF MY RACK, AND YELLED TO MY ROOMMATE, LCDR [REDACTED], THAT WE MUST HAVE RUN AGROUND, AND THAT WE HAD TO GET DRESSED AND GET TO THE WEATHER DECKS. WE BOTH DRESSED RAPIDLY, BUT THE ROOM WAS IN DISARRAY AND I COULD NOT FIND MY SOCKS, SO I JUST PUT ON MY SHOES AND HEADED FOR THE DOOR. LCDR [REDACTED] WAS AHEAD OF ME, AND WHEN THE DOOR WAS OPENED THE PASSAGEWAY WAS FILLED WITH ACRID SMOKE. I RAN BACK INTO THE ROOM AND GRABBED BOTH EEBL'S AND HEADED FORWARD. THERE WERE ALOT OF CRUNCHING NOISES AND MANY PEOPLE RUNNING ABOUT AND YELLING. THE GENERAL QUARTERS ALARM WAS SOUNDING. WHEN I REACHED THE MIDSHIPS QUARTERDECK I LOOKED RIGHT AND SAW THE BRIDGE OF THE SHIP, KOTA PETANI, EVEN WITH THE QUARTERDECK. IT APPEARED TO BE PARALLEL TO MINKAID, BUT FACING AFT. I WENT TO THE STARBOARD SIDE AND LOOKED AFT AND SAW FLAMES AND SMOKE. I HEARD SOMEONE, WHO I BELIEVE TO BE BOOM, YELLING ORDERS TO PEOPLE WHO WERE BREAKING OUT FIRE HOSES. A MAN WHO WAS IN AN OBA WAS STANDING NEXT TO ME, AND I TOLD HIM TO GO CHECK ALL STATEROOMS IN OFFICER'S COUNTRY TO MAKE SURE THAT EVERYONE WAS AWAKE AND TURNED OUT, AND TO

All redactions are B-6

REPORT BACK TO ME IF THERE WERE ANY INJURED. I SENT HIM WITH ANOTHER PERSON IN AN OBA. I THEN WENT TO CIC, WHERE CWO2 AND C3. HOMERICH WERE HANDLING COMMUNICATIONS AND THE WATCH, THEY SEEMED TO HAVE THINGS WELL IN HAND. WE WERE HAVING TROUBLE MAINTAINING COMMS WITH SECURE VOICE, SO WE AGREED THE RENTE TO PASS THE OREF 3 FOR US, AND TO RETURN TO RENDER ASSISTANCE. I THEN WENT TO THE BRIDGE. LTJG

HAD THE DECK AND WAS BEING ASSISTED BY LTJG THE XO WAS ON THE BRIDGE, AND TOLD ME THE CO WAS IN DC CENTRAL. MEN WERE IN THE WATER, SO I SAID I WOULD GO DOWN AND HAVE THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT LAUNCHED. LT ALBERT WAS ON THE MIDSHIP'S QUARTERDECK WHEN I RETURNED, AND I HAD STOPPED BY RADIO TO GET WALKIE-TALKIE'S. LTJG

SHOWED UP AND I GRABBED SOME PEOPLE TO GET THE WHALEBOAT LAUNCHED. WE ENSURED THAT ALL PERSONNEL HAD THE PROPER SAFETY EQUIPMENT IN THE BOAT, WHICH WAS OBTAINED FROM THE LIFE JACKET LOCKER. WE LOWERED THE BOAT MANUALLY, BUT THE RUDDER CAUGHT ON THE CONTROL BOX. WE RAISED IT USING THE HAND CRANK, THERE WAS NO POWER, AND THEN LOWERED IT AGAIN WITH NO DIFFICULTY. SOMETIME DURING THIS TIME THE PEOPLE IN OBA'S RETURNED AND TOLD ME THAT SOMEONE WAS DEAD IN ONE OF THE STATEROOMS. I ASKED WHICH ONE, THEN TOLD THEM THAT THEY WERE TO GO TO DC CENTRAL AND GET A CORPSEMAN TO VERIFY THAT THE CASUALTY WAS IN FACT DEAD, I DID NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY CHANCES. THE WHALEBOAT WAS LAUNCHED WITH LTJG AS BOAT OFFICER, AND THEY PROCEEDED TO THE MEN IN THE WATER, DIRECTED VIA WALKIE TALKIE FROM THE BRIDGE. I WAS CONTINUALLY SENDING PEOPLE FORWARD TO THE FORECASTLE WHO WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH THE FIRE FIGHTING EFFORT. I LEFT LT

IN CHARGE OF THE MIDSHIP'S AREA, TELLING HIM TO ENSURE NO ONE WENT AFT UNLESS REQUESTED FROM CENTRAL. THE SHIPS HAD DRIFTED APART BY THIS TIME. I WENT TO THE FORECASTLE AND FOUND ETI HAYDEN AND A CHIEF, I DON'T REMEMBER WHO, AND TOLD THEM TO KEEP EVERYONE ON THE FORECASTLE SO THEY COULD BE ASSEMBLED IN A CENTRAL LOCATION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AS NEEDED. I THEN WENT BACK TO COMBAT AND TOLD CWO2

TO START AN OREF 3 NAVY BLUE. THEN I WENT TO THE BRIDGE TO SEE HOW THINGS WERE PROGRESSING. WE SEEMED TO HAVE ALL FIRE PARTIES MANNED, AND THE FORECASTLE WAS ORGANIZED, SO I RETURNED TO CIC TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPER REPORTS WERE BEING MADE. I ALSO INFORMED THE XO THAT WE HAD ONE OFFICER WHO WAS POSSIBLY DEAD. I KNEW THAT IT WAS THE STATEROOM OF LT MCFREE, LTJG AND ENS.

FROM THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN TO ME BY THE MAN WHO INVESTIGATED IN THE OBA. I HAD SEEN LTJG SO WE ATTEMPTED TO DISCERN IF IT WAS LT MCFREE OR ENS WE HAD ENS. FAGED, AND HE CALLED THE BRIDGE, HE WAS IN REPAIR THREE. WE THEN KNEW THAT IT WAS LT MCFREE. WHEN I RETURNED TO COMBAT I FOUND ALL THE OBA'S ASSEMBLED AND ORDERLY. WE WERE STILL HAVING TROUBLE COMMUNICATING VIA SATELLITE, SO WE PASSED ALL INFORMATION TO RENTE VIA NAVY RED OR THE WALKIE TALKIE IN COMBAT. WE COULD HEAR THEM MAKING THE REPORTS WHEN POWER CAME BACK UP, AND THEY WERE RELAYING VERY ACCURATELY. THEY ALSO SEEMED TO BE TAPING, AS THEY WOULD STATE TIMES. I RETURNED TO THE BRIDGE AND SAW THAT OUR WHALEBOAT WAS RECOVERING THE MEN IN THE WATER, AND THE RENTE WAS DIRECTED TO HELP SEARCH THE AREA. THE RENTE THEN WENT TO ASSIST THE MERCHANT WHO HAD A FIRE FORWARD. THE SHIP'S WERE NOW ABOUT 2000 YDS APART. THE SUN WAS COMING UP AND EVERYONE SEEMED VERY COMPOSED. I RETURNED TO COMBAT AND CWO2

WAS HAVING TROUBLE PUTTING TOGETHER THE OREF 3. I THEN SAT DOWN AND DRAFTED ONE, AND RELEASED IT MYSELF. I THEN WENT TO THE MIDSHIP'S QUARTERDECK TO SEE HOW THINGS WERE PROGRESSING AND TO COORDINATE RECOVERING THE INJURED MEN IN THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT. WE COULD HEAR THE

All reductions are B.6.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE BRIDGE AND WHALEBOAT VIA THE WALKIE TALKIE IN CIC. WHEN I GOT TO THE MIDSHIP'S QUARTERS, I STARTED HAVING THE ACCOM LADDER LOWERED IN CASE THERE WAS A NEED TO LIFT THE INJURED VIA A STOKES. HOWEVER, THE WHALEBOAT SAID THAT WAS NOT NECESSARY, AND WE LOWERED A JACOB'S LADDER PORT MIDSIDE. I USED THE PORT SIDE SINCE THERE WAS LITTLE SMOKE THERE. DURING THIS TIME THERE WERE TWO EXPLOSIONS AFT. WE CONCENTRATED ON GETTING THE INJURED ABOARD, AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE EXPLOSIONS. I WENT TO THE FORECASTLE, WHERE THEY WERE RIGGING A J-BAR DAVID AND HORSE COLLAR IN CASE THAT WAS NEEDED. I GRABBED SEVERAL PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN RECOVERING THE INJURED. I THEN RETURNED TO THE BRIDGE TO SEE ABOUT GETTING A MUSTER. A MUSTER WAS TAKEN, AND WE FOUND NO OTHER MISSING PERSONNEL. WE THEREFORE RECOVERED THE MOTOR WHALEBOAT.

I DO NOT RECALL HOW MANY TIMES I MADE THE CIRCUIT BETWEEN THE BRIDGE, CIC, MIDSHIP'S AND THE FORECASTLE. ALL PERSONNEL WERE DOING THEIR JOBS, AND I WAS MERELY ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE EFFORTS, KEEP UP MORALE, AND MAINTAIN ORDER. WE HAD SOUND POWERED PHONES IN CIC WHERE WE GOT REPORTS FROM DC CENTRAL. I HAD NO DIFFICULTY OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM THEM, AND USED THIS TO FORMULATE THE OPREP 3'S. THE FIRST THREE OPREPS I RELEASED MYSELF, THEN STARTED ROUTING THEM THROUGH THE XO AND CO. THERE WAS A LOT OF CONFUSION AS TO THE STATUS OF THE TORPEDOES. MY INITIAL REPORT WAS THAT 6 WERE LOST OVER THE SIDE, AND 2 ON BOARD. THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE WAS ALSO NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH WE HAD GOOD INFORMATION ON THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRE-FIGHTING EFFORT. I NEVER WENT TO THE SCENE, AS I FELT THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH PEOPLE THERE, AND THEY DIDN'T NEED ANOTHER PERSON GETTING IN THE WAY. THEREFORE, THE INITIAL REPORTS ON THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE WERE GROSSLY UNDERSTATED. I ASSUMED THAT MOST OF THE DAMAGE BEING REPORTED WAS DUE TO THE FIRE, AND NOT THE COLLISION. POWER WAS EXPEDITIOUSLY RESTORED, AND WE STARTED MAKING OUR OWN REPORTS. FOOD AND DRINKS WERE AVAILABLE, AND THERE WAS NO WATER PRESSURE. THE EFFORTS TO RESTORE STEERING TOOK THE LONGEST, ALTHOUGH WE HAD PROPULSION EARLY ON. I REMAINED IN CIC THROUGHOUT THE MORNING, THEN DEvised A NEW WATCHBILL, PUTTING TWO QUALIFIED COUL'S ON THE BRIDGE FOR EACH TEAM. I FELT THAT THIS LEVEL OF EXPERTISE WAS NECESSARY CONSIDERING THE DAMAGE. WHEN I WAS NOT ON THE BRIDGE, OR FORECASTLE I WAS IN CIC, OVERSEEING REPORTS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND NAVIGATION. I SLEPT IN CIC THAT NIGHT ON THE DECK, AND TOOK THE MILWATCH ON THE BRIDGE. MY OVERALL IMPRESSION OF THE DAMAGE CONTROL EFFORT, WAS THAT IT WAS PROFESSIONAL AND ORDERLY. A DC WIFCOM SET IN CIC OR ON THE BRIDGE WOULD HAVE HELPED IMMENSELY, AS MOST INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED THIRD HAND THROUGH DC CENTRAL. THE CREW REMAINED IN GOOD SPIRITS THROUGHOUT, AND NEVER WAVERED. LTJG *B-6* AND LTJG *B6* DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB ON THE BRIDGE THROUGHOUT. THE XO COORDINATED EVERYTHING, AND WE DISCUSSED MANY THINGS THROUGHOUT, SUCH AS THE MUSTER, WHICH ALL WENT WELL.

A FINAL NOTE. THE CIC STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES STATE THAT I AM TO BE CALLED WHENEVER THERE IS A PROBLEM, OR THE CIGWO OR CIGWE IS IN DOUBT. THIS OCCURRED MANY TIMES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND I DO NOT RECALL EVER SNEWING SOMEONE OUT FOR WAKING ME. THAT NIGHT I WAS NOT CALLED. I DO NOT KNOW WHY, OR IF I HAD BEEN IF IT WOULD HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE. THE LAST QUESTION OF EVERY CIGWO BOARD WAS 'WHAT DO YOU DO IF YOU ARE EVER IN DOUBT, OR HAVE A QUESTION? THE ANSWER WAS TO CALL MR. I WISH I HAD BEEN CALLED. I HOPE THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS DISASTER, ALTHOUGH I CANNOT SAY THAT WITH CERTAINTY.

*Very Respectfully,*  
*B-6*

THIS STATEMENT CONSISTS OF SIX PAGES.  
I HAVE REVIEWED ALL SIX PAGES AND SWEAR  
THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION IS TRUE AND  
ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE

B-6  
witnessed  
B-6

B-6  
J LOR, USN  
19 NOV 1989

LT, JAGC, USNR  
AUTH: 10 USC 936 (a) (1)

I, <sup>B-6</sup>, LIEUTENANT, USN, AM THE COMBAT SYSTEMS OFFICER ONBOARD USS KINKAID (DD 965). I HAVE BEEN IN THE NAVY EIGHT YEARS. I REPORTED ONBOARD KINKAID FEBRUARY 1989. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED REGARDING COMBAT SYSTEM EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION ON THE MORNING OF 12 NOVEMBER 1989.

1. POSITION OF DLRP: IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST C3120.39B, THE DATA LINK REFERENCE POINT MUST BE WITHIN 17 DEGREES LATITUDE AND 17 DEGREES LONGITUDE OF THE SHIP. THE SHIP'S RELATIVE POSITION TO DLRP OR HER COURSE AND SPEED WOULD HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE OPERATION OF THE NTDS PROGRAM. HOWEVER, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE "DLRP SHOULD NORMALLY BE ASSIGNED FORWARD OF THE POSITION AND INTENDED MOVEMENT SO HAS TO INSURE UNITS DO NOT MOVE OUT OF THE MAXIMUM RANGE LIMITATIONS." THERE WERE NO NTDS PROGRAM FAULTS THAT REQUIRED THE DLRP TO BE KEPT IN FRONT OF THE SHIP.

2. CLOSE CPA NTDS ALERTS: THE KINKAID'S SHIP'S OPERATIONAL PROGRAM (CHIF (3Y/3C/2I/16M)OORB(BL6/JATL)4.0(DD 963)) DOES NOT HAVE A CLOSE CPA ALERTS. THE ONLY EMERGENCY ALERTS ARE:

A. BRIDGE CONSOLE OPERATOR DESIGNATES AN EMERGENCY CONDITION BY DESIG/TERM EMERG CCAEB ACTION.

B. A LINK II EMERGENCY MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

THERE WERE NO CLOSE CPA OR COLLISION ALERTS LISTED IN THE TECH MANUALS OR SOP MANUALS FOR THE SYSTEM.

3. DRAI: ON 1 NOVEMBER 1989 IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE DRAI WAS GIVING IMPROPER COURSE AND SPEED INPUTS TO THE DRT. TROUBLESHOOTING REVEALED TWO FAULTY SYNCHROS IN THE DRAI. ONE FEEDS THE DRT, THE OTHER FEEDS THE COURSE AND SPEED DISPLAYS ON THE DRAI ITSELF. SUPPLY HAD ONLY ONE SYNCHRO ONBOARD SO ONLY THE SYNCHRO FEEDING THE DRT WAS REPLACED. THE SYSTEM WAS RECALIBRATED AND ON 3 NOVEMBER 1989 WHILE INPORT SRI LANKA, A FULL SYSTEM TEST WAS SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED. ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989, THE DRT/DRAI HAD TWO FAULTS. THE FIRST WAS THE FAULTY COURSE AND SPEED DISPLAY ON THE DRAI. THE SECOND WAS THAT OCCASIONALLY THE DRT WOULD "JUMP" APPROXIMATELY 1/4 TO 1/2 INCH. THIS "JUMP" WAS VERY OBVIOUS TO THE DRT PLOTTERS AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM. THE FAULT IS BELIEVED TO BE CAUSED BY A FAULTY STEPPING MOTOR IN THE DRAI. BOTH THE STEPPING MOTOR AND THE SYNCHRO WERE ORDERED ANORS. W

4. SPQ-9A: ON 12 NOVEMBER 1989, THE SPQ-9A WAS FULLY OPERATIONAL AND WAS IN THE "PRE-STANDBY MODE." IT TAKES APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES TO GO FROM "PRE-STANDBY" TO RADIATE. NORMAL PROCEDURE WAS IF THE CICWO DECIDED HE WANTED THE SPQ-9A LITE-OFF, THE CICWS WOULD GET THE DUTY FC, HOWEVER BOTH CICWS (OS2 JOHNSON, OS2 TIDWELL) HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO LITE-OFF THE RADAR IF THE SITUATION REQUIRED IT'S USE.

5. GYRO'S: THE FWD GYRO HAS HAD AN INTERMITTENT FAULT FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN DAYS WHICH HAS ON OCCASION CAUSED IT TO TUMBLE. THE GYRO WAS TAKEN DOWN WHILE IN PHUKET, THAILAND FOR ADDITIONAL TROUBLESHOOTING. THE GYRO WAS RESTARTED ON 11 NOVEMBER 1989 AND WAS OFF-LINE WAITING TO COMPLETE IT'S 24 HOUR STABILIZATION PERIOD ON THE MORNING OF 12 NOVEMBER 1989. AFT GYRO WHICH WAS ONLINE 12 NOVEMBER 1989 WAS SHUT DOWN AFTER THE COLLISION BECAUSE OF WATER LEAKING INTO THE SPACE. FWD GYRO WAS PLACED ONLINE FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT AND IT EXPERIENCED NO PROBLEMS UNTIL 14 NOVEMBER 1989 WHEN IT TUMBLED WHILE AT SEA DETAIL. THE GYRO WAS IMMEDIATELY RESTARTED AND WAS ONLINE AGAIN IN APPROXIMATELY SIX MINUTES. THE AFT GYRO WAS RESTARTED WHEN THE FWD GYRO TUMBLED. NEITHER GYRO HAS HAD ANY PROBLEMS SINCE. FWD ASIRF 1

6. CHART RECORDER FOR UQN-4A: NOT NORMALLY USED. THE SONAR SUPERVISOR HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MONITOR THE FATHOMETER TO ENSURE IT'S PROPER OPERATION. THE BRIDGE HAS A REMOTE DIGITAL READOUT. THE ONLY TIME THE CHART RECORDER IS USED IS FOR EXERCISES RECONSTRUCTION PURPOSES OR IF THE DIGITAL DISPLAY IS LOST DUE TO A CASUALTY.

7. BINOCULARS: ONLY 3 OF 6 BINOCULARS USED BY THE BRIDGE WATCH TEAM WERE CONSIDERED FULLY USABLE. THE OTHER 3 BINOCULARS HAD DAMAGED OPTICS AND COULD ONLY BE USED BY CLOSING ONE EYE.

I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

B-6  
Signature

20 Nov 89  
Date

C. B. G.  
LT, JAGC, USNR  
Officer Authorized to Administer  
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

MY NAME IS [REDACTED]. I HAVE BEEN IN THE NAVY FOR NINE YEARS. I REPORTED ONBOARD KINKAID MARCH 21, 1989. I AM THE CHIEF ENGINEER. I WAS ON WATCH AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION AS EOOW. I HAD RELIEVED ENS [REDACTED], MY FUELS OFFICER AT 0400. GSE2 WAS MY PACC OPERATOR AND GSM3 WAS THE EPCC OPERATOR. DC3 WAS AT THE DCC. ALSO IN THE SPACE WAS GSM1. THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT WAS ONLINE: 1B, 2B GTM IN SPLIT PLANT MODE; 1, 2 GTG IN PARALL; 1 & 2 WHB; 1B 2B F/O PUMPS SUCKING ON FO TANKS 5-162-2-F AND 5-260-1-F; 1A AND 2B LO PUMPS; 1 & 2 ELECTRIC CRP PUMPS; NR2 LPAC IN CONSTANT RUN; 1HPAC; 1 & 2 SWS PUMPS; 1, 2 & 3 A/C; NR1 FW PUMP SUCKING ON NR2 FW TANK; 1 & 2 EVAPS DISTILLING TO NR3 FW TANK; NR1 REEFER; 1,3, & 5 FIRE PUMPS; 1RSIA, IRSIB AND 2RSIA 60/400 HZ CONVERTERS. EQUIPMENT OOC WAS NR1 LPAC DUE TO BLOWN 2ND STATE HEAD GASKET, 1B L/O PUMP DUE TO WORN INTERNALS, BELL LOGGER DUE TO BAD IC CARD, NR2 FIRE PUMP DUE TO BROKEN COUPLING, NR1 AFFF STATION DUE TO BAD HYTROL VALVE STEM, PACEE "A" POWER SUPPLY, AND ECU DUE TO BAD CIRCUIT CARDS. DUE TO ECU CASUALTY TO THE DATA LOGGER WAS ALSO OOC AND READINGS WERE BEING TAKEN LOCAL IN THE SPACES.

PRIOR TO THE COLLISION GSM1 AND GSE2 NOTICED THROTTLES, WHICH WERE AT THE BRIDGE, GO FROM ALL AHEAD STANDARD TO FLANK 1. GSE2 I NOTICED IT FIRST AND ASKED GSM1 WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS HAPPENING. I DON'T RECALL BEING NOTIFIED OF THE CHANGE IN SPEED. THIS WAS 30 SECONDS TO ONE MINUTE PRIOR TO THE COLLISION AND GSM1 REMEMBERS THE ENGINES COMING UP IN SPEED AND SHAFT RPM PICKING UP BUT DOESN'T RECALL IF WE WERE AT FULL FLANK 1 AT THE TIME OF THE COLLISION.

THE COLLISION ALARM WENT OFF AND I ORIGINALLY THOUGHT IT WAS ACCIDENTALLY SET OFF UNTIL IT WAS PASSED OVER THE 1MC, "ALL HANDS BRACE FOR SHOCK." I BRACED BY GRABBING HOLD OF THE EOOW'S DESK, THE COLLISION OCCURRED. I DON'T RECALL THE AMOUNT WE LISTED OVER TO THE STARBOARD BUT I WAS TOLD IT WAS ABOUT 14 DEGREES. GSM1 TOOK OVER PACC AND GSE2 TOOK EPCC AS THEY WERE THE MOST EXPERIENCED. IMMEDIATELY THE PACC & EPCC STARTED THEIR INITIAL CASUALTY PROCEDURES. I WAS CALLING THE SPACES FOR DAMAGE REPORTS OVER THE 2JV. THE PACC TOOK THROTTLE CONTROL AND CAME TO ALL STOP. BOTH MAINS WERE STILL ONLINE AND SHAFTS ROTATING. THE PACC STARTED TO EMERGENCY STOP 1B, 2B GTMS BUT STOPPED WHEN HE SAW EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL AND HE INITIALLY THOUGHT WE HAD RUN AGROUND AND THAT THE BRIDGE MAY NEED THEM.

MEANWHILE, BOTH 1 & 2 GTG'S REMAINED ONLINE BUT THE SWITCHBOARDS HAD SPLIT OUT DUE TO FAULT CURRENT DETECT LOGIC. 1 & 2 SWITCHBOARDS WERE STILL ONLINE BUT WE HAD NO INDICATIONS FROM NR3 SWITCHBOARD AND EVERY ALARM WAS LIT ON 3GTG. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO START 3GTG. THE FAULT CURRENT DETECT ALARMS FOR 3 BOARD ALL WERE ILLUMINATED AND 1S-3S AND 2S-3S FAULT CURRENT DETECT ALARMS WERE GOING ON 1 & 2 BOARDS, INHIBITING THE REST OF THE BUSTIES FROM BEING CLOSED. ADDITIONALLY, ALL FIRE PUMPS STOPPED AND FIREMAIN PRESSURE DROPPED TO ZERO. WHAT WE DIDN'T KNOW WAS THAT WE HAD A FIREMAIN RUPTURE.

ABOUT ONE MINUTE AFTER THE COLLISION THE MPA ENTERED THE SPACE AND RELIEVED ME AS EOOW AND I WENT OVER TO DC CENTRAL. SHORTLY AFTER THAT THE DCA WAS THERE AND ALL PHONETALKERS WERE MANNING UP. OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS HAVING NO FIREMAIN. WE ORDERED P-250'S RIGGED UNTIL FIREMAIN WAS RESTORED. ABOUT 6 MINUTES AFTER THE COLLISION THE AFT THIRD OF THE FM LOOP WAS ISOLATED AND 1, 2, 3, 5 FIRE PUMPS WERE RESTARTED AND FIREMAIN RESTORED TO FORWARD 2/3 OF THE LOOP.

All redactions are B.6

WE BEGAN FIGHTING THE FIRE. ORIGINALLY, A CLASS "B" FIRE WAS REPORTED COMING FROM THE AFT STARBOARD FUELING PIT. I DIDN'T KNOW UNTIL 10-15 MINUTES INTO THE PROBLEM EXACTLY WHERE THE DAMAGE WAS AND 20-30 MINUTES INTO THE PROBLEM WHAT THE EXTENT WAS. THE EOW WAS ISOLATING ALL SERVICE PIPING GOING AFT SO I BELIEVE THE "B" FIRE WAS CAUSED BY RESIDUAL FUEL IN THE TRANSFER PIPING. A FIRE WAS REPORTED IN THE STARBOARD TORPEDO MAGAZINE WHICH WE LABELED AS A CLASS "D" FIRE DUE TO OTTO FUEL. WE ASKED AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO FLOOD THE MAGAZINES FROM THE CO WHO WAS IN CCS AT THIS TIME AND STAYED THERE THROUGHOUT THE FIRE. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO FLOOD THE MAGAZINE BUT THE VALVE WAS DAMAGED AND NO FIREMAIN WAS AVAILABLE ANYWAY. WE HAD TO BREAK INTO THE MAGAZINES USING CROWBARS TO SQUEEZE PEOPLE IN ENOUGH TO FIGHT THE FIRE FROM THE SAME DECK AS IT WAS ON. REPAIR 5 WAS THE HOSE TEAM DOING THIS. MEANWHILE REPAIR 3 WAS FIGHTING THE FIRES FROM THE SEASPARROW DECK AND THE AIRCREW WAS FIGHTING IT USING FP1000 HOSES. ADDITIONAL "A" & "C" FIRES WERE REPORTED IN THE AREA AND WERE FOUGHT.

DURING THE FIRE, SMOKE BOUNDARIES WERE SET BUT NOT USING SMOKE CURTAINS. STILL SMOKE REACHED UP TO THE GALLEY SERVING LINE. DESMOKING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY SETTING POSITIVE VENTILATION IN MER 1, 2 AND AUX 2 AND BLOWING THE SMOKE OUT THE WEATHER DECK ACCESS. THIS WAS AN HOUR AND 20 MINUTES INTO THE PROBLEM. FIRES WERE OUT APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR AND 10 MINUTES INTO THE PROBLEM. TWO REFLASHES OCCURRED AFTER FIRES WERE OUT IN THE STRD TORPEDO MAG DUE TO RESIDUAL OTTO FUEL BUT THEY WERE QUICKLY PUT OUT. A PERMANENT REFLASH WATCH WAS SET ON THE SEASPARROW DECK WITH A 12FT APPLICATOR DISCHARGING INTO THE DEBRIS AND ONE WAS SET IN THE PASSAGEWAY OUTSIDE THE MAGAZINE.

DURING THE FIRE, A SMALL EXPLOSION WAS REPORTED WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE ONE OF THE OTTO II FUEL TANKS COOKING OFF. IT SENT A FIREBALL OUT BUT DID NO APPARENT DAMAGE. FIRE TEAMS WERE STILL FIGHTING THE FIRE FROM THREE DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. ALSO, ABOUT 20 MINUTES OR SO INTO THE PROBLEM REPAIR III WAS ORDERED TO ABANDON TO THE FANTAIL DUE TO LOSS OF POWER (DUE TO ELECTRICAL ISOLATION) AND SMOKE IN THE AREA. REPAIR III IS JUST AFT OF THE HT SHIP WHICH HAD FIRE AND SMOKE IN IT. ALL EQUIPMENT WAS MOVED TO THE FANTAIL.

COMMUNICATIONS WERE DEFICIENT WITH THE LOCKERS. THIS CAME FROM LOCKERS NOT PASSING THE INFORMATION AND LOSS OF COMMS. THE DC WIFCOM FROM THE SCENE TO REPAIR III WAS LOST ON ITS NORMAL CHANNEL AND WAS RECOVERED BY SEARCHING CHANNELS. ADDITIONALLY, WIFCOM WAS AFFECTED BY THE ANTENNAS BEING CUT BY THE COLLISION AND THE FACT THAT NULLS ARE PRESENT IN ITS COVERAGE, ESPECIALLY ON THE WEATHERDECKS.

FLOODING WAS REPORTED IN AOQ AND I ASSUMED SINCE THERE WAS NO WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY IN THE PASSAGEWAY OUTSIDE IT AND CONNECTING AOQ TO SUPPLY DEEP STORAGE THAT THE PASSAGEWAY AND DEEP STORAGE COMPARTMENT WERE FLOODED ALSO. I KEPT AN EYE ON OUR LIST TO ENSURE WE WEREN'T TAKING ON MORE WATER. OUR LIST NEVER EXCEEDED THREE DEGREES EITHER SIDE. ADDITIONALLY, I KNEW THE MOST FORWARD FO STORAGE TANK IN THE AFT STARBOARD BANK WAS RUPTURED AND SPILLING FUEL OUT. THE UNKNOWNNS WERE WHETHER JP-5 PUMP ROOM AND AFT IC WERE FLOODED. REPORTS CAME IN THAT THE DECK IN LAUNDRY WAS HOT WHICH INDICATED TO ME THAT THERE MAY BE BURNING FUEL FLOATING ON WATER IN JP5. THE AFFF BILGE SPRINKLING WAS LIT OFF IN HOPES OF DOUSING THIS BUT AFFF STATION 4 FP-180 QUICKLY SEIZED UP FOR UNKNOWN REASONS, STOPPING ANY AFFF FROM GOING TO JP-5 PUMP ROOM. IT IS BELIEVED THE PIPING GOING TO JP-5 PUMP ROOM WAS BLOCKED BY THE DAMAGE. REPORTS ALSO CAME IN THAT THE JP-5 PUMP ROOM ESCAPE TRUNK WAS FLOODED HALFWAY, ALSO INDICATING JP-5 PUMP ROOM WAS FLOODED. AFTER FIRES WERE OUT, THE ESCAPE TRUNK WERE PUMPED DOWN AND JP-5

PUMP ROOM WAS INVESTIGATED AND FOUND TO BE RELATIVELY DRY. THE WTD INTO THE SPACE WAS SECURED WITH MINIMAL LEAK BY. AFT IC WAS FOUND TO BE DRY ALSO WITH ITS WTD HOLDING. BOTH WTD WERE SHORED TO GIVE ADDED STRENGTH. MINOR FLOODING WAS FOUND IN COMBAT SYSTEMS BERTHING BUT THIS WAS COMING FROM CABLEWAY PIPING PENETRATIONS INTO AOQ BULKHEAD AND FROM DECK DRAINS DUE TO THE WASTE DRAIN SYSTEM BACKING UP. BOTH OF THESE WERE DEALT WITH AND FLOODING NEVER EXCEEDED 2-3 INCHES.

SO ESSENTIALLY FIRES WERE OUT, FLOODING ISOLATED AND THE AREA DESMOKED IN APPROXIMATELY TWO HOURS. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN CCS/DCC WERE: THE FIREMAIN BREAK IN THE AREA OF THE DAMAGE WAS ISOLATED AND FIREMAIN RESTORED TO THE AFT LOOP, 1B GTM WAS STOPPED AND THE STBD SHAFT LOCKED 15 MINUTES INTO THE PROBLEM (THIS BECAUSE DAMAGE TO THE STBD SHAFT WAS UNKNOWN). 1B GTM WAS STOPPED WITHOUT CONTROL AIR TO THE AFT PART OF THE SHIP (WITH CLUTCH ENGAGED) DUE TO LOSS OF LP AIR. THIS LOSS ALSO AFFECTED BOTH WHBS AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF STEAM CAUSED BOTH EVAPS TO SALT UP. 1LPAC WAS BROUGHT BACK ONLINE AND WE WERE ABLE TO RESTORE LP AIR TO BOTH ENGINE ROOMS, GET THE BOILER GOING AS WELL AS THE EVAPS AND CONTROL AIR TO THE AFT GTMS. THIS GAVE US BOTH SHAFTS 3 HOURS INTO THE PROBLEM.

ONCE FIRES WERE OUT AND THE AREA DESMOKED, I WENT TO LOOK AT THE DAMAGE AND CONCENTRATE GETTING SYSTEMS RESTORED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. THE PRIORITY WAS TO GET POWER TO AFT STEERING THAT HAD LOST POWER. THIS WAS DONE BY RIGGING CASUALTY POWER TO IT FROM LC31. CHILLED WATER WAS ALSO RESTORED TO AFT STEERING. BOTH PORT AND STARBOARD RUDDERS HAD BEEN CENTERLINED AND LOCKED PREVIOUSLY AND WERE UNLOCKED. STEERING CONTROL WAS SENT TO THE BRIDGE BUT WAS LOST RIGHT AWAY DUE TO IC PROBLEMS WHICH WERE FIXED. FROM THEN ON, WE HAD STEERING AT THE BRIDGE BUT MAINTAINED AN AFT STEERING WATCH.

OTHER ITEMS OF NOTE WERE: THE REMAINING FUEL IN AOQ WAS REMOVED BY GETTING UNDERWAY TO SUCK IT OUT AND BY USING EDUCTORS TO SKIM OFF THE TOP. LIGHTING WAS RESTORED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO AFFECTED SPACES BY RESTORING PORTIONS OF NR3 SWITCHBOARD BY FEEDING IT THROUGH 2S-3S BUSTIE BREAKER THAT WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED. 1S-3S WHEN CLOSED KEPT TRIPPING 1GTG OFFLINE. THIS MAY HAVE CAUSED LOSS OF POWER TO THE BRIDGE. ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE 1S-3S WERE MADE JUST AFTER THE COLLISION AND AN HOUR LATER, LC 42 WAS ALSO RIGGED WITH CASUALTY POWER DIRECTLY INTO THE BREAKERS TO RESTORE LIGHTING & VENTILATION TO OFFICERS COUNTRY. CASUALTY POWER CAME OFF 1 SWITCHBOARD FOR THIS. UPS NEVER CAME ON BECAUSE NO POWER WAS EVER LOST TO THE SYSTEMS IT SUPPLIES. OBA CHANGEOUT WAS ESTABLISHED AT THE PORT AMIDSHIPS QUARTERDECK. I HAD THE MS'S GET FOOD AND WATER UP TO THE FIRE TEAMS EARLY INTO THE PROBLEM TO PREVENT DEHYDRATION. SCOT AIR PACKS WERE BROKEN OUT OF THEIR STORAGE IN THE TRASH COMPACTOR ROOM BUT NEVER USED. ONLY TWO FIRE FIGHTING ENSEMBLES WERE USED BY THE HOSE TEAM DOWN IN THE PASSAGEWAY OUTSIDE THE STBD TORP. MAGAZINE. HEAT STRESS DID NOT EFFECT THOSE IN IT. THE DC CONSOLE EXPERIENCED GROUNDS AND SHORTS THAT AFFECTED THE OTHER CONSOLES IN CCS. SO IT WAS SECURED. OTHER ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS RESULTED IN THE PACC AND EPCC BUT THIS WAS HOURS AFTER THE COLLISION, DUE TO GROUNDS, SHORTS AND BLOWN POWER SUPPLIES. ADDITIONALLY, FREQ. CONTROL WAS LOST AT THE EPCC BUT SWITCHBOARDS WERE MANNED AND CONTROL PASSED THERE. THE PROBLEMS IN PACC AND EPCC SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED A LOSS OF PITCH CONTROL LATER THAT NIGHT TO STBD SHAFT. CONTROL OF THROTTLES WAS PASSED TO THE PLCC AND ELECTRICAL PLANT CONTROL GIVEN TO SWITCHBOARD AND EPCC AND PACC WERE "DE-ENERGIZED" TO BEGIN REPAIRS. I do hereby swear or affirm that the above statement reflects the truth to the best of my knowledge.

B-6 - ZANNOY  
Signature Date

B-6  
LT, JAGC, USNR  
Officer Authorized to Administer  
Oaths by 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

HTJ-9

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of Dereliction of Duty / Hazardous waste and that:  
violation of orders

- a. I have the right to remain silent. (S) Init.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial. (S) Init.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both. (S) Init.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview. (S) Init.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time. (S) Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent (S) Init.
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement. (S) Init.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning. (S) Init.
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview. (S) Init.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me. (S) Init.

B-6  
Witness' Signature) 11600089 (Date)

B-6  
(Signature)

16 Nov 89  
(Date)

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

the logs and other people who are connected with other events. We have tagged some pieces of time so we know pretty well when some things happened and what we are trying to do is get the whole picture of what happened. That is the first responsibility of the board here. So start with when you took the watch and start talking through it in your terms.

A. I took the watch at about 0415 in the morning, in the southeastern straits of Maraca. I know it was very dark with a visibility that was good.

Q. Before your relief, was there any confusion in the picture in your turn over process or anything like that?

A. No.

Q. You were comfortable with.....

A. I was comfortable with taking the watch.

Q. Ok. No hesitation. Ships position was fixed pretty well?

A. Yes. I'm not sure when.....I can't remember the last time we had it fixed. I can't recall the.....I had no worries about it at the time.

Q. Ok. How about active contacts?

A. There were none. I felt comfortable taking the watch.

Q. Ok. Your JOOD was TMC B6 ?

A. B6

Q. Have you ever stood watch with him before?

A. Not as JOOD. Maybe as under instruction. But not as JOOD, no.

Q. Ok. So now you have got the watch and your starting to head down the....well don't let me put words in your mouth. Are you starting in the traffic separation scheme or are you winding up to get into it?

A. We are just entering the actual traffic separation scheme. We're not sure....How long is the watch.....

Q. Would you like to have a chart on it?

A. Yes. Here is 0400.

Q. You took the watch around 0419. And that is fairly normal, the standing order says the OOD relieves 15 minutes after the hour.

A. Yes. Fifteen minutes after.

Q. They stagger the watches?

A. Yes. So they can get settled in. Let's see, on this track, it was noticed that we would come close to the shoal water or close to

this area right here which I wanted to avoid.

Q. What's that, the wreck there?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok. And you were on a course of 1-4-0?

A. 1-4-0.

Q. Ok.

A. So what we did was.....

Q. And you were north of the navigators sail plan?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok.

A. So at this point we altered course, I'm not sure what this course is but....

Q. Would you like to look at the deck log? There's a deck log here.

A. Yes.

Q. Did the officer you relieve say why you were north of the navigators track?

A. Because of the shipping. It wasn't very heavy that night. There was shipping. I think this is what he said was that he noticed the RENTZ had been moving around quite a lot to avoid contacts with collisions. And he found it was easier to steam lightly north of the track and that there was no problem in doing that and he found....judged it to be a much safer approach. So we altered course....it must have been to 1-3-5 - 4-3-2.

Q. Which automatically meant that you had to cross over to get into the south side by him being north of the track when he turned over the watch to you. You had to get down there across didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok.

A. Since that when we changed course to this way and my intention was to follow this course which followed fairly good water all the whole way down until we got back on track in the vicinity of....to the point of Charley marked.

Q. That's where you were trying to intercept?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok.

A. At that time, because of the red light, we're not able to see the

traffic separation schemes, they played a factor in my mind when coming to this new course. So....

Q. So you could not see the Magenta strip?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you see the arrows there under the red light?

A. Sir?

Q. Could you see the arrows, the outbound arrows? You could not see those under the red light?

A. I don't remember, sir.

Q. That there is the inbound arrow?

A. I don't recall seeing those, no.

Q. Ok. They are not very easy to see.

A. I called down to CIC to talk to the watch officer to let him know what I was doing. To tell him that I was coming to 1-3-5. That it would be a good course, be good water. There were no contacts that would cause us any problems for us going on that course and seemed to be the best thing to do to avoid a wreck. Come back down....

A. Did you have any idea what the water depth was at the wreck?

A. No. I....and....I....it just seemed to be the best thing not to run straight over it. The watch officer came up and pointed out the traffic separation scheme and said it advisable not to proceed on that course and advised us to come over on the south side of the traffic separation scheme.

Q. Ok. Now about what time was that? When the CIC came up and pointed that out to you?

A. It was....it must have been around 0435. This is the basis that we considered things and thought, yes he was probably right and how it would be best to change course at 4-4-0 and we did change course to 1-8-0. It seemed the most direct way to get back down south into the south bound side of the traffic separation scheme.

Q. Ok. So you turned to 1-8-0?

A. Yes.

Q. Now that's time 40?

A. Time 40, yes.

Q. Ok.

A. We then looked for a course that would take us south of the traffic separation scheme and get us through this area right here and 4-8 we determined that coming back more or less with the channel on

this course, .24, we could....Now during this time we were looking for this buoy right here with the flashing light. The four flashers, that one there. Because we were....concerned....I....I say we, I was concerned. There were 11 meters to the right that we had to avoid.

Q. Eleven meters? Ok.

A. So I wanted to try and keep the buoy on our starboard side. At this point I'm not sure of the exact order, but we're looking at the buoy and it doesn't seem to be....I can't find it. I can't seem to find where it should be on the basis of D.R. I also notice somewhere around here that the monitor indicated that we crossed this line here. This blue area of shallow water and it didn't match up to the chart.

Q. It didn't match up with chart D.R.?

A. Yes. Where we were on the chart.

Q. The only fathometer information I have....there was not the fathometer, while it was turned on, did not have a paper trace find, so all I have here is a couple of spots with some fathometer marks and this the quarter masters collected. These are time zulu so 2200, this is 2203 so 200 is 0500, so your dealing up here between 2130 and 2200 and I see a 41 fathom and a 12 fathom.

A. Yes.

Q. And that's....

A. That was the chart that I noticed....and it was fairly sudden there. Or at least it was fairly sudden then.

Q. Now this is a time 48, so you think you dropped off from a....so you went from....from roughly 50 meters.....40 - 50 meters, 25 fathoms. The fathometer reading in fathoms at this point, do you remember?

A. The fathometer reads is fathoms and you got till it gets to 60 feet then you have to change over.

Q. So it's dropping off from about 20 -25 fathoms going to drop off to 20....is that a 30 meter curve? that's a 30 meter curve. A 30 meter curve, so it's dropping off to about 15.....15 or less?

A. Twelve is the number I remember seeing a lot because I was watching the fathometer a lot as we were going through here.

Q. Ok. And that's from the time you turned on to this course. But you say it didn't match?

A. Yes.

Q. I guess what I'm trying to figure out....

A. What time that happened?

Q. Yes. So we know that you turned at the line of either 48 or 49?

A. Yes.

Q. What we just don't know is what the D.R. lines specifics were. Where you really were on there?

A. Yes. It was also....I was concerned with the light. Where the light was and if this were the case....the light, if it were here, the light should be off to our starboard. Because we were facing this way now and the light should be off the starboard bow.

Q. Were you using the 1-2-4 course?

A. Yes. This course right here.

Q. Ok. Starboard bow is right off your \_\_\_\_\_?

A. Yes.

Q. It's right where you thought?

A. That's where I was looking for it.

Q. And the distance looks like it's somewhere around five miles or less.

A. It was off the port bow....

Q. When you finally discovered it, it was off the port bow?

A. Yes. It was off the port bow and that's why we changed course to 1-1-0.

Q. Ok.

A. We're on 1-2-4, buoy is 1-1-5, were on 1-2-4, the buoy is about 1-1-5.

Q. So your about nine degrees off your port bow?

A. Yes. The reason I say 1-1-5 is because we will aim to the right of the buoy about five degrees. Why I came to 1-1-0.....

Q. Changes course to 1-1-0?

A. To 1-1-0.

Q. Passed the buoy on starboard?

A. Yes. And....

Q. And so that was about 0500?

A. Yes. 0457.

Q. 0457?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened in the following 20 minutes?

A. Usually the JOOD and I'm usually conscious of what he's done sir. If that happened this morning I wasn't....there were other problems we were having. I think....lets see it must have been about three thirty, because I know Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ was telling me that there had been a heavy storm that crossed the straits and it was now down over over the Samatra and our radar picture was very cluttered and very bad returns.

Q. Ok. Let's see if we can't sit here and talk about....at one point somebody said, "Hey there are flashing lights out there." You called SM2 *Bb* You remember that?

A. Yes. There was a buoy, just one, then a couple of degrees to the right of it there was a white flashing light and....

Q. A couple of degrees to the right of the yellow flashing buoy?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw a white flashing light a couple of degrees to the right?

A. Yes.

Q. Alright let's see. Ok.

A. And so you can see the bright flashing light and it was also....it must have been just regular lights because you could see after the flashing had stopped....called up to the signal bridge and asked if they could identify it. If it was somebody trying to contact us.

Q. Did you see the normal running lights after the flashing went away?

A. I saw white lights.

Q. Mast head range?

A. It may have been those lights. I did not see the mast. I saw the lights as soon as there was contact but I couldn't make out as to what aspect I was looking at. It was just lights and I couldn't make out the position or even what I was looking at. What kind of target angle. I don't know if I saw the full signal or if I just saw the flashing. It made me wonder if this maybe wasn't a buoy. This may have added to my confusion.

Q. Ok. SM2 *Bb* did not see that. You told....

A. He did not see the flashing....he saw the flashing buoy and reported back that it was a buoy. I think he did not see the other flashing.

Q. A few minutes later than that you saw it again. Or somebody, it was either you or the JOOD, saw white flashing again.

A. I couldn't say who saw that. It may have been me or it may have been the JOOD or someone else on the bridge. Us and the quarter master, as well, were looking for these lights.

Q. Ok. At this time SM2 *Bb* sees it and he's attempting to turn

on the signal sight and attempting to signal to them.

A. No.

Q. Do you recall seeing the flashing light for the second time?

A. I don't know. I think I must have seen it the second time. I didn't know *B.B.* had recognized it as a flashing signal light and was going out to respond with our light. I did not know he was doing that.

Q. Alright. Did you have any conversations with the JOOD about there's a contact close. We have to do something?

A. The JOOD, I know the JOOD, his mention of a contact is what brought me to the bridge wing the last time just before the collision and pointed it out. He may have pointed it out before, I know during all this time I was going back and forth to the chart, out to the bridge wing to look around, back to the chart, to check the fathometer and I'm sure during these times he must have pointed out contacts to me. On this course he must have pointed it out. I know at some point, I'm not sure how far before collision, so he must have told me at least once. He did point out the contact and I looked at it and I was thinking we were over taking it.

Q. What did you base that thought that you were overtaking it on?

A. Because I must have seen a red light and a red light is port side, the target angle. So I think I must have seen a silhouette at that time and it appeared to be my perspective going that way, port side.

Q. Did you ever see a silhouette?

A. I must have seen a silhouette, yes.

Q. What target angle did you see?

A. I must have been looking at a target angle of about.....

Q. 2-0-0?

A. 2-0-0 - 2-3-0, something like that when in fact it must have been a target angle of more like 0-3-0.

Q. Did you....prior to the contact that struck you, had there been, prior to that, any other contacts that passed fairly close aboard?

A. Yes. I remember we had made contact \_\_\_\_\_  
with which we do 10 thousand yards or less.

Q. Right. About when on your watch?

A. I don't remember. I do remember at least one occasion going over the contact point with Chief *B.B.*. Hearing him call the Captain, giving him a contact report. Making use he did it right.

Q. You did not - Chief *B.B.* made the contact?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok. You did not call the Captain yourself at any time during this watch?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember any contacts coming close aboard in the immediately vicinity prior to the collision?

A. I do not remember any contact coming very close to us, as in closer than 2000 yards. I think....anything closer than that I would remember that now. I know in the case of the ship that hit us, I didn't realize how close it really was until seconds before it actually hit.

Q. Ok. Do you happen to know what skunk that was?

A. No.

Q. At the moment you recognized that you had an extremis situation, do you remember what your order was? It is not logged. It is something that should be logged here.

A. I can not....I looked at the contact book.... it just hit me. It was heading for us. At this point our bow was very close to crossing it's bow and I saw what was happening. The contact....

Q. Was that your starboard bow?

A. It's not on our starboard bow. It's....starboard bow.....

Q. Draw a picture of it.

A. The front of our ship....contact....I'm not sure what the range is, the bridge here. I think contact was at about this point.

Q. Ok. So broad on the starboard bow and showing you a....either a 0-0-0 or a 3-4-0 or a 3-4-5 target angle? Is that about right?

A. Yes.

Q. Ok. Now you have recognized that and now you recognize that you have a tough situation?

A. A collision situation.

Q. Do you remember what order.....

A. My immediate order, once I recognized it was "Order flank bell", came in, "Pull ahead flank one". I felt being...I don't know how clearly I detailed this in my mind at the time, but thinking that we couldn't back down because we couldn't stop and start pulling back, at which time it would hit us. And what we need to do was to basically out run it, to cross in front of it, to out run it. I didn't think we had time to stop or to change course. I order Flank Bell and....I don't know for sure if it was the right to do but that is what I ordered at the time.

Q. Ok. And you did not order a course change?

A. I did not order a course change. I know I just want to get the most possible speed forward to try and out run it. Have it pass by the stern of us. And that was the last command I gave as far as rudder command, uh shift commands. I came in, ordered Flank bell, and we had a very good possibility of collision. I said sound general quarters, sound collision alarm, sound five short blasts. I seem to recall them saying that the alarms did not work but they must have. I heard the last two words, I don't know if I heard them after the collision or what. They passed over the LMC "Brace for shock". I think the boastwain mate must have been passing the word, I was going up to the whistle to start blowing it, five short blasts. And then, I don't know how long after that, the ship hit, the collision occurred.

Q. Alright. Let me shift off to a couple of general things if I can. During this period of time of transit, all the JOOD were enlisted at this point. All relatively new.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The last several days of your trip. The JOOD's had the con.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But were they allowed independent action? They could give engine and rudder orders? A true conning officer?

A. They could.

Q. They could. They did not have to wait for the OOD to tell them?

A. They didn't have to. There was no formal instructions. As general practice which....I can't recall exceptions to but it's general practice that they would check with us first. To do such and such. We would tell them yes or no whatever the case may be.

Q. Prior to the collision, do you remember the JOOD or anybody being insistent about this contact?

A. No. They may have been. I may have just been so wrapped up in the navigation picture that I may just not have fully understood what they were saying. I remember Chief <sup>B-6</sup>, what did he say....did point out, shouldn't we do something, I forget the phrase he used but he did point out that we were on a collision course but I did not recognize it at the time.

Q. Alright. Let's go to another watch, on any other day, open ocean, no problem. What role did the bridge console operator, he had CPA information. Would he, you had a contact that has CPA of 8000 yards, you now make a maneuver with the ship that is going to close the CPA by 4000 yards, would you have to ask the console operator to give his CPA, would? Would they do it routinely? Would they update at any particular time? Would they let you know? Would they just put it on the status board? What would they do?

A. It would vary.

Q. It would vary.

A. Sometimes they would call it out. Sometimes they would write it on the board. Occasions they would \_\_\_\_\_. But I do not know what happened on this night.

Q. Ok. What's the common acknowledgment from the OOD or the JOOD or the Conning Officer to receiving a report made to that person?

A. Aye.

Q. Aye.

A. Sometimes...I know in my case, you just usually \_\_\_\_\_ I've just heard.

Q. Ok. What is the acknowledgment made by the OOD, JOOD and Conning Officer, I guess this would be the Conning Officer, whenever a helmsman comes up to relieve the helm. And is requesting permission, was the acknowledgment given to that person?

A. Very well, relieve the helm.

Q. Ok. You have made a number of course changes after you took the deck.

A. Yes.

Q. Was the Commanding Officer called for those course changes?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. As the Conning Officer, I never informed the Commanding Officer of course change I made.

Q. Huh?

A. I never informed the Commanding Officer of any course change I made.

Q. You never did that night?

A. No.

Q. Was that a conscious decision or were you wrapped up in what or did you just say, well I'm just getting back from town I don't need to call him?

A. It wasn't a conscious decision, we were essentially on track and what I thought I was doing was making minor adjustments. Preceding in the direction that the Captain expected us to go that night and no I did not report those to the Captain.

Q. It that in accordance with the standing orders?

A. The standing orders do quote to report all course changes to the CO, sir.

Q. Another question relating to that. At any time during your watch, from 0415 to 0500, 0515, think that hey things aren't going so well up here, something is not right, I should call either the CO, XO, navigator or maybe somebody else that could help me? Did you ever think about that?

A. At one point I did think, ok, well let's just think to their stewards way, call a navigator. It was just seconds after that I started getting comfortable with the light. I'm not sure what time that was. Other than that, no I didn't.

Q. So at one time you did feel like that?

A. At one time I was about to.....

Q. I don't know where I'm going. I'm going blind. There is no water, \_\_\_\_\_ water like I just passed over, maybe I should just stop and call somebody.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was that person you felt you should call.

A. I thought I should call the navigator up here. I should call the Captain and let him know what is going on. And then I saw the light and it started matching up with the picture and I thought I was worrying about nothing and that the situation was back in hand. As it turned, it wasn't.

The above transcript is an accurate reproduction of oral testimony provided by LTJG <sup>B6</sup> ; on 16 November 1989 to the Investigating Officer while under oath.

( B6 )

LT, JAGC, USNR  
AUTH 10 U.S.C. 936(a)(1)

ARTICLE 31 WARNING

LTJ.g. 1

I have been advised that I may be suspected of the offense of dereliction of duty and that:

- a. I have the right to remain silent.
- b. Any statements I do make may be used as evidence against me in trial by court-martial.
- c. I have the right to consult with lawyer counsel prior to any questioning. This lawyer counsel may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel without cost to me, or both.
- d. I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview.
- e. I have the right to terminate this interview at any time.

Init.  
Init.  
Init.  
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Init.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I fully certify and acknowledge that I have read the above statement of my rights and fully understand them, and that:

- a. I expressly desire to waive my right to remain silent
- b. I expressly desire to make a statement.
- c. I expressly do not desire to consult with either a civilian lawyer retained by me or a military lawyer appointed as my counsel without cost to me prior to any questioning.
- d. I expressly do not desire to have such a lawyer present with me during this interview.
- e. This acknowledgment and waiver of rights is made freely and voluntarily by me, and without any promises or threats having been made to me or pressure or coercion of any kind having been used against me.

Init.  
Init.  
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Init.  
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\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)      11/16/0089  
(Date)                      (Signature)      11/16/0089  
(Date)

Understanding the above I wish/do not wish to make the following statement.

All redactions are B-6.

My name is B6. I was commissioned May 29, 1987. I have been on the KINKAID since 13 May 1988. My position was First Lieutenant until approximately a week and a half ago. I am the present Missiles Officer. The NSSMS and the Harpoon Weapon System. My collateral duty is the Welfare and Recreation Officer.

My first watch standing as CIC Watch Officer was the previous watch. This was my second watch as CIC Watch Officer. The watch qualification board was approximately one week prior. No, I did not get a copy of the qualification letter. I was just told I was now qualified after finishing the board. The board consisted of the Operations Officer, the CIC Officer, LT. B6, and LT B6. The Commanding Officer was on the board for part of the time. He was stepping in and out. I do have my SWO PQS books onboard. I feel that I am fully qualified to stand the watch.

The morning started at 0355 when I received a wake up which was later than I had put in. The Watch Officer who had the mid watch didn't see the wake up. I got dressed and washed up and went up to CIC at approximately 0410. At 0410, I started the relieving process with the Watch Officer. Some major information received during the relieving process was:

- (1) There was no SPA-25 operator and there was no DRT operator. This was the way the watches were set up after we left the gulf. I questioned that earlier in the day during my first watch in Combat since leaving the gulf. I asked the Operations Officer. His answer was when we went through the straits we would work out getting more people up to stand watch. I had one watch earlier during the day with the same manpower that I had when I came on the 04-08. CIC had been arranged in four sections instead of two.
- (2) I asked what type of fixes were being used. They had been taking their fixes every half an hour before entering the strait. I was told we were getting radar fixes when I came on watch. Their last fix was a radar fix. They were getting radar fixes off land and nav aids, bearings and ranges. I believe they were taking their fixes off buoys. I was told that the 0400 position was a fix. I believe they had just cut this and they were cutting it off the buoys. And, also they did not have GPS but they were getting Omega.
- (3) I asked how we were tracking the designated surface contacts. It was obvious to me that since we did not have SPA-25 we were using NTDS for surface tracking and we had to track, designate and pass it up to the bridge via track supervisor. The track supervisor was being track supervisor and surface tracker and JL talker and DSA operator and operating Link 11 and logging in contacts and CPA's. That was Petty Officer Randolph. He was sitting on the surface tracker console. He was operating in the surface tracker mode. There was no one sitting at the track supervisor console. Petty Officer Lapedes was at the air track console.
- (4) The communications were all satisfactory.
- (5) The EW sup was setting up an EW exercise with the Rentz and he was going to start that at 0430.
- (6) I asked him how traffic was. He said that traffic was light and I looked at the console and there were four or five contacts being tracked. This is before

we entered the straits.

(7) I asked about the SPA-25 and DRT being manned up because I was concerned that we were going through the straits and we would be overwhelmed. Especially the surface track on the NTDS would be overwhelmed and not be able to provide the right information. I asked the Watch Officer, OS1 Shaw this information. I was told by Petty Officer <sup>TS</sup> that they would be standing by to man up if the traffic got heavy. I assumed they were standing by, if not in Combat somewhere awake. They were designated people. I asked when we go through the straits are we going to have extra people manning. No, there was nothing said about a navigation brief.

(8) According to the night orders we were supposed to be in a formation being I believe 4,000 yards ahead of the Rentz. Those are the big things before I relieved the watch.

Approximately at 0430 I relieved the watch. The watch turnover was not rushed. I was up there relieving him for about 20 minutes and after I relieved him he was still there about five <sup>maybe</sup> even ten minutes. I don't know why I relieved OS1 <sup>TS</sup> instead of CWO <sup>TS</sup>.

At 0430 I started settling down, looking at the chart. I saw the surface picture, the contacts being designated were being sent up. There were no contacts of immediate concern. Approximately 0440, the OOD called down and said he planned on taking course 135. Sometime between 0432 and 0440 he called me and told me "hey, I am going to be coming to this course" and when I crossed that with the chart I saw that was going to take us across the traffic separation scheme. I did not get a fix at 0430, I believe that at 0430 it was still a DR from the 0400 fix. In the ship's position log they have it as a DR. This 0430 was a DR. I looked at the chart and saw the 135 course was going to be taking us through the traffic separation scheme instead of passing around. To my knowledge, whether this was a fix or a DR, I thought we were in the North bound separation scheme. The OOD told me he was going to come to 135 and I looked at the chart and saw it was going to take us through the traffic separation scheme in an improper manner.

I went up to the pilot house and talked to the OOD and because the traffic separation scheme was magenta in the red light, the quartermaster and the OOD had a hard time seeing it. That is when they made their course change to 180. I went to the bridge between 0432 and 0430. I recommended coming to course 180 to bring us back down South on to the correct side of the traffic separation scheme. The OOD did that. I was up on the bridge long enough to see the quartermaster DR out until time 0448 when he had himself as being approximately on track here, and he laid out the course change to get us back following track. The track course was 122 according to the chart. As 0448 it was safe to come to 124 and regain track.

Now, when I went back down to Combat, I told them what was going on. What we were doing, they laid out their DR. I got back down to Combat at approximately 0446, one or two minutes right before they made their turn. They had laid out their DR and they held us changing course too soon and coming back into the traffic separation scheme and coming across back North. Based on seeing the QM's chart and seeing Combat's chart, I trusted the QM's chart more than Combat's chart. When I first came down the CIC watch supervisor was laying out Combat's DR. I also looked at the NTDS console at the contacts that were being tracked and again there was nothing within three or four miles at the closest. Again, I was not immediately concerned with the surface picture because the contact

information was being passed up.

As soon as the OOD changed course at 0448 I saw that Combat's DR was probably wrong. Before I went up to the pilot house for the second time I was talking to the Watch Supervisor and I said okay because once all this stuff started happening I was not comfortable with going to the NTDS console and not seeing the tracks like you would on the SPA-25. I told the Watch Supervisor to man up the SPA-25 and the DRT. That is when I found that the way it had been previously planned to man them up was to have the man on the charts take the SPA-25 and the Watch Supervisor to take the charts and there was not anyone designated to take the DRT. This is approximately 0450.

I went up to the pilot house and asked the Officer of the Deck do you have these nav aids and he said yes we do. I first looked for the buoy in front because this was the one that we were going to take on the starboard side. This was the OOD's intention and I concurred. The buoy was approximately 10 degrees off the starboard bow. The buoy had a yellow light and did four flashes, went dark and then repeated. We compared this to the chart. I went out to the port bridge wing. I looked at the white light on this buoy. I knew these were the buoy's because I was watching and mentally timed them. I was not using my watch. I was up there for a few minutes talking to the OOD and I looked around and the contact of concern, as a result of the collision, was in visual sight and approximately 8,000 yards away. I knew this was the one that hit us because this was the only one that was right there. There were other contacts around. I believe it was designated Alpha Golf. This was about 8,000 yards on the starboard bow. This was approximately at 030 relative. I don't recall what the target angle was but I know it was a bow aspect.

The one thing that I was concerned with when we initially made our change was a charted wreck. Once I saw visually where we were and agreed with the OOD's track I felt there was no longer a problem with the depth of water. The OOD and I did not discuss how close he was going to take the buoy starboard. I would be guessing at the range but I would say that when I saw the buoy it was approximately between 2,000 and 3,000 yards ten degrees off starboard bow. Once I saw where we were and I saw that the light was right there, I knew that the wreck would not be a problem.

When I came back down, B-6 was on the SPA-25 and he was starting to set that up and the Watch Supervisor had a whole bunch of other charts out on the chart table and was trying to coordinate with Petty Officer Randolph an NTDS DLRP. I was a little upset with that so I told him to put the extra charts away, and get me a fix. He tried getting a fix with what Petty Officer Randolph had on the NTDS. He had marked the buoys as reference points and was trying to get a fix with those but they were not cutting. He tried to get a cut off the SPA-25 and that did not work either. This all took a few minutes. I started to get a little frustrated and I told P. O. B-6 to go up to the pilot house and coordinate with the quartermaster and get his last fix or estimated position. I do believe the 0500 fix was a DR. From my understanding when I came back down we did not have a fix. About 0455 B-6 was on the SPA-25. About 0500 while I was in CIC we did not get a fix. I know while I was down there we did not get a fix.