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OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
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IN REPLY REFER TO

JAG/COMNAVLEGSVCCOMINST 5530.2C
Code 63
JUL 25 2011

JAG/COMNAVLEGSVCCOM INSTRUCTION 5530.2C

From: Judge Advocate General
Commander, Naval Legal Service Command

Subj: NAVY COURTHOUSE SECURITY PROCEDURES

Ref: (a) The Judicial Conference of the United States,
U.S. Courts Design Guide, 2007 edition
(b) OPNAVINST 5530.14 (series)
(c) OPNAVINST 1640.9 (series)

Encl: (1) Risk Assessment Form

1. Purpose. To promulgate security policy and procedures for Navy courthouses.

2. Cancellation. COMNAVLEGSVCCOMINST 5530.2B. This new instruction is a complete revision of the previous instruction and should be read in its entirety.

3. Background

a. An effective courthouse security program is essential for the proper administration of military justice. Open public access for military justice proceedings requires a secure environment in which all who attend courtroom proceedings are safe and free from physical harm and intimidation.

b. Reference (a) provides guidance on the planning and design of federal court buildings. The security requirements outlined in reference (a) envision a stand-alone facility, open to the public, and manned with fully trained security staff for a judicial system capable of handling over 100,000 court proceedings in over 2,000 courtrooms annually.

c. By contrast, Navy courthouses handle fewer than 1,000 court proceedings annually and are historically manned with temporary personnel with limited security training. Although Navy courthouses are located within the secured perimeter of bases, court proceedings are conducted in transitional

JUL 25 2011

facilities, shared facilities, or other buildings that were never designed to hold court proceedings.

d. Reference (b) provides guidance on the Navy's physical security and law enforcement program. By leveraging the security requirements of references (a) and (b), this instruction provides Navy courthouse security requirements designed to detect, deter, and defeat the most likely internal security threats within Navy courthouses and to detect and deter external security threats in and around Navy courthouses.

4. Applicability. This instruction applies to all certified Naval Legal Service Command (NLSC) courthouses and courtrooms, designated temporary courtrooms, and non-NLSC courtrooms in which NLSC or Office of the Judge Advocate General (OJAG) personnel are participating in military justice proceedings.

5. Definitions. For purposes of this instruction, the following definitions apply:

a. Courthouse. A building or a designated and secured portion of a building that is designed or used to convene military justice proceedings. A courthouse may include the external areas, such as parking lots in the immediate vicinity of the building and the combined internal space of the building, including, but not limited to courtroom(s); judicial, witness, member, and spectator spaces; and trial and defense counsel spaces as recommended by Deputy Director Management and Plans, Office of the Judge Advocate General (Deputy Director Code 63), after consultation with Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC) Security (N3AT) and Commanding Officers (COs) at the local Region Legal Service Office (RLSO) and Naval Legal Service Office (NLSO), and certified by Commander, Naval Legal Service Command (CNLSC).

b. Courtroom. A room primarily used to convene military justice proceedings as recommended by Deputy Director Code 63, after consultation with the respective RLSO CO and NLSO CO and CNIC N3AT, and certified by CNLSC. All courtrooms under NLSC control and the courtroom in Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard will be tiered in accordance with paragraph 9. A courtroom may be further defined or classified as below.

(1) NLSC Controlled Courtrooms

(a) Permanent Courtroom. A space under the control of the designated RLSO CO, and in certain situations the NLSO

JUL 25 1997

CO, primarily used to conduct military justice proceedings. The courtroom located in Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard is a permanent courtroom under the cognizance of the Assistant Judge Advocate General (AJAG) (Military Justice). The AJAG (Military Justice) shall fulfill the responsibilities otherwise to be performed by a cognizant RLSO CO. Similarly, with respect to appellate proceedings held in the Building 58 courtroom, the Chief Judge, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) will fulfill the responsibilities otherwise to be performed by a cognizant Circuit Military Judge.

(b) Temporary Courtroom. A room under the control of the designated RLSO CO, not originally or necessarily designed for military justice proceedings, but utilized to convene military justice proceedings while the permanent courthouse or courtroom is undergoing renovations or facility updates. See paragraph 10 for additional rules governing temporary courtrooms.

(2) Non-NLSC Courtroom. A room not located within a facility occupied primarily by NLSC personnel which has not been certified or designated by CNLSC as a Tier 1, Tier 2 or temporary courtroom or considered as a Tier 3 courtroom in accordance with this instruction, that is utilized to convene Navy and Marine Corps military justice proceedings or military justice proceedings involving NLSC personnel. This instruction does not apply to courtrooms located on a Joint Base that are utilized primarily by another service, unless otherwise certified as a NLSC courthouse or courtroom. The Honor Courtroom at the United States Naval Academy, and courts-martial held on board naval ships (MOJAGS) are examples of non-NLSC courtrooms. See paragraph 11 for additional rules governing non-NLSC courtrooms.

c. Military Justice Proceeding. A military justice proceeding involves any pre-trial, trial, or post-trial session or proceeding associated with a special or general court-martial, including Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 32 investigations, sessions held under UCMJ Article 39(a), and oral arguments before the NMCCA. Absent unique circumstances to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the RLSO CO, a military justice proceeding does not include summary courts-martial, a UCMJ Article 802 conference, non-judicial punishment hearings, boards of inquiry, or administrative separation boards.

JUL 25

d. Shared Facility. A building whose tenants are not solely under the command of the respective RLSO, NLSO or Trial Judiciary occupying the building.

6. Policy

a. Threat Assessment. Two types of threats exist to courthouse security: internal threats that primarily threaten participants in military justice proceedings and personnel working inside the courthouse, and external threats that primarily threaten the physical security of the facility. Threat risk can be assessed as either low, medium, or high risk. Threats can be mitigated through the use of security measures consistent with this instruction. Consequently, the security requirements within this instruction are designed to deter, detect and defeat threats to internal courthouse security and to deter and detect threats to external courthouse security.

(1) Deter. The ability to prevent the initiation of threats to personnel safety and physical security in and around the courthouse.

(2) Detect. The ability to identify potential and actual threats to personnel safety and physical security in and around the courthouse.

(3) Defeat. The ability to counter, combat, or prevent the completion of, through the use of force if necessary, potential or actual threats to personnel safety and physical security in and around the courthouse.

b. Risk Assessment. The tiering of NLSC courthouses under this instruction is designed to optimize resources by aligning increased security requirements with facilities that handle a larger volume of military justice cases. Consequently some courthouses and courtrooms will have more robust security measures than others. As a result, a proper risk assessment is necessary to ensure a military justice proceeding is held in a facility that is capable of deterring, detecting and defeating the potential threats to the courthouse, courtroom, or personnel.

(1) Risk Assessment Procedures

(a) The RLSO CO shall ensure an initial risk assessment, enclosure (1), of the military justice proceeding is completed and provided to the participating NLSC personnel, the

JUL 25 2011

cognizant Circuit Military Judge, appellate judge, or detailed military trial judge, and convening authority prior to the initial military justice proceeding in a case. Military justice proceedings assessed as medium or high risk will also be forwarded to the cognizant Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Special Agent in Charge (SAC). The risk assessment will dictate the lowest tiered courthouse within the respective area of responsibility (AOR) in which the military justice proceeding may be held. If the results of this risk assessment require military justice proceedings to be moved to an appropriately resourced courthouse or courtroom that creates an undue burden on the convening authority, the RLSO CO shall consult with the convening authority to determine if a situational waiver as described in paragraph 16.c. will be necessary to convene the military justice proceeding.

(b) All subsequent military justice proceedings in a case will assume the same risk assessment as the initial risk assessment. If new or additional information becomes available at any point during the military justice proceedings that causes the RLSO CO, NLSO CO, assigned trial counsel, assigned defense counsel, cognizant Circuit Military Judge or detailed military trial judge, NCIS SAC, and/or convening authority to believe the initial risk assessment of the military justice proceeding no longer adequately reflects the perceived threat to personnel and physical security, the RLSO CO shall ensure a new risk assessment is conducted and provided to the above personnel.

(2) Risk Assessment Factors. To optimize NLSC security resources with these requirements, every military justice proceeding will be assessed a risk level of high, medium, or low risk. NLSC personnel should consider any and all factors in assessing the risk level of a case. The following factors are meant to serve as a guide in evaluating the relative risk associated with a particular military justice proceeding. No one factor is more important than another. This is not an all inclusive list, nor is there an affirmative obligation to obtain all of this information before making a risk assessment.

(a) the nature of the underlying crime associated with the proceeding;

(b) the presence of the accused, victim, witnesses, and family members at the proceeding;

(c) the mental, physical and criminal history, if known, of the accused, victim, witnesses, family members or

JUL 25

other parties with a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings;

(d) the accused's CO's overall assessment of risk to personnel or facilities;

(e) the level of expected media interest;

(f) the level of expected community impact or interest; and

(g) any other facts or circumstances known to the RLSO CO that would assist in assessing the relative risk associated with the military justice proceeding.

(3) Low, Medium and High Risk Military Justice Proceedings

(a) A low risk military justice proceeding is a proceeding in which the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as unlikely. An assessment of low risk does not mean a violent or disruptive act will not occur, but that a violent or disruptive situation is not reasonably anticipated. Participants must still remain vigilant to the possibility of violence or other disruptions during the proceeding.

(b) A medium risk military justice proceeding is a proceeding in which the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as possible and merits the implementation of additional security measures. An assessment of medium risk does not mean that a violent or disruptive act will occur, but that a violent or disruptive act might be expected.

(c) A high risk military justice proceeding is a proceeding in which the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as reasonably foreseeable and merits additional security measures. An assessment of high risk does not mean a violent or disruptive act will occur, but that a violent or disruptive act could reasonably be expected even with the implementation of additional security measures.

(d) Using the above criteria in evaluating each military justice proceeding on a case-by-case basis, it is expected that a large portion of military justice proceedings

JUL 25 2014

within the Navy's military justice system will be assessed as low risk. For illustrative purposes only, an uncontested special court-martial with no witnesses dealing with a single specification of prescription drug abuse would likely be assessed as a low risk proceeding. Conversely, a smaller portion of the Navy's military justice proceedings are expected to be assessed as medium or high risk. For illustrative purposes only, a contested general court-martial dealing with the rape of a minor child who will testify in person with the victim's family and media present during the proceeding would likely be assessed as medium or high risk.

(e) Military justice proceedings assessed as medium or high risk require additional risk assessment-specific security requirements identified in paragraph 12.b. below. Military justice proceedings assessed as high risk should ordinarily be held within a Tier 1 courthouse or other appropriate facility as determined by CNLSC. Additional consultation with Deputy Director Code 63, NCIS SAC, Region Security Officer (RSO) and/or Installation Security Office (ISO) security forces may be necessary to ensure adequate security for these proceedings.

c. Funding. Security discrepancies requiring funding must be documented as an unfunded requirement with the Installation Commanding Officer, Base Public Works Officer (if facilities-related), OJAG Code 63, and CNLSC. If the discrepancy is facilities-related, the RLSO CO is responsible for seeking guidance from and submitting a project funding request to OJAG Code 63 and coordinating the project with Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), or Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), as appropriate.

7. Roles and Responsibilities

a. CNLSC

(1) Act as the certifying authority for all Tier 1 and Tier 2 courthouses and courtrooms. This authority is not delegable. Areas of non-compliance or deviations from the security standards set forth in this instruction specifically identified in the certification will be considered waived as described in paragraph 16.a.

(2) Designate temporary courtrooms as necessary. This authority is not delegable.

JUL 25

(3) Receive, review, and timely grant, where appropriate, situational and conditional waivers to this instruction on a case-by-case basis in accordance with paragraphs 16.b. and c. This authority may be delegated to Deputy Commander, Region Legal Service Office (DCOM-RLSO).

(4) Review security measures for non-NLSC courtrooms. This authority may be delegated to DCOM-RLSO and Deputy Commander, Naval Legal Service Office (DCOM-NLSO).

(5) Ensure NLSC commands are properly resourced to execute the security requirements of this instruction.

(6) Consult with CNIC as necessary to properly implement this instruction.

(7) Consult with Director, NCIS as necessary to coordinate policy in support of this instruction.

(8) Ensure a review of implementation and compliance with this instruction is part of the annual Article 6 inspection process.

b. DCOM-RLSO/Assistant Judge Advocate General - Management and Plans (AJAG 06)

(1) Exercise oversight of the Navy's courthouse security program and coordinate with the Chief Judge of the Department of the Navy (CJDON) to implement additional policy and guidance consistent with this instruction.

(2) Consult with CNIC as necessary to properly implement this instruction.

(3) Act in the absence of CNLSC on matters pertaining to courthouse security unless specifically prohibited by this instruction.

(4) Conduct courthouse security assessments as required in accordance with this instruction.

(5) Coordinate with the respective RLSO and NLSO CO to define courthouse and courtroom spaces to be certified.

(6) Provide a written courthouse security assessment recommending courthouses and courtrooms for annual certification

JUL 25

to CNLSC, the cognizant Circuit Military Judge, and the respective RLSO and NLSO CO.

(7) Coordinate with CNIC N3AT to develop and maintain a Courthouse Security Officer course of instruction.

(8) Coordinate with CNIC N3AT to develop and maintain a Courthouse Security Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) program.

(9) Coordinate with CNIC N3AT to develop and maintain uniform procedures and equipment standards for courthouse security.

(10) Coordinate with CNIC N3AT to identify items that are prohibited within courthouses and courtrooms.

(11) Maintain a record of courthouse and courtroom certifications.

(12) Consult with CNIC N3AT and NCIS Threat Management Unit (TMU) when notified of inappropriate communications or threats against NLSC or judiciary personnel. In the case of threatening or inappropriate contacts of judiciary personnel, coordinate with the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and the CJDON.

(13) Consult with CNIC N3AT as necessary to properly implement this instruction.

(14) Assist NCIS as necessary in promulgating additional guidance consistent with this instruction concerning the disposition of firearms in Navy courthouses.

c. DCOM-NLSO

(1) Coordinate with the CJDON and DCOM-RLSO to implement additional policy and guidance consistent with this instruction.

(2) Review security mitigation measures for military justice proceedings in non-NLSC courtrooms involving NLSO personnel only.

JUL 25 1999

d. CJDON

(1) Coordinate with DCOM-RLSO and DCOM-NLSO as necessary to implement additional policy and guidance consistent with this instruction.

(2) Consult and coordinate with CNIC as necessary to properly implement this instruction.

e. RLSO CO

(1) Serve as the officer primarily responsible for security of properly certified NLSC courthouses and courtrooms for Navy-Marine Corps cases or when a non-Navy entity is conducting a military justice proceeding in a NLSC courthouse or courtroom within the respective AOR.

(2) Develop standard operating procedures to implement a courthouse security program in accordance with this instruction.

(3) Designate a courthouse security officer in writing responsible for implementing this instruction. Notify the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and local judiciary.

(4) Assign an assistant courthouse security officer for courtrooms within the AOR. Notify the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and local judiciary.

(5) Designate a courtroom security officer for medium and high risk military justice proceedings. Coordinate as necessary with NCIS SAC, local RSO or ISO, and law enforcement officers directly involved in the medium or high risk military justice proceeding in developing a security plan for the military justice proceeding.

(6) When a courtroom security officer is present for medium or high risk military justice proceedings, arrange for a face-to-face meeting between the courtroom security officer and all law enforcement officers not associated with the medium or high risk military justice proceeding who enter a courthouse in order to coordinate pre-planned responses and expected level of mutual support.

(7) Recommend tiering of courtrooms to CNLSC.

JUL 25

(8) Where applicable, submit security mitigation measures to CNLSC, or a duly appointed representative, for review and/or approval as necessary.

(9) Ensure a risk assessment, enclosure (1) is conducted prior to any military justice proceeding.

(10) Inform Deputy Director Code 63 and local NCIS TMU when any NLSC or judiciary personnel receives an inappropriate communication or threat as a result of the personnel's official duties, regardless of the medium through which the communication is transmitted. Ensure coordination with the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and CJDON for threats directed towards judiciary personnel.

(11) Coordinate with the cognizant Circuit Military Judge, local judiciary, the CO of the local NLSO, NCIS SAC, and RSO or ISO as appropriate, to implement this program.

f. AJAG (Military Justice)

(1) Serve as the officer primarily responsible for security of military justice proceedings that occur in Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard.

(2) With regard to military justice proceedings that occur in Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard, comply with responsibilities assigned to RLSO CO as described in subparagraphs (2) through (10) of paragraph 7.e. above, as well as all other responsibilities assigned to RLSO CO throughout this instruction.

g. Courthouse Security Officer

(1) Serve as the courthouse security officer primarily responsible for overseeing the daily implementation of courthouse security measures within the respective area of responsibility.

(2) Maintain records of training and PQS for courthouse security personnel as delineated within this instruction.

(3) Maintain records of security system operability checks and inspections in accordance with this instruction.

(4) Forward courthouse security reports as required in accordance with this instruction.

(5) Coordinate with the cognizant Circuit Military Judge or local judiciary, the NLSO CO, and RSO or ISO as appropriate, to implement this program.

h. Assistant Courthouse Security Officer

(1) Ensure courtroom security measures are implemented for the courtroom to which assigned.

(2) Assist the courthouse security officer in the daily implementation of the courthouse security program.

(3) Coordinate with the cognizant Circuit Military Judge or local judiciary, the NLSO CO, and RSO or ISO as appropriate, to implement this program.

i. Courtroom Security Officer

(1) When present during medium and high risk proceedings and, as resources permit, for low risk military justice proceedings, act as the officer primarily responsible for courtroom security as necessary to deter, detect and defeat threats against the presiding military judge.

(2) When present during medium and high risk proceedings and, as resources permit, for low risk military justice proceedings, act as the officer primarily responsible for courtroom security as necessary to deter, detect and defeat threats against other personnel in the courtroom.

j. Assigned Trial/Government Counsel. Assist RLSO CO in ensuring a risk assessment, enclosure (1) is conducted in accordance with this instruction prior to all military justice proceedings.

k. NLSO CO

(1) Resources permitting, provide support consistent with this instruction upon request from the cognizant RLSO CO or when directed by CNLSC or a duly appointed representative.

(2) Implement security procedures consistent with this instruction for defense counsel spaces, permanent courtrooms in facilities operated primarily by NLSO personnel or other facilities or spaces as directed by CNLSC or a duly appointed representative. Provide reports of physical and personnel

security for those facilities and/or spaces as necessary to the cognizant RLSO CO.

1. Circuit Military Judge. Coordinate with the cognizant RLSO and NLSO CO as necessary to implement this instruction.

8. Implementation. Deputy Director Code 63, with assistance from CNIC N3AT where practicable, will conduct an independent assessment for each RLSO and Building 58, recommending courthouses and courtrooms for certification to CNLSC as required by this instruction. All waivers granted under the previous instruction for a particular courthouse or courtroom will remain in effect, unless sooner vacated or extended by CNLSC or a duly appointed representative, until that courthouse or courtroom is certified under this instruction.

9. Tiering. Courthouses shall be tiered based on the volume of activity at each courthouse and the security capabilities of the facility. A courtroom, other than a temporary courtroom, within a courthouse shall assume the same tiering level as the courthouse itself, unless otherwise certified. Certification of courthouses will be in accordance with paragraph 14, below. Deputy Director Code 63 should consult with CNIC N3AT and the respective RLSO and NLSO CO when recommending the appropriate tiering level for a courthouse or courtroom. Funding decisions made in response to documented security discrepancies shall be based, in part, on the tiering of courthouses.

a. Tier 1 Courthouse

(1) Optimally, each RLSO should have at least one Tier 1 certified courthouse. Normally, a shared facility will not be designated as a Tier 1 courthouse unless structural modifications have been made to ensure that the designated courthouse spaces are physically segregated from non-courthouse spaces.

(2) Any military justice proceeding, regardless of risk assessment, can be convened within a Tier 1 courthouse.

(3) Tier 1 courthouses shall be the preferred facility for military justice proceedings assessed as high risk.

b. Tier 2 Courthouse

(1) Military justice proceedings assessed up to medium risk can be convened within a Tier 2 courthouse without prior approval from CNLSC or a duly appointed representative.

(2) Use of a Tier 2 courthouse for military justice proceedings assessed as high risk may only be approved by CNLSC.

c. Tier 3 Courthouse. Only military justice proceedings assessed as low risk may be convened within a Tier 3 courthouse.

10. Temporary Courtrooms

a. During facility upgrades and renovations to a RLSO courthouse or courtroom, the courthouse or courtroom shall be designated as a temporary courtroom by CNLSC. The designation shall indicate the appropriate risk level for which the courtroom is assessed based on the recommendation of Deputy Director Code 63 after consultation with CNIC N3AT. Approval must be obtained from CNLSC before convening a military justice proceeding with a higher risk assessment than what the courtroom is certified to convene. The RLSO CO shall consult with Deputy Director Code 63, CNIC N3AT, local judiciary, cognizant Circuit Military Judge, the NLSO CO, and their respective RSO or ISO, when appropriate, and submit security mitigation measures consistent with this instruction to CNLSC via the CJDON and DCOM-RLSO for approval before any military justice proceeding can be held in a temporary courtroom.

b. For temporary courtrooms expected to be used longer than six months, Deputy Director Code 63, in coordination with CNIC N3AT, should conduct a certification visit in accordance with paragraph 14 below as soon as practicable.

11. Non-NLSC Courtrooms. When it becomes necessary to hold military justice proceedings in non-NLSC courtrooms, the cognizant RLSO CO shall ensure a risk assessment of the facilities and proceedings is completed. For military justice proceedings involving only NLSO personnel (e.g., the U.S. Coast Guard military justice proceedings), the cognizant NLSO CO shall ensure a risk assessment of the facilities and proceedings is completed. Where the proposed mitigating security procedures are deemed to be insufficient, the cognizant RLSO or NLSO CO shall submit a formal notification to CNLSC via Deputy Director

Code 63, the CJDON, and DCOM-RLSO or DCOM-NLSO as soon as possible for further guidance.

12. Minimum Security Requirements. Security requirements under this instruction are classified as courthouse physical security requirements and risk assessment specific security requirements. Courthouse physical security requirements are those minimum security requirements necessary for a facility to be certified within a particular tier of courtrooms. Risk assessment specific security requirements are additional security requirements, over and above the courthouse physical security requirements of the facility (regardless of its tier), that shall be implemented during military justice proceedings assessed as medium or high risk.

a. The minimum courthouse physical security requirements for each tier of Navy courthouse are as follows:

(1) Tier 1. Tier 1 security guidelines shall be applicable at all times to the entire courthouse facility as certified by CNLSC. For Tier 1 courthouses located in a shared facility, these security guidelines shall be applicable to only those spaces certified by CNLSC.

(a) Courthouse Access

1. Designated entry control points (ECP) shall be used for entering a courthouse.

a. Public ECP. A public ECP shall be designated as the main point of entry to the courthouse. All persons entering through the public ECP, with the exception of identified law enforcement personnel, shall be screened in accordance with this instruction. The public ECP shall be staffed by a minimum of two appropriately trained personnel during normal working hours. Personnel assigned to staff the public ECP shall not be tasked with any other duties while manning entry control points.

b. Restricted ECP. When available, assigned RLSO, NLSO and TRIJUDACT staff may use designated controlled (cipher locks, swipe cards, etc.) restricted ECPs to enter the courthouse. If such personnel choose to enter the courthouse through the Public ECP, they will be subjected to regular screening as specified above.

JUL 25

2. Visitor badges shall be issued to all visiting personnel who present proper government photo identification upon entry to a courthouse. A visitors log shall be maintained at the entry control point. If information is not retrieved from the visitor's log by a personal identifier, but by date or time, the log is not a "System of Records" under the Privacy Act. In addition, if the visitor's log is not kept as part of an information technology system, no privacy impact assessment is required. Visitor badges shall be prominently displayed by visitors at all times. Visitors without proper identification badges may be required to leave the courthouse.

3. The public ECP should be positioned at the main entrance of the building and allow for smooth flow of foot traffic through the metal detection area and, where practicable, should not have a direct line of sight into courtrooms, witness waiting rooms, or trial counsel/defense counsel offices.

4. Placards shall be prominently displayed at the entry control point notifying all personnel that they are subject to search at all times. Those not consenting to a search will not be permitted entry. Placards shall also list prohibited items. Those found to possess such items while in a Navy courthouse may be subject to disciplinary action, removal from the courthouse, or both.

(b) Courthouse Metal Detection Devices. Properly calibrated walk-through metal detectors shall be installed at the public ECP to the courthouse. All personnel, with the exception of identified law enforcement personnel, shall be required to pass through the walk-through metal detectors, and screened, as necessary, with properly tested hand-held metal detectors before entering the courthouse.

1. Responsibility. The courthouse security officer shall ensure metal detection devices are correctly installed, calibrated and operated. NLSC personnel must receive appropriate training before operating and monitoring metal detection devices. Where appropriate, the courthouse security officer may coordinate with the RSO or ISO to assist with metal detection operation and monitoring.

2. Persons with Disabilities. If sufficient space adjacent to the walk-through metal detector permits passage of an assisted walking device (wheel chair, motorized wheel chair, etc.) the individual should bypass the walk-through metal detector and be screened with a hand-held metal detector.

JUL 25

If there is insufficient space adjacent to the walk-through metal detector, an American Disabilities Act-compliant metal detector should be used.

(c) Duress Alarms

1. At a minimum, duress alarms capable of notifying base security shall be installed at the entry control point, at the judge's bench in the respective courtrooms, and in the judges' chambers. Duress alarms shall provide a visual alert to personnel within the courthouse facility and be supplemented with an audio system capable of alerting personnel within the courthouse to the nature of the alarm and to direct personnel movement within the courthouse as necessary to respond to the alarm. Duress alarms may also include an audible alarm to augment the visual alarm. Ideally, duress alarms should directly alert law enforcement without the need for additional RLSO or NLSO security personnel intervention after the alarm is activated. Where installed duress alarms do not directly alert local law enforcement, local RLSO procedures shall include procedures to ensure local law enforcement is immediately notified of the courthouse emergency.

2. All duress alarms and audio systems should be tested at least weekly to ensure connectivity with base security.

(d) Surveillance Systems. A video surveillance system linked to a centralized monitoring area shall be utilized to monitor internal and external courthouse facility spaces. Placards should be prominently displayed near external areas notifying personnel that the area is under video monitoring surveillance. The RLSO CO should coordinate with Deputy Director Code 63, CNIC N3AT and the RSO or ISO as appropriate to determine optimal placement of surveillance systems and monitoring stations.

(e) Firearm Safes. Courthouses shall possess lockable firearm safes within RLSO spaces to facilitate weapon storage as necessary. Firearm safes shall be located in an area that allows for continuous supervision when they are in use. RLSO COs shall implement appropriate measures to ensure that such safes are properly supervised and inspected prior to and following each use. When necessary as part of a specific security plan, firearm safes will be used to store firearms during military justice proceedings assessed as medium or high risk that require a courtroom security officer.

(f) Access Controls. Access control systems, activated by biometric readers, cipher locks, swipe cards, proximity cards, or deadbolts, shall be installed within the courthouse to limit access to sensitive areas, such as judicial chambers, trial and defense counsel spaces, and other locations as appropriate.

(g) Daily Inspections

1. The courthouse security officer will be responsible for ensuring daily security inspections of the courthouse and each courtroom within the courthouse are conducted on regularly scheduled working days prior to opening the courthouse to visitors. Additional security inspections are required prior to reopening the courtroom to visitors after any vacation of the courtroom (e.g., lunch, extended recess), or at any time that the RLSO CO or his designee(s) deem warranted by circumstances.

2. Security inspections of NLSO and local judiciary spaces may be conducted by NLSO and local judiciary personnel respectively. The cognizant NLSO CO and Military Circuit judge shall ensure the results of the inspections are timely reported to the courthouse security officer.

3. RLSO personnel conducting security inspections of NLSO and local judiciary spaces shall announce their presence before inspecting any spaces. Time and circumstances permitting, inspections of areas that include privileged materials require prior consultation with the NLSO CO or cognizant Military Circuit Judge.

(2) Tier 2. Tier 2 security guidelines prescribed in this instruction shall be applicable only to the CNLSC certified courtroom during military justice proceedings, or as otherwise required by the respective RLSO CO.

(a) Courtroom Access. There shall be a single public entry control point to the NLSC certified courtroom. With the exception of law enforcement personnel, all personnel will be required to enter the courtroom through the entry control point. Military judges will have separate access from chambers directly to the bench. The public entry control point should be positioned to allow for smooth flow of foot traffic through the metal detection area and, where practicable, should

not have a direct line of sight into the courtroom, adjacent witness waiting rooms, or trial counsel/defense counsel offices.

(b) Courtroom Metal Detection Devices. Walk-through and hand-held metal detection devices shall be located at the single public entry control point into the courtroom. All personnel, with the exception of law enforcement personnel, shall be screened with appropriate metal detection devices prior to entering the courtroom. The use of properly calibrated metal detection devices shall be in accordance with paragraph 12.a.(1)(b) above.

(c) Duress Alarms

1. At a minimum, duress alarms capable of notifying base security shall be installed at the entry control point, at the judge's bench in the respective courtrooms, and in the judges' chambers. Duress alarms shall provide a visual alert to personnel within the courtroom and RLSO, NLSO and local judiciary assigned to spaces located in close proximity to the courtroom. Duress alarms may also include an audible alarm to augment the visual alarm. Ideally, duress alarms should directly alert law enforcement without the need for additional on-site security personnel intervention after the alarm is activated. Where installed duress alarms do not directly alert local law enforcement, local RLSO procedures shall include procedures to ensure local law enforcement is immediately notified of the courthouse emergency.

2. All duress alarms should be tested at least monthly to ensure connectivity with base security.

(d) Surveillance Systems. Where practicable, video cameras linked to a centralized monitoring area, should be utilized to monitor the internal/external areas of the courtroom. Placards should be prominently displayed near external areas notifying personnel that the area is under video monitoring surveillance. The RLSO CO should coordinate with Deputy Director Code 63, CNIC N3AT and the RSO or ISO as appropriate to determine optimal placement of surveillance systems.

(e) Access Controls. Access control systems, activated by biometric readers, cipher locks, swipe cards, proximity cards, or deadbolt, shall be installed to limit access to the courtroom and adjacent support spaces.

JUL 25

(f) Placards. Placards shall be prominently displayed at the entry control point of the courtroom notifying all personnel that they are subject to search at all times. Those not consenting to a search will not be permitted entry into the courtroom. Placards shall also list prohibited items. Those found to possess such items while in the courtroom may be subject to disciplinary action, removal from the courtroom, or both.

(g) Inspections. Courtroom security inspections are only required on those days when military justice proceedings are scheduled. The courtroom and designated surrounding area shall be inspected at the beginning of the day prior to opening the courtroom to visitors and prior to reopening the courtroom to visitors after any vacation of the courtroom (e.g., lunch, extended recess), or at any time that the RLSO CO or designee(s) deems warranted by circumstances. Inspections of local judiciary and NLSO spaces shall be in accordance with paragraph 12.a.(1)(g).

(3) Tier 3. Tier 3 security guidelines prescribed in this instruction shall be applicable only to the CNLSC certified courtroom during military justice proceedings, or as otherwise required by the respective RLSO CO. The cognizant RLSO CO may promulgate additional security guidelines for Tier 3 courtrooms consistent with this instruction.

(a) Courtroom Access. There shall be a single public entry control point to the courtroom. The control point should be positioned to allow for smooth flow of foot traffic through the metal detection area and should not have a direct line of sight into the courtroom, adjacent witness waiting rooms, or trial counsel/defense counsel offices.

(b) Metal Detection Devices. Use of hand-held metal detectors may be used in place of walk-through metal detectors to screen all personnel, with the exception of law enforcement personnel, prior to entering the courtroom through the public entry control point.

(c) Duress Alarms

1. Duress alarms capable of directly or indirectly notifying base security shall be installed at the judge's bench. Additional duress alarms may be installed at the entry control point to the courtroom and in the judges' chambers. Duress alarms shall provide a visual alert to

001 25

personnel within the courtroom as well as RLSO, NLSO and local judiciary personnel assigned to spaces located in close proximity to the courtroom. Duress alarms may also include an audible alarm to augment the visual alarm. Ideally, duress alarms should directly alert local law enforcement without the need for additional RLSO or NLSO security personnel intervention after the alarm is activated. Where installed duress alarms do not directly alert local law enforcement, local RLSO procedures shall include procedures to ensure local law enforcement is immediately notified of the courthouse emergency.

2. All duress alarms should be tested at least quarterly to ensure connectivity with base security.

(d) Placards. Placards shall be prominently displayed at the entry control point of the courtroom notifying all personnel that they are subject to search at all times. Those not consenting to a search will not be permitted entry into the courtroom. Placards shall also list prohibited items. Those found to possess such items while in the courtroom may be subject to disciplinary action, removal from the courtroom, or both.

(e) Inspections. Courtroom area security sweeps are only required on those days when military justice proceedings are scheduled. The courtroom and designated surrounding area shall be inspected at the beginning of the day prior to opening the courtroom to visitors and prior to reopening the courtroom to visitors after any vacation of the courtroom (e.g., lunch, extended recess), or at any time that the RLSO CO or his designee(s) deems warranted by circumstances. Inspections of local judiciary and NLSO spaces shall be in accordance with paragraph 12.a.(1)(g).

b. The risk assessment specific security requirements for high risk and medium risk military justice proceedings are as follows:

(1) High Risk

(a) Security Plan. The cognizant RLSO CO shall submit a written security plan that identifies potential threats, security vulnerabilities, and mitigating efforts to CNLSC via the CJDON, and DCOM-RLSO prior to the initial military justice proceeding in a case. Likewise, the RLSO CO shall also submit a written security plan when the initial risk assessment of a subsequent military justice proceeding is later reassessed

to be high risk. A copy of the plan shall be provided to the Circuit Military Judge or detailed military judge, NLSO CO, trial counsel, defense counsel, civilian counsel and any other persons as determined by the RLSO CO.

(b) Courtroom Security Officers. At least two courtroom security officers capable of deterring, detecting and defeating threats directed towards the presiding military judge and personnel within the courtroom shall be present for all military justice proceedings. The RLSO CO should consult with their respective RSO/ISO, and NCIS SAC for assistance as appropriate.

(c) Secondary Screening. In Tier 1 courthouses, a secondary public entry control point shall be situated outside of the courtroom. All persons, with the exception of identified law enforcement, courtroom security personnel, assigned trial and defense counsel and assigned TRIJUDACT staff, entering the courtroom through the public entry control point shall be rescreened prior to entering the courtroom. The control point should be positioned to allow for smooth flow of foot traffic through the metal detection area and should not have a direct line of sight into the courtroom or adjacent witness waiting rooms, or trial counsel/defense counsel offices.

(d) Metal Detection Devices. All personnel, with the exception of identified law enforcement, courtroom security personnel, assigned trial and defense counsel and assigned TRIJUDACT staff, shall be screened with a hand-held metal detection device prior to entering the designated courtroom.

(2) Medium Risk

(a) Security Plan. Courthouse security officers shall ensure that a written security plan that identifies potential threats, security vulnerabilities, and mitigating efforts is submitted to the respective RLSO CO prior to the initial military justice proceeding. Likewise, courthouse security officers shall ensure that a written security plan is submitted when the initial risk assessment of a subsequent military justice proceeding is later reassessed to be medium risk. A copy of the plan shall be provided to the Circuit Military Judge or detailed military judge, NLSO CO, trial counsel, defense counsel, civilian counsel and any other persons as determined by the RLSO CO.

(b) Courtroom Security Officer. At least one courtroom security officer capable of deterring, detecting and defeating threats directed towards the presiding military judge and personnel within the courtroom shall be present for all military justice proceedings. RLSO CO should consult with their respective RSO, ISO, and NCIS SAC for assistance as appropriate.

13. Courthouse Design Guidelines. Reference (a) provides optimal design criteria for U.S. District Courthouses. These criteria provide the framework around which Navy courthouses and courtrooms should be designed as well. Guidelines contained within this paragraph are not requirements, but should be treated as such in order to drive future designs and resource allocation to ensure Navy courthouses and courtrooms are optimally designed to detect, deter and defeat internal threats to courthouse personnel, while remaining consistent with configuration needed to facilitate the fair disposition of criminal proceedings and to detect and deter external threats to the courthouse. The cognizant RLSO CO shall establish local security mitigation measures where facility limitations do not allow for these guidelines to be incorporated.

a. Courtroom and Support Spaces Design Guidelines

(1) Judge's Bench. Optimally, the judge's bench should be elevated as compared to the remainder of the courtroom surroundings, be positioned so as to provide the judge with his or her own access to the courtroom, and be located a safe distance from counsel tables.

(2) Court Reporter. The court reporter shall be positioned adjacent to or in front of the judge's bench and a safe distance from counsel tables and testifying witnesses.

(3) Bailiff. Where possible and while a judicial proceeding is in session, the bailiff should be at such a position as to be able to step between the accused and the testifying witnesses and military judge, if necessary, but otherwise at no time blocking the accused's, counsel, members' or military judge's line of sight to witnesses. The bailiff shall be subordinate to the direction of the military judge and will act accordingly. When resources permit, NLSC personnel or local security forces should be utilized for medium and high risk military justice proceedings.

(4) Members' Box. The members' box should be positioned so as to provide the members with a separate

ingress/egress to the courtroom from the general public and participants.

(5) Trial/Defense Counsel Tables. Counsel tables should be positioned at a safe distance from the judge's bench and witness box.

(6) Gallery. The gallery should be positioned to face the judge's bench. Permanent seating, secured to the deck or attached together, is preferred to prevent the use of temporary/removable seating as weapons or projectiles.

(7) Accused. The right of the accused to a fair trial is paramount. The mere presence of security measures, such as restraints, may indicate to a member that the person is dangerous, which in turn may deprive the accused of a fair trial. Notwithstanding these concerns, security needs as delineated in reference (c) may mandate that the accused be restrained in the event the accused exhibits a threat to safety in the courthouse. The military judge exercises the authority to restrain the accused as appropriate, pursuant to Rules 801 & 804, Rules for Courts-Martial. Even when necessary, care should be exercised in choice of restraint of the accused to minimize any implication adverse to the accused. For example, leg shackles might adequately restrain, but should be obscured from the members by draping counsel tables.

b. Courthouse Support Spaces Guidelines

(1) Judge's Chambers

(a) Duress Alarm. Judicial chambers should be equipped with functioning duress alarms, which automatically notify base security and the remainder of the courthouse facility, of an emergency in the chambers.

(b) Chambers Location. Judicial chambers should be located in an area of controlled access not directly available to non-staff members within the courthouse.

(2) Members' Deliberation Room. The deliberation room should be soundproof and have a separate ingress/egress access to the courtroom.

(3) Trial/Defense Counsel Offices. Trial and defense counsel offices should be located in an area of controlled access not directly available to non-staff members within the

JUL 25

courthouse. In shared facilities, trial and defense counsel offices should have access to separate heads within their respective RLSO or NLSO designated office space that are not directly accessible by other tenants or visitors within the shared facility. Where defense counsel spaces are located within the CNLSC designated courthouse, the RLSO CO will normally be responsible for the security of those spaces, unless agreed upon otherwise by the respective RLSO and NLSO CO. Where defense counsel spaces are not located within the CNLSC designated courthouse, the NLSO CO will normally be responsible for the security of those spaces, unless agreed upon otherwise by the respective RLSO and NLSO CO. Inspections of trial and defense counsel spaces shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph 12.

(4) Witness Waiting Areas. Separate waiting area rooms for both prosecution and defense witnesses should be provided. Access from the waiting areas to the courtroom should be as short and direct as possible. Where facility limitations do not allow for separate prosecution and defense witness waiting areas, the respective RLSO CO should establish additional security procedures and mitigation measures to properly segregate government and defense witnesses.

(5) Heads. Separate facilities should be designated for the military judge and members, such that they are non-accessible to the public. Where possible, heads intended for use by court participants and spectators should be located within the certified courthouse and courtroom area to avoid the need for exiting and re-entry through the entry control point. Where facilities limitations do not allow for separate heads, the RLSO CO should establish additional security procedures and mitigation measures to properly segregate personnel associated with a particular military justice proceeding. All heads within the courthouse must contain posted warnings against discussing judicial proceedings.

(6) Ground Floor Spaces. Windows on the ground floor of the courthouse should remain locked at all times, except when the occupant of a ground floor office is physically within the space. Where security assessments have determined a need, window grating or intrusion detection systems shall also be installed.

14. Certification

a. Tier 1 and Tier 2 Courthouses. CNLSC shall certify Tier 1 and Tier 2 courthouses and courtrooms annually. A certification will remain effective for 18 months unless sooner vacated or extended by CNLSC. Certification will be based on an annual, independent, on-site assessment performed by Deputy Director Code 63 with assistance as necessary from CNIC N3AT. The assessment shall specify any deviations from or areas of non-compliance with this instruction. The respective RLSO and NLSO CO and the cognizant Circuit Military Judge will be briefed at the conclusion of the assessment and given seven (7) days to comment on the report before the report is forwarded via the CJDON and DCOM-RLSO (and DCOM-NLSO, when appropriate) to CNLSC for certification. For certification of Building 58 of the Washington Navy Yard, the AJAG (Military Justice) shall fulfill the responsibility of an otherwise cognizant RLSO CO; and the Chief Judge, NMCCA shall fulfill the responsibility of an otherwise cognizant Circuit Military Judge. Unless otherwise noted, certification will be deemed a waiver of specific deviations or areas of non-compliance that are identified in the annual assessment.

b. Tier 3 Courthouses. Tier 3 courthouses will not be certified by CNLSC. The cognizant RLSO CO will submit security mitigation measures consistent with this instruction annually via the CJDON to DCOM-RLSO for review. A copy of such measures will be provided to the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and NLSO CO. Upon request, Deputy Director Code 63 can perform an assessment of Tier 3 courtrooms in conjunction with the annual on-site assessment of Tier 1 and Tier 2 courthouses and courtrooms.

c. Temporary Courtrooms. CNLSC shall designate temporary courtrooms as necessary. A designation will remain effective for 18 months unless sooner vacated or extended by CNLSC. Designation will be based on an independent, on-site assessment, performed by Deputy Director Code 63 with assistance as necessary from CNIC N3AT when required. The cognizant RLSO CO and Circuit Military Judge will be briefed at the conclusion of the assessment and given seven (7) days to comment on the report before the report is forwarded via the CJDON and DCOM-RLSO to CNLSC for designation.

d. Non-NLSC Courtrooms. Non-NLSC courtrooms will not be certified by CNLSC. Additional security measures consistent with this instruction shall be implemented as necessary.

15. Local Assessments and Reporting Requirements

a. Local Assessments

(1) System Operability Checks. The courthouse security officer shall verify courthouse security systems operability in accordance with this instruction.

(2) Drills. The courthouse security officer shall conduct frequent notice and no-notice drills to test the security procedures and equipment of the courthouse, and to ensure all hands know their respective roles in case of a security emergency. Coordination is necessary with the respective NLSO CO and members of the judiciary when conducting drills, especially when conducting no-notice drills. At a minimum the courthouse security officer shall conduct one security drill per quarter for each courthouse or courtroom within the respective area of responsibility. Drills will be as realistic as possible; however, safety is of paramount concern and appropriate safety controls will be in place at all times during all drills.

(3) After-Action Reports (AAR). The courthouse security officer shall document and maintain results of drills within AARs. AARs are subject to review as part of the annual certification process.

b. Reporting Requirements

(1) Tier 1 and Tier 2 Courthouses and Temporary Courtrooms. RLSO CO shall provide a quarterly report to DCOM-RLSO via the Deputy Director Code 63 for all Tier 1 and Tier 2 courthouses and temporary courtrooms within the respective RLSO's area of responsibility. The report should include the status of all courthouse security equipment and the results of any drills conducted during the time period. A copy shall be provided to the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and NLSO CO.

(3) Tier 3 Courtrooms. RLSO CO shall provide an annual report to DCOM-RLSO via the Deputy Director Code 63 for all Tier 3 courtrooms within the respective RLSO's area of responsibility. The report should include the status of all courtroom security equipment and the results of any drills

conducted during the time period. A copy shall be provided to the cognizant Circuit Military Judge and NLSO CO. The report may be submitted in conjunction with the annual assessment visit.

16. Waivers


a. Certification Waivers. Where resources or facility limitations prevent compliance with this instruction, the annual independent on-site assessment shall note these limitations and identify appropriate mitigation measures as necessary. Any deviation or area of non-compliance with this instruction specifically noted in the CNLSC certification will be deemed waived. RLSO CO will not be required to submit any additional requests for waivers for deviations or area non-compliance with this instruction that have been waived by certification.

b. Conditional Waivers. Where resources or facility limitations that were not identified during the annual certification assessment prevent compliance with this instruction, the cognizant RLSO CO shall request a conditional waiver, in writing, from CNLSC, or a duly appointed representative, to continue operations in lieu of the deficiency. The conditional waiver shall be submitted on command letterhead and signed by the commanding officer. Conditional waivers will be submitted via the cognizant Circuit Military Judge, CJDON, Deputy Director Code 63, and DCOM-RLSO to CNLSC, or a duly appointed representative, as expeditiously as possible. Conditional waivers shall describe the deficiency, explain the command's efforts to develop a suitable alternative solution to mitigate risk, delineate a plan to correct the deficiency, and provide a projected completion date to correct the deficiency. CNLSC or the duly appointed representative shall act upon a conditional waiver request within 72 hours of submission.

c. Situational Waivers. Where situations not contemplated by this instruction arise, the cognizant RLSO CO shall request a situational waiver from CNLSC, or a duly appointed representative, in accordance with the procedures described in paragraph 16.b. above. Situational waivers shall identify the special circumstances requiring deviation from this instruction, provide a risk assessment of the associated military justice proceedings and propose security measures to mitigate the relative risk associated with the proceeding. CNLSC or the duly appointed representative shall act upon a situational waiver request within 72 hours of submission.



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**MILITARY JUSTICE PROCEEDING
RISK ASSESSMENT FORM**

To be completed prior to the initial military justice proceeding of a case or where changes in circumstances require a reassessment of the relative risk of subsequent military justice proceeding.

This risk assessment shall apply to all subsequent military justice proceedings of a case unless changes in circumstances require a reassessment of the relative risk.

All parties, to include assigned trial counsel, assigned defense counsel, cognizant military judge, the convening authority and NLSO CO will be provided a copy of the risk assessment form. Military justice proceedings assessed as medium or high risk will be forwarded to the cognizant NCIS Special Agent in Charge.

The factors are intended to aid the RLSO CO in determining the relative risk of a particular military justice proceeding. There is no obligation to obtain all of the information on the risk assessment form. However, the absence or presence of such information can be used by the RLSO CO in assessing the relative risk.

Low Risk- the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as **unlikely**. An assessment of low risk does not mean a violent or disruptive act will not occur, but that a violent or disruptive situation is **not reasonably anticipated**.

Medium Risk- the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as **possible** and merits the implementation of additional security measures. An assessment of medium risk does not mean that a violent or disruptive act will occur, but that a violent or disruptive act **might be expected**.

High Risk- the potential for violence or other types of disruption in and around the courthouse is assessed as **reasonably foreseeable** and merits additional security measures. An assessment of high risk does not mean a violent or disruptive act will occur, but that a violent or disruptive act **could reasonably be expected even with the implementation of additional security measures**.

JUL 25

**MILITARY JUSTICE PROCEEDING
RISK ASSESSMENT FORM**

U.S. v. _____

Charges: _____

Will victim, witness or family members be present during proceedings? Y/N _____

List any known mental, physical or criminal history of the accused, victim, witnesses, family members or other parties with a direct or indirect interest in the proceedings.

The accused's CO's overall assessment of risk to personnel or facilities. _____

Expected level of media/community impact or interest?

Any other facts or circumstances known to the RLSO CO that would assist in assessing the relative risk associated with the military justice proceeding. _____

RLSO CO's recommended risk assessment:

High	Medium	Low
Approved by: _____		RLSO CO
Reviewed by: _____		TC
_____		DC
_____		MJ
_____		Convening Authority
_____		NCIS SAC
_____		CSO

JUL 25

**MILITARY JUSTICE PROCEEDING
RISK ASSESSMENT FORM**

U.S. v. _____

Risk Assessment:

High

Medium

Low

Personal Information	
Accused Name	_____
Rank	_____
Yrs Svc	_____
Charges	_____

If known:	
Criminal history	_____
Mental history	_____

Interested Parties	
Victim(s)	_____
Family Members	_____

Command	_____
Media	_____

If known:	
Criminal history	_____
Mental history	_____

Commanding Officer of Accused overall assessment:

Additional matters for consideration:

Initial Risk Assessment

Approved by: _____
 Reviewed by: _____

RLSO CO
 TC
 DC
 MJ
 Convening Authority
 NCIS SAC (Medium/High risk only)
 CSO (Medium/High risk only)

Reassessment (if needed)

Requested by: _____
 Approved by: _____
 Reviewed by: _____

RLSO CO
 TC
 DC
 MJ
 Convening Authority
 NCIS SAC (Medium/High risk only)
 CSO (Medium/High risk only)